Streetwise Professor

The euphoria over the collapse of the Assad regime lasted, oh, a good two weeks. Now the meet-the-new-boss-different-than-the-old-boss-but-still-really-bad reality is rearing its ugly head, and the war of all-against-all is returning with some combatants basically reversing roles.

Specifically, the old Ins–the Assadists/Syrian Arab Army–are the new Outs, and the old Outs–the jihadists including most notably the HTS–are the new Ins. The new Outs have fled to ethnic enclaves to resist the new Ins. The roles are reversed, and the locations changed, but the fundamental nature of the conflict is eerily similar.

?? Intense clashes rage into their second day in Tartus, Syria, between Syrian Arab Army resistance cells and forces loyal to the new government.

Footage captured by a local woman from her home offers a close-up view of the chaos, showing militants exchanging fire directly below… pic.twitter.com/jtsokMHdqO

— DD Geopolitics (@DD_Geopolitics) December 26, 2024

There’s plenty more like that. What happened in Iraq post-2003 is a good template for what will happen in Syria, namely, regime “dead enders” (in Donald Rumsfeld’s description) will burrow into ethnic enclaves (Alawites in the case of the SAA) and wage a brutal guerrilla/terror campaign against those who ousted them. And those who ousted them will not respond with the same scruples that the Americans did in Iraq.

The Alawites will see this as an existential conflict. It is likely that they will either hold on and wage a protracted war, or will be wiped out. Either way, the exit of Assad will not usher in a new Kumbaya era, but more war to the knife.

Meanwhile, the United States and other western powers are rushing to make nice with the leader of the new Ins, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Julani has a long al Qaeda pedigree, on the basis of which he achieved the great distinction of being named as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.” Not just a designated global terrorist mind you, a specially designated one, and one with a $10 million bounty on his head, no less. His parents must have been so proud.

But the US has indicated that he is someone they can work with, and has removed the bounty.

Apparently because he now wears western style suits and says anodyne things about his plans for Syria and because he’s not Assad.

NB: Assad wore really nice suits too.

I’m also reminded of when westerners cooed over Yuri Andropov because he drank scotch and liked jazz.

Suckers.

All of this is wishcasting. Leopards don’t change their spots, and snakes that shed their skins are still snakes.

And even in the unlikely event that the Face (Julani) has really had a road-to-Damascus conversion, what about all those heavily armed people under him? Will they get with the program, or view Julani as a sellout whom they will eliminate and replace with someone more congenial? Congenial to their jihadist agenda that is, not to humanity generally or the Syrian people specifically.

The Russians are still clinging to their bases on the coast. No doubt the bazaar is open and their are negotiations going on between them and the new Ins over the terms to keep them. It is no coincidence, however, that the aforementioned conflict between the SAA remnants and the HTS is taking place in Tartus–where the Russian naval base is.

Russia has every incentive to support these Alawite elements, meaning that the latter will have strong logistical support, possibly air and ground support, and a relatively secure enclave. Probably more secure than HTS’s was in Idlib. Iran also has an incentive to provide support though this will be somewhat more challenging given HTS’s control over Iran’s old overland supply routes. But overall, I seriously doubt the new Ins will be able to eliminate the new Outs, and the war will continue.

And don’t forget that the Assad collapse has helped ISIS, which has been an enemy of the new Ins when they were the Outs. In response, the US is bombing the shit out of ISIS, but that will not destroy them.

And Turkey is is continuing its onslaught against the Kurds in the northeast. Julani has said that an independent Kurdish enclave in Syria is unacceptable, thereby signaling collaboration with Turkey.

Which puts both on a collision course with the US, which has supported and protected the Kurds, primarily because the latter have been the main boots on the ground in the conflict against ISIS. Will that support continue under Mr. Unpredictable’s presidency? Despite his rhetoric, i’m betting it will, for several reasons. First, because of the aforementioned reactivation of ISIS, whom Trump fought viciously. Second, because that’s where the oil (such as it is) is, and who can forget Trump’s “we’re keeping the oil” statement (made to the accompaniment of much harrumphing around the world). Third, because I doubt Trump is will believe the new Ins have shed their terrorist spots. Fourth, because I doubt he wants to empower Erdogan–especially given the latter’s ambition to assume leadership of the anti-Israel movement.

And as for Israel, they are certainly not putting any faith in Julani and the gang, so they are merrily blowing up any and all weapons that the new Ins might think about using against them. Further, they are amassing a security perimeter on Syrian territory–which will inevitably lead to tension and conflict with the new Ins.

All this means that the situation today isn’t all that different than it was a month ago. Some of the players have switched places, but all the players are still playing. There was a sectarian and ethnic war in Syria for the last decade, and every indication is that there will be a sectarian and ethnic war there for the next decade. At least.

The request line is open! Responding to Ex-Global Super-Regulator on Lunch Break, here are some thoughts on Syria.

The big picture: it was a shitshow, it is a shitshow, and it will continue to be a shitshow. Just under new management.

Reading the stories of the assault through Aleppo, then Hama, then Homs, and finally Damascus, I thought of the scenes in Lawrence of Arabia in which the Arab irregulars rampaged past a collapsing regular army and took Damascus on 1 October 1918, which soon plunged into tribal bickering and chaos under their rule.

