Streetwise Professor

May 19, 2018

Step Right Up! See the Amazing Anti-Trump Contortionists Defy the Laws of Anatomy and Reason!

Filed under: Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 4:46 pm

If you’ve been asking yourself where all the carnival barkers and side-show contortionists have gone, wonder no longer! They have joined the elite media and vast swathes of the US bureaucracy, especially intelligence and federal law enforcement.

The examples are uncountable, but two are of particular moment today.  The first relates to Operation Telling the Truth Slowly (Very Slowly), which relates to a counterintelligence operation mounted against the Trump campaign.  You’ll remember that the original response, 14 months ago, to Trump’s allegation that he had been “wiretapped” was outraged denial.  Said denials no longer being plausible have required massive contortions to create a new narrative.  The barkers at the NYT are promoting the show, based on leaks from US law enforcement and intelligence.   Well, yes, a US intelligence asset located in Britain was sent out to contact Carter Page and George Papadopolous, because of their suspect Russian ties.  Michael Flynn was also targeted because despite his vitriolic anti-Russia rhetoric in a book, he shared a table with Putin once at an RT function.

But this wasn’t a campaign directed at the Trump campaign! Oh–quite to the contrary! According to the whatever-is-worse-than-execrable-and-then-whatever-is-worse-than-that James Clapper, with the WaPo serving as chief barker now, this was intended to PROTECT Trump from insidious Russian influences.  Which of course had to be accomplished by never telling him that his hangers on were being investigated.

There is widespread speculation about who the individual pointed at Page and Papadopolous was.  The Republicans in Congress are demanding to know the name, which has sent the deep staters and their barkers (e.g., Ben Witless, I mean Wittes) into paroxysms of rage.  Krugman went so far as to assert that demanding the revelation of this name is treason.

Um, the NYT article has released leaked information about just about everything about the guy but his shoe size.  (That’s probably tomorrow’s exclusive.) . Certainly every intelligence agency in the world from whom we would want to protect his identity already knows who he is–and did so probably even before the leaks.  So it is beyond superfluous to conceal his identity–except to buy the FBI and CIA and others some time and perhaps the chance to cover their sorry asses.

I actually take comfort in their rage.  It means they are very, very afraid.

What is interesting is Carter Page’s silence.  All he has to say is: “I met the following people”–and let the frenzy begin!  He wouldn’t be disclosing any intelligence, because he would not represent, nor would he know, who was a US source.  That he remains silent suggests he is scared.

Or of course some intrepid journalist could ask him (perhaps dropping a name like, I dunno, Stefan Halper)!

I know.  I’m so droll.

One last thing on this.  The conventional reporting, especially on the pro-Trump side, is that there was a spy in the campaign.  This is misleading (based on what we know) and they should stop saying so NOW to avoid providing a convenient straw man for the anti-Trumpers to knock down.

I think what happened is more analogous to The Sting, or another classic con.  Someone was sent to set up a mark.  In this case, the marks were Page and Papadopolous,  After they were set up, they could serve as a pretext to mount a counterintelligence operation that wormed into the Trump campaign via their communications, and the communications of everyone they communicated with.

The second contortion act, involves yesterday’s meeting between Merkel and Putin.  Now,  non-contortionists with a modicum of sense of shame and intellectual consistency would blast her for meeting with their alleged arch enemy, whom they claim happens to be the root of all evil in the world.  But, what is clear is that despite all of their ravings about Putin as part of their jeremiads against Trump, that in their minds Trump is the arch enemy and the root of all evil in the world.   Putin is just a convenient stick to beat him with, and when that stick doesn’t work, they will pick up another.

But instead she is being lionized, and being credited for reasonably working with Putin to oppose Trump’s anti-Putin measures (such as threatening to block Nord Stream) and Trump’s move on the Iran deal.  FFS, if Trump had met with Putin the anti-Trump lot would be barking that  it is because he was selling out the West, and that he is the equivalent of the South Seas Cannibal.  Merkel is making cooing noises at Russia and Putin–primarily out of her narcissistic pique at Trump–and saying how important it is for Germany to have a good relationship with Russia.

Merkel says to applause that good relations with Russia are important to Germany.  Which is exactly what Trump has said about Russia and the US–only to have this thrown back in his face as evidence of his being Putin’s pawn.

If Trump said or did any of these things the barkers would be screaming. SELLOUT.  TRAITOR. COLLUSION. IMPEACH HIM–THEN BURN HIM AT THE STAKE!

