Streetwise Professor

Last week was the 161st anniversary of the Battle of Shiloh, and fortuitously saw the delivery of David Powell’s Decisions at Shiloh.

Dave is a prolific author, especially of Western Theater subjects, most notably Chickamauga (the subject of his three volume trilogy, as well as a book on the Tullahoma Campaign that preceded Chickamauga). He is also author of Failure in the Saddle, a devastating critique of Confederate cavalry performance in the Chickamauga campaign: Nathan Bedford Forrest is not spared! Thus, Dave is not shy to criticize and challenge.

It was therefore surprising to me to see him accept uncritically conventional wisdom about the Confederate deployment at Shiloh. In a nutshell, under a plan developed by second-in-command P. G. T. Beauregard’s chief of staff Thomas Jordan, the Confederate Army of Mississippi attacked Grant’s Army of the Tennessee with a formation of three successive lines: Hardee’s corps in front, followed by Bragg’s, followed by Polk’s, all supported by Breckenridge’s Reserve Corps. This allegedly led to command confusion as once contact was made with the enemy, as units from different corps were intermingled, thereby preventing corps commanders from controlling their troops. Eventually, Hardee, Bragg, and Polk agreed on an ad hoc arrangement whereby each would command units in a particular sector, regardless of the corps to which the units belonged.

The alternative, according to Powell and numerous others stretching back decades (e.g., Wiley Sword–yes, his real name–in Shiloh: Bloody April from 1974) was the plan allegedly conceived by Confederate commander Albert Sidney Johnston, whereby the three Confederate corps would be arrayed in separate columns attacking in line, rather than successive lines, with with Polk on the left, Hardee in the center, Bragg on the right, with Breckinridge in reserve.

The basis for this assertion is thin indeed. In a letter to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Johnston wrote:

Confederate forces, 40,000, ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg [Landing]. . . Beauregard, second in command; Polk, left; Hardee, center; Bragg, right wing; Breckenridge reserve.

That’s it. The entire basis for the supposed alternative (and supposedly superior) plan.

So many issues. Most importantly, Powell (and many predecessors) seem to be reading way too much into this. Is it the barest sketch of an operational plan designating a deployment of troops, or is it merely a description of the organization of Johnston’s army?

A fair reading supports the latter interpretation. First, the mention of “Beauregard, second in command” suggests organization, not operation. Second, the use of the word “wing” is clearly ambiguous, especially in the context of early-1862.

Specifically, in this period, the word “wing” was used to describe a multi-division organization: it was essentially a synonym for “corps.” Army corps were not officially recognized by the Confederacy until 18 September, 1862: recall that in August, 1862 at Second Manassas Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was organized into a Left Wing (under Jackson) and a Right Wing (under Longstreet). In Johnston’s army, the three corps were designated as such only 5 days before Johnston’s letter to Davis, and prior to that were referred to as “Grand Divisions”.

It is therefore not clear whether the reference to “wings” in Johnston’s obviously clipped (for telegraphing) missive to Davis represented an operational plan, or a mere description of the forces at Johnston’s command, and who commanded the basic units of maneuver.

Further, if this was Johnston’s operational plan, why did he abandon it in favor of Beauregard/Jordan’s supposedly inferior one? He was the army commander, after all.

But beyond the very thin evidence that Johnston envisioned an attack by three corps in separate columns rather than in successive lines is the issue of whether such a three column attack was even feasible, given the road net and terrain of the battlefield. I seriously doubt that it was.

The optimal conditions for a three column attack required three parallel roads, one for each corps. But no such roads existed.

The Confederates marched from their camp at Corinth, MS to the battlefield on two parallel roads that converged at a place called “Mickey’s” (or Mitchie’s). From there, only a single road led to the Union cantonment.

Indeed, quite predictably there was a confused traffic jam at the road junction that required some time to sort out, which contributed to the delay in the Confederate attack. Due to the necessity of marching northwards on a single road to get at Grant, the four corps of Johnston’s army were necessarily arrayed one after the other.

So how would they have deployed from this line of march into the (allegedly) preferred (and superior) Polk left; Hardee center; Bragg right formation? Not easily, that’s for sure. They could not magically appear in that formation: they had to get there. But how?–and Powell and his predecessors don’t say.

There was a single road leading towards the Confederate right north of the Mickey’s intersection: the Bark Road. (Johnston wanted to place the weight of his attack on his right to drive Grant away from the Tennessee River and into the bottoms of Snake Creek.). Theoretically, once Hardee’s corps had passed that intersection, Bragg’s could have turned right along the road, marched until it’s left was clear of Hardee’s right, then moved onto line with Hardee. Or eschewing the road, Bragg’s corps could have marched by the flank through the woods south of the Bark Road and then advanced to line up with Hardee.

All of this would have taken time. Hours, given the rawness of the Confederate troops and their commanders, and the nasty terrain. During which time the element of surprise would have almost certainly been lost. (Grant and Sherman would have been most appreciative, given the intense criticism directed at them for being surprised.)

The movement of Polk’s corps/wing to the left would have been even more problematic. There was no road along which it could have moved. A cross country march through the woods cut by ravines and bounded by Winningham Branch and Shiloh Branch would have been confused, time confusing, and noisy.

