Streetwise Professor

July 24, 2014

The EU’s Non-Paper and Its Non-Sanctions Show Europe is Non-Serious About Russia

Filed under: Military,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 7:01 pm

There was a brief frisson of excitement late last night and this morning, because of a rather startling headline in the FT: “Ukraine Crisis: EU to Weigh Far-Reaching Sanctions on Russia.” Oh joy! Maybe they are actually growing a pair:

The sanctions measure, contained in a 10-page options memo prepared by the European Commission and distributed to national capitals, also proposes barring the Russian banks from listing new issues on European exchanges, preventing them from using London or other EU stock markets to raise funds from non-Europeans.

But the Euros didn’t want to go too far:

The proposal would not initially include a similar prohibition for Russian sovereign bond auctions out of fear the Kremlin could retaliate by ordering an end to Russian purchases of EU government debt, the document states.

These conclusions were based on a leaked document that had been circulated among the member states before a highly guarded meeting held today to consider future measures against Russia.

Then further details came out about the document, and when that happened, frisson was replaced by resignation, and an understanding that the Euros are still short more than a pair: their testicular deficit makes the Greek budget deficit pale in comparison.

As it turns out, the document was what in Eurospeak is referred to as a “non-paper.” (Doc embedded here.) Yes, they have things called “non-papers.” How Orwellian is that?

So just what would a non-paper be? This is what it be:

These surreal-sounding documents crop up quite often in Brussels. Non-papers are discussion documents drawn up either by one of the EU’s institutions or by a Union government. They are designed to stimulate discussion on a particular issue and do not represent the official position of the institution or country which drafted them. Non-papers have no official status, but can be very useful in starting debates on particularly sensitive issues, allowing EU decision-makers to talk about issues they would find it politically difficult to take a firm line on. They can also be used to test the water on subjects without obliging countries to take a stand, thus avoiding potential diplomatic rows.

So, at best, non-papers are the start to a conversation. A straw man proposal to shoot at. The country circulating one does not even really take ownership of what is proposed in it. It’s a “so what do you think of this?” sort of thing.

In other words, hardly an action item on the immediate agenda. And definitely not anything being “weighed” seriously, even in the aftermath of the murder of 298 people, and the ongoing maskirovka invasion of Ukraine. It represents the outer limit of maybe, someday: it doesn’t represent anything likely, today.

So rather than moving on the quite robust sanctions proposed in the non-paper, the Euros moved forward with a flaccid enhancement of its sanctions. While the caskets were being carried off of a transport plane in the Netherlands, the stalwart Euros took a strong stand: they added some individuals and a few non-Russian companies to their list of the sanctioned. In other words, rather than taking the advice of the non-paper and doing something robust, the Euros voted in favor of non-sanctions, thereby proving that they are non-serious.

This is apparently the sort of sanctions that Merkel and others consider “prudent.” Not prudent in the sense of accomplishing anything. Quite the contrary, prudent in the sense of not accomplishing anything, because accomplishing something might make Vlad cross, and we can’t have that, can we?

If this is the most the Euros can muster when the corpses of those murdered are still above ground, just imagine how little they can do when the bodies are finally buried. Actually, I think that the prospect of any serious action against Putin will be interred long before the last poor victim reaches her final resting place.

This ineffectual action (but I give it too much credit by calling it ineffectual; or an action) followed a week of rather sordid bickering between the grandees of Europe. No country was willing to agree to measures which imposed more costs on it than on another EU nation. So when the UK urged France to forego the billion plus dollar sale of the Mistrals, the French refused, and heatedly pointed out that the British were hypocrites because they were not volunteering to do anything that would cut off the flow of oligarch cash into London. This was the diplomatic version of: “Don’t call me a crack whore: You’re the real crack whore.”

But I do a grave insult to crack whores by comparing them to European governments.

(With respect to the Mistrals, note well that the French give the same reason for delivering them as Russia gave for delivering arms to Assad: “we are obligated to perform on existing contracts.”)

This matters not just because the pressure on Putin is reduced if the Europeans go AWOL. It also matters because Obama has made it abundantly clear that he will not get too far out front of the Europeans. Numerous anonymous administration officials were busy peddling that message. Meaning that since the Europeans are doing a little more than nothing, Obama will not say to hell with them, and shame them (if they are capable of shame) by implementing measures that will grievously harm Russia. He will do a little more than a little more than nothing, so they won’t look bad.

Meaning that if Putin’s Botox-frozen face was capable of cracking a smile, he’d be grinning from ear to ear. Because he knows he is living the psychopath’s dream: getting away with murder. 298 and counting, to be precise.

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4 Comments »

  1. The only possible rationalization for the weak-tea sanctions policy is that “the threat is greater than the execution” as they say in chess. Once tough sanctions are in place, Putin’s incentives shift because he has to publicly look weak if he gives in and because getting a tough sanctions regime undone once it had been laboriously constructed can be difficult.

    But I don’t buy it. The threat is only stronger than the execution if it is actually a threat, and right now credibility is at a premium.

    Comment by srp — July 25, 2014 @ 5:51 pm

  2. @srp-You are right. It is all about credibility. Obama squandered that repeatedly in the past, with red lines and such. Now the shying away from serious sanctions just undermines the credibility of the threat that they will be used in the future.

    Where I disagree is that it is harder to undo sanctions than to impose them. Access to dollar clearing system can be turned on and off like a faucet.

    The ProfessorComment by The Professor — July 25, 2014 @ 7:19 pm

  3. (With respect to the Mistrals, note well that the French give the same reason for delivering them as Russia gave for delivering arms to Assad: “we are obligated to perform on existing contracts.”)

    Which is doubly laughable because as anyone who has had the misfortune to work with the French knows, they are quite happy to ignore a contract when it suits them. You’d accept this excuse from the Japanese or Swiss, but not the French.

    Comment by Tim Newman — July 27, 2014 @ 3:58 am

  4. @Tim-True. Nor from the Russians. Which makes the comparison even more apt.

    The ProfessorComment by The Professor — July 27, 2014 @ 12:53 pm

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