Streetwise Professor

Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke ignited a firestorm by blaming California wildfires on environmental extremists who oppose logging and other measures (e.g., controlled burns) to reduce fuel load, and denigrating the contribution of global warming.  For this, he has been accused of heresy, and no doubt many of those accusing him would like to consign him to the flames at the stake.

One particularly disturbing aspect about this debate is its polarity–it’s framed as forestry management vs. climate change.   And here, both Zinke and his critics are culpable.

It doesn’t have to be that way.  Policy on forest management can be analyzed quite independently of climate change.   Indeed, to the extent there is a dependence, logically one should be more supportive of measures to mitigate fire risk if you believe that other factors–including warming–have raised that risk.  That is, the warmists, and those who believe there is a connection between warming and fire risk, should be the biggest supporters of reducing the factors that increase the frequency and intensity of fires–and reducing fuel load would be at the top of the list.  These are measures that can be taken in the here and now, and which do not involve wrenching costs.

But that requires pragmatism, and that is something that is conspicuous by its absence on the environmentalist left.  Indeed, they largely view mitigation and other pragmatic, gradualist responses to climate change as a serious moral failing requiring a response befitting the Inquisition, culminating in an auto de fe.  That is, the response is religious in nature, and not logical or pragmatic.  Mitigation is about trade-offs, and evaluating costs and benefits.  These are not the terms of religious debate.

Indeed, I surmise that one of the reasons for raging against mitigation–and likely the most important reason, especially among the more strident–is that mitigation undermines the case for the totalitarian measures that many on the environmental left ardently support.  And if you think totalitarian is too harsh a word, I think you are quite wrong.  Fighting climate change is the justification by many on the left for a complete reordering of economic and social systems, achieved by coercion and force if necessary.

If mitigation reduces the harm, the case for such totalitarian measures is undermined.  And since for many on the left the primary value is not the environment per se, but a complete reordering of economic and social systems, this represents a mortal threat to their political agenda.

That is, environmentalism and climate change are largely instrumental–Trojan Horses, as it were.  This is why mitigation strategies are met with such intense hostility.  What’s the point in mitigation, if it deprives you of an opportunity to reorder society?

As a matter of rhetoric, people like Ryan Zinke (and Trump, for that matter) would be better to separate issues relating to mitigation of risk from the climate change issue, or to the extent that they bring up climate change at all, emphasize that mitigation is even more valuable to the extent that climate change does increase the risk of things like wildfires.  Do not let the Trojan Horse into the debate.  Emphasize that such measures can be a pragmatic response to a risk.  I think that would resonate much more with ordinary people, as much as it infuriates ideologues.

In June, I spent 9 days in Turkey.  For someone as interested in history as I am, it was a phenomenal visit.  From the Hittites to the tomb of Midas in Gordium to Ephesus to Cappadocia, it is a series of historical marvels, and I only scratched the surface.

Since I am fascinated by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, one of the most interesting historical figures of the 20th century,  one of the highlights of my visit was a trip to his mausoleum and museum in the Atakabir in Ankara.  The visit was particularly timely, given that Ataturk’s legacy and handiwork is currently at risk.

The political environment in Turkey was febrile during my visit.  I left exactly one week before the (snap) presidential election, and the deep political divisions in Turkey between the Islamist followers of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (concentrated in central Anatolia, where I visited) and the remaining adherents of Kemalism (mainly in the west, centered in Izmir, where I visited as well) were on full display.

I had some thoughts (hopes, maybe) that enough Turks would realize that Erdoğan would use an election victory to Islamize and revolutionize (and not in a good way) the country further, and would deny him an outright victory that would allow him to realize his Ottoman pretensions.  But the tribal loyalties to Erdoğan are too wide, deep, and intense, and he won a victory.  Not a landslide, but not all that close, either.

And true to form, he took a couple of point election win as an invitation to act out his political and economic fantasies.  Turkey has fared well growth-wise for the past decade-plus, but it exhibits many of the fragilities of an emerging market, and especially a fast-growing emerging market.  Navigating this situation requires prudence, and some willingness to let the monetary authorities rein in excess.

But these are two things that Erdoğan quite clearly lacks, and indeed scorns.  In particular, he has a fixation about interest rates, which he believes are evil, and should be zero.  His natural inclinations are egged on by some of his biggest business supporters, who are construction magnates addicted to cheap credit.

Fear of Erdoğan’s monetary profligacy had already caused substantial declines in the lira prior to the election, and his statements shortly before the election on Bloomberg TV about taking control of monetary policy caused a further selloff. Then post-election, he appointed his son-in-law as finance minister.  (I guess it could have been worse: at least he did not appoint his truly idiotic son.) That stoked fears even more.

Then, post election, he has gotten into a confrontation with the US over buying S-400 air defense systems from Russia, and over the arrest of an American pastor accused of treason.  He has refused to give an inch on the preacher, despite warnings from the US, and a shot across the bows in the shape of sanctions imposed on two Turkish government ministers.

This is an utterly stupid and pointless conflict, and likely reflects Erdoğan’s obsession with FETO and the Gülenist movement led by his former confrere, and now archenemy, Fetullah Gülen–an obsession that has been at a fever pitch since last July’s abortive coup.  One needs to pick battles carefully, and this is not one that a rational man would choose to fight.

The escalation of this conflict has been mirrored by further declines in the lira.

Perhaps Erdoğan could have gotten away with this with Obama, or a Bush, or a Clinton in the White House.  But it is beyond insane to wave a red flag in front of Trump, and Trump has responded predictably to what he perceives to be a challenge.

Today Erdoğan gave a speech that was intended to ease fears, but it didn’t.  It fed them, as his answer to the currency crisis was for Turks to sell foreign currency and buy lira.  Great plan! Except the Turks who adore Erdo don’t have dollars and euros, and the Turks who have dollars and euros pretty much hate Erdo.  So the speech triggered an implosion in the lira.

At which point Trump put the boot in, announcing punitive tariffs on metal imports from Turkey (steel being a particularly big industry there), embellished with a Trumpian suck-on-this-one-Recep tweet.  The free-fall intensified. Now a full-fledged crisis looms, and Erdoğan is constitutionally temperamentally incapable of dealing with it, as this would require him to make a humiliating public climb-down on firmly held beliefs and positions–the most notable of these being the greatness and destiny of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

So Erdoğan has doubled down, ranting about economic warfare and economic hitmen.  That may play in Anatolia, but it won’t in the currency and capital markets.

