Streetwise Professor

April 17, 2023

Fixing Texas’ Electricity Market: The Theory of the Second Best In Action

Filed under: Climate Change,Economics,Energy,Politics,Regulation — cpirrong @ 6:05 pm

The Texas legislature meets every other year, meaning that 2023 is the first session in which legislation to address the issues that became apparent with the near death experience of the Texas power grid during Winter Storm Uri in February 2021 can be considered. The Texas Senate has passed two bills. Senate Bill 6 mandates the building of 10,000 MW of thermal generation (with on-site fuel storage), to be paid for via an “insurance” mechanism that guarantees a 10 percent rate of return to be funded by uplift charges to transportation and distribution utilities. Senate Bill 7 effectively creates an ancillary services market that allows dispatchable generation to sell reserves (e.g., spinning reserves) on a day ahead basis.

Opponents of the legislation state that it represents backsliding from the ideal of competitive energy markets:

Opponents immediately created the false narrative that the Texas bills are proof that Texas politicians “no longer have faith that competitive markets can adequately and economically satisfy the electricity need of Texas citizens,” said Beth Garza, a consultant for the think tank “R Street Institute.”

Well, the bills do represent major departures from Texas’ “energy only” market design. But this raises the question of what undermined the energy only market in the first place. And the answer to that is clear: subsidies for renewables. Past subsidies have wreaked havoc for years. Future subsidies, especially those in the Green New Deal in Drag, AKA the Inflation Reduction Act, threaten to wreak even more havoc in the future.

As I’ve written, this problem was evident years ago, in the mid-2000s. Even then, the penetration of renewables was undermining the economics of thermal generation, leading to exit of such capacity, thereby pressuring reserve margins and compromising–seriously–reliability. The process has continued inexorably in the past 15 years or so, leading to the precarious situation that culminated with Uri–and which has led to chronic concerns about blackouts during every cold snap and heat wave since.

The upshot of the process is an electricity system with a decidedly suboptimal generation mix. Too much intermittent, non-dispatchable renewables, too little dispatchable thermal. The Senate bills are attempts to address that distortion.

This is a great example of the “theory of the second best,” in which one policy that would be suboptimal in the absence of any distortions is welfare-improving in the presence of other distortions. The massive past, present, and prospective subsidies for renewables have distorted the operation of an energy only market. The past subsidies cannot be undone, and the future subsidies are also largely out of the control of Texas and ERCOT. So subsidies for thermal generation that would otherwise be objectionable can improve economic efficiency because they counterbalance the effects of these other subsidies.

It is clear that persisting with the EO market would be a recipe for future disaster. Subsidy to offset subsidy is a second best approach, but the first best is unattainable due to the renewable subsidy induced distortion.

Are there other policies that might be preferable? The only real alternative I can see is a capacity market (another departure from energy only), with capacity obligations clearly directed at dispatchable resources. I am skeptical about the credibility of capacity commitments, and the ability to tailor them to address reliability concerns in particular. Furthermore, political economy considerations threaten capacity markets: renewables operators will lobby to qualify for capacity payments.

SB6 is focused on encouraging investment in dispatchable, reliable capacity. It is likely the MW will be forthcoming. The main challenge is whether the MWh will be there when needed, that is to ensure that the new generation is maintained so as to be able to supply surge demand with a high probability. To provide the incentive to make it so the EO market has to allow generators to earn high prices when supplies are tight. Political economy may again be the main obstacle to this. The new generation will earn high returns–perhaps well above 10 percent–during the periods they are most needed. This will create political pressure to claw back these profits: “windfall profits tax,” anyone? The prospect for clawback undermines the incentive of the new generation to be optimized to supply power in times of short supply.

In sum, renewable subsidies distorted the EO market. Some second best measure (the first best being no renewable subsidies) is necessary. These must effectively subsidize investment in reliable, dispatchable, thermal generation. Between the two main alternatives on offer–guaranteeing a return on investment on such generation, or a capacity market–the former seems superior. But regardless of which is chosen, it is essential to keep in mind what requires the choice: the distortion that compromised the reliability of the Texas grid in the first place, namely, renewables subsidies.

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3 Comments »

  1. Intermittent = unreliable. From that simple observation all else follows.

    A partial solution, perhaps?
    OK, we’ll subsidise your stupid windmills, but in return you guarantee a minimum X megawatts at all times. If the wind doesn’t blow, then you (the windfarmer) have to go buy the juice on the open market to meet your minimum supply guarantee.

    Comment by philip — April 18, 2023 @ 7:20 am

  2. @phillip. I couldn’t agree more. But even though this “simple observation” should be self-evident, it is ignored again and again by those hell-bent on eliminating fossil fuels.

    Your idea is a good one. The potential pitfall I see is enforcing the obligation on renewables producers. Look at the contracts for differences experience in the UK. Renewables producers supposedly agreed to sell at a fixed price. But when prices rose above that level, they said screw our CFD obligations, we’ll sell at the market price. They treat the contracts like options, not like forwards. And they are getting away with it.

    Any such obligation to meet contractual volume commitments therefore has to be designed to be self-enforcing. That will be difficult, due to the political economy issues raised in my post.

    Comment by cpirrong — April 18, 2023 @ 2:42 pm

  3. Thank you, prof. Actually I’ve had a bit more of a think, and I suspect my idea is in fact a terrible one. Partly for the reasons you mention above. Also because civil servants with pots of other people’s money to splurge think that their counterpart is acting in good faith.

    Intermittent supply and variable demand are in no way linked in real world terms. But when intermittent supply is more than the peak minus trough demand the whole market goes ¡¡¡
    As shown in UK and Germany in particular.

    Comment by philip — April 18, 2023 @ 3:17 pm

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