The Defective Military Metaphor
Obama’s speech on Iraq seemed listless and perfunctory. Much of it was boilerplate–no surprise there. Some of it was disturbing, most notably his continued ambivalence on Afghanistan:
Within Afghanistan, I have ordered the deployment of additional troops who-under the command of General David Petraeus -are fighting to break the Taliban’s momentum. As with the surge in Iraq, these forces will be in place for a limited time to provide space for the Afghans to build their capacity and secure their own future. But, as was the case in Iraq, we cannot do for Afghans what they must ultimately do for themselves. That’s why we are training Afghan Security Forces and supporting a political resolution to Afghanistan’s problems. And, next July, we will begin a transition to Afghan responsibility. The pace of our troop reductions will be determined by conditions on the ground, and our support for Afghanistan will endure. But make no mistake: this transition will begin – because open-ended war serves neither our interests nor the Afghan people’s. [Emphasis added.]
He throws a small bone to the critics of his Afghanistan policy with his remark about “conditions on the ground.” But everything else in the statement–including the phrases I’ve italicized–clearly indicate that the American commitment is tightly circumscribed. Moreover, the commencement of the drawdown is written in stone (“But make no mistake: this transition will begin”). The only flexibility is on the pace of the drawdown–not its inevitability.
This is all delusional because the goal of his policy–Afghanization, the building of Afghan capacity to secure the country’s future–is completely incompatible with this cramped timeline. It is widely recognized that Afghan state and military capability are years behind Iraq’s, and there are grounds for concern about the viability of Iraq’s as an independent entity even after many years of robust American support and training. So there is no way Afghanistan will be capable of what Obama wants in July of 2011, or years beyond that. If we are lucky, the drawdown in Afghanistan will commence when we are at the end of the beginning of the beginning. This is a disaster in the making. A warm up the helos and clear the roof of the embassy-type disaster.
But that’s not the main thing that struck me about the speech, because it was completely in line with his previous statements. What hit me was the clunky attempt to “pivot” to the economy. This was hardly a thing of grace, and in its own way is quite revealing:
Unfortunately, over the last decade, we have not done what is necessary to shore up the foundation of our own prosperity. We have spent over a trillion dollars at war, often financed by borrowing from overseas. This, in turn, has short-changed investments in our own people, and contributed to record deficits. For too long, we have put off tough decisions on everything from our manufacturing base to our energy policy to education reform. As a result, too many middle class families find themselves working harder for less, while our nation’s long-term competitiveness is put at risk.
And so at this moment, as we wind down the war in Iraq, we must tackle those challenges at home with as much energy, and grit, and sense of common purpose as our men and women in uniform who have served abroad. They have met every test that they faced. Now, it is our turn. Now, it is our responsibility to honor them by coming together, all of us, and working to secure the dream that so many generations have fought for -the dream that a better life awaits anyone who is willing to work for it and reach for it.
Our most urgent task is to restore our economy, and put the millions of Americans who have lost their jobs back to work. To strengthen our middle class, we must give all our children the education they deserve, and all our workers the skills that they need to compete in a global economy. We must jumpstart industries that create jobs, and end our dependence on foreign oil. We must unleash the innovation that allows new products to roll off our assembly lines, and nurture the ideas that spring from our entrepreneurs. This will be difficult. But in the days to come, it must be our central mission as a people, and my central responsibility as President.
Note the direct assertion that the same kinds of things that work in a military campaign are what are needed to rejuvenate the economy. This is not new. Statists are fond of using military metaphors to describe the economy, and military style, command and control, methods to address economic issues. Lenin’s writing is littered with military metaphors. (And no, I’m not saying Obama is a Leninist.) Ditto fascist economic tracts. (And not saying he’s a fascist either.) In the US, during the New Deal, military metaphors and command and control type measures to address the crisis were all the rage. In the 1970s, Carter said that fighting the energy crisis was the “moral equivalent of war,” and attempted to implement a raft of centralized, government-driven initiatives to deal with energy. Statists rattle the economic saber at every opportunity.
