Streetwise Professor

December 13, 2010

Some Further Thoughts Re the NYT and Derivatives

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Economics,Exchanges,Financial crisis,Politics — The Professor @ 11:25 am

One of the sob stories in yesterday’s NYT piece is that the incumbent dealers froze out Bank of New York Mellon from membership in ICE Trust, a CCP for CDS.  The CEO of BNY Mellon Clearing is quoted as saying “We are not a nobody.”

Which raises the question: given BNY Mellon’s non-nobodiness status, if OTC derivatives trading is so obscenely profitable, why didn’t that bank–and others–endeavor to get a bigger piece of those profits and increase the scope of its business in competition with the major dealers?  What was the entry barrier that prevented that?  I’m not saying there wasn’t one, just that nobody has come up with a credible answer as to what it is.

To put things in perspective, BNYM is 7th among US banks (that’s just US banks) in overall derivatives positions.  It is dwarfed by the big 5.  In terms of overall notional, in billions, per OCC data, the rankings are JPM ($75253); BAC  ($48520); Citi ($45991); Goldman ($42087); HSBC ($3683); Wells Fargo ($3612); BNY Mellon ($1457).  In terms of CDS, which is really what is relevant in any discussion of ICE Trust, the numbers are (in the same order): $5355; $4694; $2397; $499; $759; $126; $.7.  Yes, $.7 for BNY.  And even this comparison is misleading, because it covers only (a) US banks, (b) not all of the US derivatives dealers do all their business through a bank; and (c) there are other firms in CDS that rank above BNY Mellon, including: PNC, Suntrust, US Bank NA, Keybank, Fifth Third, RBS Citizens, Morgan Stanley Bank, Deutsche Bank Americas, and Huntington Bank.

That disparity speaks volumes.  As I’ve said before on SWP and elsewhere, and as has been noted in other contexts in the economic literature, cooperative organizations work better and can be governed more efficiently when the members are homogeneous.  BNY Mellon is a very different animal than the members of ICE Trust.  Moreover, is it really credible that the major dealers were so afraid of competition from the bank with the 17th largest CDS book among US banks, with an outstanding position that was rounding error as compared to the other ICE Trust members, that anti-competitive exclusion was the true motive for keeping out Bank of New York Mellon?

Note to Louise Story:  Data is our friend.  Further note to Louise Story (forwarded from George Stigler’s ghost): the plural of “anecdote” is not “data.”

Next thought.  As I suggested in yesterday’s post, there is a tension between the dominant narratives involving OTC derivatives.  The one narrative is that there is an evil cabal of bankers that exercise market power and keep prices (spreads) at supercompetitive levels: this would suppress output.  In this narrative, regulators should take measures that increase competition–and thereby increase output.  The other narrative is that OTC derivatives markets are too big, thereby posing a systemic risk, and that output should shrink.

This sounds like Alice in Wonderland.  One pill makes you too big.  The other pill makes you too small.  Which is it?  Are the markets too big or too small?  Which pill did they take?

If you really think that the OTC derivatives markets are too big because of systemic risks, on second best grounds you should favor reducing competition, and enhancing market power.   You should rejoice that a dealer cabal restricts output.  (You should rejoice on other grounds too: high profits lead to higher capital–to the extent it isn’t paid out in bonuses and dividends–and hence less systemic risk.)

So: pick your poison (or your pill, as you like).

(Further apologies to George Stigler, who said that “Well, there are always second best considerations” is an economics conversation stopper.  Not that I think the above will stop this particular conversation.)

Next item: thanks to Felix Salmon, my sometimes foil/sparring partner, for his extended coverage of SWP in his story on the Story story.  To satisfy your curiosity, Felix: no, she didn’t.

Print Friendly, PDF & Email


  1. […] a slightly different take on this, go visit the Streetwise Professor.  He and I have sparred over this and other market structure from time to time.  But we both are […]

    Pingback by Banks, Clearing and Over the Counter Derivatives Points and Figures — December 13, 2010 @ 1:58 pm

  2. just linked to your post, and felix. I think it’s in the same vein as mine. I don’t have access, nor do I know where to search for the data you mentioned in your post. Look at it purely from a structural, regulatory and strategic angle.

    This battle is just beginning.

    Comment by Jeff Carter — December 13, 2010 @ 2:16 pm

RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URI

Leave a comment

Powered by WordPress