Streetwise Professor

It’s pretty clear that the major agricultural trading firms, notably the ABCDs–ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus–are going through a rough patch of tight margins and low profits.  One common response in any industry facing these conditions is consolidation, and in fact there is a major potential combination in play: ADM approached Bunge about an acquisition..

I am unsatisfied with most of the explanations given.  A widely cited “reason” is that grain and oilseed prices are low due to bumper crops.  Yes, bumper crops and the resulting low prices can be a negative for producers, but it does not explain hard times in the midstream.  Ag traders do not have a natural flat price exposure. They are both buyers and sellers, and care about margin.

Indeed, ceteris paribus, abundant supplies should be a boon to traders.  More supply means they are handling more volume, which is by itself tends to increase revenue, and more volume means that handling capacity is being utilized more fully, which should contribute to firmer margins, which increases revenues even further.

Greg Meyer and Neil Hume have a long piece in the FT about the potential ADM-Bunge deal. Unfortunately, they advance some implausible reasons for the current conditions in the industry. For example, they say: “At the same time, a series of bumper harvests has weakened agricultural traders’ bargaining power with customers in the food industry.” Again, that’s a flat price story, not a spread/margin story.  And again, all else equal, bumper harvests should lead to greater capacity utilization in storage, logistics, transportation, and processing, which would actually serve to increase traders’ bargaining power because they own assets used to make those transformations.

Here’s how I’d narrow down where to look for more convincing explanations. All else equal, compressed margins arise when capacity utilization is low. In a time of relatively high world supply, lower capacity utilization would be attributable to increases in capacity that have outstripped gains in throughput caused by larger crops.  So where is that increased capacity?

There are some hints of better explanations along these lines in the FT article.  One thing it notes is that farmer-owned storage capacity has increased.  This reduces returns on storage assets.  In particular, when farmers have little on-farm storage they must sell their crops soon after harvest, or pay grain merchants to store it.  If they sell their crops, the merchant can exploit the optionality of choosing when to sell: if they store at a local elevator, they pay for the privilege. Either way, the middleman earns money from storage, either in trading profits (from exploiting the timing option inherent in storage) or in storage fees. If farmers can store on-farm, they don’t have to sell right after harvest, and they can exploit the timing options, and don’t have to pay for storage.  Either way, the increased on-farm storage capacity reduces the demand for, and utilization of, merchant-owned storage. This would adversely impact traders’ margins.

The article also mentions “rivals add[ing] to their crop-handling networks.” This would suggest that competitive entry/expansion by other firms (who?) is contributing to the compressed margins.  This would in turn suggest that ABCD margins in earlier years were abnormally high (which attracts entry), or that the costs of these unnamed “rivals” have gone down, allowing them to add capacity profitably even though margins are thinner.

Or maybe it’s that the margins are still healthy where the capacity expansions are taking place. Along those lines, I suspect that there is a geographic component to this. ADM in particular has its biggest asset footprint in North America. Bunge has a big footprint here too, although it also considerable assets in Brazil.  The growth of South America (relative to North America) as a major soybean and corn exporting region, and Russia as a major wheat exporting region, reduce the derived demand for North American handling capacity (although logistical constraints on Russian exports means that Russian export increases won’t match its production increases, and there are bottlenecks in South America too).

This would suggest that the circumstances of the well-known traders that have more of a North American (or western European) asset base are not representative of the profitability of grain trading overall. If that’s the case, consolidation-induced capacity “rationalization” (and that’s a major reason to merge in a stagnant industry) would occur disproportionately in the US, Canada, and western Europe.  This would also suggest that owners of storage and handling facilities in South America and Russia are doing quite well at the same time that owners of such assets in traditional exporting regions are not doing well.

So I am not satisfied with the conventional explanations for the big ag traders’ malaise during a time of plenty. I conjecture that the traditional players have been most impacted by changes in the spatial pattern of production that has reduced the derived demand to use their assets, which are more heavily concentrated in legacy production regions facing increased competition from increased output in newer regions.

Ironically, I’m too capacity constrained to do more than conjecture. But it’s a natural for my Université de Genève students looking for a thesis topic or course paper topic. Hint, hint. Nudge, nudge.

One of the most remarkable events–non-events, actually–of 2017 was the virtual total lack of any official Russian recognition of the centenary of the Bolshevik Revolution.  The dilemma is particularly acute for Vladimir Putin, a proud Chekist–and, of course, the Cheka was the creation of the Revolution, and arguably essential to its survival.