Given the limitations of the road net and the nasty terrain, a set piece deployment as envisioned by the critics of the Beauregard/Jordan plan was wildly impractical, and wildly unlikely. The advance of the subsequent lines into open spaces uncovered when Hardee attacked from his lead position astride the Corinth road was probably the best, and certainly the fastest, way to bring Bragg’s and Polk’s units into contact with the scrambling Federal defenders.

Yes, it led to a jumbling of units, and the devolution of the battle into a series of attacks by brigades operating largely independently of one another, and under no central command. But this would have almost certainly occurred even under the hypothetical alternative plan (even assuming that it was feasible). Ultimately the battle by brigades was dictated by the exigencies of terrain and the rather haphazard deployment of the Union brigades, which was driven by where they were camped and their extemporized response to surprise.

And note well that the planners of even well-organized Civil War assaults exercised little control once battle was joined. Think of Jackson at Chancellorsville or Longstreet at Chickamauga. In the latter case, Bushrod Johnson’s division attacked straight ahead, Hindman veered to the left, and Law wheeled to the right, each in response to immediate threats posed by the Union forces. Naturally units oriented towards the threat, not according to some pre-ordained plan, and the planner could do nothing about it.

One must also consider the specific corps commanders who were supposedly going to exercise control.

Polk? Ha! Look at Chickamauga, where he was formally in command of two army corps, but did not orchestrate the ordered attack on time, and when it did occur, exercised virtually no control over it.

Hardee, later reputed to be the best Confederate corps commander in the west? At Peachtree Creek and Atlanta in 1864 he launched attacks with far more experienced troops. In each case, these attacks splintered into independent actions by individual brigades, again due to the exigencies of terrain (wooded, cut by ravines–like at Shilho) and an unknown and irregular deployment of the Union troops (again like at Shiloh). There is little indication that Hardee exercised any command once his troops stepped off in either of these battles.

Bragg? Another guffaw. At Shiloh itself his tactics were clumsy, consisting mainly of ordering uncoordinated piecemeal assaults on the Hornet’s Nest.

Raw troops. Inexperienced commanders at every level. Rough terrain. A primitive road net. A determined foe. These are what ultimately dictated the course of the battle. It probably would have played out in much the same way in the end regardless of the formation in which the Confederates started.

In sum, I think that the controversy over the Confederate battle plan at Shiloh is a red herring. The evidence that Johnston seriously considered an alternative is wafer-thin: and if he did consider it, he obviously was not strongly committed to it, else he would not have deferred to Beauregard. More importantly, the feasibility of the plan is highly doubtful, given the reality that the Confederates had to approach the Union camps over a single road and there were no easy ways to deploy from a column of corps on that road into a line of corps abreast. And perhaps most importantly, the friction of battle and the reality of no-plan-survives-contact-with-the-enemy meant that regardless of how they were lined up to begin with, the Confederate brigades would have almost certainly operated largely independently as dictated by the terrain and the deployment of Union troops.

The outcome at Shiloh was not dictated by the Confederate battle plan. In fact, that plan arguably had little or no influence on how events played out on 6 April 1862. It was a matter of roads and terrain, and given those constraints it is likely that putting the Confederate troops as they were worked as well or better than any alternative would have.

The XVth Corps of the Army of the Tennessee was one of the most storied and successful combat formations of its size in the Civil War. (Not to mention two ancestors served in it.) It is therefore gratifying to see it receive a book-length treatment in Eric Michael Burke’s Soldiers By Experience: The Forging of Sherman’s Fifteenth Army Corps 1862-1863.

I can give the book a qualified endorsement. It is really a tale of two books, one very good, the other not so much.

The narrative history portion of the book is excellent. In particular, the extended treatments of three largely neglected campaigns/battles–Chickasaw Bayou, Arkansas Post, and the efforts of Grant to get at Vicksburg from the north via the twisting streams of the Mississippi Delta–are very well done and fill a gap in Civil War historiography.

I was particularly interested to read the role that Morgan L. Smith and two Zouave units–the American Zouaves (recruited in Illinois but incorporated into Federal service as the 8th Missouri Volunteer Infantry) and the 11th Indiana Volunteer Infantry–played in developing innovative tactics that eventually spread throughout what became the XV Corps. I’ve read a huge amount of Civil War history since I was 8, and never came across this fact. A nice riposte to the Confederate general Daniel Gladden’s remark that all it took to make a Zouave was 6 yards of red flannel and an Irishman.

The analytic part of the book is not up to the standard set by the narrative part. The basic thesis is banal: military units have a culture that is shaped by their experience. Well of course.

The more specific thesis, that as a result of the bad experiences at Chickasaw and Arkansas Post the XVth Corps was neuralgic about attacking fortifications, is borderline slanderous (because it insinuates cowardice), and repeated endlessly.

The XVth Corps’ neuralgia was hardly unique. Every unit, North and South, had an intense aversion to attacking earthworks–once they had experienced it. If the XVth Corps was unique in any way, it was that it had such unfortunate experiences earlier than any other large unit, and therefore learned of the futility of such assaults earlier than any other large unit.