If anything, the ethnic, sectarian, and ideological divisions of the 2024 conquerers are more extreme and latent with violence than the tribal divisions of 1918. Thus, the current euphoria over the fall of the truly odious Assad will prove as fleeting as the euphoria over the fall of the odious Khaddafy. Libya’s recent history is therefore a useful reference in evaluating Syria’s likely future. (The main difference is that Libya has relatively large amounts of oil to fight over).

There are numerous armed groups in Syria with wildly conflicting agendas. The group that has gotten the most attention, HTS, is widely portrayed as a Turkish proxy, but this is wrong. Turkey’s player in the game (a game with a very complex scorecard, even with which you might not be able to identify all the players) is the Syrian National Army, but it was not aimed primarily at the Assad regime. Instead, it (and hence Erdogan) has launched its main effort against the Kurdish (YPG) forces in northeastern Syria. The Kurds were instrumental in the defeat of ISIS–with a considerable assist from the US. Meaning that Turkey’s proxies are attacking US proxies.

Won’t that be fun. What the rump US administration will do is unknown, and that is presumably why Erdogan is in such a hurry, trying to change the facts on the ground before Trump takes office.

So post-Assad Syria is at least a 3-sided conflict, akin to the climatic scene of The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (minus any Good character a la Clint):

Probably more in fact because the Jihadi and Jihadi-adjacent HTS is itself a coalition of many Islamist groups who could well fall out. And because it would not be surprising if Assad regime elements go underground a la Saddamites post-2003 and wage a guerrilla/terror war. And because Iran will almost certainly attempt to employ Hezbollah elements to retain a shred of influence in the country.

A quick take on the losers and winners.

Losers:

• Iran. Clearly the biggest loser, and the worst in a string of defeats in the last year. Assad’s Syria was the essential logistical lynchpin and staging area for Iranian support to Hezbollah. That’s basically gone, leaving an already reeling Hezbollah to wither on the vine. Further, Israel has moved rapidly to destroy Syrian military infrastructure (which Iran used) and to seize “buffer zones” that will make it difficult for Iran to utilize even smuggling operations to sustain Hezbollah. In retrospect, October 7 may look like Pearl Harbor. A seeming smashing surprise attack that set off a chain of events that ended ultimately in defeat.
• Hezbollah. For the same reasons as Iran.
• Russia. His regime’s collapse makes Assad’s other major patron looks like a giant with clay feet. Russian troops in the interior are bugging out to the coast: the serpentine routes of some convoys looks like some mini-Xenophon Anabasis. As for the bases that these troops are fleeing to, they still remain in Russian hands although the anti-Assad forces have evidently surrounded them. These bases are so vital that I expect Russia will cut some deal with the victors to retain them. They are essential to supporting Russian operations in Africa. Moreover, without the naval base at Tartus Russia has no ability to support a presence in the Mediterranean, a prestige item for Russia. The Turkish Straits are closed to them so they can’t operate in the Med from Black Sea bases. Given that most of the Russian fleet now consists of short-legged frigates and the like, it’s not operationally feasible to show the flag in the Med from the Baltic or Arctic. (Not to mention if the Russians are forced out of Tartus, the frigates and patrol craft it has there now would have a hard time to get back to St. Petersburg. A winter voyage would be particularly fun!) So Russia will probably hang on with its fingernails, but its position will be tenuous and its reputation damaged further.
• Hamas. Another loser as a result of Iran’s emasculation.

Winners:

• Israel. The biggest winner by far. Iran’s and Hezbollah’s losses are its gain. It has moved with remarkable speed to exploit the opportunity by (a) obliterating virtually all Syrian military assets (aircraft, ships, depots, arms production facilities) thereby depriving any successor state/statelets of them, and (b) establishing the aforementioned buffer zone east of the Golan Heights. Israel’s security situation in the north is better now than probably ever.
• The US, though the picture is far more mixed than for Israel. Although the Biden-Obama administration is likely to differ, Iran’s strategic defeat is a gain for the US. (Biden-Obama’s approach to Iran is one of the most baffling and stupid foreign policies in American history). As noted above, a conflict with Turkey over the Kurds looms. A jihadi regime in Syria (or more realistically, parts of Syria) is not ideal, and may be worse from a realpolitik perspective than an Assad regime. The greatest benefit to the US would be a serious retrenchment by Iran, which would reduce the strategic risks for the US in the Middle East (given that Iran is the main source of those risks).
• Other Arab regimes, especially in the Gulf. Again due to the Iranian losses. Some are saying the Saudis and Qatar will be the big winner because Assad’s fall will permit the building of a gas pipeline through Syria (and Jordan) to Turkey and then Europe. This would exacerbate Russian losses and be a win for the Gulfies, but I think it is an unlikely outcome. The chaos that is likely to reign for years in Syria will make this pipeline as chimerical as the oft-vaunted claims about pipelines through Afghanistan.

TBD:

• Turkey. Again, it’s main interest is not in Syria per se, but in the Kurds. I expect the US will prevent Erdogan from achieving the destruction of the Kurds that he seeks, so it is likely that Turkey will not achieve the victory it seeks. Many in Turkey greeted the news of Assad’s fall by saying: “Great! Now all the Syrians can go home!” Unlikely, for reasons I discuss shortly.
• Lebanon. The weakening of Hezbollah should be a great boon to Lebanon. But it’s Lebanon.
• The Syrian people. Assad’s regime was monstrous. The country has been devastated. (I think GNP has fallen by something like 90 percent). But the likelihood of continued strife means that Syrians are unlikely to harvest the fruits of peace. And being ruled by Islamists will not be fun times–especially for minorities like Christians and Alawites. So contrary to the hopes of the Turks (and the Europeans who have also found Syrian immigrants to be pestilential) I doubt there will be a flood of people back to Syria, and indeed there might be another exodus.
• Ukraine. Ukrainians are crowing over Putin’s humiliation. But how Putin will react is unclear. Having lost and made to look ineffectual in Syria he may decide to amplify his efforts in Ukraine. And will logistic complications lead him to redeploy assets from Africa to Ukraine? Who knows?