But the Revolution’s legacy–including its anti-religious, anti-nationalist ideology, as well as tens millions of dead and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union–clashes with Putin’s current ideology of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality 2.0.  Hence the low-key (bordering on no-key) recognition of the events of October, 1917.

Last week Putin attempted to square this circle with a truly Orwellian formulation: Communism was Christianity. No–really:

“Maybe I’ll say something that someone might dislike, but that’s the way I see it,” Putin said in an interview for the documentary Valaam, an excerpt of which was broadcast on Russia 1. “First of all, faith has always accompanied us, becoming stronger every time our country, our people, have been through hard times.

“There were those years of militant atheism when priests were eradicated, churches destroyed, but at the same time a new religion was being created. Communist ideology is very similar to Christianity, in fact: freedom, equality, brotherhood, justice – everything is laid out in the Holy Scripture, it’s all there. And the code of the builder of communism? This is sublimation, it’s just such a primitive excerpt from the Bible, nothing new was invented.”

Look, Lenin was put in a mausoleum. How is this different from the relics of saints for Orthodox Christians and just for Christians? When they say that there’s no such tradition in Christianity, well, how come, go to Athos and take a look, there are relics of the saints there, and we have holy relics here,” Putin concluded.

Somebody should look in said mausoleum to see if Lenin is spinning at about 1000 RPM at the the assertion that his creation and ideology were mere sublimations of primitive Christianity.  Ditto Marx’s grave in London.

Make no doubt that Putin is going all in on Orthodoxy: just note his recent frigid dip to celebrate the Epiphany.

Moreover, Putin is being very selective in his commemorations of Russian history. For instance, largely reviled by the Orthodox, Peter the Great is virtually absent. And now we see that he reinterprets the most epochal–and apocalyptic–event in Russian history, a Revolution that was driven by a hatred and rejection of orthodox, nationalist autocracy, as some sort of historical continuity.

This is all quite amazing. Evidently Putin does not believe that he can attack communism, Bolshevism, and Leninism outright, because they resonate with too many people–particular among his political base. But he is acutely aware of the tension between his current crypto-tsarist ideology and the militantly anti-tsarist ideology that dominated Russia for 75 years.  So in a very Soviet way he completely rewrites history to assert that black is really white.

When Putin says “that’s the way I see it” what he really means is: that’s the way Russians are supposed to see it–get with the program. Who are you going to believe, Putin or your lying eyes?

Not long after finishing my immigration post, I came across this article that cracked me up:

Dutch vegan who applied for a Swiss passport has had her application rejected because the locals found her too annoying

Nancy Holten, 42, moved to Switzerland from the Netherlands when she was eight years old and now has children who are Swiss nationals.

However, when she tried to get a Swiss passport for herself, residents of Gipf-Oberfrick in the canton of Aargau rejected her application.

I guess they can’t kick her out, but they can deprive her of citizenship.  (And “Oberfrick”–heh.)

This is an amusing illustration of a broader Swiss principle: who gets to be Swiss depends on their contribution to Switzerland, and their ability to integrate with those already there.  A more serious illustration comes from a recent change in Swiss citizenship law:

On 20 June 2016, the Swiss Parliament voted on the new Swiss Citizenship Act, which will come into force together with the relevant Ordinance on 1 January 2018. The main aim of the new law is to limit the issuance of Swiss citizenship to well-integrated foreign nationals only. Furthermore, the Citizenship Act also aims to harmonise the residence requirements and implement into a law the authorities’ practice. [Emphasis added.]

. . . .

Under current law, the basic requirements to obtain Swiss citizenship can be summarised as follows: a. The applicant must have resided a minimum of 12 years in Switzerland (of which at least three years within the five years prior to the application) and a certain amount of time (usually between two to five years) in a specific canton and in a specific commune prior to being able to apply. Shorter periods apply to certain categories of applicants aged between 10 and 20 years for whom the years spent in Switzerland between their 10th and 20th birthdays count double in the calculation of the 12- year period required at the federal level. b. The applicant must prove that he/she is well integrated in Switzerland. As per the current practice of the Swiss authorities, the following requirements usually need to be fulfilled: the applicant must have a clean criminal record, prove that he/she fulfils all financial obligations, in particular with respect to tax payment, has a good reputation, has a good knowledge of a Swiss national language (i.e. French, German or Italian), has a basic knowledge of Swiss geography and history, and knows how the Swiss political system functions. c. Additional requirements may need to be met according to the respective cantonal and/or communal laws.

. . . .

