Russia’s Shambolic Logistics in Syria
In responding to Micheal Weiss’s idiotic hyperventilating (but I repeat myself) about Russian intervention in Syria, I quoted the old adage: Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics. I noted that logistics severely constrained Russia’s military capacity in Russia. Look no further than this for evidence of how shambolic Russia’s logistics are:
Earlier this year, an old refrigerator ship called the Georgiy Agafonov, built to transport fruit and vegetables for the Soviet Union, was quietly gathering rust in the Ukrainian port of Izmail where the Danube flows into the Black Sea.
Its owners, a Ukrainian state company, assumed it would never sail again. When a Turkish company offered to buy it for $300,000, they watched as the hulk was towed away, presumably for scrap.
Nine months later the ship is back at sea, renamed Kazan-60, reflagged as part of Russia’s naval auxiliary fleet, and repurposed as an unlikely part of Moscow’s biggest military operation outside the old Soviet boundaries since the Cold War.
. . . .
The need for the extra cargo ships arose because Russia’s warships did not by themselves have enough capacity to supply the mission, said Vasily Kashin, senior research fellow at the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.
“Before we had to use amphibious landing ships to carry supplies to Syria. But now they are not sufficient and we are creating a new class of military transports which are part of the navy but in fact are pure cargo ships,” he said.
An icebreaker called the Yauza was also sent to the Mediterranean from the Arctic to beef up Moscow’s logistics. According to publicly available shipping data, it made two trips to Syria in October and November.
Buying old cargo ships gives Moscow more control than contracting out its transport to commercial carriers, said Gerry Northwood, chief operations officer with British maritime security firm MAST.
Russia has utilized some flashy weaponry–such as surface and submarine launched cruise missiles–in its Syria campaign. But this is military Potemkinism, a dazzling facade that distracts from the shabby and creaking structure beneath. Especially now, with rumblings about Turkey closing the Bosporus to Russia, those freaking out about Russia’s involvement in Syria need to look beneath the facade, and understand how the realities of logistics, which have doomed far more campaigns than anything that has transpired on battlefields, fundamentally limit what Russia can even hope to achieve.
There’s two things to know about Russia’s intervention in Syria.
The first is that it does represent a defeat for American foreign policy. It showcases the collapse of American influence and prestige in the Middle East and among the great powers, and a reversal of a major American foreign policy achievement dating back to the 1970s. However, once it happened, it was done. That can’t be reversed, but neither could it happen again.
The second is the ongoing problem or threat represented by Russian activity in the Middle East, and that is very limited. Other than a spoiler complicating diplomatic efforts, Russian activity is limited.
People need to separate the two. No matter how embarrassing it is for the US that Putin has interjected Russia back into Middle East politics, there is no reason for panic as to what he can do going forward. One can admit it is a defeat for US foreign policy while still admitting that while the horse has left the barn, that the loss is very survivable.
Comment by Chris — December 16, 2015 @ 6:24 pm
The first is that it does represent a defeat for American foreign policy. It showcases the collapse of American influence and prestige in the Middle East and among the great powers, and a reversal of a major American foreign policy achievement dating back to the 1970s.
I don’t see it that way. Both Iraq and Iran were traditionally clients of the Soviet Union, as was Syria and Egypt. Coming to the aid of their sole ally in the region when he is on the brink of being toppled is hardly an embarrassment for the US: what US interests in Syria have suffered? Okay, Assad survives (for now) but it’s not like the US had an alternative lined up.
Comment by Tim Newman — December 17, 2015 @ 3:16 am
When a Turkish company offered to buy it for $300,000, they watched as the hulk was towed away, presumably for scrap.
A Turkish company?! Oh, the irony!
Comment by Tim Newman — December 17, 2015 @ 3:17 am
I am at a loss to see why using cargo ships for carrying cargo proves that Russia is in the soup. I’m quite prepared to believe that Russia has bitten off more than she can chew, but this seems to me to be no evidence at all for that proposition. Presumably when the US was building up huge forces in the Gulf, she used cargo ships.
Comment by dearieme — December 17, 2015 @ 8:01 am
Tim, you should know your view is a minority one. After Egypt turned from the Soviet Union to the US in the mid/late 1970s, the Soviet Union’s ability to influence the Middle East dramatically declined, and it is generally considered that the US successfully eliminated Soviet Union as a major influence after that. America excluded the Soviets from a prominent role in the Arab-Israeli peace process for example. Syria and Iraq still bought lots of Soviet military equipment, Soviets had very little influence in them. Neither provided the strategic assets Egypt did, neither was a contender for leadership of the Arab world, and both resisted attempts at Moscow to control them despite the weapon sales. Syria repeatedly did things counter to Moscow’s wishes. Gorbachev finally had enough, and he reduced the # of advisors, subsidies, and other support given to Syria. After 1991, Russia essentially had no influence in the Middle East at all. This is why Sadat’s turn from Moscow to Washington is considered such a huge American foreign policy victory during the Cold War.