Once upon a time the military would have stepped in.  But Erdoğan has neutered it as a political force.  Some of the neutering took place after the coup, but the utter incompetence of the coup suggests that his earlier efforts to destroy the foundations of Kemalism had made considerable progress.  (The coup was so botched that it is not unreasonable to think that Erdoğan let it proceed, knowing it would fail and that he could exploit it.  Indeed, it’s not outside the realm of possibility that he facilitated it.  He has certainly been the beneficiary.)

Erdoğan is sometimes compared to Ataturk.  Ataturk was a transformative figure, and Erdoğan certainly wants to be one, and has indeed already engineered considerable transformation of Turkish state and society (although in this he was aided greatly by demography, which has seen the population of the Anatolian heartland explode and the population of the Rumelian regions stagnate.)

But although Mustafa Kemal had grand visions to Make Turkey Great Again, he was remarkably prudent in his actions.  Most importantly, whereas Erdoğan has pretensions to make Turkey a regional hegemon, and indeed, a new Ottoman Empire, Ataturk concentrated on nation building at home.  He was incredibly wise in avoiding entanglements in the looming European war, and his successor İnönü followed that lead and stayed out of WWII. Erdoğan’s involvement in Syria was a catastrophe from the word go, and his religiously-driven antagonism towards Israel, a natural ally, has been foolish in the extreme.

Under Ataturk and his successors, by focusing on domestic changes, Turkey had the breathing space to construct a functioning state and avoided the disaster that afflicted every other country in Eurasia from 1939 to 1945.   Erdoğan is not so wise.

Where does it end?  I can’t seeing it end well.  Erdoğan will likely be able to rely on his fervent political base to remain in power, and has shown no reluctance to crush opposition by any means necessary.  He has already used, and likely will continue to use, the economic crisis to stoke the us vs. them passion that has been an important part of his political success.  Turks are nationalistic (a legacy of Ataturk, ironically), many past the point of chauvinism.

We see too many examples from around the world (Venezuela, Syria, Iran) of how autocratic leaders can survive economic crisis.  Turkey is not even close to becoming one of those basket cases, and if a Maduro can hang on, so can Erdoğan.  As Adam Smith said, there is much ruin in a country, and Recep Erdoğan is likely to show how much ruin there is in the Turkish nation.

An aside. Trump has been playing Godzilla the currency markets.  Yes, Turkey is the worst (well, not counting hyperinflating Iran and Venezuela), but most other emerging market currencies have been cratering, and the dollar has been advancing.  Of particular interest is the decline in the ruble (and the simultaneous sharp drop in Russian stock prices).  Sanctioning Russia over Skripal, and the threat of more, have caused the RUB to fall by around 8 percent, 5 percent on Thursday alone.

Obviously he’s in Putin’s pocket.

Well, if he is, he’s picking it.  So much for collusion.

Putin has been conspicuously silent through this, and Russia has made sounds about trying to reach some rapprochement with the US.  Of course, Medvedev was trotted out to denounce the US.  But that just illustrates that Putin is playing it smarter than Erdoğan: Medvedev is meaningless, and his only role is to take the heat for Putin.  `

When I was growing up, network TV was pretty much all there was, and summer was the time of re-runs.  The Trump-Russia collusion obsessives remind me of those old days, because currently they are re-running–and re-running–the Trump Tower meeting. This is in essence a re-run of a re-run, because this was a story about a year ago, when it was recounting events of a year before that–July, 2016.

So why do the Trumpophobes keep returning to this story, like a dog returning to its vomit?  Well, for one thing, the fact that they have to keep flogging this is proof positive that there have been absolutely no material developments on the collusion front, so they have to go back to this subject, presumably to barf it back up again so they have something to tide them through future lean times on the collusion beat.

That is, the necessity of recycling old news is proof positive that there is no new news.

It’s also incredibly amusing that they don’t recognize that the Trump Tower story not only does nothing to move the impeachment or indictment needle–it actually contradicts the collusion meme, and for a bonus implicates their beloved Hillary in a far more nefarious plot.

As I said from the time the story first broke: if the Trump campaign was hot to pursue over-the-transom offers of dirt on Hillary from marginal Russian figures, it could not have previously been a  party to a quid pro quo arrangement with Putin et al whereby the Russians hacked the Dems in exchange for some future benefit in the remote chance (as believed by everyone–including the Russians at the time) Trump won.  So if you believe the Trump Tower meeting matters, as a matter of logic you must acknowledge that allegations of a pre-existing agreement are false.  (Yes, I know–expecting logic from this lot is delusional!)

Moreover, the Trump team got nothing.  The promises of dirt were just bait to get a meeting for the Russians to yammer on about the Magnitsky Act and Bill Browder.  So at most the Trump team was guilty of bad intent.  But if getting dirt on the opposition from Russians is bad–or  even illegal–then Hillary and the Democrats are far more guilty than Trump.  They spent a large sum of money to hire Steele to gather dirt on Trump from Russian sources (still undisclosed–assuming they even exist).  Further, they actually received information, and shopped it around, with Steele eventually leaking to friendly journalists before the election.  And even worse, the Steele dossier was vectored to the FBI in an attempt to spark a counterintelligence operation, and perhaps criminal action, against Trump.  And even worse than that, in the spirit of reruns, the dossier was the centerpiece of an effort to kneecap the incoming president.

(Given the connections between the Russian in the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, and Fusion GPS–and hence Steele–there is also the possibility that the meeting was a setup.  I could speculate on who would have an interest in such a setup,  and the ability to set it in motion.  I leave that as an assignment for the class.)

Compare all that to a meeting that came to naught, and you must conclude that if the Trump Tower meeting was beyond the pale, the actions of the Hillary campaign were beyond the bounds of the Milky Way.  There was bad intent (by the Trumpophobe standards implicit in the hyperventilating about the Trump Tower meeting), and the intentions were realized (whereas that was not the case in the Trump Tower meeting).

Proverbs 26:11 reads: “As a dog returns to his vomit, so a fool repeats his folly.” I’m not a Bible quoter, as a rule, but in this case the proverb fits too well to pass up.  By repeatedly returning to the subject of the Trump Tower meeting, the Trumpohobe fools repeat their folly.  Over and over again.

The Sechin business model is clearly not to generate profit through canny investment, careful stewardship of capital, and containing cost.  Rather, it could be called The Rent Seeking Variations.