Only applicants holding a C-type permit (permanent residence permit) may apply for Swiss citizenship (currently, holders of B-type residence permits may also apply). The applicant must have resided a total of 10 years in Switzerland (not 12 years as today). The ordinance to the SCA now details the concept of ‘good integration’. According to the ordinance, an applicant is deemed as being well integrated if he/she:

• has good oral and written language skills in one of the national languages;

• respects the public order and security;

• respects the Swiss federal constitution;

• participates in the economic life or undergoes education, i.e. the applicant is employed or attends a school/university;

• ensures that his/her family members are integrated;

• is not a threat to the internal and external security of Switzerland;

• is familiar with Swiss living conditions.

Applicants with a criminal record or who are dependent on Swiss social welfare will most likely be rejected.

Indeed, regarding the last point, the new law precludes citizenship for those who have been on public assistance in any time in the past three years.

Fortunately, it appears that yodeling is not a requirement!

Note that none of these criteria are based on nation of origin.  There will no doubt be a relationship between the likelihood of meeting these criteria, and whether one emigrates from a s***hole, but the law does not discriminate or create quotas on the basis of national origin (which is likely by itself to be a very crude proxy for ability to contribute, and which is part of US law primarily as the result of ethnic politics).

Certain aspects of the Swiss naturalization system are not practical for the US.  In particular, the role of cantonal and communal authorities in authorizing citizenship (as the Annoying Dutch Vegan found out to her chagrin) is a non-starter here.  This conflicts with the US Constitution, and is at odds with the much greater mobility of Americans vs. Swiss.  But the principle of conditioning citizenship on integration, fluency in a national language, non-dependence on public assistance, lack of a criminal record, etc., is certainly possible in the US, and makes sense.  It is certainly a more rational and sober policy than one that revolves around nauseating pap about “dreamers” and the like: whenever a debate centers on agitprop and euphemisms you know it is fundamentally dishonest and manipulative.

You can’t paint the Swiss as mouth-breathing populist, nationalist wackos: if anything, they are a little too control-freakish for me (and most Americans, I’d wager).  Indeed, the Swiss have been very successful at balancing a deep integration in the world economy and international institutions with a pride in their own national traditions and mores, and a desire to preserve them.  They have avoided many of the problems that somewhat similar nations (notably Sweden and the Netherlands) have experienced with their immigration policies. (There’s nothing like Malmo or Gothenburg or Rotterdam in Switzerland.)  The Swiss have struck a reasonable balance between openness to foreigners and national pride, and are not consumed by the neurotic complexes and self-loathing that have paralyzed many Swedes, Dutch, Germans, etc. (and the governments of these nations).

Switzerland therefore represents a plausible example/role model for a reasoned immigration debate in the US. Yet it is almost never mentioned here.

And it’s not just immigration.  The Swiss health care system has much to recommend it–far more than the dysfunctional system that prevails in the US.  The Swiss model would be a great starting place for a transformation of US healthcare.  I’d prefer an even more market-based system, but politics is the art of the practical, and I realize that my ideal is not gonna happen. But the Swiss model meets many of the goals of the left in a much more efficient way than our current system, and certainly dominates monstrosities like the UK or Canadian systems.

It would be impossible–and indeed, highly objectionable–to try to make the US like Switzerland. For myriad reasons. But there are some things we can take from Switzerland, or should at least consider seriously. Not that I’m holding my breath.

A few comments on ShitholeGate.

First, I dunno if Trump said it. It sounds in character, but the sources for it (being anonymous and/or Dick Durbin) are hardly unimpeachable.

Second, there must be a shortage of fainting couches, smelling salts, and pearls for clutching in DC and media land, given the collective swooning and shock at the thought that a president used a four letter word.

Uhm, LBJ anybody? Nixon?

Third, there are logically coherent and logically incoherent objections to what Trump allegedly said about questioning the wisdom of admitting more people from shitholes than non-shitholes (e.g., Norway–though at one time, my ancestors apparently disagreed!)

The logically coherent objection is: “Yes, these are horrible, abjectly miserable places, which is why we should take in people from them, on humanitarian grounds.”

The logically incoherent objection is: “How dare you call them shitholes! They are wonderful places full of wonderful people! But we are rescuing people from lives of misery by taking in the poor and huddled masses from these places.” If they’re so great, why the intense desire to leave?

Suffice it to say, the logically incoherent objection has been the dominant narrative on the left.

The logically coherent objection creates its own issues: logical coherence is necessary for it to be a reasonable policy position, but by no means sufficient.

One of the issues is: what is the limiting principle? Or is there none?: do you favor no restrictions on immigration whatsoever? If that’s your position–be open about your support for open borders. Don’t try to have it all ways.

