The Dangers of “Reforming” the USMC: Tread Very Carefully
I have often written of my admiration for the United States Marine Corps–all the while acknowledging that I would not be good fit for the Marines đ In particular I admire its culture. It is a true warrior culture that often seems strange to outsiders, who often include even those in other branches of the military. This culture, forged in combat for almost two-and-a-half centuries has allowed the Marines to prevail in virtually every kind of battle (sniping from topmasts; counterinsurgency in Central America, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq; urban warfare; amphibious assault; and even armored drives in the desert) in virtually every possible climate (except Arctic, though the Marines train for that too). This flexibility and adaptability has distinguished the USMC, and perhaps reflects its often precarious status within the US military: it has had to adapt to survive, especially in the battle for defense dollars.
The organization and doctrine of the USMC is also very distinctive and worthy of admiration. The USMC has always been built round the rifleman: “every Marine a rifleman.” As such, its doctrine is based on fire and maneuver, with artillery, armor, and most crucially organic air power (fixed and rotary wing) having the mission of assisting the grunts at the pointy end take and hold ground. As a result, they have been amazingly successful in doing so.
The current Commandant of the USMC, David H. Berger, is pushing a major reorganization and reorientation of the Corps that would radically change it. The motivation for Berger’s revolution is that the US must reorient to confront China. Berger believes that the USMC can best advance that objective by operating in the littorals to direct fires at Chinese naval targets and to provide reconnaissance and screening for the USN and USAF.
To accomplish this mission, Berger believes that armor is irrelevant, and that conventional artillery will play a much diminished role in the Marine’s future. He also believes that the days of amphibious assault are over.
Based on these precepts, Berger would massively overhaul the force. All armor–all–would be eliminated, on the theory that if the Marines need it, they can call on the Army. (Hmmm.) The number of artillery battalions would be slashed. The number of infantry battalions would also be reduced, and the sizes of these battalions would be reduced as well. The Marines would operate many fewer aircraft.
What would be increased under Berger’s plan? Missiles capable of striking enemy ships and land targets from littorals, and anti-aircraft missiles.
Berger would also transform manpower policies, in particular by bringing in specialists in areas such as cyber and giving them rank and assignments based on civilian experience and expertise.
I must admit deep reservations about this vision. I do commend the refocus on fighting China, in the littorals in particular. I also understand that military conservatism can be extremely destructive. Living off past glories and perpetuating past practices risks becoming like the Prussian army that remained wedded to old ways, only to be crushed by Napoleon at Jena.
But I deem the proposal to be extremely risky, and likely ill-advised.
Most importantly, it is a reorganization built on a particular theory of what war will be fought in the future, and how it will be fought. Militaries have always been poor at forecasting the future. Moreover, creating a force that can do one thing gives an enemy the incentive to do something other than what the force is designed to do, which renders it all but ineffective. (Think of the Maginot Line. There are many other examples.)
War is uncertain, and the future of warfare is uncertain–and one’s enemies have incentives to attempt surprises that add to the uncertainty.
In the face of considerable uncertainty, optionality is extremely valuable. The ability to adapt is extremely valuable. A force designed to do one thing offers very little optionality, and is of little utility outside that one thing. Which gives an enemy a reason to do something else.
The Marines have demonstrated the benefits of that optionality for their entire history, and in particularly during the last 35 years. In that time, they have succeeded in armored warfare in the desert, urban warfare in extremely hostile environments, guerrilla warfare in jungles and the Hindu Kush. All because of the adaptability of fire and maneuver to different combat situations, the diverse organic weapons of the USMC, and the peerless training and esprit of Marines of all ranks.
Yes, fighting China in the littorals may be the most likely future conflict. But planning based on the most likely outcome is almost always faulty logic, especially considering that the enemy gets a vote and can avoid fighting the way you are oriented to fight.
Berger’s plans would largely eliminate that optionality. This would deprive the national command authority of the ability to respond flexibly to the predictably unpredictable types of conflicts that will occur in the future–or will not occur, because the US does not have the capability to fight them.
I am also deeply skeptical that modern weaponry has rendered fire and maneuver obsolete. If anything, the Russian experience in Ukraine demonstrates that the inability to execute fire and maneuver is a recipe for military disaster.
The re-engineering of Marine culture is particularly worrisome. It is really the USMC’s secret sauce. It is the product of centuries of evolution and experience. It is an intangible that has led to tangible results from the shores of Iwo Jima to the sands of Tripoli to the Halls of Montezuma and pretty much everywhere else that Marine boots have trod and Marines have bled.
All in all, Berger’s proposal has a very McNamara feel to it. McNamara had some insights and offered some constructive criticism and made some constructive changes, but for the most part his influence was baleful.
Ironically, Berger’s proposal has unleashed a barrage of fire and much maneuvering from myriad critics, including notably every living USMC commandant. The opposition position is well-summarized in a James Webb op-ed, Webb being a USNA grad, Vietnam combat Marine, and ex-SecDef and Senator. A series of essays in Task and Purpose also offers extremely trenchant criticism of Berger’s plan. I found General Van Riper’s essay particularly persuasive, as was the one on Berger’s “talent management” plan, which emphasizes the risk it poses to the Marines’ unique culture.
Of course, military forces have to adapt as technologies and threats change. Optimizing these adaptations is difficult because of the huge uncertainties involved. But it is precisely those uncertainties which make plans based on a narrow conception of future threats and technologies particularly ill-advised. The fire-and-maneuver-based USMC has demonstrated amazing flexibility and adaptability in his storied history. A prudent course would be to determine how to adapt such a force to incorporate a new mission without crippling its ability to execute old ones. Unfortunately, that is not the course that General Berger is setting, and that leaves me very uneasy indeed.