One of Sechin’s favorite variations is to pump up a flagging bottom line by shaking down his erstwhile partners.  The classic in this genre is the takeover of Bashneft at a knockdown price extracted by putting its owner Sistema under extreme legal pressure, which Sechin followed by suing Sistema for alleged misappropriations, which were only vaguely pleaded, and which if anything suggested that Rosneft was delinquent in its due diligence.

Sechin is now replaying this gambit, this time with its partners is Sakhalin I–which include ExxonMobile.  Again, the allegation is lacking in specifics.  Rosneft accuses the partners of “unjust enrichment” in 2015 and 2016.  In a world-class, epic act of projection, Rosneft accuses Exxon Neftgaz and the others of “interest gained by using other people’s money.”

The case was filed on Sechin’s home court–the arbitrage court on Sakhalin.  I seriously doubt that Exxon would have put itself into a situation where it was at the mercy of a Russian kangaroo court, so no doubt the first battle will be jurisdictional.

Sechin succeeded against Bashneft and Sistema in large part because Russia put its main shareholder Vladimir Yevtushenkov in jail at one point, and clearly was in a position to do it again.  ExxonMobil and the others in the partnership are less vulnerable, and Exxon in particular is used to these sorts of bruising battles.  So Igor has his work cut out for him.

For a while–during the Tillerson years–Exxon and Rosneft were chummy.  Sanctions put a kaibosh on the relationship, and this is clearly a signal that they are sooooo over.  Which just leaves Rosneft even more isolated than before, and unlikely to attract technology, expertise, and money from a major foreign power anytime soon absent some exchange of hostages that will curb Sechin’s predatory instincts.

The fallout for Russia more broadly is also clearly negative.  This is just another indication of its opportunistic and predatory approach to foreign investment, which just will raise further barriers to such investment in the future.

Operating on Shakedown Street can be lucrative in the short run, but pretty soon you run out of suckers to shake down.

Perhaps counterintuitively to some, this is an indication of why freaking out over Russia is so overdone.  Its internal dysfunction has hampered, hampers, and will hamper in the future its economic performance, and hence its potential to build capability to challenge the US in a serious way.   Yes, it can be a pain, but the very aspects of its system that make it so objectionable also serve to undermine its ability to pose a serious threat to any major power.

The freakout du jour–Trump’s questioning whether it made any sense to have Montenegro in Nato–triggered a flashback (from inauguration day, in fact):

Another example of dysfunction is Montenegro’s impending bid to join Nato. Just what is the rationale for this? There is none: Montenegro brings no military capability, but just adds an additional obligation.

But it’s worse than than. Nato’s biggest weakness is its governance structure, which requires unanimity and consensus in major decisions. This is flagrantly at odds with one of the principles of war–unity of command–and makes Nato decision making cumbersome and driven by the least common denominator. Nato’s governance, in other words, makes it all too easy for an adversary to get inside its decision loop.

Coalitions are always militarily problematic: Napoleon allegedly rejoiced at the news that another nation had joined one of the coalitions against him. Nato’s everybody gets a vote and a trophy philosophy aggravates the inherent problems in military coalitions.

Put differently, decision making power in Nato bears no relationship to contribution and capability. This is a recipe for dysfunction.

So what is the point of adding yet another non-contributor (population 620K!) whose consent is required to undertake anything of importance? This is madness.

It is especially insane when one considers that Montenegro is a Slavic country with longstanding ties to Russia, and in which Russia has a paternalistic interest. Parliamentary elections last year were extremely contentious, with the pro-western incumbents barely hanging on. Post-election, there were allegations of an attempted coup engineered by the Russians. The country is extraordinarily corrupt. All of which means that if you are concerned about Russia undermining Nato, Montenegro is the last country you would want to admit. It is vulnerable to being suborned by Russia. Outside of Nato-who cares what Russia does there? Inside of Nato-that is a serious concern, especially given the nature of Nato governance.

But apparently current Nato members believe that it would be really cool to collect the entire set of European countries: frankly, I can think of no other justification. There is no better illustration of how Nato has lost its way, its strategic purpose, and its ability to think critically.

Now Trump’s particular objection (that Montenegrins are excitable types who might trigger WWIII) was typically Trumpian, in that it was a rather bizarre thought process/formulation that ultimately led to the right conclusion: it makes no sense to include Montenegro in Nato, and doing so can only cause trouble.  Arriving at the correct conclusion based on fractured reasoning–or a fractured articulation of the reasoning–usually occurs only by accident, but it happens enough with Trump that it is unlikely to be totally accidental.  But given that the establishment places undue emphasis on articulateness and verbal polish, the convoluted explanation completely prevents people from taking the conclusion seriously–in part because they are too busy freaking out.

Something that I pointed out in my post goes double–or triple–today.  Simultaneously freaking out about the existential threat posed by Russia and the outrage of objecting to including Montenegro in Nato is utterly illogical to the point of idiocy, and no amount of verbal acuity is going to change that fundamental fact.  That circle cannot be squared.

So here’s what we have on offer: articulate and invariably wildly wrong, or wildly inarticulate and sometimes right, especially on big issues.

Even by the standards of the last two years, the hysteria that erupted over Trump’s statements in the press conference with Putin in Helsinki were off the charts.  Benedict Arnold! Treason! Traitor! Impeachment! On CNN some supposed ex-Watergate lawyer compared it to Kristillnacht. I suppose if we wait a few hours it will become the latter-day equivalent of Auschwitz.  I’m only surprised that I haven’t seen it compared to the Hitler-Stalin Pact.  Give it time!

The most disgusting comparisons in my mind were to Pearl Harbor and 9/11, suggesting that what Trump did would have been analogous to sitting down with Tojo after Pearl Harbor or Osama after the Twin Towers went down.

Reality check.  Pearl Harbor death toll: 2403. 9/11 death toll: 2996. 11/8/16 death toll: zero.  1,117 American sailors were vaporized, drowned, or incinerated on the USS Arizona alone on 12/7/41.  Anyone comparing Russian hacking to those catastrophes is completing lacking in perspective, not to say mental balance, and is willing to make the most outlandish comparisons out of partisan spite.  Especially inasmuch as spy games have been going on since time immemorial, and between the US and Russia/USSR for decades.  What transpired in 2016 is par for the course. Where’s the outrage been all these years?

And is the US supposed to go to war with a nuclear power over hacking? For that is the implication of the Pearl Harbor and 9/11 analogies.  That is not just lacking in perspective–that is utterly deranged.