And tell me: how is Making America Great Again anti-western?   If anything, it is a muscular assertion of Western primacy by a Gulliver who is unwilling to be tied down by Europutians.  I would argue that in fact, Germany is far less part of the West than the US, and has been since before Arminius slaughtered three Roman legions in the Teuteborg Forest.  (I may well write a post on this.  Suffice it to say that German thought has always been decidedly opposed to Anglo-Saxon, French, and Italian thought, and two world wars show exactly how and why.) Meaning that making America great again is far more pro-Western than Making the EU Great ever will be, given that it is a crypto-socialist Trojan Horse for German ambitions.

I also note that Merkel is–get this–reaching out to Xi as an ally on free trade.

No, really.

This is such utter bullshit that even my 800 SAT score scatalogical vocabulary is utterly inadequate to do it justice.  Yet all of the carnival barkers not only eat it up, they regurgitate it.  (This also happened in spades at Davos.)

So we see why all the contortions are necessary.  Every argument must be bent and twisted and contorted in order to support the anti-Trump crusade, even though doing so violates the rules of logic, the rules of evidence, and basic human decency.

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May 17, 2018

Rosneft: The Farce Continues

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Energy,Russia — The Professor @ 7:22 pm

Remember when the Russian government said it was going to privatize a piece of Rosneft? Hahahaha. That is so 2016–please try to keep up!  In its announcement of “Rosneft 2022” the company proposes to buy back about $2 billion in shares, which is just about 20 percent of the piece sold off in 2016–no, wait–2017–no, wait–2018.  Adding even more hilarity is that the buyback plan was apparently at the insistence of Qatar, the last buyer standing which agreed to buy most of the shares initially privatized, much to the relief of the banks (Intesa and unnamed Russian ones) who were wearing a big piece of the risk.

I’m guessing that this was one of the terms Qatar laid down to absorb the entire hand-me-down stake for the original 2016 price, even though in Euro terms Rosneft’s shares are substantially lower today (despite a rallying oil price!)

Quite the vote of confidence there, eh?  Well, not that that’s surprising.  The conspicuous failure of any Chinese buyer to step into the shoes of disgraced CEFC tells you just how much confidence Rosneft inspires these days.

I am hard pressed to recall such a farcical series of events involving a major company.  If this one of  Russia’s state champions, just think of the shape the palookas are in!

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Today’s Adventures in Trumpland

Filed under: Economics,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 6:38 pm

The WSJ reports that the Trump administration has told Germany that the US would restart talks on a trade deal with Europe if Germany pulls the plug on support for the Gazprom-led Nord Stream project.  I find the linkage rather odd, but we’re talking the Trump administration here, and moreover, it may well be a brushback pitch after all of the German-led Eurowhining about the US: “Think it’s bad now? Let’s see what it’s like when I put my mind to it.”

One EU official responded as follows:

“Trump’s strategy seems to be to force us to buy their more expensive gas, but as long as LNG is not competitive, Europe will not agree to some sort of racket and pay extortionate prices,” an EU official said.

I could perhaps take this seriously, were it not for the fact that Germany forces its own citizens to pay “extortionate prices” for power produced by outrageously uncompetitive means as a result of its idiotic energiewende policy.

How extortionate? How uncompetitive? The article claims that US LNG would cost about 20 percent more than Russian gas.  Well, Germans pay approximately 50 percent more for power than the average across the EU, and EU-wide average prices are about double the US average.

In other words, Europe has its own energy extortion racket in place, and doesn’t want to let in any Americans.

The other interesting aspect to this story is that it is yet another example (I’ve lost count of the number) of the alleged Putin pawn Trump taking a major shot at the Russians.  The Russians are not pleased:

The Kremlin shot back immediately as spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the U.S. efforts “a crude effort to hinder an international energy project that has an important role in energy security.”

“The Americans are simply trying crudely to promote their own gas producers,” he said.

All I can say is that if Trump was bought, he sure as hell didn’t stay bought.  Not that any of those who have invested their entire being in the Trump-Russia collusion narrative will bother to notice.

Speaking of the obsessed and delusional, yesterday represented an all time low in the dishonesty of the inveterate Trump haters.  In a meeting with law enforcement officers, Trump called members of the brutal Salvadoran gang MS-13 “animals,” but the media and many politicians widely asserted that he was referring to immigrants as a whole.  If you read the transcript, it is clear that only someone who is deeply and deliberately dishonest could make such an assertion.

The fallback position of these reprobates is that well, MS-13 members are people too, so it is wrong to call them animals.

All right, if that’s what you think–prove it.  Invite a few to move in with you, and you can discuss the nuances of “kill, rape, and control” (“mata, viola, controla“) which just so happens to be the MS-13 motto. (Some say that “rob” is part of the motto too.)  If you’re real nice, they just might honor your request not to bring those icky guns into your house, and will just bring their machetes instead.  After a few verses of Kumbaya, I’m sure that your common humanity will shine through, along with some light illuminating the hole in your neck where your head used to be.