If you do favor restrictions, what criteria will you apply for determining who can immigrate to the US? What are the benefits? The costs? What is the incidence of those costs and benefits? Again, be open about it–speaking in gauzy generalities is dishonest, and makes it impossible to evaluate your position.

A related issue is that those who object to, or even have reservations about, open borders or even relatively liberal immigration policy are routinely excoriated as racists and bigots. Yes, some are. But many are not, even though they have a strong preference for traditional American culture which is deeply rooted in European cultures and ethnicity. Do you believe that is a legitimate preference?  If not, do you advocate the rejection of democratic means to decide immigration matters because those with illegitimate views might prevail? Further, African Americans are to a large extent more opposed to immigration than white Americans. Is that due to racism? Or is it a telling indication that the views on immigration also (and arguably primarily) fall along economic/class lines?

This touches upon another element of incoherence in the immigration debate: assimilation. Many (and arguably most, now) advocates of liberal immigration policies are hostile to the notion of assimilation, again imputing racist motives and cultural bigotry to those who believe that current immigrants should assimilate the way that their grandparents and great-grandparents and generations before them did. But hostility to assimilation and hostility to those who favor assimilation means that it’s OK for some (immigrants) to prefer their own culture, ethnicity or race, but it’s not OK for others (the native born) to do so.

This is another variation on the incoherence of identity politics. The most ardent advocates of identity politics scorn intensely those who feel that their identity is threatened by mass immigration, especially mass immigration without assimilation. In the identity politics animal farm, all identities are equal, but some are more equal than others.

Along these lines, it is pretty apparent that the political elites who are most ardent in support of very liberal immigration policies are those who are least likely to be disclocated by large flows of immigrants, and may indeed benefit from it. Those they scorn–many of whom voted for Trump–are the ones most likely to be adversely impacted, either economically or socially/culturally.  Ironic coming from people who are also likely to claim that they favor redistribution in order to reduce economic inequality.

Personally, I confess to some ambivalence on these matters. The libertarian in me favors free movement of people. At the same time, I recognize the Friedman/Richard Epstein point that the welfare state means that immigration is not the result of mutually beneficial bargains entered into without coercion: immigration attracted by the potential to obtain benefits funded by coercive taxation is problematic indeed. (Friedman and Epstein object to the welfare state in large part because it makes unrestricted immigration infeasible.) Furthermore, I understand the importance of social trust and communication and coordination due to shared assumptions and beliefs, and how those can be facilitated by some homogeneity in ideals and culture and background. Relatedly, a democratic polity operating on a principle of consent has to give preference to current citizens.

Immigration has always been a fraught issue in the US, although the intensity of views about it has waxed and waned over time. Our handling of the issue has never been perfect, but I think that (a) the US historically did a better job of it than any country in history (certainly modern history), and (b) we handled immigration best prior to the rise of the welfare state, and when assimilation was a widely shared ideal. Those conditions do not prevail now, which makes me much more cautious, and indeed skeptical, about relatively untrammeled immigration. As a result, I think it’s fair to ask: how many should we accept from where?, and shouldn’t we be more skeptical about mass immigration from countries that are vastly different economically, culturally, and socially?

Some time back I promised a post on Bill Browder. A hectic schedule and the holidays intervened, so though I’d collected loads of material, I didn’t have time to write a post. Events from yesterday–namely the release of the transcript of Fusion GPS head Glenn Simpson’s interview with Congressional investigators–make this timely, so I’ll try to summarize what I have concluded. Oddly, one conclusion is that when it comes to Bill Browder, Simpson and I are of like mind. On other matters no–but even there Simpson’s Browder testimony shows precisely why his opinions on Trump are suspect.

As for Browder, here are my conclusions in somewhat abbreviated form.

First, Browder assiduously cultivates the image that Diogenes’ search for an honest man would have ended had the old Greek met one Bill Browder. But in fact, his honesty, integrity, and scruples are highly questionable indeed.

The essence of the Browder as Hero narrative is that he was a lone crusader for honest business practices in Russia, and that he fought a corrupt and brutal establishment. In retribution, the establishment stole one of his companies in order to defraud the Russian government, and killed Browder’s loyal employee, Sergei Magnitsky when he had the temerity to challenge them. Bill Browder, martyr by proxy.

A review of his actual business dealings in Russia strongly suggests a very, very different story.