And what is the hysteria about, in the end?: mere words.  Nothing of substance transpired at the summit–as could have been expected.  The overwrought fears that Trump would totally capitulate on Syria, or recognize the Russian seizure of Crimea, or sell Ukraine down the river turned out to be imaginary.  There were just anodyne statements about working toward common goals, which will likely result in nothing.

How would things have been different, or be different today, or tomorrow, or next year, had Trump aggressively chastised Putin publicly about the alleged interference in the 2016 election?  No different at all, except that the hysterics would have had to find something to be hysterical about.   And I guarantee you: they would have.

What would Putin have done had Trump called him out?  First, he would have denied.  As he apparently did when Trump brought it up.  Second, he would have responded with a litany of sins that the US has committed against Russia, in which he would no doubt include the 2011 elections in Russia. After all, the man is the master of whataboutism and bald face denials of the obvious.  Why would you expect any different yesterday?

“Did so!”  “Uh-uh.” “Stay out of our politics!” “You did it first!”

That would have been edifying.

Which would leave us where, exactly? Right where we are today.

And if the failure to say sufficiently condemnatory words about Russian interference is treasonous, what is the failure to do anything about it when it was happening, in full knowledge that it was happening?  Which is exactly what the Obama administration did–by its own admission.  Would the hysterics have given Trump a pass if he had imitated Obama and told Putin to “cut it out”?  Yeah.  Right.  This also suggests an utter lack of seriousness.

What I find most deeply disturbing about this is that the Russia/Putin fetish is distracting attention from a real strategic threat.  By every measure–economic, military, geopolitical–China is a more dangerous power than Russia.  Indeed, even if you emphasize cyberattacks as the primary threat, China is likely far more dangerous than Russia, although amnesia about things like massive penetration of the F-35 program or the OPM hack (which compromised the personnel records of every federal employee) seems to be epidemic.  And it is not as if China does not, and has not, attempted to interfere in US elections.  (Johnny Chung, anybody? Maria Hsia? Buddhist Temples?)

Chairman Xi must be beside himself in glee that the US is tearing itself apart over Russia, a declining power, to the neglect of China, a rising one.

Perhaps Trump could have spared himself some of the attacks had he been more critical–though I am doubtful that he could have done anything short of killing Putin that would have placated the critics.  But no doubt Trump knew that.  No doubt he knew that having a summit at all would put him in a vulnerable situation.  Certainly he was aware that the indictment of the 12 Russian GRU personnel was a trap set by elements in his own Justice Department.

Yet Trump had the summit, and indeed pushed to have it, and said what he did at the press conference, knowing the likely fallout.  Why?

Of course the anti-Trump theory is that he is in Putin’s thrall, either because of genuine admiration or blackmail.  But this does not comport with much of his actual behavior in office, which includes killing hundreds of Russians in Syria, opening declaring an energy war, browbeating Nato to spend more on defense directed at Russia specifically, blasting the Germans about NordStream II, and on and on.  Further, what is the likelihood that there is some deep dark secret that only a few Russians know?

I think the more likely explanation is that Trump deliberately provoked his frenzy in full knowledge of the consequences, to prove that he will not back down, and that he will not validate his critics by acquiescing to their demands.  It was a typically Trumpian in-your-face-what-are-you-gonna-do-about-it moment.

The only other person I have seen with a similar take is James S. Robbins:

The easiest thing to do politically would be to avoid Russia. The president did not have to attend this summit meeting, especially with the midterm elections months away and Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s expected report looming. He could have simply avoided both the issue and the optics.

But Donald Trump did not become president by doing the easy or expected thing. His political M.O. is to disrupt the opposition by owning the downside. A summit with Vladimir Putin is the perfect Trumpian way to say to his frantic critics that he couldn’t care less what they think. And it may force some of the more thoughtful ones to begin to consider the possibility that President Trump is right, and the entire Russian collusion narrative has been a lie.

I seriously doubt the last sentence.  Or at least, I doubt that there are any critics who are both frantic and thoughtful (and the former greatly outnumber the latter).  But it is pretty clear that Trump has signaled that this is war to the knife–against his domestic political enemies–and he is not capitulating.

As Trump wings his way east, first to a Nato summit, and then to a meeting with Putin in Helsinki, the commentariat and political class in the United States and Europe are on the brink of–another?–psychotic event.  The meeting with Putin in particular has triggered panic.

One recurrent theme is that Putin and Trump have similar views on the “rules based, institutions based, international order.”  Therefore, they are effectively allies and jointly a threat to the peace and stability of the world.  The title of one piece in Bloomberg summarizes the angst: Putin is Trump’s brother from another Motherland.

As a factual matter, it is true that both Putin and Trump challenge the existing post-Cold War consensus.  But since they reach that destination by very, very different routes, the similarities are far more superficial than the differences.  Furthermore, the consequences of this apparent convergence are likely to be far less dire for the United States than the angst-ridden claim.

It is only natural that Putin challenges the existing order.  After all, he presides over the main successor state to the Soviet Union, and much of the existing order was designed explicitly to contain and neuter the USSR.  Furthermore, the collapse of the USSR left Russia marginalized,  at best, which does not comport with Russia’s deeply held views that it is a great power–a view that Putin holds, clearly.  Russia also has a truly Westphalian mindset, which holds that the internal affairs of any nation are its business alone, and not subject to the meddling of others–or the “international community” at large.  Indeed, the one multilateral organization that Russia supports–the United Nations–receives its approbation precisely due to the fact that it can be used to derail international efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of states–including pariah states.  Putin’s revisionism is therefore readily understood.

Trump’s is more complicated, and reflects a longstanding divide in the United States.  Much of the criticism of Trump from the American establishment–including the part of the establishment that considers itself conservative, and indeed the sole legitimate voice of conservativism–is therefore a manifestation of longstanding divisions in American politics, which (a) caused his election, and (b) is why it is becoming less hyperbolic to talk of a new American civil war.

The best template to explain and understand this is Walter Russell Mead’s division of American foreign policy thought into Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian schools.  The establishment is decidedly Hamiltonian and Wilsonian.  As Mead–and I–noted from the onset of Trump’s emergence–he is the avatar of the long marginalized, and indeed scorned, Jacksonian America.  The establishment thought that this component of the American polity had long since been condemned to obscurity, and views its resurgence with the fright of a horror movie character seeing The Mummy or Jason Voorhees come back from the dead.

