Paging Mark
I was serious when I said I was particularly interested in your opinion regarding the RCN spy allegations. I know you can offer a unique perspective on this, and since you are definitely quite open to making your views known on other matters, not only here but on other forums, I am somewhat surprised that you are silent on this one.
PO1 Mark Chapman doesn’t want to discuss his years with the Royal Canadian Navy as it relates to his current work for the Kremlin. I’m sure you understand.
Comment by Basilisk — April 23, 2012 @ 8:31 pm
Will Sublime Oblivion continue to ignore the espionage post along with Mark? Is revealing, no? The cabal of Putin trolls is highly selective. – Basilisk
Because I didn’t feel a particular need to humor random paranoiacs on the web?
Lucas quite obviously has a pathological hatred towards Russia, he once wrote an entire post comparing it to Mordor. Why anyone would entertain his paranoid drivel, which he himself has admitted is mainly motivated by his need to pay his son’s way through university, is beyond me (well not really the Russophobe market is a lucrative one in the West). Obviously I will not be funding this bigot by buying his book or wasting my time reading it.
Spying is a fact of life practiced by all nations of consequence and it is the height of arrogance, double standards, and moral dishonesty to selectively condemn some for it while ignoring others. Hence par for the course for the SWP Hive.
Comment by Sublime Oblivion — April 23, 2012 @ 9:44 pm
My my Anatoly, that was a very big non response and completely unrelated to PO1 Mark Chapman’s duplicitous activities in the Royal Canadian Navy. As a naval electronic sensor operator, PO1 Chapman was privy to information that would interest Russia. Perhaps there should be formal inquiry into PO1 Chapman’s loyalty to Putin? He certainly doesn’t seem to have much regard for his beloved Canadian forces. It’s also possible that he’s financially motivated just as you may be. Attending University in California must be expensive.
Comment by Basilisk — April 23, 2012 @ 10:37 pm
Hi; sorry, I didn’t see this until Anatoly brought it to my attention by email. It’s pretty late here, so if nobody minds, I’ll respond tomorrow after work.
Comment by Mark — April 24, 2012 @ 11:18 pm
Once again, my apologies for not responding earlier. I have to confess
that I do not read The Streetwise Professor every day, every week or
even sometimes every month; not because it isn’t a good blog, but
because I am busy with other things and barely have time to update my
own. I envy the Professor his prodigious output, and originally intended
to post at least as often, but there was just no way I could keep it up.
Anyway, as I mentioned, I was not even aware my opinion had been
solicited until Anatoly Karlin emailed me to let me know.
I’m flattered by the implication of at least one individual that I am
plugged into some international spy clubhouse and that I know every
individual accused of trading in secrets, but in fact I do not know SLt.
Delisle. There are a couple of reasons for this; one, although the navy
is the smallest component of the Canadian Forces, it still consists of
around 8,500 people in the regular force. Two, SLt Delisle serves on the
opposite end of the country with Maritime Forces Atlantic, almost 3000
miles away. Three, he is an officer and I am not, and we typically do
not fraternize with one another. Therefore, I know just about what you
know, from the same sources – the press and the internet. I will say the
Canadian Forces are keeping a very tight lid on this one, probably to
deny the defense any possibility of the defendant getting off due to a
presupposition of guilt or tainting of the evidence.
Many will say, ha, ha, Canada doesn’t have any military secrets. That’s
mostly true, at least so far as domestically-developed military
technology goes. Aside from a few modest technological advances,
Canada’s military hardware accomplishments mostly lie in improvement of
systems we buy elsewhere; the Oto-Melara 127mm gun that used to be the
main deck gun on the Tribal Class Destroyers, for example. We purchased
it from Italy, the radar that controlled it was Dutch (the WM-22) and
the two exchanged information through an American-made interface unit
that had more switches than the bridge of the Millenium Falcon. The feed
system for the gun was a horror show; you could measure the rate of fire
with a calendar rather than a stopwatch. Canadian technicians rebuilt it
from scratch, resolving most of its problems, and Italy got the rebuilt
feed system back with the guns when we bought the new Super-Rapid
Compact 76mm. However, Canada is a favoured target for espionage not
because of our domestic military wizardry, but because of our alliances.
Canada is privy to information, for example, from the USA that the UK
does not have. Similarly, Canada shares information with the British
that the Americans do not see. Also, there may be a perception that its
security is weak and easily penetrated, although that is no more true of
Canada than of anyplace else. I’ll explain why; none of this is
classified, by the way.
Basically, it all boils down to trust. You have to trust that the people
who know your secrets will not betray them because…well, because they
won’t. There were many occasions, when our classified materials were
still mostly in hard-copy book form rather than electronic media as they
are now, when I would be one of only a handful of people aboard, a
member of the duty watch. I had the combination to the safe: I could
have photocopied books all night long without even paying for the paper,
and hauled it all ashore in a duffel bag. Why wouldn’t I do that? I just
wouldn’t. It goes against every value and principle I learned. SLt
Delisle learned the same principles. Why would he do it? I don’t know,
but I do know there was practically no way of stopping him. You can’t
watch everybody every minute of every day, or the watchers would have to
be several times the numbers of the serving military. You might think
other countries do it a lot better. You’d be wrong. John Walker, a U.S.
navy man and a spy for Russia for 17 years, was quoted as saying the
U.S. Navy’s security was “worse than K-Mart”; he was a communications
specialist, and used to drive right through the main gate with bags of
classified material in his car that were supposed to be burned or
shredded. Robert Hanssen, FBI agent and Russian spy for 22 years –
that’s at least 10 polygraph tests he must have passed, since he would
have had to do one every 2 years. Ditto Aldrich Ames, CIA Agent and
Russian spy for 9 years. During that period he claimed income of
$60,000.00 a year, but was spending up to $30,000.00 a month and drove a
new Jaguar. Come on.
I don’t know why people who do those things do them. Money, I suppose,
in some cases, but you’d have to be so careful about hiding it that I
question whether you would enjoy it. SLt Delisle worked at a
high-security establishment, and because of that likely could have compromised some very
important information. I have to say I doubt much of it would have to do
with the Arctic; most of that discussion is in the public domain and
regulated by existing laws that often do not have a lot of leeway.
Additionally, existing agreements on potential exploitation of the
Arctic are based on joint stewardship by the interested parties.
Disputes so far have been mostly resolved reasonably. Much future
decision-making turns on which end of the Lomonosov Ridge is its origin
and whether it will be accepted as an extension of either country’s
(Russia or Canada) continental shelf. Unless SLt Delisle stumbled on a
plan to fake geologic reality – doubtful – whatever information he is
alleged to have transmitted likely has little to do with that.
Comment by Mark — April 25, 2012 @ 6:34 pm