The XVth Corps assaults occurred in December, 1862 (Chickasaw) and January, 1863 (Arkansas Post). Prior to that time, the only other major assault against field fortifications occurred when the Confederates attacked Corinth, Mississippi in October, 1862. Even then, the Corinth defenses were not as formidable or as heavily manned as those at Chickasaw Bluffs or Arkansas Post. (There were of course earlier attacks on troops stationed behind pre-existing defenses, like the Stone Wall at Fredericksburg or the Sunken Road at Antietam.)

Virtually every time other formations attacked earthworks subsequent to December 1862-January 1863 (a) the attacks were bloodily repulsed, and (b) like the XVth Corps, the attackers shuddered at the the thought of ever doing it again. The XVth Corps was therefore no exception possessing some distinctive culture involving a unique aversion to attacking earthworks: it was the rule, and the corps essentially pioneered the rule through its experiences in the winter of 1862-3.

In other words: they were no dummies, and learned quickly because they had to.

I note that bad experiences were not even necessary. Yes, the XVth Corps was reluctant to attack the formidable defenses of Vicksburg in May, 1863. But so were the XIIIth and XVIIth Corps, which had not had to attack earthworks prior to 19 and 22 May, 1863. As veterans they could quickly understand the likely outcome of rushing prepared defenses manned by veteran troops.

Crucially, after the grim experiences of the winter of 1862-3 the XVth Corps drew upon the Zouave tactics of the 8th Missouri and 11th Indiana to develop an open order, skirmishing-style tactical system that was well-adapted to the realities of the rifled musket, field fortifications, and combat in wooded terrain. Not all who would be bloodied in attacking trenches in the Civil War figured that out. Hell, 1914 armies (especially the French, but the Germans too) hadn’t figured that out.

I have to say too that as a book based on Burke’s PhD thesis, its academic style is sometimes rather grating: it comes off as somewhat pompous and stilted. And I say that as an academic.

In sum, if you are interested in the Civil War at a relatively deep level, I can recommend the book. It provides excellent coverage of some overlooked campaigns, and goes into considerable tactical detail. But if you do read it, discount the (academic) thesis and focus on the historical narrative.

And the war grinds on.

The main news in the last weeks is the death by bombing of Vladlen Tatarsky, AKA Maxim Fomin, a mouth-breathing Russian nationalist military blogger–or at least he was, before he rested in pieces. He blowed up real good.

The deliverer of the bomb (concealed in a statuette of Fomin, apparently to appeal to his narcissism) was a woman who was associated with the opposition movement (such as it is). She claims she was duped, and had no idea that the statuette contained a bomb.

Of course the issue is whodunit. The Ukrainians might first jump to mind, but they have far bigger fish to fry. My immediate conclusion was that Fomin was a casualty of dogs fighting under the carpet, Russian style. Specifically, the military vs. Wagner, and vs. Yevgeny “Nosferatu” Prigozhin specifically. Prigozhin definitely thinks so. Fomin was blown up in a Wagner-associated club, and was a vehement partisan of Prigozhin.

This makes perfect sense, and is emblematic of the mafia-like nature of the Russian state. (I am reminded of Cleveland, circa 1976-7, when it was known as “Bomb City USA” because the mobsters were whacking one another with bombs rather than bullets during that period). Darya Dugin’s demise is another example.

These internecine struggles are traceable to a single fact: the utter failure of Russian military efforts in Ukraine. The fact that private security companies are vying with the state, and specifically the uniformed military, is also symptomatic of the degradation of the state and its concomitant loss over the monopoly of violence. This poses a threat to the autocrat.

Wagner was created to give Russia plausible deniability when intervening overseas, in Africa and Syria, for example. (Although in the latter case, when they attempted to tangle with the US hundreds of them got greased. By Trump. You know, Putin’s puppet.) But there is no guarantee that a force created for that purpose can be limited to that purpose, but instead may slip the bridle and pursue its own interests.

Meaning that Putin is fighting a war on two fronts, one far more dangerous than the other.

On the other battlefield, i.e., Ukraine, the meat grinder stalemate continues. Russia makes incremental gains around Bakhmut, but at appalling cost. And for what? Even if they take the city, it will not materially change the operational picture. They will push back the Ukrainians, rather than achieve a penetration. And even a penetration would be irrelevant, because Russia lacks the means to exploit it. Hell, it is refurbing T-54s and T-55s (NB: the number refers to the year the model was introduced) to replace its horrific losses in armor. Those will be meat for Javelins and Carl Gustavs, and regardless, the Russians haven’t the logistical capability to support a breakout.

The Russians are also on tenterhooks awaiting a threatened Ukrainian counteroffensive. To illustrate their anxiety, they have dug defenses on numerous beaches in Crimea.

How are the Ukrainians going to get there, pray tell? Swim?

The success of any such counteroffensive depends less on Ukrainian capabilities than Russian infirmities: last autumn’s Ukrainian advances were made possible by Russian exhaustion and collapse. The more Russia wastes itself in futile assaults against meaningless objectives that lead to nowhere, the better chances the Ukrainians have to push them back again.