Jacksonians challenge virtually every aspect of the Hamiltonian-Wilsonian consensus.  The foreign policy establishment–whether Neocon or liberal internationalist–believes that America has some grand mission abroad, to bring democracy, peace, equality, freedom, or economic progress, or some combination thereof, to the rest of the world.  Jacksonians (and Jeffersonians) do not believe in such missionary work, and indeed are quite skeptical of it.  In the words of John Quincy Adams (ironically Jackson’s political foe and bête noire) “she [the US] goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” Jacksonians are deeply patriotic, and believe that theirs is the greatest nation in the world, but that it should lead by example and not attempt to impose by force or more subtle forms of coercion or blandishments its views, beliefs, or mores on others.

This leads them to be deeply skeptical of international engagements, let alone conflicts, when US interests are not directly threatened.  And unlike internationalists, they define American interests narrowly.

On this score, recent history is strongly supportive of Jacksonian skepticism.  As in so many aspects of life, the past quarter century–or perhaps to date it more precisely, since the fall of the USSR in 1991–has demonstrated the incompetence of the architects of internationalist policies, the infeasibility of these policies, or both.  This period has been marked by a litany of bloody, expensive failures, of which Iraq and Libya are the most conspicuous (but not only) examples.  Interestingly, these failures were the responsibility of different parties, different administrations, and different mindsets (Neocons on the one hand, “responsibility to protect” on the other), and differing degrees of international buy-in, but these different parts of the establishment shared a belief that the exercise of American power could make the world a better place by destroying monsters abroad.  The experiences strongly suggest that these beliefs were utterly mistaken.

(A confession: I supported the war in Iraq.  In retrospect, it was the worst misjudgment of my life. One of the main challenges of writing this post is to not overlearn from that mistake.)

Putin was adamantly opposed to US/European action in Libya, but he was prime minister at the time and Medvedev acquiesced to American and European pressure.  Give the devil his due: regardless of his motivations, Putin’s (and Lavrov’s) diagnosis of the consequences of that intervention were far more accurate than, say, Hillary’s, or pretty much any member of the US or European foreign policy “elite.”

Given this woeful record, what person in his right mind would NOT be skeptical of a deeper intervention in Syria, say, with the objective of regime change?  Syria makes Game of Thrones look simple by comparison.  Yet few things attract the foreign policy establishment’s ire like Trump’s oft-expressed desire to withdraw from Syria, or at least sharply limit American involvement there to destroying ISIS.

And given this woeful record, deep skepticism about the competence of the establishment, and the desirability of messianic interventions even if guided by a competent establishment, is well-justified.

Which leads me to reiterate a theme that I have written about for going on three years now: if the established elite hates Trump, and the Jacksonian resurgence that he personifies, they have no one–no one–to blame but themselves.  No one has brought more discredit to the beliefs of the establishment than that self-same establishment.  Internationalist, heal thyself.

Jacksonians also prize sovereignty and independence, and bridle at attempts to subordinate the US to international bodies, or tie it down in alliances with nations whose interests are less than fully aligned with America’s–especially when the US pays a disproportionate share of the expense.  And especially when the alleged allies repay the effort and expense with endless ankle biting and carping criticism.

Here is where Trump’s criticism of Nato resonates.  That Nato nations free ride on US defense expenditure is beyond dispute.  Trump calls the Europeans out on this, and they squeal like stuck hogs–and the US foreign policy establishment squeals right along with them.

More implicit in Trump’s criticism is a question about the purpose of Nato in 2018.  It had a purpose in 1949.  It had a purpose in 1990.  What is its purpose now?  Trump is effectively daring it to find one.

The UN and many other international bodies are often opposed to the US, and even the alliances (especially with Europe) seem to consist of Lilliputians intent on tying down the American Gulliver.  This also rankles independent and sovereignty-minded Jacksonians.  Global progressives think that the US is a malign force that needs to be suppressed and controlled by international bodies.  That also grates intensely on patriotic Jacksonians.

Jacksonians—and many Hamiltonians—are also justifiably critical of an omnipresent nanny state that regulates every aspect of human existence.  This is why his criticism of the EU is justified, and why many Americans nod in agreement.  And why many Europeans also agree, even though intense social pressure forces them to mute their criticism.  Jacksonians also value democracy, and hence are not enamored with the profoundly anti-democratic EU (whose motto appears to be: “you will vote until you get it right”).  So European outrage at criticism of the EU is music to my ears.

The Trump—Jacksonian—critique of the foreign policy establishment in the US and abroad therefore has much merit.  And again, the very reason that Trump is in a position to challenge the elite consensus is that the elite has failed time and again to deliver on its promises.  It is a legend in its own mind.  In reality, not so much.

The Hamiltonian side of me is most disturbed by Trump’s stance on trade.  But even here one can see his point.  It is farcical to characterize the current world system as one of free trade.  Real free trade would not involve byzantine agreements that only a mandarinate can interpret.  China is profoundly protectionist.

I think that Trump is a mercantilist, and that represents a deep intellectual error.  But many of his critiques of China in particular, and to a lesser degree the Europeans, have some basis in fact.  Whether trade wars are the best way to redress what Trump criticizes is anther matter.

Given all this, I discount the shrieks of the establishment—heavily.  One can object to some of Trump’s specific criticisms.  You can criticize his methods.  But if he is a barbarian at the gates, the city that fears he is about to sack it is vulnerable because of its own profound internal failings.

Which brings me back to Putin.  One of the standard attacks against Trump is that by sharing a distrust of the current international system with Putin, Trump is strengthening Putin and weakening the United States.

I am of course no Putin booster (as 12 years of posts amply demonstrate), and think it is desirable to contain Russian influence.  But to believe that Trump’s challenge to the prevailing consensus empowers Putin and disempowers the United States is to engage in the same kind of zero sum thinking that I have criticized Putin for in the past.

Indeed, Putin should be careful what he asks for.  A replacement of the multilateralist international system with a more independent, unilateralist—and Jacksonian–United States will not necessarily redound to Putin’s benefit, and may be his worst nightmare.  The increase in American defense spending, and the aggressive promotion of US energy, are antithetical to Putin’s interests.

At best, the reorientation of US policy may give Putin more freedom of action in places like Syria—to which I say, good luck with that, and welcome to it.  It may also empower Russia to some degree in the near abroad, but even there Russia’s fundamental—and increasing—weaknesses (economic, demographic) will limit the damage it can do.

But fundamentally the US shares few interests with Russia, and has many opposing interests.  America unbound, more unilaterally assertive where it views its true interests to lie, and not distracted or enervated by efforts in peripheral areas, is more threatening to Russian interests in the long run than a Clinton administration would have been.