So that’s my hot take on Syria. The basic takeaway is that it is the end of a regime but not the end of wars in Syria. And that from a geopolitical perspective it redounds to the benefit of all those at odds with Iran.

Tayyip Recep Erdoğan suffered a resounding electoral spanking in yesterday’s mayoral elections in Turkey. (Or Türkiye, as Erdoğan insists you call it.)

Erdoğan’s AKP party suffered a loss of 15 mayor’s posts, with most of those going to its main rival, the CHP. CHP actually outpolled AKP on a national level, which is unprecedented. The most stinging losses were in Istanbul (Erdoğan’s home city) and Ankara. In Istanbul, which Erdoğan desperately wanted to retake, Ekrem İmamoğlu handily retained the mayor’s office.

İmamoğlu’s victory is indeed impressive, and he has received almost all of the attention in the aftermath of the election: he has been anointed as the likely replacement as president for Erdoğan in four years’ time. Yet all of the focus on İmamoğlu obscures another figure, Ankara mayor Mansur Yavaş.

Yavaş’s margin of victory was even more resounding than İmamoğlu’s, with him winning over 60 percent of the vote, as opposed to İmamoğlu’s smidge over 50 percent. Yavaş has a sky-high approval rating–as his electoral landslide demonstrates.

Moreover, although İmamoğlu may be more appealing to westerners and westernized bougie Turks who are the core CHP constituency, a series of electoral failures (13 consecutive losses in parliamentary and presidential elections under the hapless “leadership” of former party boss Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who selfishly insisted on leading the party in the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections) has demonstrated clearly that CHP cannot secure an electoral majority on its own. Further, demographics are its enemy–religious AKP types outbreed secular (and often atheist) CHP types.

Yavaş is not really CHP, despite the fact that he has run on its ticket in Ankara. His political origins lie in the MHP, a nationalist party founded by one of the leaders of the May 1960 coup, Alparsan Türkeş (“bashbo,” who is still something of a cult figure among Turkish nationalists). He split with MHP because its longtime leader Devlet Bahçeli allied with Erdoğan and the AKP (perhaps because of blackmail).

As a result of this background, Yavaş has the potential to expand the CHP’s appeal to nationalists (who represent a smallish but potentially pivotal segment of the Turkish electorate) in a way that İmamoğlu does not. Yavaş’s main problem is that MHP has historically been anti-Kurdish. But the AKP has been harshly anti-Kurdish as well, and Kurds will likely conclude that CHP will constrain any anti-Kurdish inclinations Yavaş may harbor, making him the lesser of two evils. In sum, Yavaş has a greater potential of forming a coalition that can displace AKP than does İmamoğlu.

Yavaş is also a very tough guy, a lawyer who has frequently faced down Erdoğan in Ankara. Erdoğan fears him more than İmamoğlu.

So don’t be so sure that Turkey’s political future is in the hands of the more telegenic, western-appealing İmamoğlu rather than in those of the more dour, less well-known, and more Turkish qua Turkish Yavaş.

That said, having two highly credible leadership candidates can be both a blessing and a curse. CHP has a long history of infighting and back-biting, and no doubt Erdoğan will try to stoke a rivalry between Yavaş and İmamoğlu. But the very fact that he may have to do so in order to maintain his party’s grip on power is an indication that his position is far weaker than it was when he waltzed to victory a year ago.

The Turkish lira is now about 12, a big recovery from its nadir on Monday. I expressed skepticism that Erdoğan’s announced policy of guaranteeing some Turkish bank deposits against an adverse move in the TRY was the cause. As we’ll see in a moment there is something to that. But even if the policy announcement caused all or some of the rebound, my skepticism about the viability of this mechanism remains.

As to the logic behind the policy. In essence, there was a run on the lira, and one way of running was to sell lira on deposit, and buy dollars. A typical bank run is to sell deposits for currency. One reason bank runs are far less frequent today in places like the US is deposit insurance, which is basically a mechanism to ensure that a dollar on deposit will always be worth a dollar of currency. That short-circuits the run dynamics, in which fear that a dollar of deposits will be worth less than a dollar of currency, which induces people to race to convert deposits into currency, which can cause banks to fail . . . leading to deposits being worth less than the equivalent amount of currency.

What Turkey has announced–and note, it has not announced the details so this isn’t really a plan but a sketch of a plan–is equivalent to a form of deposit insurance. Except that here the government is promising the TRY value of deposits will be worth at least a fixed amount of USD or Euros. But the idea is the same. If people are convinced that their deposits will remain pegged to the dollar, they have less incentive to run.

There is a key word in the prior sentence: “convinced.” It might work if people believe it will work. It won’t work if people don’t. So how can they have confidence? This confidence is necessary, but not sufficient, for success.

The confidence depends on the reliability and solvency of the guarantor. It’s not quite clear who that is in this situation. Is it the banks? The government? The former would be ludicrous, so let’s go with the latter.

