Streetwise Professor

Ukraine has shocked Russia–and to some extent the world–with a bold incursion into the Kursk Oblast of Russia proper. The Ukrainians have penetrated many kilometers into Russia, captured numerous prisoners, devastated several convoys of troops dispatched to stem the Ukrainian attack, and stirred up enough confusion to cause several Russian friendly fire episodes.

The Ukrainians adopted the Wee Willie Keeler strategy–hit ’em where they ain’t. This contrasts with the Russian strategy: hit ’em where they are; with your face; repeatedly. (Last year’s abortive Ukrainian counteroffensive was an example of them hitting ’em where they were. Apparently they’ve learned better).

The Ukrainian attack (of indeterminate strength, due to rather effective operational security) penetrated a stretch of the Russian border manned with neglected border troops (many of whom were underfed and who had not bathed for extended periods) and Chechen TikTok warriors. They advanced quickly, seized important roads, crossroads, and settlements. They have also sent out raiding parties to hit and run many kilometers in advance of the positions that they have secured and are preparing to hold.

Of course this surprising and humiliating development has led to bitter recriminations and searches for scapegoats in Russia. The FSB claims that it warned Gerasimov and the Russian general staff of a Ukrainian buildup on the latter’s side of the border, but Gerasimov et al ignored their warnings.

Historically, almost every major military surprise was preceded by warnings and substantial intelligence that in retrospect foretold what occurred. It’s all in the interpretation of that information by the decision makers in advance that matters.

Soon after the Russian offensive aimed at Kharkiv bogged down, the Ukrainians and the YouTube and Telegram channels that are often conduits for Ukrainian information operations warned that Russia was amassing forces in the Kursk region for a potential attack on the Sumy Oblast in Ukraine. It is uncertain whether such a buildup was actually taking place, but in many respects that is irrelevant. If Gerasimov et al took the Ukrainian warnings at face value they would have interpreted the Ukrainian concentration in Sumy as a preemptive defensive response rather than the harbinger of an invasion. Indeed, they would have considered this good news.

It would be particularly amusing if Russia had been running an influence operation threatening the opening of a new front in Sumy in order to draw Ukrainian troops to the area and away from where Russia really wanted to attack. In that case, Gerasimov would have rubbed his hands in glee at when the FSB delivered news of the Ukrainian move: “Our plan is working!!!”

It may be that Ukraine had initially moved troops north based on a belief of Russian action in Sumy, learned that it was at most a feint and that there were really no serious Russian forces in the area, and decided to flip the board and use the troops moved for defensive purposes for an offensive into a vacuum.

In other words, who psyched out whom here is not clear. It is quite possible that the Russians psyched themselves out in a too clever by half attempt to psych out the Ukrainians. Note that Gerasimov’s pre-war reputation for genius was based on his alleged mastery of such deception operations. (Remember the “Little Green Men”?)

Regardless, Russia is clearly on the back foot here and scrambling to recover.

The Ukrainian operational objectives are unclear, are probably multifaceted, and likely will adjust depending on how the battle goes. One objective could be to disrupt Russian logistics further by interdicting a rail line that supplies the main Russian advances further south: Ukraine has been waging a steady drone and missile campaign against Russian logistics (including notably at air bases) and the Kursk incursion would fit into that broader campaign. Another natural one would be to cause a diversion of Russian forces from Donetsk and Luhansk. Delivering a political embarrassment to Putin would be another worthy goal.

How much further will Ukraine go? I doubt very far. Expanding the breakthrough would require many more forces and create severe logistical strains for the Ukrainians themselves. How long will they stay? That depends on the Russian response and how Ukraine deals with it.

It seems that initially that the Russian reaction is helter skelter, sending random collections of units (sometimes stray platoons) forward piecemeal. This has exposed them to being defeated in details by fires (drones and artillery), often while strung out on the road. If the Russians continue to do this, the Ukrainians can stay a rather long time: if they come on the same old style, the Ukrainians will meet them in the same old style.

The smarter thing for the Russians to do would be to amass forces carefully and systematically relatively far back from the Ukrainian front line, and then attack simultaneously on multiple axes. But the Russians haven’t shown the ability to do anything smart so far. Nor have they demonstrated the ability to engage in operational maneuvers with multiple units over a broad front: their recent offensive batterings in Donetsk and Luhansk have been almost exclusively piecemeal attacks of platoon sized units on the same, single axis, day after day. Moreover, the humiliation of this incursion and Putin’s frustration strongly push the Russians to a frantic, extemporized response. And if the Russians do the smart, it will take some considerable time, which the Ukrainians can draw out with continued attacks on logistics.

So either way, I expect Ukraine to be camping out in Kursk well into the autumn.

One other amusing aspect of this episode is the Russian hysterical demands that the international community condemn this violation of sacred Russian territorial sovereignty. “MOM! NO FAIR! UKRAINE HIT ME BACK!”

Cry me a river, Vova. Have have fun in the Second Battle of Kursk. I don’t think it will turn out as well for you as the first one did for Stalin.