Further, Trump’s more benign view of Russia may reflect an assessment that Russia is not truly a great power, given its economic, demographic, institutional, and social limitations.  In terms of capability, and arguably intentions, China represents a more pressing challenge to the US, and focusing on Russia represents a foolish diversion of resources and division of efforts.  That is, Trump may be less cultivating Putin than patronizing him.

In sum, the post-Cold War world order has been vastly oversold.  The encomiums heaped upon it reflect intentions—and self-congratulation–far more than results.  Putin challenges it for his reasons.  Trump challenges it for very different reasons.  Arguably both are acting in their national interests.  A meeting between these two challengers to the existing order could not have occurred unless that order had failed, fundamentally.  The hysteria surrounding it is a testament to the failure of the hysterics, not the success of what they are defending.

The WSJ reports that the CFTC engaged in extraordinary efforts to prevent manipulation of the CDS market by Blackstone Group.  Blackstone had bought about $333 million in protection on homebuilder Hovnanian, and then extended a low-interest loan to the company to induce it to make a technical default on debt the company itself owned (having bought it back).  The CFTC caught wind of this, and put on the full court press and eventually, uhm, persuaded (by intimating that it considered such behavior manipulative) Blackstone to negotiate an exit from the CDS with its counterparties.

In the Allen-Gale taxonomy, this would be best characterized as an “action-based” manipulation, as opposed to trading-based, or information-based.  It is clearly not a market power manipulation.

The conduct at issue is clearly a form of rent seeking–a set of transactions engineered for the purpose of obtaining a wealth transfer.  Unlike a market power manipulation, the direct welfare costs of this activity were probably small, and limited to the costs of negotiating with Hovnanian, and executing the CDS transactions.  However, as in most manipulations, the big costs here were indirect.  Blackstone’s scheme undermines the CDS market as a risk transfer mechanism.  In effect, Blackstone’s stratagem was a form of moral hazard, in that the insured could affect the probability of loss.  Moral hazard raises the cost of insurance, and leads to suboptimal risk transfer.  (Yes, I know that CDS market participants shudder at the use of the word “insurance” to describe CDS, in part because they want to avoid insurance regulation.  I am not using the word in its legal sense, but in an informal way to describe a risk transfer mechanism.)

CDS are particularly prone to moral hazard because individuals (notably, the managers of corporations) can do things to trigger defaults, and CDS can provide them directly or indirectly with an economic incentive to do so.  Further, CDS contracts are incomplete (i.e., not all possible contingencies can be specified) and often as a result contain ambiguities that clever rent seekers can exploit to win a payoff.

The CFTC’s actions are therefore laudable.  What’s particularly curious about this, however, is precisely the fact that it was the CFTC that intervened here.  Under Title VII of Frankendodd, the SEC has jurisdiction “over ‘security-based swaps,’ which are defined as swaps based on a single security or loan or a narrow-based group or index of securities (including any interest therein or the value thereof), or events relating to a single issuer or issuers of securities in a narrow-based security index”–the CFTC has jurisdiction over everything else.

The Hovnanian CDS are clearly in the SEC’s ambit, and not in the CFTC’s.  But in the case of the Hovnanian CDS, the SEC has been conspicuously absent. IIt is not mentioned at all in the WSJ piece.)  Curious, that.  Even more curious given the jealousy with which the SEC (like most government agencies) defends its turf against perceived incursions–especially the CFTC.   Why did the SEC let the CFTC take the lead on this, without a peep of protest?  And why did the CFTC apparently overstep its authority?

Things could have become interesting had Blackstone persisted with its scheme, and the CFTC filed an action against it.  In the event, an obvious legal response by Blackstone would have been to claim that the CFTC had no legal authority to take enforcement action.

Given this legal issue, the CFTC’s intervention may have less of a deterrent effect on future manipulations than an SEC intervention would have.

The SEC does not have the reputation of being a shrinking violet by any means, but it has been noticeably shy in some high profile events, the Hovnanian CDS story being one, and Tesla being another.  Makes me wonder . . .

The WSJ embarrasses itself with this silly Yarosov Trofimov “think piece”  titled “Russia’s Turn to Its Asian Past.”  I say “think piece” in quotes because that’s what it pretends to be, but there really isn’t a lot of thought in it.  It is a farrago of random quotes and facts about Russian history that actually betrays little actual knowledge of Russian history.

Trofimov’s basic thesis is that spurned by the West, Russia is increasingly looking east, and moreover, “some Russians” (how many, out of a population of ~140 million he doesn’t say) look favorably on the Golden Horde.  Indeed, the piece is illustrated with a drawing of Putin as Genghis Khan–and even though Trofimov didn’t choose the illustration, he did speak approvingly of it on Twitter.

Trofimov’s “evidence”?  Well, Putin laments Russia’s lost empire, for one thing.  This is hardly a new phenomenon: Gaidar wrote a book about a decade ago titled “Collapse of Empire” which starts out discussing the lost empire syndrome and how it has haunted Russian consciousness since 1991, and which argues that Russia won’t progress until it gets over that loss.  Gaidar noted that this was accompanied by widespread resentment of the West, and ambivalence–or worse–about where Russia fit in.

For another, “Now Russia is increasingly looking East, toward an uneasy alliance with an illiberal and much more powerful China, and—in recognition of the country’s increasingly Muslim makeup—with nations such as Turkey and Iran.”  This is just great power politics.  In what represents continuity, rather than change, a leadership that believes in multipolarity, rejects globalism, has a decidedly Westphalian worldview, and views the US as its primary rival is looking for like-minded allies, who happen not to be in the West.  Go figure.  This doesn’t make Putin a Genghis wannabe pinin’ for the Hordes.

Trofimov assembles quotes from assorted people who claim Russia is rejecting the West due to various slights, real and perceived.  Again, in a nation of 140+ million people, you can find people–even well-known ones–who can express all sorts of views.  Moreover, again, it’s a long way from saying that Russians generally think that they’ve been making a huge mistake for the past, oh, several centuries blaming Russia’s relative backwardness on the “Mongol (or Tatar) Yoke.”

Trofimov’s lack of seriousness is best illustrated by his treating seriously one person in particular–Aleksandr Dugin, whom Trofimov describes as “the leading voice of this Eurasianist movement in Russia today.”  OK: I dare you to name the second leading voice.  One would probably be very hard-pressed to do so, which indicates just how marginal this movement is.