So how is the government going to fund the guarantee? It’s likely hoping that the mere fact that people believe it can and it will will mean that the government is never on the hook for anything.

But that’s not realistic. The value of the TRY will fluctuate for the same reasons that currencies always fluctuate. Macro shocks. Balance of payment issues. Capital flows. Whatever. The Turkish government is short a put on the currency (that’s essentially what the guarantee is–a put on the TRY). Sometimes these factors are going to push the TRY down, obligating the government to make good on its promise.

So how is it going to pay for that? And note that it will have to pay a good fraction of the time. Roughly 50 percent of the time if the floor is set at the current exchange rate.

Print lira? LOL. So the lira declines, and the government prints more lira to pay off on its short put. Which will depress the lira further. Requiring more printing, etc. etc. etc.

Short put=short gamma. Short gamma can create an unstable positive feedback mechanism, and positive feedback mechanisms in economics very often have extremely negative consequences. Lira declines feed further declines. And again–as with any currency, lira declines are always a major risk. This is especially true with a country like Turkey. And resorting to this mechanism would likely destroy the trust that it depends on.

OK. The printing option seems pretty dumb–though don’t put it past Erdo! So, to meet its obligation to top up lira-denominated accounts to compensate for a decline in the TRY, instead of printing lira Turkey could sell dollars and Euros for lira which it then gives to depositors. At least this would potentially create a beneficial (negative/stabilizing) feedback mechanism, with the $ and € sales tending to increase the value of the lira.

But where is Turkey going to get the dollars and euros? That’s what I meant the other day when I said don’t trust a madman whose mouth writes checks his wallet can’t cash.

This second mechanism can be viewed another way: as a commitment device. Specifically, a device committing Turkey to defend the lira. Effectively, a way of committing to a peg: it has to buy lira/sell $ or € when the lira declines. And if Erdo’s other promise–not to raise interest rates–is believed, committing to a peg and foregoing the option to raise interest rates to defend the currency.

And if this is the real plan, it faces all the risks that pegging inevitably entail. Pegs are always at risk to speculative attack. Turkey is particularly so, given its paucity of foreign exchange reserves and its bizarre government policies. No doubt George Soros’ interest has been piqued.

This is why I am skeptical. Skeptical as to the announcement of this sketch of a plan leading to a 33 percent rally–FX traders no doubt have figured out what I just laid out. Skeptical as to the feasibility and stability of this mechanism, even if it did levitate the lira.

And as I alluded to at the outset, it may well be the case that the plan didn’t raise the lira on Monday and keep it there–traditional government intervention has. The FT reports that the central bank has spent billions of dollars in recent days to stabilize the TRY. This suggests that the plan is basically just propaganda to (a) conceal what is really going on behind the scenes, a traditional defense of the currency, and (b) allow Erdo to take credit for the rally without admitting that more dollars are going out the door.

Regardless of the mechanism, defending the lira puts strains on Turkey’s public finances. The fact that Turkish credit spreads have widened even as the currency has strengthened suggests that Mr. Market has figured that out.

Turkey, like all countries, faces the “impossible trinity.” A country cannot have a fixed exchange rate, an open capital account, and an independent monetary policy. But Erdoğan is promising all three. Fixing interest rates at low levels as he promises, because he’s on a mission from Allah=independent monetary policy. He has promised to maintain free movement of capital. And now, he is implicitly promising to fix the exchange rate.

We know with metaphysical certainty that this is impossible–the “impossible trinity” phrase came about for a reason. So it’s going to end badly. The only question is which part of the trinity is Erdoğan going to jettison. Based on form, I predict the lira.

The Turkish Lira has crashed, down over 50 percent since September, and now trading at less than a third of the value it had when I was in Turkey in 2018. It would be unfair to apply Jefferson Davis’ epitaph for the Confederacy: “Died of a Theory.” Instead, “Murdered by a Theory” would be more accurate.

And the murderer is readily identifiable: Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. His theory is that high interest rates cause inflation, so as inflation accelerated and the Lira plummeted, rather than allowing the central bank to tighten monetary policy and raise interest rates, he pushed it to cut rates–which only accelerated the TRY’s crash.

Sunday, even Erdoğan apparently realized that his economic rationale was risible, so he switched gears, saying that this policy was dictated by Allah and the Koran:

“What is it? We are lowering interest rates. Don’t expect anything else from me,” Erdogan said Sunday in televised comments from Istanbul. “As a Muslim, I’ll continue to do what is required by nas,” he said, using an Arabic word used in Turkish to refer to Islamic teachings.

Meanwhile, Erdoğan has been telling his largely religious (and poor) political base (which is being devastated by inflation) that this is just a test from Allah. That the Koran says that Allah is seeing whether you can bear such trials in silence and faith, and that if they vote for him again in 2023 he will fix inflation. Whip Inflation Then (Insallah). Or something.

So now, the Lira is being murdered by theology instead of a theory.

The chaos became extreme on Friday, with Borsa Instanbul shutting down due to a crash in Turkish shares that triggered circuit breakers. The chaos continued on the open, with the USDTRY breaching 18 and the stock market shutting down again:

Note the big rally earlier today. Though it is rather sobering that 15 is, relatively speaking, good news.