Of course, that will never happen.  Those who are preening and posing would never dare even enter the neighborhoods where MS-13 and similar gangs operate, let alone invite them into their houses.

Further: by defending these beasts, our better thans are condemning decent and innocent people whom they claim to care about to their depredations.

This is the worst kind of moral posing by the worst kind of poseurs.  These are twisted partisan hacks pretending to be moral titans. To let their rank partisanship utterly blind them to the reality of evil, and to ignore those who will have to suffer from that evil, is appalling beyond words.

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May 4, 2018

Stick a Fork In It: It’s Done

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Energy,Russia — The Professor @ 10:02 am

Glencore has just announced that the deal to sell Rosneft shares to CEFC has been terminated.  Furthermore, the QIA-Glencore consortium is being wound up, with virtually all of the shares going to QIA:

The members of the Consortium have agreed to dissolve the Consortium originally put in place in December 2016 for the purposes of acquiring a 19.5% stake in Rosneft and will take direct ownership of the underlying Rosneft shares.  In connection with that, the Consortium has today entered into an agreement to transfer a 14.16% stake in Rosneft to a wholly owned subsidiary of QIA (the “Transaction”) the consideration for which will to be used for the settlement of the Consortium’s liabilities. This agreement will become effective on 7 May 2018.

On completion of the Transaction, the Consortium will be wound up and the margin guarantees provided by Glencore will be terminated.  At that point, Glencore will retain an equity stake in Rosneft shares commensurate with its original equity investment announced in January 2017, which amounts to 0.57%, and QIA will hold an equity stake of 18.93%.

Meaning that in reality, as I noted at the outset of the deal, Glencore was basically a straw buyer–a beard–to provide the appearance of western corporate participation in the deal.

The price is also interesting:

The consideration for the Transaction attributable to Glencore’s interest in the Consortium (being 50% of the consideration for the Transaction) is approximately EUR 3.7 billion.

Well, the original December 2016 price was EUR 10.2 billion, meaning that this price is at a 25 percent discount from the original deal.

Who ate this difference?  Glencore?  I doubt it, but if it did, it would raise huge questions about its disclosures (or lack thereof) at the time of the original deal.  Regardless, this is yet another example of Glencore playing with fire.  What comes after trifecta?

I further note that whereas it was rumored that a Chinese state company would step into the shoes of CEFC, this hasn’t happened.  Yet, anyways.

Some state champion, that Rosneft, eh?

Update.  Some arithmetic.  The sums disclosed by today’s announcement basically indicate that Qatar assumed all but Glencore’s sliver at an amount equal to the original amount of the deal agreed to in December, 2016–including the mystery €2.2 billion which pretty much everybody but me and Ivan Tkachaev at RBC missed.  Qatar originally put up €2.5b, Glencore €.3b, and Intesa €5.2b, which adds up to €8b, or €2.2b short of the announced €10.2b.  The difference apparently came from as yet unnamed Russian banks, this in spite of Putin’s claim that Russian banks would not provide financing for a Rosneft “privatization.”

Today Qatar agreed to pony up €7.4b.  Add to that its original €2.5b and Glencore’s €.3b, and voila!, you have . . . €10.2b.  Miraculous, no?  Everybody remains whole!

Here’s the problem though.  Rosneft has been trading pretty much flat in RUB.  On 9 December, 2016, its share price was 370.8 RUB.  Today, it is 386.75 RUB, about 4 percent higher.  However, the RUB has depreciated about 12 percent against the EUR, going from 65.9707 to 75.155RUB/EUR.  So, in EUR terms, Rosneft is worth about 8.5 percent less than in December, 2016, but Qatar is paying the same price today as was agreed to then.

Why would Qatar do this?  Yes (as Ivan T points out to me) ~€1b is pocket change for the QIA, which has a $320b portfolio.  But still, you don’t get rich by gifting ~10 percent of deals.  So is there a side deal?

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May 2, 2018

When You Play With Fire, Eventually You Get Burned–Even if You are Glencore

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Politics,Regulation,Russia — The Professor @ 6:10 pm

Even by the standards of the commodity business (and the commodity trading business in particular) Glencore is known for its appetite for political and legal risk, and its willingness to deal with sketchy counterparties.  It does so because by taking on these risks, it gets deals at good prices.  But the bigger the appetite, the greater the indigestion when things go wrong.

In the past several weeks, Glencore has hit the going wrong trifecta.

It has a longstanding relationship–including marketing deals and equity investment–with Rusal, entered when the Russian company’s reputation was particularly dubious in the aftermath of the aluminum wars, and its owners were involved serial litigation.

We know what happened to Rusal–it is in dire straits because of US sanctions.  Yes, the Treasury has indicated that it will take Rusal’s case on appeal, but there is no guarantee that it will grant a stay of execution when the appeal process is completed.