Dugin is a fringe figure to whom Putin paid some attention years ago, but his fifteen minutes of fame is long over.  He is now basically an outcast, having been fired from Moscow State University in 2014 for saying “kill them all” when asked what should be done with Ukrainians.  Giving Dugin any credence would be akin to emphasizing the importance to American contemporary thought of some Neoconfederate who once was a professor until he was driven from the academy for his lunatic ravings.

And oh, it’s not like Eurasianism is a new thing.  The current strain is sometimes referred to as “Neo-Eurasianism”, to distinguish it from the earlier version that flourished for a time in the emigre community after the Revolution (of which Nikolai Trubetzkoy was probably the most well-known advocate).  There are differences, of course, but the key commonality is that Eurasianism old and new emphasize Russia’s apartness from the West, and attribute it largely to its unique geographic position.

Having seen Dugin portrayed as some Svengali-like figure to Putin by those who view the Russian president as a bogey man, I have learned that anyone who gives him any importance whatsoever is unlikely to have anything insightful, or even interesting, to say.

The most amusing piece of “evidence” Trofimov presents is “a small theme park reconstruction of Sarai Batu”, “the Horde’s razed 15th century capital.” Whatever!

The most annoying thing about Trofimov’s article is its utter lack of historical perspective.  He acts as if Russian ambivalence and hostility towards the West is a new thing.  As if Russian questioning of its relationship to the West is something that has developed in the second half of the Putin era.  As if it is a novelty for some parts of the Russian intelligentsia and political class to reject the West and insist that Russia carve out a distinct place in the world and develop its distinct–and superior–society.

Hardly.  It is in fact a very old thing, and represents a major theme in Russian history.  Trofimov says that what is happening now is “an attempt to undo the westernizing approach that has dominated the Russian state going back all the way to Czar Peter the Great, three centuries ago.”  In fact, there have been such attempts ever since, well, the time of Peter the Great (e.g., the Old Believers who rejected Peter’s changes to bring the Russian Orthodox Church’s rituals in line with those of the Greek).  The subsequent centuries have seen see-sawing debates between Slavophiles and Westernizers.  Virtually everything that Trofimov cites as indicating some great new reversal of Russia’s progressive arc to the West in fact has echoes in the writings of the Slavophiles in the mid-19th century, and in those of their successors over the years.  They have never gone away.

Indeed, a Russian much admired in the West for his stand against the Soviet Union, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, was essentially a Slavophile who was hardly a lover of the West.  Ironically, one of the criticisms leveled against Solzhenitsyn when he returned from exile in 1994 is that he had nothing new to say about Russia, but was merely recycling old Slavophile thinking:

WHEN Alexander Solzhenitsyn set foot on Moscow soil July 21 after 20 years of forced exile, the influential Russian literary journal, Novy Mir, was already preparing to publish his programmatic tract, “The Russian Question at the End of the 20th Century.”

The lengthy article, which examines Russian history since the 17th century and sums up the writer’s historio-philosophical views, is “as significant as his celebrated 1990 essay ‘How to Rebuild Russia,’ ” Novy Mir editor Sergei Zalygin excitedly told the Rossiiskaya Gazeta.

But what new ideas does Mr. Solzhenitsyn truly bring to his Russian brethren? Surprisingly few. In fact, the man acclaimed as Russia’s greatest living writer presents almost nothing that hasn’t been heard before, either from him or the host of Russian nationalist Slavophiles dating back to the 19th century. Indeed, the 40-page essay is permeated with familiar principles such as “healthy isolationism,” antidemocratism, nationalism, and xenophobia.

Thus, to the extent that there are anti-Western intellectual currents in Russia, and that some in Russia (particularly among the intelligentsia) are advocating Russia turn its back on the West, this represents historical continuity, rather than discontinuity.

And it is particularly important to emphasize that this is now, and has always been, much more of a parlor game for intellectuals than something that has affected Russian government, policy, or statecraft.  Indeed, if anything–now and in the past–the direction of causation has been from international setbacks to intellectual ferment, than it has been from intellectuals’ ideas to Russian policy, whether under tsars, commissars, or presidents.

Trofimov actually acknowledges this, but then throws it aside:

It’s not clear to what extent the Kremlin believes its own propaganda. While resentment over Russia’s diminished stature is a key motivator of Mr. Putin’s behavior, so far Russia’s decision-making has been driven largely by opportunism rather than by a grandiose civilizational shift. “I don’t think Putin is thinking in terms of historical mythologies,” said Mr. Kortunov of the Russian International Affairs Council. “I don’t think he needs an ideological grounding for his policies.”

Actually, it’s quite clear: it doesn’t believe it at all.

In sum, all this chin pulling over “who lost Russia?” or “is Putin a new Stalin/Genghis?” is vapid.  It is an offshoot of the End of History fantasies that accompanied the end of the Cold War, and which posited that the entire world would converge to the liberal Western model, particularly that epitomized by the US.  The competing Clash of Civilizations view made much more sense at the time and has certainly stood the test of events much better.  No one lost Russia because Russia was never the West’s to lose.  It has always been a self-consciously distinct civilization that has constantly struggled to define its relationship to the West.  The current intellectual debates within Russia, and the nature of Russian policy towards the West and the rest of the world, are continuations, not departures.  History rhyming, as it were.

The current obsession with Putin in the West obscures that fundamental fact.  Putin could get killed by a falling house tomorrow and very little would change.  It wouldn’t be like the death of the Wicked Witch of the East leading to the liberation of the Munchkins. Russia would be Russia.  The changes in Russian policy and mindset would be superficial, at best.  Russia would continue its centuries-long attractive-repulsive relationship with the West.  Russia would continue to have strong authoritarian tendencies and an abiding suspicion of its neighbors.

Unfortunately, the Trofimov piece, like so many others, completely lacks this historical context, and leaves one with the impression that what is happening now in Russia is something extraordinary.  It’s not: it’s very ordinary, in the Russian scheme of things.  But by giving the opposite impression, articles like this create false perceptions about current events, and false expectations about how things may change in the future, or how American or European policies could materially impact how things evolve.

There’s an old expression: это Россия.  That’s Russia.  Often said with a shrug, indicating resignation about things that have always been so, and are unlikely to change.  Yaroslav Trofimov hasn’t identified something new.  He’s basically described something quite old: это Россия.  Would more people understand that was the case.

Trump sent a letter admonishing European nations that have failed to meet their solemn promise to spend 2 pct of GDP on defense.  In reply, Merkel dispatched her Defense Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, to deliver a whinge that would embarrass a teenager explaining to mom why he hasn’t cleaned his room.  For the last 10 years.