The recovery was driven by an Erdoğan statement to the cabinet today in which he pledged to defend the currency and to protect Turkish depositors against currency declines. To be honest, I find it hard to take his announcement seriously, although the markets apparently have. He has made commitments, but their credibility is dubious at best, especially since he pledged to continue his Crazy Erdo interest rate policy.

To carry through on these promises, Erdo needs dollars and Euros. Which he doesn’t have.

So I would be short the TRY at 15. Relying on a madman’s mouth writing checks that his wallet can’t cash is foolish.

There are larger lessons here.

The first is that this demonstrates the extreme dangers of presidentialism and highly personalized political systems. A “leader” with no checks and balances can indulge in insane policies at a whim. Erdoğan has gutted every institution in Turkey that could counter his ambitions–and his flights of policy fantasy. The press is suppressed, with more journalists in jail in Turkey than anywhere in the world. Civil society figures (and ordinary people) are muzzled due to the threat of being arrested for “insulting the president.” (The friend of a friend, the head of the Ataturk Institute, has been convicted of this and has the sword of Damocles hanging over his head.) The courts are packed with his goons, and the military was neutered after the abortive coup of 2016 (which in retrospect looks more and more like a false flag operation, given how it has redounded to Erdo’s benefit).

(Erdoğan’s careening into megalomania actually makes Putin look good by comparison. Russian macroeconomic policy under Putin has actually been rather responsible. Perhaps because Putin is uninterested in the subject and willing to delegate, or because he realizes that he is not especially competent in the subject. Either way, his forbearance looks wise especially in contrast to Erdoğan.)

Another lesson is that fakakta economic policies can do incredible damage in short order, yet “leaders” may recklessly implement nonetheless. In the United States, the Biden administration’s continuing attempt to spend additional trillions in the face of the worst inflation of the last 40 years is economic insanity: here the United States is at risk of dying from ignoring a theory (the fiscal theory of the price level). Even non-righties like Larry Summers realize the danger

Fortunately, a semblance of checks and balances remains in the US, and Joe Manchin has played Horatio at the Bridge, holding off BBB for now. But for how long? The specter of presidentialism hangs over the US too: Manchin is being assailed viciously by the left as a threat to “our democracy” for his temerity in resisting the president’s will–even though said president’s mental incapacity is manifest.

The US should take heed of what is going on in Turkey, and not gut checks and balances, give carte blanche to presidents, and engage in reckless economic policies. Alas, given the sway that turkeys hold in politics and the media, this may be a vain hope.

The Biden administration self-inflicted two serious diplomatic wounds in the space of a single day.

First, even though India is experiencing a wave of covid infections and deaths, its worse so far, the administration refused to relent on a ban (imposed by the Trump administration) on the export of vaccine ingredients.

Yes, the policy was originally Trump’s, but (a) you’d think that would be a bug not a feature with this administration, (b) India’s circumstances are far more dire today than they were when the ban was implemented, and (c) in the US, vaccine usage has nearly reached a saturation point, with many providers having shots wanting for arms.

India (both the government but especially the citizenry) has reacted extremely negatively due to this refusal, which is not surprising given the state of covid panic in the country. The United States should be courting India, not alienating it. After decades of hostility to the US (due not least because of US support for Pakistan, India’s post-independence antipathy to colonial powers or their allies, and dependence on Soviet/Russian weapons), India’s existential conflict with an aggressive China had created an opportunity to make India if not an ally, a country with which the US could cooperate on issues of common interest–most notably containing China.

That underlying dynamic is still there, but this thoughtless refusal fuels the latent suspicions of the US among many Indians and makes such cooperation far, far more difficult. It benefits the health of Americans virtually not at all, but alienates a country we should be courting.

The second self-inflicted wound involves Biden’s official recognition of the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire during the depths of WWI. (Do not underestimate how this war scarred Turkey. The Ottoman Empire suffered a greater percentage loss of population during the war than any other nation, even if one deducts the Armenian dead. The Ottoman Empire was dismembered, and Turkey itself was almost devoured in the aftermath. Only Ataturk’s miracles in the War of Independence saved Turkey from being divided among the Western powers and the Greeks, and left as an Anatolian rump that no one else wanted.)

Yes, the fate of Armenians was horrible. Well over a million died. Numberless others were displaced, often to desolate camps in the Syrian desert. If you meet someone whose name ends in “ian” they are almost certainly the descendants of the Armenian diaspora. (Those with names ending in “yan” are usually post-Soviet emigres). Their martyrdom was widely acknowledged in the US. In my parents’ era, children were told to eat their vegetables, because of the starving Armenians.

Like all historic episodes, especially those that occurred in the crucible of WWI, the story is complicated. But regardless of where the guilt lies, it happened more than a century ago. Those who committed the atrocities, and those who suffered them, have long since died.

But living Turks of all political persuasions are neuralgic about being blamed for these long-ago events. Even ardent Erdoğan haters in the CHP are of one mind with him on this issue: calling what happened in the long-dead Ottoman Empire a genocide is a red line. Those who do so are Turkey’s enemies.

Turkey’s response was immediate. It recalled its ambassador to the US, and its foreign minister gave a bitter statement, claiming that this will irreparably harm Turkish-US relations. He also said that the US should not cast stones, given its historical treatment of Native Americans. (The administration’s repeated condemnations of America’s historical actions make it a particularly attractive target for such barbs.)

Many in the US, particularly in the Armenian community, dismiss this. They say that it will blow over.