Obama’s speech reflects a similar mindset that the economy is something that is amenable to central direction and control, like a military campaign, as does his recent statement on the economy:
“Every single day, I’m pushing this economy forward, repairing the damage that’s been done to the middle class over the past decade and promoting the growth we need to get out people back to work,” Obama said in his statement.
General Obama, leading the economic charge. “Fighting for economic recovery on all fronts.” He called for a “full-scale attack” on economic issues, and called on the Republicans to end their “blockade” against a “jobs bill.” It is amazing that a man that is so painfully, obviously diffident–at best–about his real military responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief is so aggressive in his deployment of military imagery–and centralized, quasi-military methods–on economic matters.
This is fundamentally wrongheaded, and actually destructive. The economy is not an army, to be commanded and directed. Centralized methods founder on information and incentive problems, and the daunting complexity and interconnectedness of the economic system. Attempts to centralize invariably impair efficiency, and stymie growth, rather than the reverse. This is particularly true when helter skelter attempts to restructure massive parts of the economy create pervasive uncertainty that paralyzes private decision makers. Military-style, centralized, command and control methods are the last thing the economy needs to prosper.
I’ve said before that the greatest lesson of the Great Depression is that we learned the wrong lessons from the Great Depression. There was at the time (notably at Chicago), and increasingly so today, a recognition that the dirigiste thrust of Roosevelt’s policies and the great uncertainty created by the improvisational nature of the centralized policies exacerbated the depth and duration of the Depression.
This is a plausible reading of the current situation as well. If Obama truly views economic matters in the way suggested by his rhetoric, as something amenable to centralized, hierarchical, military-style methods, we can anticipate a continuing, stumbling recovery, if we’re lucky. In other words, General Obama’s ringing call to economic arms will not lead us to victory, but to quagmire–to appropriate a word so beloved of his ilk.
Typical “politics instead of leadership” that we have been getting from the Great Speechifier. What are his policies? What are his priorities? What are his basic principles? Where does he intend to lead us? We don’t need metaphors. We need sound economic principles and sound leadership. Its been two years and we are still waiting for specifics. As a wise man once told me, “people don’t wait to tell you good news.” 62 days left until election day. If anyone wants to see something interesting, pull up a daily bar chart of the DOW starting January 1993 and going forward to 6 years or so. What exact day did the great economic boom of the 1990’s start? The Wednesday after the 1994 interim election. Check it out. Just saying.
Comment by Charles — September 1, 2010 @ 4:27 pm
And a huge bond rally too, Charles. I remember it well.
…and end our dependence on foreign oil.
And we will do this using the little-known method of banning drilling in our own waters.
Comment by Tim Newman — September 1, 2010 @ 7:58 pm
Yet another oil rig explosion.
But who cares? The most important thing for Newman and his ilk is to further enrich oiligarchs.
Comment by Sublime Oblivion — September 2, 2010 @ 2:18 pm
This may come as a surprise to Sublime Oblivion, but the oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico is not run for the benefit of oligarchs. Nor are the operations carried out by my own employer, at least not on the projects I’m assigned to.
Yes, the oil business is dangerous, none know that more than those – like me – who work in it. We are aware of it, we accept the risks, and attempt to minimise them. We understand that this is too much to stomach for precious little academics who pontificate for a living, but until you and your ilk stop buying petroleum products – and I mean “stop buying petroleum products”, not write boring articles on how everybody else should make sacrifices in order to avert disasters you’ve predicted to the amusement of those who know what they’re talking about – then we’d appreciate it if you just let us get on with it. We’re providing you with the means to live the lifestyle you’ve chosen matey; we’re not asking for thanks, but a little less adolescent whining would be nice.