Shall we begin the beating? Let’s!

Nato, she said, was not just about “cash” — but also about “capabilities” and “contributions”.

Just what “contributions,” exactly? Tiresome, supercilious lectures, with a heavy emphasis on Germany’s moral superiority?  Nothing that actually goes boom or risks killing anyone downrange, apparently.

And what capabilities? By Germany’s own accounting, its lack of readiness is “dramatic”:

What’s wrong with the Bundeswehr?

• Bartels pointed to “big gaps” in personnel and equipment. At the end of 2017, no submarines and none of the air force’s 14 large transport planes were available for deployment due to repairs.
• Other equipment, including fighter jets, tanks and ships, was outdated and in some cases not fully operational because of bad planning or a lack of spare parts. Some air force pilots were unable to train because too many aircraft were being repaired.
• Soldiers have experienced increasing levels of stress and there was a lack adequate leadership due to some 21,000 vacant officer posts.
• The report said the government needed to pursue reforms “with greater urgency” and increase defense spending.
• A lack of funding and inefficient management structures and planning were behind the problems. Germany has cut defense spending since the end of the Cold War. In 2017, it spent about 1.2 percent of its economic production in 2017 on the armed forces, which is below the 2 percent target recommended by the NATO alliance.

Other than that, they’re a powerhouse!

Tanks? Did you ask about tanks? Planes?

The Bundeswehr is due to take over leadership of NATO’s multinational Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at the start of next year, but doesn’t have enough tanks, the Defense Ministry document said.

Specifically, the Bundeswehr’s ninth tank brigade in Münster only has nine operational Leopard 2 tanks — even though it promised to have 44 ready for the VJTF — and only three of the promised 14 Marder armored infantry vehicles. [An American tank company has 14 M1s, by the way.  A company.]

The paper also revealed the reason for this shortfall: a lack of spare parts and the high cost and time needed to maintain the vehicles. It added that it was also lacking night-vision equipment, automatic grenade launchers, winter clothing and body armor. [It would probably be more efficient to list what they aren’t lacking.]

The German air force is also struggling to cover its NATO duties, the document revealed. The Luftwaffe’s main forces, the Eurofighter and Tornado fighter jets and its CH-53 transport helicopters, are only available for use an average of four months a year — the rest of the time the aircraft are grounded for repairs and rearmament.

And I guarantee you, these problems are NOT because of intense use and deployment.  It is neglect and stinginess–pure and simple.

German leadership is apparently deaf.  So deaf that they can’t even hear Trump:

Bundeswehr Chief of Staff reacts: Volker Wieker defended the military, saying “no complaints have come to my ear either in Germany or from our allies.” He did however admit that combat-readiness needed to be improved.

Back to Frau van der Leyen:

“You can easily spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence without actually offering anything to Nato,” she said in Berlin on Tuesday evening. “The question for Nato is not just how much you spend nationally on defence, but how much does the country provide in terms of contributions that Nato needs.”

Maybe so, if this example of pointless military expenditure is representative of the best Germany can do.  But if you don’t spend squat you clearly won’t offer anything to Nato.  And squat is pretty much what your contributions are to Nato needs.  Training with broomsticks and shouting “bang! bang!” is not what Nato needs.

So let’s see whether you can spend money on defense and buy some capabilities with it, shall we?  Let’s put that vaunted German efficiency to work!

Germany, Ms von der Leyen stressed, was the second-largest supplier of troops to Nato behind the US, as well as the second-largest supplier of troops in Afghanistan.

Germany also has the second-largest population and economy in Nato, and on a per capita basis and a GDP basis, so it should supply the second-largest number. Even so, it definitely does not pull its weight.  It is a free-rider by every measure whose contribution does not match its population or economic heft.

Insofar as Afghanistan is concerned, Germany has suffered fewer KIA there than not just the US, but the UK, Canada, and France.  On a per capita basis, it has suffered far fewer than Australia, Italy, Poland, Denmark (which has suffered only 14 fewer KIA, despite its vastly smaller population–and the disdain with which Germans treat them), Spain, the Netherlands, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, New Zealand, Norway, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

None of which, I might add, hosted anything like the Hamburg Cell of Al Qaeda for years.

Given that record, any decent, self-respecting government official (perhaps an oxymoron!) would pass over Afghanistan in silence.

The minister also pointed to the prominent role of the German Bundeswehr in Nato’s push to bolster the security of member states in eastern Europe.

Prominent? Like how, precisely?  The VJTF is the primary Nato contribution to the security of eastern Europe, and we’ve already seen just how pathetic Germany’s contribution to that is.

“To be clear: we stand by the 2 per cent goal that we set ourselves in Wales. We are on the way to meeting it. And we are ready, and have shown that we are ready, to take on substantial responsibilities inside the alliance,” the minister said.

“We are on our way to meeting it.” On your way? When will you get there? In time to celebrate Putin’s 90th birthday?

I can guarantee you that this pathetic response will not mollify Trump.  To the contrary–it will only make him more pissed off.  Meaning that the next Nato summit will be loads of fun!

In other news, Germany says that sanctions will not affect Nord Stream 2:

Germany has been assured by the United States that any sanctions imposed on Russia will not affect the building of a gas pipeline to bring Russian gas to Europe, a spokeswoman for the German economy ministry said on Friday.

The spokeswoman said that guidelines provided by the United States suggested that construction of Nord Stream 2 would be unaffected.

I dunno, Fritz.  Sounds like a dare to Trump, and if he takes you up on it, it will be to screw you, not the Russians.  And continuing to make pathetic excuses for reneging on Nato commitments just might spur him to do so.

Finally, Merkel, who has become the epitome of the careerist politician who clings to power at all cost, jettisoned her supposedly principled moral stand on refugees and agreed to set up camps at the German border to detain them for processing.  Her Bavarian gadfly, Horst Seehofer, was apparently mollified by this concession.

The Social Democrats in the coalition have yet to sign off.  I would not be surprised if Merkel uses their opposition to renege on her commitment to Seehofer–it is probably as firm as her commitment to boost defense spending.

I will not be surprised at anything Merkel will do to hang on to power.  No doubt she will suffer pretty much indignity to do so. Because that is pretty much her overriding concern, to which everything else is subordinate. Meaning that I sincerely hope that Trump continues to bust her chops about Nato, and pretty much anything else, for that matter.