Streetwise Professor

The war in Ukraine has pointed out the fact that modern combatants consume massive amounts of munitions. This can only be a surprise to those with short memories, or the ignorant. Hell, Saddam had it figured out. He cached massive stores of shells. His problem was he didn’t have time to use them because the US went through his army like crap through a goose. Twice. But he left behind enough to keep American EODs working OT for months to blow it up . . . and to supply the explosives for numerous IEDs deployed by his “dead-enders” against the American forces occupying Iraq.

Awakened from their post-Cold War reveries by the shock of Russia’s invasion and Chinese truculence, American, European, and Asian politicians have recognized the desperate need to increase their munitions stocks, and to expand their surge capacity to produce in the event of war. That’s good: better late than never. But rather than make everything willy-nilly, to respond to this awareness it is imperative to prioritize munition types–and the weapons used to fire them. This requires an appraisal of strategic priorities and likelihoods.

Ukraine needs primarily artillery shells, 155mm mainly, and lots of them. That’s because it is engaged in a war of attrition on a relatively static front against an enemy that employs artillery en masse. But such ammunition should not be an American priority because such the United States will not fight such a war, short of a major strategic blunder.

The inability of Russia to defeat Ukraine means that the likelihood of a land conflict against that country is low. And regardless, if it does break out, the Europeans should be the one to fight it, and therefore should be looking to their own munition supplies.

China is the United States’ main likely adversary in a major war. But it is highly unlikely that the US would be facing off against China in a major ground war. It would be beyond idiocy for the US to charge into China. It would also be idiocy for the US to deploy major ground forces to Taiwan in the event of an invasion, and risk getting trapped like, say, the British on Crete in 1941.

The most likely theater of a major ground war involving the US would be Korea. However, South Korea has proved to be the least free riding of any American ally, and has built up a credible military and a military industrial base to back it up. (Poland is also pretty much a non-free rider. Funny how countries on a front line take security threats more seriously, isn’t it?) I think South Korea can–and should–take care of itself, especially on the ground, with the US chipping in with air and sea support

Since a strategically sensible US would be unlikely to engage in a shell eating contest a la Ukraine, what should its munitions strategy focus on?

Again, China is the main potential adversary, the one that poses the greatest threat to the US, and the one which has the greatest capability. In the event war breaks out with China, what should US strategy be? That strategy should dictate procurement priorities.

I’ve never been all that fussed by China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (“AA/AD”) strategy, precisely because it would be strategically insane–and unnecessary–for the US to attempt to contest the area that China wishes to deny access to, namely the South China Sea. In the event of war, the proper US strategy would be to flip the board and implement an AA/AD strategy against China. Specifically, to deny it access to the region beyond its AA/AD zone. That is, don’t try to get in–keep them from getting out. Turn the fortress they believe they’ve constructed into a prison.

This is a strategy akin to classic British sea power strategies, dating back to the 18th century, which relied on blockades against Continental enemies, first France, then Germany. In the wars against the French culminating in the Napoleonic Wars, the blockades were often “close.” In WWI, the blockade was “far.”*

A “far” blockade would work for the US against China because China faces some of the same vulnerabilities as Wilhelmine Germany, namely, a dependence on raw material imports, most notably an inability to feed itself, and sea lines of communication that are very vulnerable to being severed by myriad means.

China is acutely aware of its dependence on food imports, especially animal feed inputs. The “iron rice bowl” is a thing of the past: as China has developed, so has its consumption of mean protein, and its people’s expectation of it. Xi has prioritized making China self-sufficient in food–a sure tell that he realizes the vulnerability. But this will take a long time under the most ideal circumstances, and is unlikely to occur in any event, especially given how China has ravaged its soil and waters in the past decades, and the disaster that generally results when autocrats attempt to force increased agricultural production.

Imposing and maintaining a blockade of China will require primarily submarines, aircraft, and surface vessels armed with long range precision munitions. And also mines. Lots of mines. Mines are a relatively cheap, low casualty risk, highly leveraged way of blockade and area denial. A large fraction of Japanese merchant shipping was sunk by mines laid by subs and aircraft in WWII. The mining of Haiphong in Vietnam was probably more decisive than the Operation Linebacker bombing campaign. Mining the waters around Chinese ports would have a devastating impact.

PGMs will also be vital in deterring any attempt by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (a name that cracks me up) to break out of a US (and Japan, and Australia, etc.) cordon sanitaire around the South China Sea–or destroying it if it tries. They will also be the primary means by which the United States can strike long-range Chinese weapons that pose a threat to the ships of the US and its allies, and the land bases (on Guam, in Japan and in the Philippines) on which they will rely.

The networking of sensors and platforms, and the deployment of offensive weapons on virtually every US Navy platform, will serve to make a US judo move of denying access to an access denier very effective–if it is backed with adequate means. This will require lots of long range, precision munitions to work–so ramping up their production, stocks, and production capacity of such weapons should be the priority.

But although networking platforms and the employment of precision weapons greatly leverages US capabilities to implement this strategy, the fundamental fact is that the US has too few platforms. The USN is now at a mere 297 hulls, and the current Biden budget proposal will shrink that to 291. The Navy has not submitted a shipbuilding proposal, and the brass are pushing to decommission 11 ships. Navy construction capacity is woefully inadequate. The capacity to build the fleet’s backbone–Burke class destroyers–is limited to 2 per year. The DDG(X) is still a pipe dream. The first Constellation class frigate has just been laid down. Most importantly, production of Virginia class submarines (the most potent threat to China, as their absolute freak out over the AUKUS nuke sub deal shows) is limited to two per year, and US submarine construction capacity will be challenged by the necessity of also building new Columbia class SSBNs to replace the aging Ohios.

So it is not just ammunition–it is platforms to fire it from. And on that score the United States is at best treading water, and may actually be slipping under.

Yes. Ukraine is a wake-up call–although one that should have been unnecessary. But just because the Ukrainians are suffering a WWI-esque shell shortage does not mean that the United States should prioritize artillery ammunition to fight a major land war. Adapting capability to likely adversaries and strategies dictates a focus on long range sea- and air-launched anti-ship and land attack weapons, and crucially the means to employ them. Which means more hulls and more airframes.

These take a long time to build. The time is now to start producing the weapons, and to expanding the capacity to produce the things that can deploy them. Right now we are unduly dependent on hoping the Lord looks kindly on our praise (if we would even give it today), because there just isn’t enough of the right kind of ammunition to pass to fight the most likely and most dangerous conflicts.

*This strategy cuts against the US grain. It frequently takes a long time to implement and take effect. In WWI it took 4 years for the British blockade to bring German to the brink of starvation. In the Civil War, the blockade was also extremely important, but also took years to affect the military situation. The strangulation of Japan by US submarines and mines was also decisive, but took a good two years to have a real impact.

In WWII Churchill wanted to employ the classic British strategy against Germany. This drove the Americans (not to mention Stalin) nuts: they wanted to charge onto the Continent ASAP. Strategic patience is not an American virtue. But it will be a necessity if the US does get involved in a shooting war with China. In such a war, time would be on the US’s side, precisely because what has made China powerful has also made it vulnerable.