For one thing, Browder was engaged in the voucher privatizations of the 1990s. These were, without cavil, among the most monstrous acts of mass theft and fraud in modern economic history. They were the primitive capitalist accumulation that built many modern Russian fortunes (and filled more than a few graveyards). Any Dudley Do-Right who tried to operate in that environment would have been ground to dust within weeks, if not days. It was an extreme Darwinian environment in which the most unscrupulous and often most brutal prevailed. If Browder survived that–and indeed thrived–draw your own conclusions.

For another, Browder’s initial partner in Hermitage Capital Management (his investment vehicle in Russia) was Edmund Safra. Safra’s sketchy dealings are legendary. He always dismissed allegations about his shady business practices as antisemitic, but there are many other Jewish financiers who have not attracted the same criticism. Further, Safra was involved (through his Republic Bank) in a mysterious scheme to jet billions of dollars in cash to Russia during the 1990s–it was dubbed “the money plane.” Just what went on there is unknown, but it doesn’t pass the smell test.

Safra died under bizarre circumstances in Monaco in 1999. An ex-Marine who served as his nurse was convicted of murder, but few find that story plausible, or complete. One of the competing theories is that he was killed by the Russian mob. (There are so many suspects, that maybe the true story is something along the lines of Murder on the Orient Express–everybody did it.)

Regardless, voucher privatizations plus Safra is hardly the CV of a commercial saint.

Browder also claims that he tried to bring honest corporate governance to Russia. He points to his attempts to change Gazprom as an example.

A different story is far more plausible: Browder’s investment in Gazprom was an arbitrage play, pure and simple. Due to restrictions on foreign ownership of Gazprom’s Russian shares, those shares sold at a substantial discount to the ADRs traded outside of Russia. Browder found a way–legal he says, illegal say the Russians–to buy Gazprom Russian shares. This allowed him to capture the big discount.

Putting the legality of the structure that he used to buy the shares aside, making an arb trade like that can be very profitable, and thus very attractive. That’s why Browder and his investors wanted in. Given the farcical prospects for actually changing Gazprom’s governance, I’m pretty sure that the Corporate Crusader act that Browder put on was just a cover for his more mercenary motives.

And this is a general impression that I come away with after reading a lot about him. The whole Last Honest Man in Russian Investing shtick was a canny PR ploy that allowed his backers to distance themselves from the tawdry (and worse) reputation that investing in Russia had at the time. Browder was their beard that allowed them to pretend that they were in an honest relationship.

Browder has been prosecuted by the Russian government, both for tax violations and his purchase of Gazprom shares. He portrays these prosecutions as vengeance for his crossing the wrong people in his crusade for honest business practices in Russia. I have no doubt that his prosecution might have been selective, and indeed driven by vengeance–but maybe not as revenge for his honesty, but for his taking from the wrong people. Further, even if the prosecutions were selective (i.e., others doing the same but not prosecuted) and driven by vengeance, that doesn’t mean they weren’t justified–and perhaps even just.

I don’t have the basis to opine on the legality of the structure of his Gazprom purchases. But I can say that the Russian accusations regarding tax violations seem very plausible. These involved setting up companies that received tax breaks for hiring disabled veterans, but the Russians colorably show that he did no such thing.

The Russians also allege that he was in fact involved in the tax fraud that resulted in Magnitsky’s death. This allegation is far more speculative, and perhaps libelous–but it is not totally lacking in plausibility, especially in light of Browder’s track record.

Since getting kicked out of Russia in 2005, and since Magnitsky’s death, Browder has spent his life crusading against Putin and the Russian government. The centerpiece of his campaign is the alleged involvement of Russian government officials (tax officials mainly) in the theft of $230 million in tax refunds fraudulently obtained from a Hermitage company seized by the Russians, and the death of Magnitsky while in custody in an investigation of the theft.

Here it is evident that Browder’s relationship with the truth is, well, situational and transactional. The best evidence of this is his deposition in the Prevezon case in New York. Browder tried mightily to avoid being served, and here is one place where Browder and Simpson intersect: Simpson was part of the effort to serve Browder, on behalf of his (indirect) client, Prevezon CEO Denis Katsyv.

During that deposition, Browder admitted repeatedly that he had no evidence whatsoever to back some of his most lurid and damning allegations against those he alleges were complicit in the Russian tax fraud and the death of Magnitsky. For instance, he has claimed repeatedly that he could trace the ill-gotten gains from the tax fraud to specific individuals. In the deposition, he admitted he could not.

(Here Browder has something in common with dossier assembler Christopher Steele. Once in court testifying under the penalty of perjury, Steele was at pains to admit that the claims in the dossier were unsubstantiated, in contrast to his hair on fire representations to the FBI.)