So basically in 1975, Soviet influence was dramatically reduced, and by 1985 this had become neglible, and after 1991 this was essentially zero. So for a 25 year period, the US didn’t have to deal with the Russians at all, and for 15 years prior to that the US contended with an ever diminishing Soviet influence (40 years total). Compare that to 1973 or earlier when the US and Soviets were constantly tussling for influence.
This is why Russia coming back as a player in the Middle East is such a big deal. The US didn’t really have to worry about reaching a deal with Moscow on any Middle East issue, now it does. Furthermore, since Russia is now a player, other countries can now try to use Russia against the US as leverage.
Syria could not be considered to be a Russian ally. Russia merely had good political ties from past history, and a few legacy bases that weren’t being used. If you had asked anyone in 2012 whether Syria was a Russian ally, the answer would have been no unless your definition as ally was very broad. If you had told people that Russia would be militarily intervening to preserve the Assad regime in 2012, very few people would have believed you. It is very likely that with a stronger President, Putin wouldn’t even have dared to do so. But after seeing the red line failures and Ukraine, Putin felt he’d be able to pull it off.
Iran was never a client state of the Soviets. They were pro-West under the Shah, and the Ayatollahs hated the Communists almost as much as the Great Satan. I think you just got confused on that one.
Comment by Chris — December 17, 2015 @ 12:54 pm
Iran was never a client state of the Soviets.
Where do you suppose they got their weaponry from?
Comment by Tim Newman — December 17, 2015 @ 4:18 pm
@dearieme. Because it shows that the Russians have no existing sealift capacity, and have to resort to buying near derelict castoffs to support their operation in Syria.
The US has the Military Sealift Command which has a large inventory of diverse and modern logistics vessels that are purpose-built for military uses, and yes, it chartered modern container and RoRo vessels. The Russian has nothing equivalent, and thus has to rely on rust buckets.
And believe me, the US didn’t have to bring an icebreaker to the Gulf, like the Russians are bringing to the Med. I note they are doing this when winter is starting. You have to be pretty desperate for sealift if you are bringing an icebreaker out of service in the Arctic in the winter to support a military operation in an ice-free sea.
There is not even a comparison.
This has poetic qualities.
One that probably only a true Russian might fully appreciate.
(and fill his heart with joy & melancholy, instead of laughter & ridicule)
“An icebreaker called the Yauza was also sent to the Mediterranean from the Arctic to beef up Moscow’s logistics.”
Or at least the final proof of Global Cooling.
Also good for marine incidents, category ‘ramming midship’.
Perhaps they envy the Chinese Little Blue Men, cq their marine militia, covering many, if not most, cargo & fishing vessels.
Comment by Wilhelmus Janus — December 17, 2015 @ 8:10 pm
In reply to #7; but surely the Russian lack of sealift simply demonstrates that she has had no plans for overseas attacks, unlike the US, and couldn’t afford the extravagance of US military and naval expenditure anyhow. I don’t see what’s wrong with their improvising by using what’s to hand: it seems pretty sensible. Why would they need specialist craft? I don’t suppose that they expect ISIS to have specialist naval craft to oppose them with.
If I remember rightly, at the time of the first Gulf War it turned out that for all her extravagance the US had managed to contrive a shortage of mine hunters. So then you take other steps, don’t you?
Comment by dearieme — December 18, 2015 @ 1:37 pm
@dearieme. You are totally missing my point. When Russia first intervened in Syria, Michael Weiss screeched that the Russians were going to deploy a large land force into the country. I said this was risible, because Russia did not have the logistical capability to do so. This clearly proves my point, and shows that Weiss was a hysterical idiot who doesn’t know the first thing about military operations.
I linked to the earlier post, and referred to Weiss in the first sentence.
A more general point is that it means that Russia’s escalation options are severely limited by its logistical frailties, meaning that its intervention is unlikely to be decisive. It will be enough to stave off Assad’s destruction, but not more. Stalemate is the most likely outcome.
“You are totally missing my point.” Then make your point explicitly instead of burying it in links.
Comment by dearieme — December 19, 2015 @ 1:50 am
@dearieme. FFS. Read the post. The main point is in the beginning paragraph and the last sentence: “Russia has utilized some flashy weaponry–such as surface and submarine launched cruise missiles–in its Syria campaign. But this is military Potemkinism, a dazzling facade that distracts from the shabby and creaking structure beneath. Especially now, with rumblings about Turkey closing the Bosporus to Russia, those freaking out about Russia’s involvement in Syria need to look beneath the facade, and understand how the realities of logistics, which have doomed far more campaigns than anything that has transpired on battlefields, fundamentally limit what Russia can even hope to achieve.” If that’s not explicit enough for you, I can’t help you.
Prestige in the Middle East? LOL-that’s a good one. How much did it pay? Should I tighten my belt?
Comment by pahoben — December 20, 2015 @ 8:01 am
You could walk down the street anywhere in the ME with your chest pumped out and cry I am a prestigious American so don’t screw with me. Now that is gone I guess.
Comment by pahoben — December 20, 2015 @ 8:13 am