Now is not a favorable time for a serious advance and breakout, due to rasputitsa. May is the time to look for something decisive to happen, when the roads and fields dry. The question is whether Putin will recognize that reality and husband his forces to resist, or will persist in attriting them for no purpose. Based on form, I predict the latter.

In a nutshell: they were both right and both wrong. Churchill was right that an invasion of northwest Europe in 1943 (let alone 1942) would have been an epic disaster, and the Americans were wrong to believe it was possible, let alone wise. The US was right that a maritime strategy would not defeat Hitler, or would take so long that (a) millions more would die, and/or (b) Hitler would develop nukes, and/or (c) the Soviets would end up ruling all of Europe, and Churchill was wrong to think that a maritime strategy could work in any reasonable time frame.

In the event, the battle over strategy between the Brits and Americans resulted in a wise compromise. The Americans got their invasion, but in mid-1944 when Allied strength had waxed and German strength had waned. The British cooled American rashness, and the Americans overrode British reluctance. (Though Churchill fought against the cross-Channel assault until the very end.)

I can always use a good laugh, and noted nitwit Nikole Hannah-Jones has provided one:

Other than being Black, what exactly is Sowell's expertise in slavery or history?

— Ida Bae Wells (@nhannahjones) February 10, 2023

Oh Nikki, where to possibly begin? I suggest you start with Race and Culture: one whole column of the index lists the mentions of the subject of slavery in the book. Then maybe Black Rednecks, White Liberals. (Though that may result in a messy explosion of your magenta-maned head.) And for a bit of self-knowledge, Intellectuals and Race. But in point of fact, analyses of slavery are found throughout Sowell’s massive literary output. (When thinking of him, I am reminded about a quip someone made about Paul Johnson: it’s not the amount he’s written that astonishes, it’s the amount he’s read.)

And not just North American slavery, but slavery around the world. And that’s precisely why he can speak with far more authority and insight on whether slavery in British North American colonies, and later the United States, was somehow unique and makes the U.S. the most fallen of nations, than can Hannah-Jones and her ilk.

And history generally. Again. Look at at his incredible record of scholarship, which includes detailed expositions and analyses of a wide variety of historical issues, such as immigration.

Moreover, Sowell’s approach to history stands in stark contrast to 1619 Project-style leftist “history”: In Sowell, history is a reservoir of facts and data against which theories are tested, whereas in Hannah-Jones’ “work” it is something to be twisted and distorted in order to make political and ideological points.

Thomas Sowell has had a major impact on my life and thinking since I was in college: his Knowledge and Decisions profoundly affected, and continues to affect, how I think about economics, law, and policy. Although somewhat dated because many of its examples were current at the time it was published 43 years ago, the underlying conceptual framework and analyses are timeless: it is astounding at how the intellectual errors that Sowell analyzed back then curse us today–most notably, his theme that there are no solutions, only trade-offs, something that politicians ignore daily, with COVID policy being one of the most egregious examples.

To my mind, Thomas Sowell is the most impressive public intellectual (and intellectual, period) of the past 50 years. The breadth and depth of his scholarship is unsurpassed, and his steadfastness and courage in the face of vicious criticism from lilliputians like Hannah-Jones is truly remarkable. He is a true intellectual: Hannah-Jones and her ilk are intellectualoids, at best. People with intellectual pretensions that far outstrip their abilities, and who pass off agitprop as scholarship. Only idiots think them geniuses.

One of the highlights of my academic career occurred when Sowell wrote an oped defending me against the New York Times’ slanders. No doubt his unfortunately extensive experience with slanders directed at him motivated and informed what he wrote. And the slanders continue, as Hannah-Jones’ ignorant tweet reveals. But sometimes, as in this instance, the slanders are so ridiculous that they elicit only laughter.

Today is the first day of the second year of the Russo-Ukraine War, and there is every indication that 25 February 2024 will mark the first day of the third.

Putin gave one of his increasingly demented speeches on what used to be called Red Army Day. In a nutshell (emphasis on nut) he claimed that this is an existential . . . something . . . against the “collective west,” land of godless pedos. Apparently this is a preemptive war intended to defend Russia against an impending onslaught from Nato.

Which Putin’s own actions give the lie to: according to UK military intelligence, Putin has committed 95 percent of his combat power (such as it is) to fighting Ukraine. Which would leave the rest of Russia’s long borders with godless western pedos completely open to their attack. Not something someone fearing such an attack would do.

Speaking of borders, Putin’s wannabe mini-me, your favorite narcoleptic and mine, Dmitri Medvedev, ranted that it was necessary to push back Russia’s border with Poland by a significant distance. Er, I though math was a big deal in Russia. I guess not. A simple inductive proof demonstrates that this implies that Russia would have to absorb the entire European continent in order to achieve security. Which demonstrates the futility of any attempt to find a end to hostilities based on “addressing Russia’s security concerns.” Their security concerns are unaddressable, except by dissolution of the west.

The rationalizations and projections and aspersions in these speeches don’t really matter. What matters is that they show that Putin will continue to grind on, fighting to the last Russian, to . . . . Who knows? I am reminded of Santayana: “Fanaticism consists of redoubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim.” The war has become an end in itself, not as Clausewitz famously said, politics carried out by other means.

