CEFC: The Rise and Fall of a Financial House of Cards
This 1 March article from Caixin–which has since disappeared down the memory hole in China–is a stunning exposé about the ostensible purchaser of a 14.1 percent stake in Rosneft. It portrays the company as a financial shell game that basically kited trade finance credit to grow like Topsy, and accumulate a collection of assets around the world–many of which it is now unloading. The company also utilized shadow finance to raise funds via a securities affiliate. It needed to grow rapidly to generate the financial churn that it used to finance itself. Now it is unraveling because the powers that be in China have, for some reason, decided this will happen–presumably because a forced unwind executed in a highly opaque manner is far preferable to an uncontrolled collapse that was impending.
That Glencore, Qatar, Intessa, Rosneft, and Russian and Chinese banks would agree to sell to such an entity, and/or to lend it money to permit it to purchase the Rosneft stake indicates either a shocking lack of due diligence, or more likely, a desperation to exit the deal and the lack of a more reputable buyer. Given CEFC’s implosion, and the even more fraught circumstances of government-linked Russian companies, I’d be hard pressed to identify any company that can or will step into CEFC’s shoes.
An even more important issue here is why the Chinese authorities have yanked the reins on CEFC, and hard. This follows the seizure of Anbang Insurance, and the regulatory pressure on HNA.
My suspicion is that the government realized that CEFC was a house of cards, and the financial strains of the Rosneft acquisition would bring the house tumbling down. Indeed, it seems that the company was having real difficulties securing the funding, and if it had failed that would have been a major embarrassment to China. But this only raises more important questions, such as, what inferences should be drawn from the government’s intervention? In particular, what inferences should be drawn about the state of the Chinese financial system?
One possible inference is that the CEFCs and Anbangs are the exceptions, and the government will intervene before they threaten the broader system. That’s the comforting inference. The more disturbing inference is that there are many houses of cards in China waiting to fall, and that the government can neither crack down on them all or let any fall, so it intervenes on a just-in-time basis. This kicks the can down the road, and buys time to attempt to get the leverage in the system somewhat under control.
I say attempt, because this strategy is fraught with moral hazard. A controlled wind-down cushions the blow for creditors, and the expectation that the government will do this in the future provides little disincentive to cut back on the extension of credit today. Protecting creditors from the consequences of lending to the likes of CEFC ensures that they will continue to lend to similar companies in the future. But letting companies fail in a way that imposes big losses on creditors threatens a crisis in the financial system.
I paid attention to CEFC initially because of the Rosneft angle. But I think a far more important angle is what CEFC’s rise and fall say about the Chinese financial system, and the ability of firms to grow rapidly and to a huge size on the basis of the most dodgy financing mechanisms. If CEFC is at all representative, the implications for the Chinese financial system are dire. Which could explain the haste with which the government consigned the story to the memory hole.
This is not referring to the article.
This is the first time in two weeks that I have been able to access your website.
I have been getting a screen that says your site is undergoing maintenance.
Comment by Peter — April 30, 2018 @ 1:58 pm
SWP:
Is not the same thing happening to Chinese purchases of US gov’t debt? Or are those purchasers more monitored?
Perhaps crazy Armstrong is right? His predictions never are; but his explanations in hind sight always are 100%. LOL
VP VVP
Comment by Vlad — May 1, 2018 @ 8:25 am