This is particularly outrageous given the fury with which Browder attacks anyone who questions his dealings or veracity.

So my conclusion is: Browder is a con-man and a liar. If he tells you the sun rises in the east, buy a compass and wait for sunrise.

Glenn Simpson of dossier infamy is of the same opinion. Simpson did a deep documentary dive on Browder for Prevezon’s lawyers, Baker Hostetler, and came to many of the conclusions I outline above, and some more to boot. If you read the transcript of Simpson’s interview (not testimony) before Senate Judiciary Committee investigators, you’ll see what Simpson dug up and the basis for his conclusions.

Well, doesn’t this mean that I therefore have to give credence to Fusion GPS’s research on Trump? Quite to the contrary: the difference in the methods in the Browder and Trump matters is striking. When investigating Browder, Fusion GPS did a deep dive on documentary evidence in the US, Russia, and presumably Cyprus (where Browder registered companies). (See pp. 41-49 of the transcript. Simpson is so detailed in his description of what he did in the Browder investigation that the lawyer questioning him said “Thank you for the narrative answer.” LOL.)

In contrast, with regards to Trump, Simpson et al (a) read some books, and (b) commissioned the Steele investigation, which apparently just involved in talking to people (just who is a complete mystery) who passed on unverified and unverifiable gossip. The basis for Simpson’s claim that Trump had Russian mafia connections is that Trump had connections with Felix Sater who allegedly had connections with the Russian mob: similarly Paul Manafort.

Thus, whereas the foundation for Simpson’s opinions on Browder is rock-solid, that for his opinions on Trump are charitably described as quicksand.

Simpson’s statements also call into question his honesty. When asked when he had any Russian-speaking employees, he mentioned one guy–who happened NOT to be Nellie H. Ohr, wife of ex-DOJ Associate Deputy AG. We now know that Mrs. Ohr worked for Fusion. Sean Davis said on Twitter that this was an “interesting omission.” I said it was an interesting perjury.

Simpson also insinuated that the FBI had an independent source to justify FISA-ing Trump campaign personnel–and that this guy was a walk-in. When the transcript was released, a “source close to Fusion GPS” said nope. Never happened. He was referring to Papalopolous. Another strike for his credibility.

Simpson strains credulity past its breaking point when he claims that even though he had dinner with Natalia Veselnitskaya the night before and the night after her meeting with Trump Jr., the subject never came up (she was at the other end of the table, he doesn’t speak Russian and she doesn’t speak English–even though they apparently could communicate well enough for her to get him to help her obtain a visa). Simpson claims to have been shocked at the news. Please. Big investigative reporter turned PI/opposition researcher has no clue about a bombshell meeting even after spending hours with some of the principals? He didn’t even bother to ask through a translator (who Veselnitskaya must have had along) “hey, Natalia, whatcha been doing in New York?” Please.

So my rule for Simpson is the same as for Browder: unless he has the documents to prove it, don’t believe a word he says. He will distort the truth to advance his agenda.

The most entertaining part of this is the red-on-red nature of the battle. Heretofore Browder has been something of a hero among the anti-Trump set (yeah, I’m looking at you, Michael Weiss) because he is ardently anti-Putin, and Trump is supposedly Putin’s bitch. But Simpson has even better anti-Trump bona fides, for the dossier is directly anti-Trump, whereas Browder’s  anti-Putin stance is anti-Trump only via (an alleged) transitivity.

So given a choice between Browder and Simpson, most of the anti-Trumpers are going with Simpson, and either explicitly or implicitly dumping and dissing Browder.

Karma, Bill. Karma.

Browder being Browder, he will no doubt go after Simpson with all guns blazing.

I’m stocking up on the popcorn.

The left and the media (I repeat myself, yet again) may end up ruing their choice. Given the extremely dubious nature of the dossier and those who funded, created, and disseminated it, and the very great likelihood that it was used as the basis to engage in counterintelligence surveillance of Trump campaign personnel, I believe that the dossier will likely prove the greatest political boomerang in modern political history, and will end up braining those who threw it (which includes the Clinton campaign, Fusion GPS/Simpson, the FBI and other US intelligence agencies, the media, and the “Resistance”). And if this happens, Bill Browder will be little more than collateral damage.

Back in the day, Bart Chilton was my #2 whipping boy at the CFTC (after Gary Gensler AKA GiGi). Bart took umbrage (via email) at some of my posts, notably this one. Snort.