Fanaticism or no, the prospect is for war without an end in sight. So just how is that going?

Late last year and early this there were repeated warnings of an impending Russian offensive. Some people are still talking about an “impending” offensive.

Wrong. Nothing is impending: the offensive has started. And it is going about as well as previous offensives. Arguably worse, actually. One way to summarize would be Wellington’s remark regarding Waterloo: “They came on in the same old way, and we sent them back in the same old way.“ Though Napoleon made it “the nearest run thing you ever saw” (again in the words of Wellington), on most of the front in Ukraine it is not a near run thing at all.

Why do I say the offensive has started? Several reasons. First, Putin is in a hurry. He has demonstrated his impatience time and again. Second, the evidence on the ground: the frequency and intensity of Russian attacks has increased (even if the results have not). Third, the time of year: in not too long the raputitsa will make maneuver and advance very difficult. Fourth, the Russians have every incentive to try to get ahead of the next wave of equipment (notably tanks and air defenses) that the west is (slowly) supplying to Ukraine.

The main fighting has centered on the town of Bakhmut. The Russians have “succeeded,” at the cost of immense casualties, shoving back Ukrainian positions a few kilometers here, a few hundred meters there.

If Russia takes Bakhmut, so what? Itself it has no real strategic importance. The battle reminds me of say Pork Chop Hill in Korea in 1953. The hill had very little intrinsic military importance. But the Chinese and the Americans invested it with a symbolic importance–we can’t let those other bastards have it!–and hence spent many lives and countless artillery fires to take it. Or fights over useless bits of blasted terrain in Verdun, 1916, Fort Douaumont, for example.

Bakhmut is like that. It has become important because both sides have made it a test of wills and capability.

Even if Russia takes the town, it has no ability to break out and exploit into the Ukrainian rear. Bakhmut is an infantry and artillery battle, and shoving back the Ukrainian front a bit here or there will just shift the location of the next infantry and artillery battle. This is like WWI, where even local gains could not be exploited because of the inherent limitations on movement of the attacking forces.

In WWI the Allies achieved something resembling breakout and exploitation in late-October, early-November 1918 only because the German army had been bled white in its spring offensives and the allies had amassed overwhelming superiority in infantry, artillery, armor and airpower, not least because of the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Americans.

The Germans made gains in their 1918 offensives, but those eventually also culminated far short of objectives due to the inherent limitations of trying to take large areas at speeds dictated by logistics and the pace of horses and men on foot. Nearly the same limitations the ground pounding Russian army faces today.

The Germans were in much better shape in March-May 1918, moreover, than the Russians are now. They could bring hundreds of thousands of relatively fresh, and experienced, troops from the East to spearhead the offensive. The Russians are scraping the bottom of the barrel, throwing the unfit and untrained into futile assaults in which their lifespans are measured in hours, at most.

As I noted near the beginning of the war, one reason for Russian failure then was they attempted to use armor without infantry. Now they are attempting to use infantry without armor–and when they do attempt to use armor, as they did recently at Vuhledar, the result is a bloody shambles. But without armor any possibility of exploitation is nil.

Meaning that stalemate is in prospect indefinitely.

The stalemate has brought about one change in Russian politics: the dogs are no longer fighting under the carpet, but in plain sight. In particular, the ghoulish-looking (and face it, just plain ghoulish) Yevgeny Prigozhin has been attacking publicly the Russian defense establishment. Festernik has taken credit for the gains at Bakhmut and Soledar (such as they are), and claims that the defense ministry and army have caused the slaughter of many Wagner troops by withholding artillery ammunition. Further, the nationalist right has been attacking the military for its incompetence–with good reason.

All is not well in Muscovy, in other words, and in contrast to history, some of the unhappiness is being played out in public.

Objective conditions imply that the internecine struggle will get only worse. It is the product of failure on the battlefield, and no end of such failure is in sight. A new year of war has begun, but it will not be different than the old year. A dreary verdict, but the only one the facts support.

The carnival of the Chinese balloon transcontinental transit is bringing musical flashbacks, such as this from 1983:

Or going even further back–deep into my childhood:

Groovy, baby.

Seriously though, I am of mixed minds regarding the decision–the Pentagon’s according to Biden–to defer destroying it until it had traversed the US from sea to shining sea. On the one hand, I can perhaps see that there is intelligence value in observing it. On the other, it makes the United States look pathetic before a strutting China.

On balance, I believe the latter consideration substantially outweighs the former. The lame excuse given for not puncturing it with extreme prejudice earlier–that its fall would endanger people on the ground–belies an intelligence collection motive: if that was the reason, just say so! At least that sounds more boss:

And what are the odds of someone on the ground being hurt in Alaska, the Yukon, or even eastern Montana FFS?

And was the benefit to us of the intelligence we collected on the balloon greater than the value of the intelligence the balloon collected on us?