Don’t be so sure. Under Erdoğan Turkey has been wobbling away from the American (and Nato) orbit. Given Erdoğan’s dicey domestic circumstances, stoking the resentment and taking real steps to distance the country from the US are natural political moves. Russia will clearly notice–and seize upon–the opportunity. Erdoğan will be quite open to their blandishments.

And do not underestimate the power of Turkish nationalism. In my experience, they are among the most chauvinistic people in the modern world. (Han Chinese are the only rivals for the title.) They are not postmodern or post-nationalist, like most Europeans. This is deadly serious to them. It will not blow over.

Turkey has geopolitical importance, not least because of its geographic position. It has been a difficult country for the US in recent years, in large part because of its mercurial and grandiose leader. Provoking it unnecessarily will bring the US many policy headaches. Virtually at the same moment as Biden’s announcement, Turkey escalated its conflict with America-aligned Kurds in Iraq. The genocide announcement will make it all the more difficult to try to manage that conflict.

And for what? This gesture will not bring anyone back from the dead. It will not undo what has been done. America helped in the best way possible–by welcoming tens of thousands of Armenians. (Including the Kardashians. Isn’t that sacrifice enough?) It is moral preening that will not reverse past atrocities, nor prevent future ones. And it is contrary to US national interests.

And Turks–including in particular Turks in the US–believe that Biden’s action does not even rise to the level of moral preening. In their eyes it is corruption, political venality, repaying Armenian-Americans (in California in particular) for massive campaign contributions, given in exchange for his promise to do what he just did. Given the absence of any other plausible explanation, this seems very reasonable. And very despicable

One day, two pointless gestures that do significant damage to relationships with two geopolitically important nations with which the US has had difficult relations. I see zero upside for US interests in these actions, and much downside. God help us if these are harbingers of US policy over the next four years–which alas is extremely likely.

But hey. At least we don’t have to worry about mean tweets, right?

The US military is the most highly respected institution in America today. It is also filled with many ardent supporters of Trump, and Trumpism. Therefore, in today’s febrile and vengeful political environment, it is being targeted.

Case in point. Politico reports that the “FBI is vetting [National] Guardsmen amid fears of an insider attack.” What an appalling slur–and another act in the Security Theater in the “Green Zone”. (Note: that appellation is not hyperbole: that’s how the government is labeling it.)

How much of a slur? This much:

Insider threats have been a persistent law enforcement priority in the years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. But in most cases, the threats are from homegrown insurgents radicalized by al-Qaida, the Islamic State group or similar groups. In contrast, the threats against Biden’s inauguration have been fueled by supporters of President Donald Trump, far-right militants, white supremacists and other radical groups. 

The National Guard. Just like ISIS and al Qaida. Because Trump.

Utterly disgusting.

More evidence of what the ruling class thinks of the military, because it has a lot of white men who like Trump and don’t like Biden:

.@RepCohen on his concerns w/ the National Guard securing the Inauguration: “The [National] Guard is 90 some-odd percent male; and only about 20 percent of white males voted for Biden … there are probably not more than 25% of the people there protecting us that voted for Biden” pic.twitter.com/ofQfLuCw8I

— Tom Elliott (@tomselliott) January 18, 2021

In other words, political reliability is the criterion by which the military will be evaluated. The military has stayed out of politics, but the politicians will definitely not stay out of the military.

If you’ve been paying attention, you’ll have seen a variety of articles in the last few weeks where government officials and journalists have expressed deep concern about extremist/insurrectionist/white supremacist networks and sympathies within the military.

The military–not so much the flag ranks, or even O6 types, because they have to have been politically tamed to make it that far, but lower grade officers, and senior and junior enlisted–is going to be intensely scrutinized for political reliability. I daresay that something resembling a purge may occur. Political officers, a la the Red Army during various periods? Not inconceivable.

It is very revealing that the FBI is in charge of the “vetting” of National Guardsmen. As we have seen in spades since 2016, they are the domestic enforcers of the ruling class. It is particularly apropos to be writing this on MLK day, because the FBI’s targeting of King provides a telling case study of its immense capacity for political hatchet jobs and witch hunts.

This is something one would expect to see in, say, Turkey, where Erdoğan targeted the military. And no, I’m not referring to the period after the 15 July, 2016 coup, but his actions to tame the military that culminated in the Sledgehammer trial in 2012. Tayyip may have had some justification for his actions. After all, the Turkish military had a well-established record of overthrowing governments–including the hanging of the leaders thereof (e.g., the hanging of Menderes in 1961, in the aftermath of the 27 May coup).

There is no such reason–not by the remotest stretch–to suspect the US military. The aspersions being cast on it and its members, and the clear hints of an impending cleansing, provide a chilling testament to the paranoia of the ruling class, and its bloody minded determination to subjugate anyone and anything that shows anything but abject fealty towards it.

Tayyip Erdoğan has been on a real tear. Most recently, the Turkish military test fired S-400 missiles that Turkey had bought from Russia over strenuous US objections. This is a real Kim Jung Un move, the kind of provocative acts that unhinged dictators under pressure undertake. This puts him even more on the bad side of the US.

Moreover, Erdoğan has stoked the fires of conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, clearly having given the green light to Azerbaijan to escalate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and providing extensive military support to Azerbaijan. This puts him on the bad side of Russia.

He has ramped up conflict with the EU, and with France in particular, through his provocative drilling expeditions in waters claimed by Greece. Today, according to a connection in Turkey–who sent pictures–this involved sending a Turkish warship to the waters outside of Patara–and therefore close to the Greek island of Kastellorizo.

