Streetwise Professor

A group claiming to be the Russian branch of Anonymous has hacked into Nashi emails, and announced the hack with this rather amusing video:

The Guardian has some details on the hack:

Apparently sent between November 2010 and December 2011, the emails appear to confirm critics’ longstanding suspicions that the group uses sinister methods, funded by the Kremlin, to attack perceived enemies and pay for favourable reports while claiming that Putin’s popularity is unassailable.

They provide particular insight into the group’s strategy to boost pro-Putin coverage on the internet, which in contrast to television is seen as being ruled by the opposition. Several emails sent from activists to Potupchik include price lists for pro-Putin bloggers and commenters, indicating that some are paid as much as 600,000 roubles (£12,694) for leaving hundreds of comments on negative press articles on the internet.

Re the comments part. Makes me wonder . . .

But moving right along. This is a classical example of the frequent tension between means and ends. I have been extremely critical of Anonymous, and Wikileaks/Assange, Appelbaum, etc. That criticism is based on methods, lack of accountability, the dangers of self-appointed judges (many of whom are, quite frankly, sociopaths) not subject to any checks or balances violating laws and privacy, and the serious risks to innocent individuals and to individuals working for or cooperating with legitimate law enforcement or security agencies.*

The Olympian we-are-judge-and-jury-and-executioner mindset is quite evident in the video above, as it is in this video in which Anonymous announces its threat to dox Black Bloc types who Anonymous claims are discrediting the Occupy movement (h/t R):

Which means that even when I find the target of these attacks loathsome (as is the case with Nashi and Black Bloc), I cannot condone the means. I really don’t need Anonymous to tell me that Nashi is a cretinous, thuggish organization of Putin puppets. That is quite evident from information readily obtained without engaging in the cyber equivalent of breaking and entering. The problem of unaccountable individuals deciding who should be targeted, and what information should be released, remains. Even if those unaccountable individuals sometimes choose truly unsavory targets, giving them the discretion to choose whom to target is likely to lead to more harm than good.

Although the means are technologically novel, the fundamental problem is an old one: vigilantism. This presents very thorny challenges, most notably the legitimacy of the use of private force. I readily agree that an absolute bar again such use is unjustifiable. In circumstances of systematic repression–such as in Syria at present–or the substantial failure of the government to protect lives and property, the use of private force is legitimate and often beneficial.

Thus, it is incorrect, in my view, to make categorical judgments about vigilantism as always wrong or never justified. As with virtually anything in life, there are trade-offs. But given the very great potential for egregious abuse, the bar that any justification of vigilantism must clear should be set very high. Very high.

Some specific cases help clarify the issue. For instance, Assad is engaged in indiscriminate killing in Syria, using artillery to attack those resisting his regime–and killing many innocents in the bargain. His regime has no legitimacy under any theory except that of might makes right. There are virtually no alternatives to affect change other than violent opposition.

Given this set of facts, some acts of vigilantism–including the recent hack of some of his communications–clear the bar. Indeed, most acts of private violence directed against his regime are legitimate: my concern is what happens if the vigilantes prevail (witness Libya).

Other acts do not clear the bar. Again, as much as I dislike Nashi and the regime that it serves, its true nature is readily observable. Indeed, the group is almost exhibitionist in its methods. Information about it and opposition to it can be generated without resorting to hacking.

To an economist, to whom it is second nature to think about trade offs, the key issues are: Even if a given goal has some value, what is the most efficient way to achieve it? What do you have to give up to obtain it?

With respect to politically-related hacking, the answer to these questions very much depends on the polity in question. Such actions are more likely to be justifiable in polities with little public accountability, more constraints on information, and fewer checks and balances on the powerful. Even though Russia fares very poorly by comparison to the US and Europe on all of those dimensions, in my opinion the hack of Nashi doesn’t clear the bar–though it comes close. The dangers inherent in validating the actions of self-appointed, unaccountable “guardians” (i.e., vigilantes) far exceed the value of any information produced, or the effect of this information on politics and civil society in Russia. As Putin sometimes says, “the dog barks, but the caravan moves on.” The Putin/Nashi caravan will move on, regardless of whatever sordid details that Anonymous releases. Nashi are hacks, and we all know that: hacking them won’t have any effect, and condoning this conduct could lead to far more deleterious consequences.

Indeed, most of these efforts have not had the intended effect. Bradley Manning and Wikileaks mildly embarrassed the US government, but almost certainly had no lasting impact on US policy, certainly not the impact Assange and Manning were hoping to have. The only real effect they likely had was to endanger some people named in the cables. Similarly, it’s not like the release of the Assad material has stopped him from shelling Homs or killing indiscriminately elsewhere.

Among the deleterious consequences is that these things descend into a retaliatory spiral. This appears to be what is happening in Russia. Navalny was the victim of a hack. Nashi was United Russia’s website was hacked. A cycle of hacking is apparently well underway. This is not a good thing. It is the cyber equivalent of street fights between rival party (e.g., Communists vs. Nazi SA) gangs in Weimar Germany. These are destructive in and of themselves, but also provide the perfect pretext for the authorities to crack down hard–and stifle everybody’s freedom even more. That’s especially true in a place like Russia, and the opposition will suffer most.

If anything goes, likely everything will. As much as I loath Putin and Nashi, this is the wrong way to go about it. It is unlikely to hurt them seriously. It will invite a crackdown. It is not conducive to the strengthening of civil society, as it is really just a tactic in a civil war. It can easily get out of control because the perpetrators are not accountable–on either side. Although a stronger case for anti-government hacking can be made in Russia than the US, even there I worry that it is likely to bring about more bad than good.

* Not to mention that they don’t seem all that bright or knowledgeable. Assange comes off as incoherent in most interviews. Appelbaum appears to be an idiot savant, quite expert in internet technology (and pornography) but only capable of regurgitating prog pablum on any other issue. See my earlier post for a discussion of his clueless disquisitions on IP legal matters. The thought of people such as this taking law and politics into their own hands, with no mechanism of accountability, is quite chilling.