Glencore also partnered with very dubious Israeli businessman Daniel Gertler in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  Gertler was sanctioned by the US government in December for a history of corrupt dealings in that country.  Glencore bought out Gertler in 2017.  After the sanctions were imposed, Glencore stopped paying Gertler royalties, but now Gertler is suing for $3 billion in royalties that he claims Glencore owes him.

Also in the DRC, Glencore is in a dispute with the government’s mining company, which claims that a Glencore subsidiary operating in the country is undercapitalized.  This is really a battle over rents: in essence, the government claims that foreign miners (including Glencore) overburden operating subsidiaries with debt in order to reduce dividend payments to the government (which is part owner).  The government has moved to dissolve the Glencore subsidiary.

I don’t know enough to comment on the substance of the various legal disputes in Africa.  But I can say that the risks of such disputes are material, and that they can be very costly.

In some respects, the Glencore political/legal risk strategy is like a short vol trade.  It can be a money printing machine when things go well, but when it goes bad, it goes really bad.

In a way Glencore is lucky.  It can withstand these hits now, having clawed its way back from its near death experience in the fall of 2015.  If these hits had occurred back then, well . . .

In sum, when you play with fire, eventually you are going to get burned.  Even if you are Glencore.

PS. The tumult in the Congo could disrupt cobalt supplies.  This would put pressure on one of my fave targets–Tesla–which is already in a parlous state.  Elon gave a crazed performance at today’s Tesla earnings call.  To me it came off as the meltdown of a narcissist who is facing failure and cannot handle being questioned.

I’ve been biding my time on some additional Tesla posts.  The time may be near!

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May 1, 2018

Rusal: Premature Celebration

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Politics,Regulation,Russia — The Professor @ 9:31 am

Rusal shares rose sharply and aluminum prices fell sharply on the news that the US Treasury had eased sanctions on the company.  The concrete change was an extension in the time granted for those dealing with Deripaska-linked entities to wind down those dealings.  But the market was more encouraged by the Treasury’s statement that the extension was being granted in order to permit it to evaluate Rusal’s petition to be removed from the SDN list.  It is inclusion on that list that sent the company into a downward spiral.

Methinks that the celebration is premature.  Treasury made clear that a stay of execution for Rusal was contingent upon it cutting ties with Deripaska.  Well, just how is that supposed to happen? This is especially the case if any transaction that removes Deripaska from the company not benefit him financially.  Well, then why would he sell?  He would have no incentive to make certain something–the total loss of his investment in Rusal–that is only a possibility now.

Of course, Putin has ways of making this happen, the most pleasant of which would be nationalization without compensation to Deripaska, perhaps followed by a sale to … somebody (more on this below). (Less pleasant ways would involve, say, Chita, or a fall from a great height.)

But if the US were to say that this was sufficient to bring Rusal in from the cold, the entire sanctions regime would be exposed as an incoherent farce.  For the ultimate target of the sanctions is not Deripaska per se, but the government of Russia, for an explicit foreign policy purpose–a “response to the actions and polices of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the purported annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine.”

Deripaska didn’t personally annex Crimea or support insurrection in the Donbas.  The Russian government did.  The idea behind sanctions was to put pressure on those the Russian government (allegedly) cares about in order to change Putin’s policies.  They are an indirect assault on Putin/the Russian government, but an assault on them nonetheless.

So removing Rusal from the SDN list because it had been seized by the Russian government would make no sense based on the purported purpose of the sanctions.  Indeed, under the logic of the sanctions, the current discomfiture of the Russian government, facing as it does the potential unemployment of tens of thousands of workers, should be a feature not a bug. The sanctions were levied under an act whose title refers to “America’s adversaries,” which would be the Russian state, and were intended to punish said adversaries.

Mission accomplished!  Which is precisely why the Russian government is completely rational to view the Treasury announcement “cautiously,” and to view the US signals as “contradictory.”  The Russians would be fools to believe that nationalization and kicking Deripaska to the curb would free Rusal from the mortal threat that sanctions pose.

Perhaps Treasury has viewed the market carnage, and is trying to find a face-saving way out.  But it cannot do so without losing all credibility, and appearing rash, and quite frankly stupid, for failing to understand the ramifications of imposing SDN on Deripaska.  Also, doing so would feed the political fire that Trump is soft on Russia.

Further, who would be willing to take the risk buying Rusal from Deripaska either directly, or indirectly after nationalization?  They would only do so if they had iron clad guarantees from the US government that no further sanctions would be forthcoming.  But the US government is unlikely to give such guarantees, and I doubt that they would be all that reliable in any event.  Analogous to sovereign debt, just what could anyone do if the US were to say: “Sorry.  We changed our mind.”?