And perceptions are reality. It’s not like this is a new super weapon. Pretty sure we had figured out everything it was doing and capable of doing during the time it was flying over thousands of miles of trackless waste–if we didn’t already know before it breached US airspace over the Aleutians. But the image of a spy balloon flying with impunity over the fruited plain does convey the image of a “pitiful, helpless giant” (to quote Nixon, reading what the just-retired Patrick Buchanan wrote). This is especially true given that there is a pitiful, helpless mental midget holding the position of Commander in Chief.

This reinforces the image of fecklessness that hangs around this administration like a bad smell. And fecklessness encourages recklessness. That is, we have to think about how Xi interprets this, and believe me, he’s not going to believe “we were protecting people on the ground” line for one second.

He may laugh, though.

But after he’s done laughing, he’ll incorporate what he surely perceives as an image of weakness and indecision into his calculus regarding Taiwan and other points of potential conflict.

This raises the question of motive. After all, China has supposedly reined in its “wolf warriors” and was trying to present a more conciliatory face to the US, and the world. Blinken was supposed to meet with the Chinese to help reset relations. (Nod was to remain in the White House.)

One possibility is that this was a test–would the US still proceed with a rapprochement despite a provocation (humiliation, in fact)?

Another possibility–never to be dismissed in one party (but many faction) states–is that elements in the CCP (including, perhaps, aforesaid wolf warriors) wanted to derail any rapprochement, and figured that creating an incident like this was the way to achieve that objective.

Given the opacity of the CCP/Chinese government, it’s hard to say. But under either scenario, the return message should have been: don’t fuck with us. Instead, we sent the message that we are eminently fuckable.

For their part, the Chinese lost their shit when an F-22 FINALLY took down Chairman Xi’s Amazing Flying Machine.* To which we should have replied: fuck you and the balloon you rode in on, commies. Instead, we gave a mealy mouthed, diplomatic reply.

We are in a very fraught period with China. We are trying to recover from “locust years” (as Churchill called them) of military distraction and decay and recover at least a semblance of our former naval and air dominance over China. China is ruled by a megalomaniac with ambitions to crown his achievements by retaking Taiwan. The last thing do do under those circumstances is to convey weakness. And regardless of the true justification for allowing the balloon to traipse over American unhindered, that’s exactly what happened.

The phrase “the balloon went up” means that the situation is very serious. It dates from WWI, when the appearance of a reconnaissance balloon was a harbinger of an artillery barrage incoming. Well, the balloon went up, and to my mind, was brought down far too late.

*The F-22 took down the balloon with an AIM-9X Sidewinder. A testament to how sensitive the heat seeking infrared sensor on that weapon has become. In early versions of Sidewinder it was necessary to get right on the tail of an adversary for the guidance system to be able to pick up the heat signature of the engine. To be able to take down a balloon, which has far less of a heat signature than a MiG’s exhaust, is pretty impressive.

The F-22 pilots used the call signs Frank1 and Frank2, apparently an homage to WWI “Balloon Buster” ace Frank Luke (whom Eddie Rickenbacker called the best pilot in WWI). There is some irony here, though, because it is clear that the current Pentagon leadership is shall we say slightly less aggressive than Lt. Luke.

After much hemming and hawing, too-ing and fro-ing, Germany has finally relented and agreed to the provision of German-built Leopard II tanks to Ukraine. Apparently the deal clincher was an American agreement to supply 30-odd M1A2 Abrams MBTs. These will join a modest number of Challenger IIs to be provided by the UK.

This is an important development, but not an earth shattering one as some on each side are saying. Some pro-Ukrainian western observers assert this will allow Ukraine to recapture all its lost territory-including Crimea-from Russia. On the other side, which includes the Russians and many right wing populists in the United States, this is the next step to Armageddon. As Trump put it: “today tanks, tomorrow nukes.”

Settle down, everybody. (A big ask, I know.)

Yes, these MBTs are far superior to anything Ukraine currently operates, and to anything in the Russian armory. On every crucial dimension, the western-supplied tanks are superior: firepower, protection (including protection of ammunition), cross country performance, gun accuracy, optics and fire control systems. Optics and fire control systems are especially important because it has been long known that in armored battles, he who shoots first almost always wins. Iraqi tankers found this out to their dismay (if they were lucky enough to be able to find out anything) in 1991 when their tanks began exploding from hits from M1s that they couldn’t even see. Although both the western and Russian tanks have improved in the decades since, the already yawning gap in performance demonstrated in 1991 has only increased over the years.

But quantity has a quality all its own, as Stalin was wont to say. And the fact is that the quantity of tanks being supplied Ukraine is modest. Given the inevitable attrition due to combat and breakdown, the approximately 300 tanks is about enough for one armored division for one big battle.

Consider the use of this type of force on the defense and offense.

On the defense, an armored force of this size and quality could stop Russian armored advances and launch devastating counterattacks–if they are located where the Russians choose to attack, or can get there in relatively short order.

Given the record of the last 11 plus months, moreover, it’s not clear that Ukraine needs this force to defeat a putative Putin armored attack. In February-March of last year, Russia proved singularly incapable of utilizing armor effectively in the offensive, and its tanks proved easy pickings for anti-tank guided missiles. This was in part to (as I wrote at the time) Russia’s incompetence at combined arms tactics: tanks without infantry are extremely vulnerable. Given the dross with which Russian formations are being reinforced with, and the lack of training they have received, their capabilities are almost certainly worse rather than better than a year ago.