Which raises the question of why Erdoğan would pick fights with forces far more powerful than he. Perhaps he figures that neither Russia nor the US nor the EU are in a position to do anything to him. (The EU–totes understandable!) The US is embroiled in a contentious election. Russia is facing numerous problems, including covid, protests in the Far East, and the fallout from the Navalny poisoning.

But I think that is only part of the picture. If you’ve watched the Turkish Lira recently (USDTRY) you’ll see that it has plummeted to all-time lows, flirting with 8: it reached 7.94 on Friday. When I was in Turkey a few years ago, it was around 4. This is a good indicator of how parlous Turkey’s economic position is. Eight is a lucky number in China, but not for Turkey, when the lira is involved.

So what’s on the first page of the autocrat’s playbook? When facing domestic economic trouble, create international incidents. This is an especially important play in a non-post-modern country like Turkey, in which nationalism–chauvinism, really–is a potent political force, unlike in Old Europe and wide swaths of the US.

Perhaps a more interesting question relates to Putin’s extremely passive reaction to Erdo’s provocation in a region that Russia considers part of its post-Soviet space. Especially given the large Russian military presence in Armenia. Contrast Putin’s current passivity to Russia’s growling reaction to Turkey’s downing of a Russian Su-24 over Syria in 2015. Putin made harsh threats, and Erdo folded almost immediately.

Today, with Erdo romping in Russia’s backyard–nothing.

Perhaps this reflects Putin’s own problems. While the lira is flirting with 8, the ruble is flirting with 80, having fallen dramatically in recent months. Russia’s economy is stalled, and there is widespread discontent with its handling of covid. Putin has retreated to not so splendid isolation (though he is no doubt isolating in splendor), requiring those who wish to see him to quarantine for 14 days–a dramatic contrast with his “don’t worry, be happy” message to the public on covid. He’s also at loggerheads with Europe over Navalny, though given Europe’s anger at Erdo, Putin could probably earn Brussels brownie points by standing up to him.

Or maybe Putin wants to teach Armenia a lesson. But frankly, it would be stupid to encourage conflict in the post-Soviet space merely to chasten a recalcitrant satrap–especially when that chastening comes largely due to the intervention of a foreign power. I would have thought that a major red line for Putin.

So Erdoğan’s behavior, though extremely rash, is fairly understandable in conventional terms. Putin’s, not so much.

Would that the American establishment pay more attention to that puzzle, rather than descend into another frenzy of allegations about “Russian disinformation campaigns,” this one involving Hunter Biden’s laptop.

Just how would that work exactly? In 2016, Russia allegedly interfered in US elections by buying less than $100K cheesy Facebook ads. Yet apparently within a mere 4 years Russian disinformation has reached such levels of sophistication that it can create a laptop filled with forged material about Joe and Hunter Biden–including lurid photos of the latter doing what the latter is known to do, i.e., smoke crack and patronize hookers, not to mention incriminating emails–get it to some repair guy in Delaware who just happens to give a copy of the hard drive to Rudy Giuliani (after he had told the FBI about it).

Amazing tradecraft, if true. But to anyone who shaves with Occam’s Razor, it’s not true. The story that passes the Occam’s Razor test is that a drug addled Hunter–who, recall, in the past left a crack pipe and cocaine in a rental car because he saw an owl flying over him and thought it was following him so that he figured he might be hallucinating–dropped off the laptop and didn’t pick it up. Probably because he was distracted by too many lap dances, and paternity litigation involving lap dancers.

But what matters now to Biden and the establishment–including the traditional media and especially Twitter, Facebook, and Google/YouTube–is that Joe is able to dodge this until past the election.

At which time this October surprise could turn into the national November hangover.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems hell-bent on making enemies. Indeed, other than Qatar, it’s hard to point to any nation that is allied with Turkey. Turkey doesn’t even seem to have frenemies, only real enemies.

The FT had a long piece detailing how Erdoğan is using force and threats of force to prevent other nations, notably Cyprus, from drilling for gas in the eastern Mediterranean. He has also entered into a deal for what passes for a government in Libya to develop its offshore gas, and to build pipelines that deny that Crete is part of Greece. (Hey, it was Ottoman once, right?)

Speaking of Libya, Erdo has intervened in the conflict there. Turkey has supplied advisors, drones (including armed UAVs), anti-air defenses, and electronic warfare systems to support the “government.” Further, Turkey haas shipped in thousands of Syrian jihadi-types to provide the ground forces to fight against the force led by warlord Khalifa Haftar, who is trying to overthrow the UN-recognized government.

This has led to a confrontation between French and Turkish ships off the Libyan coast. Turkey has demanded an apology, and Macron trumpeted a call with Trump during which Libya was discussed–a clear indication to Turkey that the US was leaning towards France and against Turkey.

To make things even more complicated, Egypt supports Haftar and is threatening to intervene with its ground forces to combat the Turkish-supported troops. Turkey has made stern warnings to Egypt to stay on its side of the border.

To make things even more complicated, Russia is Haftar’s biggest backer. Russian mercenaries operate there. So in Libya Erdoğan is risking conflict with Russia, France (and hence the rest of the EU–yeah, I know), and Egypt.