Indeed, the Treasury’s signaling of a change of heart indicates just how capricious it can be.  Any potential buyer would only buy at a substantial discount, given this massive uncertainty.  A discount so big that Deripaska or the Russian government would be unlikely to accept.

And who would the buyers be anyways?  Glencore already has a stake in Rusal, and a long history of dealings.  But it is probably particularly reluctant to get crosswise with the US, especially given its vulnerabilities arising from, say, its various African dealings.

The Chinese?  Well, since China is already on the verge of a trade war in the US, and a trade war involving aluminum in particular, they would have to be especially chary about buying out Deripaska.  Such a deal would present the US with a twofer–an ability to shaft both Russia and China.  And perhaps a three-fer: providing support to the US aluminum industry in the bargain (although of course harming aluminum consuming industries, but that hasn’t deterred Trump so far.)

So short of the US going full Emily Litella (and thus demolishing its credibility), it’s hard to see a viable path to freeing Rusal from SDN sanctions.  Meaning: Put away the party hats.  The celebration is premature.

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April 18, 2018

CEFC: The Rise and Fall of a Financial House of Cards

Filed under: China,Commodities,Economics,Russia — The Professor @ 12:34 am

This 1 March article from Caixin–which has since disappeared down the memory hole in China–is a stunning exposé about the ostensible purchaser of a 14.1 percent stake in Rosneft.  It portrays the company as a financial shell game that basically kited trade finance credit to grow like Topsy, and accumulate a collection of assets around the world–many of which it is now unloading.   The company also utilized shadow finance to raise funds via a securities affiliate.  It needed to grow rapidly to generate the financial churn that it used to finance itself. Now it is unraveling because the powers that be in China have, for some reason, decided this will happen–presumably because a forced unwind executed in a highly opaque manner is far preferable to an uncontrolled collapse that was impending.

That Glencore, Qatar, Intessa, Rosneft, and Russian and Chinese banks would agree to sell to such an entity, and/or to lend it money to permit it to purchase the Rosneft stake indicates either a shocking lack of due diligence, or more likely, a desperation to exit the deal and the lack of a more reputable buyer.  Given CEFC’s implosion, and the even more fraught circumstances of government-linked Russian companies, I’d be hard pressed to identify any company that can or will step into CEFC’s shoes.

An even more important issue here is why the Chinese authorities have yanked the reins on CEFC, and hard.  This follows the seizure of Anbang Insurance, and the regulatory pressure on HNA.

My suspicion is that the government realized that CEFC was a house of cards, and the financial strains of the Rosneft acquisition would bring the house tumbling down.  Indeed, it seems that the company was having real difficulties securing the funding, and if it had failed that would have been a major embarrassment to China. But this only raises more important questions, such as, what inferences should be drawn from the government’s intervention?  In particular, what inferences should be drawn about the state of the Chinese financial system?

One possible inference is that the CEFCs and Anbangs are the exceptions, and the government will intervene before they threaten the broader system.  That’s the comforting inference.  The more disturbing inference is that there are many houses of cards in China waiting to fall, and that the government can neither crack down on them all or let any fall, so it intervenes on a just-in-time basis.  This kicks the can down the road, and buys time to attempt to get the leverage in the system somewhat under control.

I say attempt, because this strategy is fraught with moral hazard.  A controlled wind-down cushions the blow for creditors, and the expectation that the government will do this in the future provides little disincentive to cut back on the extension of credit today.  Protecting creditors from the consequences of lending to the likes of CEFC ensures that they will continue to lend to similar companies in the future.  But letting companies fail in a way that imposes big losses on creditors threatens a crisis in the financial system.

I paid attention to CEFC initially because of the Rosneft angle.  But I think a far more important angle is what CEFC’s rise and fall say about the Chinese financial system, and the ability of firms to grow rapidly and to a huge size on the basis of the most dodgy financing mechanisms.  If CEFC is at all representative, the implications for the Chinese financial system are dire.  Which could explain the haste with which the government consigned the story to the memory hole.

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April 10, 2018

What SDN Hath Wrought: How Trump Rocked Not Just Rusal, But Most of Russia

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 8:42 pm

I clearly underestimated the impact that the sanctions imposed on Deripaska, Rusal, and others would have.  The initial reaction Monday by many was to puke everything Russian.  Everything.  The ruble. The overall Russian stock market.  Russian debt.  Every major Russian company.  They all crashed. The carnage was widespread and indiscriminate and extended far beyond those directly targeted.

Rusal was the biggest loser, and extended its losses today.  Overall, its stock price is down almost 55 percent.  Ivan Glasenberg resigned from the board, and just now two Russian non-executive directors also resigned.  The company is clearly toxic/radioactive.  I don’t see it surviving without massive state support, and perhaps nationalization.   But even then . . . who outside of Russia and China will buy its aluminum?  (Note China is already suffering an overcapacity problem in the metal, which US trade restrictions would only make worse.)