Logistical failings also helped doom the Russians in early-2022. If anything, massive attrition in vehicles and the effect of HIMARS has worsened their logistics woes: due to HIMARS, the Russians are being forced to locate their supply dumps well to the rear, increasing the duration of vehicle trips (effectively reducing supply capacity) and increasing the vulnerability of supply convoys to attack by drones, air attack, artillery attack, infiltrators, partisans, what have you.

So although an impending Russian spring offensive is anticipated, there is no reason to believe it would fare any better than the last one, and considerable reason to believe it would fare worse, tanks or no tanks.

Insofar as offensive operations are concerned, yes, the western MBTs can provide a striking force that might break through Russian lines. But a decent-size force of modern tanks is likely a necessary but not sufficient condition for such an outcome.

Successful armored assaults often rely on surprise and indirectness rather than mere smashing power. Tanks deployed against a weakly held section of an enemy line are far more effective than those hitting strong prepared positions. Compare Ardennes (1940, 1944) to Kursk (1943) or even the Seelow Heights (where in April 1945 a massively superior Soviet armored force took horrific casualties to overcome prepared but weakly-held defenses).

Achieving such an outcome requires considerable operational skill and operational security. Recall the lengths to which the US went to conceal its shift of its armored striking force from fronting Kuwait to fronting Iraq some distance to the west in order to be on the Iraqi flank. (In the event, the Marines smashed through prepared defenses in Kuwait, but the point holds). In 1940 and 1944 the Germans were helped by overoptimistic French and then American/British assumptions which led them to leave the Ardennes weakly defended and to discount the possibility of German massing there. At Kursk, the preparations were too massive to be concealed, giving time for the Soviets to construct a defense in depth which ground down the German armored spearheads before they could achieve a decisive penetration and breakout. Subsequently the Soviets launched a massive armored counterattack–against weaker German forces on the flanks. The same thing happened at Stalingrad.

Recent Ukrainian successes suggest some skill at deception and operational security. They evidently duped the Russians into believing the main Ukrainian effort would be in the south but instead the attack started in the Kharkiv region–agains skeleton Russian forces.

But there’s no guarantee of achieving that again, and ironically, the very mass of a big tank force makes deception and operational security all the more difficult.

There’s also the issue of whether the Ukrainian army can carry out the combined armed tactics that are necessary to succeed in an armored strike against opposition. The large casualties they have suffered over the past 11 months has certainly weakened what combined arms skill they possessed prior to 24 February 2022.

Further, there is considerable room to question how deep a penetration Ukraine could achieve. Its logistical capabilities are also limited, and the tanks they are receiving are gluttonous consumers of fuel (especially the Abrams). It would also have to confront the inexorable logic that every kilometer of advance hurts the attacker’s logistics and helps the defender’s.

And with respect to logistics, tanks require considerable maintenance support to begin with, especially when they are on the move. The fact that Ukraine is receiving three different kinds of MBT, each requiring a separate support structure (which will be of suboptimal scales) means that a lower percentage of their tanks will be operating at any time than would be the case for an American division operating a single type of vehicle.

In sum, the new western tanks will help shift the balance in Ukraine’s favor, but are unlikely to do so in a decisive way. I doubt that they will shorten the war appreciably, especially since even though they will likely result in more Russian losses on the battlefield, such losses have clearly not persuaded Putin to consider giving up, especially on terms suitable to Ukraine. And any advances the tanks facilitate will only encourage Ukraine in its belief that it can restore its 2014 borders.

So my prediction is that the western MBTs will mainly shift the line of stalemate to the east. Perhaps a considerable distance, but not nearly the distance Ukraine desires.

Recently Bruce Thornton riffed on a WSJ piece about the “Dontells,” people who don’t want to be told what to do. These people have been labeled as suffering from “Oppositional Defiant Disorder,” or “ODD.” (I’m sure that acronym is not a mere coincidence.).

This is officially recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-5. It’s supposedly treatable but incurable.

This smacks of Soviet psychiatry, which labeled those who opposed the regime as mentally ill. (Putin has resurrected this heinous practice. But hey, so has Germany which is forcing an 85 year old Holocaust survivor to be institutionalized for refusing to be “vaccinated” against COVID.)

Can’t wait until hooliganism is an officially recognized DSM condition.

The reason that ODD is running rampant is that THERE ARE LOTS OF PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT, CORPORATIONS AND MEDIA TELLING PEOPLE WHAT TO DO. About everything. Such a mystery, right?

And the fact that people being pushed by the pushy are pushing back is precisely why the pushy in government, corporations, academia, and the media are so intent on diagnosing them as mentally ill. (Of course, someone born with a Y chromosome who wants to ignore that fact and cut off his junk is the epitome of mental health and you are a hater–and probably mentally ill yourself–for harboring any doubts about this!)

I am not a religious person, but one theme in the New Testament that resonates deeply with me is Jesus’s imprecations against the Pharisees and teachers of the law. He was obviously suffering from ODD. Which is precisely why the Pharisees were hell-bent on killing him.