Bart was the comedian in that dynamic duo. He coined (alert: pun foreshadowing!) such memorable phrases as “cheetah” to criticize high frequency traders (cheetah-fast cheater–get it? Har!) and “massive passives” to snark at index funds and ETFs. Apparently Goldilocks could never find a trading entity whose speed was just right: they were either too fast or too slow. He blamed cheetahs for causing the Flash Crash, among other sins, and knocked the massive passives for speculating excessively and distorting prices.

But then Bart left the CFTC, and proceeded to sell out. He took a job flacking for HFT firms. And now he is lending his name (I won’t say reputation) to an endeavor to create a new massive passive. This gives new meaning to the phrase sell out.

Bart’s massive passive initiative hitches a ride on the crypto craze, which makes it all the more dubious. It is called “OilCoin.” This endeavor will issue said coins, and invest the proceeds in “reserve barrels” of oil. Indeed, the more you examine it, the more dubious it looks.

In some ways this is very much like an ETF. Although OilCoin’s backers say it will be “regulatory compliant,” but even though it resembles an ETF in many ways, it will not have to meet (nor will it meet, based on my reading of its materials) listing requirements for ETFs. Furthermore, one of the main selling points emphasized by the backers is its alleged tax advantages over standard ETFs. So despite the other argle bargle in the OilCon–excuse me, OilCoin–White Paper, it’s primarily a regulatory and tax arb.

Not that there’s necessarily anything wrong with that, just that it’s a bit rich that the former stalwart advocate of harsher regulation of passive commodity investment vehicles is part of the “team” launching this effort.

I should also note some differences that make it worse than a standard ETF, and worse than other pooled investment vehicles like closed end funds. Most notably, ETFs have an issue and redemption mechanism that ensures that the ETF market price tracks the value of the assets it holds. If an ETF’s price exceeds the value of the assets the ETF holds, an “Authorized Participant” can buy a basket of assets that mirrors what the ETF holds, deliver them to the ETF, and receive ETF shares in return. If an ETF’s price is below the market value of the assets, the AP can buy the ETF shares on the market, tender them to the ETF, and receive an equivalent share of the assets that the ETF holds. This mechanism ties the ETF market price to the market prices of its assets.

The OilCoin will not have any such tight tie to the assets its operators invest in. Insofar as investment policy is concerned:

In addition to investing in oil futures, the assets supporting OilCoin will also be invested in physical oil and interests in oil producing properties in various jurisdictions in order to hold a diversified pool of assets and avoid the risk of holding a single, concentrated position in exchange traded futures contracts. As a result, OilCoin’s investment returns will approximate but not precisely track the price movement of a spot barrel of crude oil.

I note the potential illiquidity in “physical oil” and in particular “interests in oil producing properties.” It will almost certainly be very difficult to value this portfolio. And although the White Paper suggests a one barrel of oil to one OilCoin ratio, it is not at all clear how “interests in oil producing properties” will figure into that calculation. A barrel of oil in the ground is a totally different thing, with a totally different value, than a barrel of oil in storage above ground, or an oil futures contract that is a claim on oil in store. This actually has more of a private equity feel than an ETF feel to it. Moreover, even above ground barrels can differ dramatically in price based on quality and location.

Given the illiquidity and heterogeneity of the “oil” that backs OilCoin, it is not surprising that the mechanism to keep the price of the OilCoin in line with “the” price of “oil” is rather, er, elastic, especially in comparison to a standard ETF: the motto of OilCoin should be “Trust Us!” (Pretty funny for crypto, no?) (Hopefully it won’t end up like this, but methinks it might.)

Here’s what the White Paper says about the mechanism (which is a generous way of characterizing it):

OilCoin’s investment returns will approximate but not precisely track the price movement of a spot barrel of crude oil.

. . . .

In order to ensure measurable intrinsic value and price stability, each OilCoin will maintain an approximate one-to-one ratio with a single reserve barrel of oil. [Note that a “reserve barrel of oil” is not a barrel of any particular type of oil at any particular location.] This equilibrium will be achieved through management of the oil reserves and the number of OilCoin in circulation.

As demand for OilCoin causes the price of a single OilCoin to rise above the spot price of a barrel of oil on global markets [what barrel? WTI? Brent? Mayan? Whatever they feel like on a particular day?], additional OilCoin may be issued in private or open market transactions and the proceeds will be invested in additional oil reserves. Similarly, if the price of an OilCoin falls below the price of a barrel of oil, oil reserves may be liquidated with the proceeds used to purchase OilCoin privately or in the open market. This method of issuing or repurchasing OilCoin and the corresponding investment in or liquidation of oil reserves will provide stability to the market price of OilCoin relative to the spot price of a barrel of crude oil and will provide verifiable assurances that the value of oil reserves will approximate the aggregate value of all issued OilCoin.