I thought I might have misjudged seriously that Potanin would gain at Deripaska’s expense: on Monday Norilsk Nickel was down almost 20 percent, and Potanin was the biggest absolute loser.  Norilsk has since bounced back, and recovered much of its loss: it is now down about 7.5 percent from Friday.  But the “shootout” auction will still be between two gunmen who have been grievously wounded by fire from an unexpected direction.

Many other Russian companies that were pounded yesterday have also bounced back.  Severstal is actually trading above the pre-sanctions-news price.  Rosneft and Novatek have also recovered most of their losses.

Sberbank remains down–down more than 16 percent.  The bank disingenuously stated that the selloff was overdone because its exposure to sanctioned companies represented only 2.5 percent of its assets.  Well, since it is leveraged about 12-to-1, that represents 30 percent of its shareholder equity, which would justify a pretty big selloff.

The ruble remains down.  Indeed, it extended its loss today, and actually experienced a greater percentage decline today (almost 5 percent) than it did Monday (around 3 percent).  Perhaps this reflects the central bank’s statement that it would not intervene in support.  But it does indicate that this is perceived as a Russia-wide shock, and not one limited to a few billionaires and their companies.

The broader selloff, somewhat overdone as it was (as reflected by today’s recovery in many names) suggests a widespread estimation that other shoes will drop, and that billionaires that escaped the first round are still at risk for the Oleg treatment.

This raises the question of how the targets were chosen. Leonid Bershidsky argues that Deripaska and Rusal were targeted because taking Rusal’s aluminum off the market (as is happening, with the LME saying it will not warrant Rusal metal not already in warehouses) would be a much more effective way of supporting the US aluminum industry than selective tariffs.  This does have a certain logic, but if that is the logic, it would speak very poorly of the the US government, for it would imply the masking of a protectionist measure behind an allegedly principled reaction to Russian turpitude. It also doesn’t explain the other targets.

Nor does it explain the non-targets.  Novatek and Timchenko are much more tightly connected to Putin than Deripaska and Rusal. And Novatek LNG competes with US LNG, so there would be a protectionist rationale for hitting it.  Yet Novatek was not subject to SDN treatment, and as noted earlier its stock price has largely rebounded.  Perhaps a journalist friend in Moscow is right that Total’s big investment in it and its Yamal project has given it some immunity.

Similarly, Rosneft and Sechin are much more in the inner sanctum than Deripaska/Rusal.  Yet it too has escaped SDN.  Perhaps the risk of creating an oil shock is too great.

The “perhapses” indicate, however, that the rhyme and reason of the administration’s actions is not obvious.  And perhaps (there’s that word again) that’s what really has the market–and many rich Russians–spooked.  Given the capriciousness of the list, everyone is at risk.

Russia’s official reaction was of course negative, but one voice has been missing: Putin’s.  It’s not quite akin to Stalin, 22 June-3 July, 1941 (when he remained out of sight after the shock of Barbarossa), but it does suggest uncertainty as to how to respond.  Not a B’rer Rabbit reaction, at least not yet.

This uncertainty is no doubt fed by the realization of the vulnerability of the Russian economy to US policy.  I’ve written before that the US could crush Russia like an overripe grape by, for instance, cutting it off from SWIFT or the dollar system altogether.  This shows that it can wreak havoc with far more limited measures.

It’s also interesting that Xi made rather conciliatory remarks yesterday.  A coincidence? Perhaps (again). But Friday’s sanction action shows that Trump can act unpredictably and punishingly.  That likely concentrates minds in Beijing as well as in Moscow.

Whatever the logic of Friday’s thunderbolt, it should put paid to the Trump-is-Putin’s-pawn and Putin-has-something-on-Trump theories.  Indeed, a desire to terminate with prejudice those narratives is as good an explanation for the administration’s action as anything.  Not that reality will interfere with the conspiratorial ravings of those in the Democratic Party and the media and the neocon NeverTrumpers.  They are just too invested and obsessed, and nothing short of a preemptive nuclear strike on Moscow is likely to change that–and even then . . . . And with Trump threatening to attack Syria despite Russian warnings against it, maybe we’ll soon put that theory to the test as well.

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April 8, 2018

Caught in the Crossfire: Oleg Deripaska and Ivan Glasenberg

Filed under: Commodities,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 7:15 pm

On Friday, the US Treasury Department sanctioned several Russian billionaires, commonly but misleadingly referred to as oligarchs. Topping the list was Rusal’s/EN+’s Oleg Deripaska.  Also included were Suleiman Kerimov , Alexey Miller of Gazprom, and Viktor Vekselberg of Renova (which holds a substantial stake in Rusal).