This resonates because we live in an increasingly pharisaical world, with priestly classes claiming a monopoly on authority and truth condemning, persecuting, and often prosecuting those who dissent. Cancel culture is just one manifestation of rampant pharisaicalism.

More prosaically, they are just so many Cartmans, demanding that you respect their authoritay and delivering a beat down if you resist.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2GfN9dw14I

The disgusting display of Davos is perhaps the most prominent congregation of modern day Pharisees. A self-anointed group of global control freaks who just know better, and who condemn those who reject their superiority–and their commands–as heretics and blasphemers. Except they use slightly different terminology, like extremists and purveyors of misinformation and disinformation.

The most outré Davos Pharisees were of course European, and many of their most bitter condemnations were directed at benighted Americans (e.g., the Euro who said that Americans were going to have to dispense with free speech and pass hate speech laws–how dare the hoi polloi be able to say mean things about us! Oh, you have no idea how much I hate you, woman. Or maybe you do, which is why you insist on such baleful laws.)

Unfortunately, there were many, many Euro-adjacent Americans there (John Kerry being the most egregious, with Al Gore giving him stiff competition in that regard), and the pharisaical class is firmly in command in American government (at all levels), corporations, academia, and media.

If you watch even a few minutes of what transpired at Davos, I am sure that you agree with me that nuking the place in mid-January would make the world a far, far better place.

The fact that the United States is the target of Europharisees is hardly surprising, given that the very reason that millions came to America in the first place was to escape the suffocating oppressions of the “elites”–royalty, nobility, and the established church. There was an obvious sorting process. The non-conformists were the most likely to leave. (Small example: I recall a study showing that Scandinavian emigrants to America were more likely to have unusual names.) Thus, Europe became more conformist, and American more heavily populated by those who bridled at authority.

Over the years, the United States has become more Europeanized, but Europe has not become more American. There has been convergence, but most of the movement has occurred in the United States, especially with the growing dominance of progressivism in government, media, academia, and corporations.

Progressives are Pharisees without God. And like the Pharisees of old they cannot brook dissent, and strive to use authority–including the authority of the state–to crush it. In doing, they label dissenters as possessed by demons or the Devil, only now their condemnations are tarted up in pseudo-scientific psychiatric jargon.

As for me, I’m ODD (by the psycho-Pharisees’ definition), and I’m proud. It manifests itself in small things (e.g., musical taste for punk and outlaw country) and large things (politics). I despise the modern Pharisees and rebel against them. I’m no Jesus, for sure, but I fervently embrace that part of his message.

Aside. In a Twitter scrape some years ago, I mocked the eminently mockable Pharisee wannabe and all around insufferable douchebag Tom Nichols. He responding by saying that I was “odd.” I guess he was right! Thanks for the compliment, Tom!

Vladimir Putin has added a chapter to the Annals of Gobsmacking Asininity by whining about the unfairness of Russia’s fight in Ukraine because of the involvement of Nato.

The article stated, “As Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized earlier… ‘the military potential and capabilities of virtually all major NATO countries are being actively used against Russia.’ Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu noted that Moscow is fighting not so much with the Ukrainian military as with the ‘collective West.’”

Tass further tried to emphasize that Russia was at a considerable financial disadvantage on the battlefield, as foreign aid to Ukraine has exceeded $150.8 billion, including military, humanitarian and financial support.

So let me see if I have this straight. Nato has always been hell-bent on destroying Russia. Ukraine posed an existential threat to Russia because it wanted to join Nato. But who coulda possibly thunk that a Nato looking for an opportunity to crush Russia wouldn’t have just stood by with its thumb up its collective butt when Russia invaded Ukraine?

The incoherence of Putin’s “thinking” is a thing to behold. But maybe that just means that Putin is a first rate intelligence, according to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s definition: “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless yet be determined to make them otherwise.”

Actually, I don’t think Vova is a genius, by anyone’s definition. The more plausible explanation for his actions is that he didn’t fear Nato, or the United States. He thought they were paper tigers who would acquiesce to his invasion of Ukraine. (No doubt the Afghanistan fiasco encouraged this belief.) They turned out not to be, so now he’s crying No Fair!–the lament of losers.

Perhaps Putin’s calculation would have been correct had his other crucial assumption that he would kick in Ukraine’s door, and “the whole rotten structure would come crashing down” been true. (For those who are unaware, that’s what Hitler thought of the USSR.) But it was Vova’s vaunted army that proved the paper tiger. Therefore, seeing that Ukraine was not going to collapse, and that Russia had jumped into a quagmire, the United States and many Nato nations (not Germany!) found that Putin had handed the opportunity to beat the crap out of him on a silver platter.

And according to Putin, that’s what Nato has been panting to do forever. And he gave them the perfect opportunity to do it. Genius!!

Which leaves Putin to be a whining little bitch bewailing the unfairness of it all.

Dude. Don’t start a knife fight on the assumption with the guy with the guns isn’t going to use them.

Some time ago I pondered what Putin’s sobriquet should be. I think this settles it. “Putin the Pathetic” it is.