The correlation of forces here is definitely not in Turkey’s favor, especially if Egypt intervenes on the ground. Egypt shares a border with Libya, and as the Desert Campaigns of 1940-41 showed, an armored force can race across Libya and achieve operational dominance. Egypt’s logistics would also be relatively simple, and it would be operating well within range of its air forces. Turkey, on the other hand, has no direct land route to Libya, and would have to reinforce and supply by sea. If shit gets real, it is highly doubtful that such a supply line would be sustainable. It would certainly be highly vulnerable to attack from air and sea.

Turkey has some submarines, some frigates (including some old US Perry Class ships) and corvettes, and some small landing craft. Egypt’s forces are comparable, with the big difference being the French-built (originally for Russia) Mistral assault ship, for which Turkey has no counterpart.

So Turkey would be in a very weak position if it indeed attempted to challenge an Egyptian incursion.

Libya is not the only country where Turkey and Russia are at loggerheads. They are also on opposite sides in Syria, and Russian-supported forces have killed well over 100 Turks. There is an uneasy coexistence between Russian and Turkey in Syria, nothing more.

But there’s more! The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (which has been going on since 1988 or thereabouts) is heating up again. Armenia is close to Russia, but Erdo is rallying behind Azerbaijan.

It’s not surprising, then, that Russian helicopters flew along the Turkish border soon after the initial Armenian-Azeri clash in mid-June, and Turkey’s condemnation of Armenia for that fighting.

Erdoğan also has a very strained, and strange, relationship with the US generally, and Donald Trump in particular. Given Trump’s mercurial nature, Erdoğan would be a fool to expect Trump to pull his irons out of the fire in a Turkish dust up with Russia. Or France. Or Greece. Or Egypt.

The Turkish economy is also in a parlous state, meaning that the country is extremely vulnerable to economic pressure. The lira has depreciated badly in recent years, is near all time lows against the dollar, and could easily tip–or be tipped-off a cliff. Turks of a certain age remember the extreme privations that followed US sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Younger generations don’t have that experience, and have (at least in the big cities) attained a degree of affluence that could be gone in a trice. It is an open question whether they would, in a fit of nationalist pride, forgive Erdoğan for that.

Erdoğan also outraged much of the Christian world with his conversion (on extremely dubious legal grounds) of the venerated Aya Sophia/Hagia Sofia from a museum (established by Ataturk) back to a mosque.

Erdoğan’s political situation is shaky–which may be why he is engaged in so much adventurism. He lost the big cities–Istanbul and Ankara notably–to the opposition CHP. He still has very strong support in the Anatolian heartland, especially among devout Muslims there (and in the cities as well). But the country is divided and Erdoğan has a lot of domestic enemies, and is making more by the day.

In sum, Erdoğan has picked a fight with pretty much everyone with a stake in the eastern Mediterranean. Why he’s doing so is not completely clear. In part, it’s delusions of grandeur: he envisions himself as the emerging dominant power in that region. But he can be so only at the sufferance of the US and Russia in particular. He is appealing to a highly chauvinistic populace–Turks are arguably the most chauvinistic nation in the world–in order to bolster his political situation.

But strategically his actions appear to be incredibly foolhardy and shortsighted. It is hard to see the upside, especially in Syria and Libya. The downsides are huge. He must be counting that the big boys in the neighborhood are willing to put up with his bumptiousness. But if he’s wrong, Turkey will be in a world of hurt.

He needs to be most careful about the Russians. After Turkey shot down a Russian jet over Syria, the furious Russian reaction forced Erdoğan to back down. Now he is risking confrontation with them not only in Syria, but in Libya and Armenia/Azerbaijan. With Putin too perhaps needing a wag the dog moment again (given the uninspiring results of his constitutional referendum, growing discontent as illustrated by open protests in the east, and chronic economic difficulties), Erdoğan could be made to order.

Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. Erdoğan is rushing in where angels avoid, and doing so very likely because he is a fool.

Apropos my earlier post on Erdoğan’s strategic brilliance, after Turkey’s army inflicted some serious damage on Assad’s armed forces, the Russians evidently made it clear that he would not be allowed to have his way in Idlib. So Erdoğan scuttled to Moscow, and emerged with a ceasefire agreement (not that he wanted one) which basically brought his campaign to a screeching halt.

The optics tell all. The fact that Erdo had to go to Moscow for one thing. But it was worse than that. Putin really rubbed the would-be sultan’s nose in it.

The same week a delegation from Zimbabwe–yes, Zimbabwe–visited Putin in the Kremlin. The entire delegation was seated. There was no statuary in sight.

When the Turkish delegation visited, all except Erdoğan were forced to stand. In front of a statue of Catherine the Great, no less, which had been moved into the room specifically for the Turkish delegation.

Catherine, of course, waged war against the Ottomans during her entire reign, and seized vast territories from them. Catherine epitomizes Russian domination of Turkey. As Russians well know–as do Turks.

After leaving the Turks to shuffle cravenly before Catherine’s bronze gaze for a few moments, Putin beckoned them to approach with a dismissive wave of his fingers, like he was calling his dogs. He was trying to humiliate. He succeeded.

Erdoğan has been flailing desperately for US and European support to counter Russia. Trump acknowledged that Turkey and Syria were fighting, but said he didn’t care.

In so many words: You’re on your own, Erdo! You made your bed with Putin, hope you stocked up on the KY.

The refugee gambit has only infuriated the Europeans. Not as if they would be willing to risk confronting Russia anyways.

Yes. Quite the genius Erdo is. Quite the genius.