OilCoin’s price stability program will be managed by the OilCoin management team with a view to supporting the liquidity and functional operation of the OilCoin marketplace and to maintaining an approximate but not precise correlation between the price of a single OilCoin and the spot price of a single barrel of oil [What type of barrel? Where? For delivery when?]. While maintaining price stability of digital currencies through algorithmic purchase and sale may be appropriate in certain circumstances, and while it is possible as a technical matter to link such an algorithm to a programmed purchase and sale of oil assets, such an approach would be likely to result in (i) the decoupling of the number of OilCoin in circulation from an approximately equivalent number of reserve barrels of oil, and (ii) a highly volatile stock of oil reserve assets adding unnecessary and avoidable transaction costs which would reduce the value of OilCoin’s supporting oil reserve assets. Accordingly, it is expected that purchases and sales of OilCoin and oil reserves to support price stability will be made on a periodic basis [Monthly? Annually? When the spirit moves them?] as the price of OilCoin and the price of a single barrel of oil [Again. What type of barrel? Where? For delivery when?] diverge by more than a specified margin [Specified where? Surely not in this White Paper.]

[Emphasis added.]

Note the huge discretion granted the managers. (“May be issued.” “May be liquidated.” Whenever they fell like it, apparently, as long as there is a vague connection between their actions and “the spot price of crude oil “–and remember there is no such thing as “the” spot price) A much less precise mechanism than in the standard ETF. Also note the shell game aspect here. This refers to “the” price of “a barrel of oil,” but then talks about “diversified holdings” of oil. The document goes back and forth between referring about “reserve barrels” and “barrels of oil on the global market.”

Note further that there is no third party mechanism akin to an Authorized Party that can arb the underlying assets against the OilCoin to make sure that it tracks the price of any particular barrel of oil, or even a portfolio of oil holdings. This means that OilCoin is really more like a closed end fund, but one  that is not subject to the same kind of regulation as closed end funds, and which can apparently invest in things other than securities (e.g., interests in oil producing properties), some of which may be quite illiquid and hard to value and trade. One other crucial difference from a closed end fund is that OilCoin states it may issue new coins, whereas closed end funds typically cannot have secondary offerings of common shares.

Closed end funds can trade at substantial premiums and discounts to the underlying NAV, and I would wager that OilCoin will as well. Relating to the secondary issue point, unlike a closed end fund, OilCoin can issue new coins if they are at a premium–or if the managers feel like it. Again, the amount of discretion possessed by OilCoin’s managers is substantially greater than for a closed end fund or ETF (or an open ended fund for that matter). (There is also no indication that the managers will be precluded from investing the funds in their own “oil producing interests.” That potential for self-dealing is very concerning.)

There is also no indication in the White Paper as to just what an OilCoin gives a claim on, or who has the control rights over the assets, and how these control rights can be obtained. My reading of the White Paper does not find any disclosure, implicit or explicit, that OilCoin owners have any claim on the assets, or that someone could buy 50 percent plus one of the OilCoins, boot the existing management, and get control of the operation of the investments, or any mechanism that would allow acquisition of a controlling interest, and liquidation of the thing’s assets. (I say “thing” because what legal form it takes is not stated in the White Paper.)  These are other differences from a closed end fund or ETF–and mean that OilCoin is not subject to the typical mechanisms that protect investors from the depredations of promoters and managers.

A lot of crypto is all about separating fools from their money. OilCoin certainly has that potential. What is even more insidious about it is that the backers state that it is a different kind of crypto currency because it is backed by something: in the words of the White Paper, OilCoin is “supported” by the “substantial intrinsic value of assets” it holds. The only problem is that there is no indication whatsoever that the holder of the cryptocurrency can actually get their hands on what backs it. The “support” is more chimerical than real.

So my basic take away from this is that OilCoin is a venture that allows the managers to use the issue of cryptocurrency to fund totally unconstrained speculations in oil subject to virtually none of the investor protections extended to the purchasers of securities in corporations, investors of closed end funds, or buyers of ETFs. All sickeningly ironic given the very public participation of a guy who inveighed against speculation in oil and the need for strict regulation of those investing other people’s money.

My suggestion is that if you are really hot for an ICO backed by a blonde, buy whatever Paris Hilton is touting these days, and avoid BartCoin like the plague.