Comment by Tim Newman — September 2, 2010 @ 10:13 pm
“This is all delusional because the goal of his policy–Afghanization, the building of Afghan capacity to secure the country’s future–is completely incompatible with this cramped timeline.”
Gorby decided to leave Afghanistan, and by early 1989 there was an Afghan army that fought pretty well as long as foreigners kept it paid and supplied, which will be required for any Afghan army we leave behind.
The USG has been building an Afghan army for far longer than the Sovs did. Clearly, the USG suck at that, and Obama knows he can’t fix that. So we’re leaving.
So typical of SWP that he breathes not a word of criticism for the guy who made the decisions that lost the Afghan war while vituperating the guy who has to clean it up.
Comment by rkka — September 4, 2010 @ 8:31 pm
So typical of SWP that he breathes not a word of criticism for the guy who made the decisions that lost the Afghan war while vituperating the guy who has to clean it up.
Which decisions, exactly?
Comment by Tim Newman — September 4, 2010 @ 11:36 pm
The decisions that put the Afghan in the lost position it was in by 20 January 2009.
Chiefly, the under-resourcing of the effort there for nearly six years.
Comment by rkka — September 5, 2010 @ 9:17 am
The decisions that put the Afghan in the lost position it was in by 20 January 2009.
Which were?
Chiefly, the under-resourcing of the effort there for nearly six years.
Firstly, the war in Iraq meant there were not many more troops available (sending the extra in 2007 required a change to troop leave rotations IIRC). Secondly, Bush was asking for Nato countries to provide more troops, to no avail. Thirdly, it is doubtful whether more troops would have made the difference between winning and losing the war: I don’t know any military analyst who thinks it was/is purely a numbers game. Fourthly, it is pretty easy with hindsight to say that more troops should have been sent, not so easy to try to balance this with actual available resources. I’m not saying Bush has handled any of it particularly well, but all the above are reasons why SWP might not feel obliged to blame Bush when discussing Obama’s current actions.
Comment by Tim Newman — September 5, 2010 @ 10:01 am
“Firstly, the war in Iraq meant there were not many more troops available (sending the extra in 2007 required a change to troop leave rotations IIRC).”
Indeed. The opening of another major war effort before the Afghan war was successfully concluded was a major strategic blunder. As President Lincol said to his Secretary of War when he wanted to declare war on the British Empire while the Civil War was going “One war at a time, Mr. Seward.”
“Secondly, Bush was asking for Nato countries to provide more troops, to no avail.”
Yet another reason to be cautious about opening another major war effort before the first was concluded.
“Thirdly, it is doubtful whether more troops would have made the difference between winning and losing the war: I don’t know any military analyst who thinks it was/is purely a numbers game.”
Numbers alone will certainly not assure a win. Insufficient numbers, below the FM 3-24 Counterinsugency suggestion of 20-25 troops per thousand population, will lose it.
For six years, our Afghan opponents had been able to grow their networks, and the strategic patience of the American people run down.
Time, once lost, can rarely be retrieved.
Comment by rkka — September 5, 2010 @ 1:07 pm
The opening of another major war effort before the Afghan war was successfully concluded was a major strategic blunder.
With the sanctions unravelling, and Russia and France in the process or rapidly normalising relations with Iraq, I don’t think the Americans had that much choice over when to get rid of Saddam Hussein. And it is far better to fight at a time of one’s own choosing than having to deal with Saddam Hussein at an unspecified later date, probably when they are genuinely neck-deep in another war.
Yet another reason to be cautious about opening another major war effort before the first was concluded.
The US forces have since WWII been structured to fight a war in two theatres simultaneously. If it turned out they couldn’t, this is hardly Bush’s fault.
Insufficient numbers, below the FM 3-24 Counterinsugency suggestion of 20-25 troops per thousand population, will lose it.
Hindsight. Who was quoting these numbers as applicable to Afghanistan before the war?
Comment by Tim Newman — September 5, 2010 @ 10:01 pm