Streetwise Professor

April 21, 2010

Will Somebody Please Call Bullshit on Gensler?

Filed under: Derivatives,Economics,Exchanges,Financial crisis,Politics — The Professor @ 8:24 pm

So I don’t have to?  Because it’s getting tiresome.

But it has to be done, so here goes.

Jeremiah’s latest gurgling appears on the oped page of today’s WSJ.  It starts with a non-sequitur, and careens downhill from there.  Gensler tells a story about his role in the LTCM situation, and then claims that to prevent a recurrence, or a repeat of AIG, it is necessary to reduce the “cancerous interconnections” (Jeremiah Recycled Bad Metaphor Alert!) in the financial system by, you guessed it, mandatory clearing.

Look.  This is very basic.  Do I have to repeat it?  CLEARING DOES NOT ELIMINATE INTERCONNECTIONS AMONG FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.  At most, it reconfigures the topology of the network of interconnections.  Anyone who argues otherwise is not competent to weigh in on the subject, let alone to have regulatory responsibility over a vastly expanded clearing system.  At most you can argue that the interconnections in a cleared system are better in some ways than the interconnections in the current OTC structure.  But Gensler doesn’t do that.   He just makes unsupported assertion after unsupported assertion.

If you have any doubts about how interconnected a clearing system is with the banks, just look in detail at what happened on 19-20 October, 1987.

Don’t believe me?  Then consider what Ben Bernanke wrote as an academic in his “Clearing and Settlement During the Crash” (3 Rev. Financial Stud. 1990 at 133):

A prominent part of the institutional structure is the interconnection of the clearing and settlement systems with the banking system.  This interconnection exists at several points.  First, banks are operationally a part of the clearing process. Clearinghouses typically maintain accounts at a number of “clearing banks. Member FCMs are required to maintain an account at a minimum of one of these banks and to authorize the bank to make debits or credits to the account in accord with the clearinghouse’s instructions. This facilitates the settling of accounts and the making of margin calls. Note that the bank’s role may exceed simple accounting if, for example, it must decide whether to permit an overdraft on an FCM’s account.

Second, banks are a major source of credit, especially very short-term credit, to all of the parties, including the customers, the FCMs, and the clearinghouse itself. As was noted above, bank letters of credit can in some cases be used as initial margin. Customers and FCMs often rely on bank credit to facilitate the speedy posting of variation margin, and FCMs would typically have to turn to banks to finance payments made necessary by customers’ defaults or slow payment. In equity markets, banks are often the ultimate source of credit for the purchase of securities on credit.

Finally, it should be noted that while, in the conventional language, most margin postings and settlement payments are made in “cash,” these transactions are, of course, not really made in cash but by the transfer of bank deposits. Thus, the smooth operation of the financial market clearing and settlement system is based at all times on the presumption that the banking system is sound and can satisfy demands for withdrawals of funds.

“A prominent part of the institutional structure is the interconnection of the clearing and settlement systems with the banking system.”  Does it get any clearer?  (No pun intended.)

Ben, would you please drop the “Gentle Ben” demeanor and slap some sense into Gensler?  You actually know something about the subject.  You’re a former educator.  And somebody needs some educatin’.

And consider the implications of a dramatic increase in the scope of the clearing system, including the clearing of many products with unique tail/jump to default risks that have not been cleared before, on the magnitude of the interdependence between the clearing system and the banking and payment systems.  The potential for operational and financial gridlock in the face of a substantial price shock will be greatly amplified if clearing is greatly expanded.

Bernanke goes on to argue that the systemic centrality of the clearing system means that it is highly desirable for the Fed to serve as the “insurer of last resort” to prevent the failure of a clearinghouse or clearinghouses.  So much for Gensler’s assertion that clearing would “greatly reduce . . . the need for future bailouts.”

This is very serious business.  Very serious.  It deserves serious consideration of the real implications of the effects of a vast expansion of clearing.  That consideration must be predicated on an understanding of the real interconnections inherent in a clearing system, not on unsupported and unsupportable denials of the existence of such interconnections.

If the basis for the policies Gensler advocates, and which Congress seems hell-bent on implementing, is a belief that clearing does not entail an intricate web of interconnections (and potentially fragile interconnections) among financial firms, then they are policies built on lies.  And all that a policy based on lies will do is sow the seeds for the next crisis.

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1 Comment »

  1. Central clearing works well for instruments which the marketplace can reasonably ascribe a value to. Once a value is reasonably ascribed to the instrument, the clearinghouse then assesses a reasonable liquidation value (not market value) for one trading day forward and requires the parties to supply sufficient financial guarantees to meet the change in liquidation value one day forward. The financial guarantees of the clearinghouse itself are sufficient only to meet default of a counterparty (or a series of counterparties) on one day liquidation value variation.

    Plain and simply, many derivatives contracts are of sufficient complexity that the market cannot (and does not) reasonably ascribe a value to them. Rather, various parties rely on proprietary models to value the instruments. If I believe my model is better then yours, I will enter into a trade. We will see when happens as time goes by and, most likely, we will see just how wrong one of us was at valuing the instrument at issue.

    Ascribing a value to a bushel of wheat, an ounce of gold or a barrel of oil is a rather mundane process. The establishment of a clearinghouse to facilitate trading of these instruments makes financial sense for the parties involved and for the marketplace as a whole. It is sheer insanity to force instruments for which a reasonable value cannot be ascribed into a clearinghouse designed for instruments for which a reasonable value can be easily ascribed. The repricing risks of instruments whose value cannot be easily ascribed are not accounted for in the models currently used by the clearinghouses to determine the liquidation value one day forward of the instrument at issue.

    Only a Congressman could force unaccounted for risk into the clearinghouse structure and then take away arguably the only source of liquidity capable of stabilizing the system once the additional risk strains the clearinghouse safeguards past their designed capabilities. Even my public school education tells me anticipate the train wreck we will be creating by destabilizing the clearinghouse system in the name of stabilizing the marketplace.

    Comment by charles — April 22, 2010 @ 10:23 am

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