Presumably the intent behind choosing these specific targets, and the sanctions law which led to their selection, is to somehow punish Putin, and to cause him to change his behavior.  The sanctions will probably fail in achieving these objectives, and could actually be a net benefit for Putin.

When it comes to Russian billionaires, there are distinct classes.

There are Putin’s favored billionaires–his buddies like Timchenko and the Rotenbergs (who share St. Petersburg roots with Putin).  To a large extent these figures are billionaires because of Putin–they are beneficiaries of his largesse.  As further evidence of their privileged position, he compensated them through favoritism to offset their losses when they were targeted for sanctions early on.

There are the billionaires Putin hates (or hated).  These are the 90s oligarchs proper, men like Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky, and Gusinsky, who are in exile or dead.

Then there are those billionaires he tolerates, because they steer clear of politics and pony up to pay for Putin pet projects (e.g., the Sochi Olympics).  Deripaska, Vekselberg, and Kerimov are in this category.

Deripaska in particular is hardly a Putin favorite, and at times Oleg has tested Putin’s tolerance–as evidenced by the pen throwing incident at Pikalevo in 2009, where Putin chastised Deripaska publicly, likening him to a cockroach who ran at Putin’s approach.

Punishing this group is unlikely to cause Putin any loss of sleep. And indeed, he may reap some benefits.  The sanctions make these men and their firms more dependent on him and Russian state support–and he can extract a price for this support.  Furthermore, it pays into his narrative of Russia being unfairly targeted by a hostile West (and the US in particular).  Indeed, the peripheral political role of those sanctioned allows Putin to make the colorable claim that the US harbors an animus against Russia and Russians generally: he will therefore be able to claim that this is just another example of American Russophobia.

Perhaps most importantly, Putin has been attempting rather pathetically to get wealthy Russians to repatriate their fortunes: truth be told, the US government is making a more persuasive case for that than anything Putin has done or even could do.  Putin is therefore somewhat in the position of B’rer Rabbit, and the US in the position of B’rer Fox.

All of these factors strongly suggest that the US action is at best symbolic, and perhaps counterproductive.  They certainly are insufficient to induce Putin to ratchet down his confrontation with the US, and may indeed play into his justification for such a confrontation.

Putting motivations and incentives aside, the sanctions will not have much impact–if any–on Russian capabilities to implement Putin’s confrontational strategy.

So again, a flamboyantly symbolic act, with little practical benefit accruing to the US.

This is not to say that the individual targets will not suffer–they will.  It’s just that Putin won’t feel their pain, or will use it to advance his own purposes.

Deripaska’s case is particularly striking.  The sanctions were clearly a surprise: Rusal stock fell 20 percent on the news, which would not have happened had it been anticipated.  [Update: as of Monday morning Central Time, Rusal is down 50 percent, and the company has asked customers to stop payment while it tries to right the business.] Moreover, Rusal/EN+/Deripaska were subjected to the most harsh form of sanctions–Special Designated Nationals (SDN) sanctions.  These are more punishing than those imposed on Rosneft, for instance.  Under SDN, any US person (including corporations) is forbidden to transact with the sanctioned individual or entity.  Moreover, secondary sanctions can be imposed on non-US entities that deal with an SDN target.  US firms can be precluded from dealing with foreign firms subject to secondary sanctions.  This makes it far more risky for non-US firms to cushion the blow against (say) Rusal: such firms may have to make the choice between transacting with US firms (especially banks and other financial institutions) and transacting with Rusal.  Many will likely say: “Lots of luck, Oleg! Been nice doin’ business with ya!”

Topping the list of firms facing this grim choice is Glencore, which has a marketing deal with Rusal through 2018.  This deal was expected to be renewed, except on a smaller scale for 2019 forward.  (On a smaller scale because Rusal has been moving away from selling primary aluminum which Glencore markets to selling value added wire rods, billets, and slabs directly to industrial customers.)  Glencore also owns 8.75 percent of Rusal, which it had announced it will convert into EN+ shares.

Of course one of Glencore’s strategies has always been to go where other companies daren’t.  Its appetite for political risk is clearly much larger than its peers in mining, and even its Swiss commodity trading peers.  But tempting fate with Uncle Sam on sanctions is a different matter, and thus I would consider a renewal of the marketing deal to be unlikely, and Glencore may also be looking to unload its Rusal/EN+ shares, although to whom and at what price are rather difficult questions to answer.  Probably to Russian entities (or a buyback financed by Russian state banks), and perhaps the Chinese, and for a song.

Glencore shares fell modestly on Friday, so the blow is not perceived as being too heavy.  But the company is likely the biggest loser other than Oleg himself.

The grievous blow directed at Deripaska also raises an issue that has not attracted much attention in the US or Europe–the fate of Norilsk Nickel.  Nornickel has been subject of a long running battle for control between Deripaska and Vladamir Potanin.  Roman Abramovich had indicated his intent to sell a block of shares that he had purchased as part of a peace deal between Deripaska and Potanin, and this raised the possibility of a “shootout” auction for the block between the two.

Well, methinks Oleg is plumb out of bullets right now, and so Potanin will prevail.  Which means that even a Russian billionaire can benefit from US sanctions on Russian billionaires.

(Curiously, although Potanin was on the “Forbes List of Potential Sanction Targets” announced earlier this year–as was Deripaska–he was not hammered the way Oleg was.  I have no idea why.)

All in all, there are loser and winners from Friday’s sanctions.  The losers are clearly Deripaska and to a lesser degree a non-Russian (despite the first name!), Ivan Glasenberg. One like winner is a Russian billionaire, and other winners are likely Chinese.

One person who is clearly not a loser, and may even be a winner, is the ostensible target–Vladimir Putin.

So other than throwing a few Russians to the US hounds baying for Russian blood, it’s really hard to see the point of this exercise.  It doesn’t advance American interests in any meaningful way.  Anyone looking for any change in Russian behavior–in Putin’s behavior–in the coming months will almost certainly be disappointed.  This is more another act in the ongoing American political melodrama than a serious policy move.

To alter a saying which Putin is fond of  quoting: the hounds will bay but the caravan–Putin’s caravan–will move on.

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March 27, 2018

CEFC: Everything Must Go! Does that Include Rosneft?

Filed under: China,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 4:11 pm

The bizarre saga of CEFC just keeps getting more bizarre.  Today Bloomberg reports that the company is selling off all its real estate.  All of it: Everything must go!

CEFC China Energy Co., the sprawling conglomerate that’s come under increasing government scrutiny, plans to sell its entire global property portfolio with a book value of more than 20 billion yuan ($3.2 billion), according to people with knowledge of the matter.

Almost 100 properties are up for sale, including its headquarters in an upscale Shanghai neighborhood, four floors of the Hong Kong Convention & Exhibition Centre and a condominium at the Trump World Tower in Manhattan, as well as hotels, residential apartments and industrial facilities, said the people, asking not to be identified because the deliberations haven’t been publicly disclosed. The properties, mostly located in big Chinese cities, include a smattering of developments overseas, the people said.

Where this leaves the deal to buy the 14.1 percent stake in Rosneft from Glencore and the QIA is anybody’s guess.  But it probably doesn’t leave it in a good place.

Rosneft’s guess is probably as good as yours or mine.  They made inquiries, and learned nothing:

Rosneft representatives have since traveled to China but failed to get any update from CEFC on the stake acquisition deal, according to the sources.

“The other party (CEFC) has just vanished,” one source said.

“Just vanished” is not a phrase you normally hear uttered when referring to the purchaser of $9.1 billion in equity!  And definitely not one you want to hear!

(The Reuters piece is horribly and confusingly written, by the way.)

CEFC had apparently already paid out some money on the deal, but it has not closed.  Glencore optimistically asserted that the deal would close in the first half of 2018–which is already half over.  Given all of this uncertainty about CEFC, this looks incredibly unrealistic, but Glencore has not provided any more guidance. Go figure!

The price  CEFC agreed to was never disclosed in full, but was allegedly enough to allow Glencore (and the Russian banks backing it) and Intessa Saopaolo to emerge whole.   Glencore did let on that the price was at a 16 percent premium to the 30 day volume weighted average of the Rosneft price, presumably meaning the 30 day period (business days? Calendar days?) prior on 8 September, 2017.  In August-early September, 2017, Rosneft traded in the $5-$5.25 range, which puts the price in the $5.80-$6.00 ballpark.  That comports with a $9 billion total price for 14.16 percent of Rosneft’s 10,598,177,817 shares, which works out to about $6/share.  The price yesterday was $5.41, so it is clear that CEFC’s position is well under water.   This readily explains why the two Chinese government entities that have taken stakes in CEFC are allegedly reluctant to takeover the company altogether and proceed with the deal: it has already incurred a 10 percent loss.

To make things even more dicey, in January VTB announced it was “ready to” loan CEFC the money to finance the deal.  Presumably some of this money flowed, and is the source of the funds that have already been paid out.

So CEFC is selling off all its property.  Will it try to unload the Rosneft stake too? Or will the deal just collapse, leaving the original parties holding the bag? The deal was touted as a great example of Sino-Russian cooperation.  Will this compel the parties to save face by proceeding, or substituting some other Chinese firm?  Presumably this will require a price adjustment.  Who will eat that?

From day one almost 17 months ago the most bountiful product of the Rosneft privatization was questions.  And they just keep on coming.

 

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