Streetwise Professor

Tomorrow (Sunday, 17 September 2023) is the 161st anniversary of the Battle of Antietam (or Sharpsburg to those daring enough to admit Confederate leanings). I have spent the days leading up to the anniversary reading D. Scott Hartwig’s massive account of the battle and its aftermath, I Dread the Thought of the Place. It is almost certain to be the definitive account of the battle for years to come.

Antietam is a battle with many moving parts, many of them moving simultaneously. Hartwig does a masterful job of describing each part down to the regimental and sometimes company level, and crucially, helping the reader understand what was going on elsewhere in the battle when X was happening at location Y.

Antietam was the bloodiest single day in American history. Perhaps the most impactful part of the book is how it gives some sense of how much carnage occurred in short periods of time in small spaces. Many paragraphs in the book describe the killing or wounding of several individual soldiers–often by name–in a single company or regiment in a period of a few minutes. The serial slaughter of color guards is particularly notable in this regard. Although of course nothing can possibly convey the shock of such violence experienced by the participants, the book individualizes the combat and its human consequences in a way that allows us to glimpse, at least distantly, how intense and concentrated the violence was.

One thing that the book makes abundantly clear is the often decisive role played by artillery in the battle. Stephen D. Lee, a Confederate artillery battalion commander at the battle, called Antietam “artillery hell.” It was for Lee, given the pounding that his batteries took on the Dunker Church Plateau. But it was an artillery hell especially for infantry on both sides who were pounded by guns that had unobstructed fields of fire seldom found on Civil War battlefields. Hartwig shows that artillery played a more decisive role at Antietam than at any other battle of the Civil War, including Gettysburg. Before reading the book, I did not appreciate role of Confederate artillery in stymying Burnside’s assault on the Lower Bridge.

The book is also remarkable in its integration of the entire vertical of the battle, from the commanding generals down through each echelon to the lowest private. It describes the actions of each, and is judicious in its judgments on the command decisions at every level of command, from the captains of companies; to the field officers of regiments, to the brigade, division and corps (or wing) commanders; and finally to army commanders McClellan and Lee. These judgments are well reasoned, and often surprising: I can’t say that I’ve ever seen anyone write favorably of Samuel Sturgis, as Hartwig does! Some come in for praise–such as Hooker. Others, not so much. The acerbic D. H. Hill would certainly take issue with Hartwig’s critical assessment of his generalship. The book’s treatment of Edwin Sumner is particularly brutal, but completely warranted given the brutality that Sumner’s soldiers experienced as the result of his blundering.

Hartwig does not shy from criticizing icons, notably Stonewall Jackson. And he comes to the defense of the often-maligned, most notably Ambrose Burnside, whose generalship at the Lower Bridge (sarcastically called Burnside’s Bridge by posterity) Hartwig treats with understanding of the challenges posed by terrain, bad staff work (notably by the Army of the Potomac’s Topographical Engineers), and equivocal orders issued by AoP commander McClellan. Hartwig makes it painfully clear that McClellan did Burnside dirty in his final report on the campaign, unjustly and counterfactually putting blame on Burnside (who by that time was discredited by the disaster at Fredericksburg) in order to distract from his own failings.

The book could have used some more careful editing. There are numerous who/whom mixups. At times left and right flanks are also mixed up, which led me to have to re-read a few descriptions, map in hand. I caught at least one curious name mistake. Union brigade commander Colonel William Howard Irwin suddenly became Colonel Irvin, and remained so for the rest of the book. Although perhaps the shade of Colonel Irwin is grateful, as his rather appalling–and perhaps drunken–incompetence (that led to the butchering of the 7th Maine) can be laid at someone else’s gravestone.

I therefore heartily recommend I Dread the Thought of the Place. But be warned!: it weighs in at a massive 790 pages (and 4.25 pounds). It is not for the faint of heart or anyone looking for an introduction to the battle.

Reading the book brought home how Civil War scholarship has developed and improved in the 50 plus years that I have been devouring books on the subject. When I first went to Antietam on my own, in 1978, the standard work was James V. Murfin’s A Gleam of Bayonets, published in 1968. It was a good, say, 20,000 foot view of the battle. Stephen Sears’ 1994 A Landscape Turned Red was more detailed, giving a say 10,000 foot view of the engagement. In subsequent years, microhistories focusing on specific parts of the battle have appeared: these give you a drone’s eye view of particular actions.

Examples include David Welker’s The Cornfield and two volumes by Marion V. Armstrong on the disastrous attack of Sedgwick’s Division–one focusing on the Union side of the action, the other on the Confederate side. John Micheal Priest’s Antietam: A Soldier’s Battle focuses (as the title suggests) on the action from the perspective of those with muskets in their hands. The Brigades of Antietam and The Artillery of Antietam describe the actions of each brigade and battery in some detail. Ezra Carman’s early detailed history has been republished, including as Visual Antietam (in 3 volumes, edited by Brad Butkovich). Then there are tour guides, like Carol Reardon’s and Tom Vossler’s A Field Guide to Antietam or Ted Ballard’s Staff Ride Guide: Battle of Antietam. Moreover, there are two excellent compendiums of maps, Bradley Gottfried’s The Maps of Antietam and Brad Butkovich’s The Antietam Battlefield Atlas. (Although the maps in I Dread the Thought of the Place are good, I strongly recommend reading it with either Gottfried or Butkovich in hand.)

Thus, there is an abundance of choices to those who want to take a deep dive into Antietam. But D. Scott Hartwig’s book is pretty much one stop shopping. It tells the fascinating story of America’s bloodiest single day of battle in incredible detail. It represents a new standard in battle history.

In its concerted effort to ensure that Yevgeny Prigozhin will not become a venerated martyr, the Kremlin consigned the late Wagner impresario’s funeral to an obscure cemetery in a gritty part of St. Petersburg, limited attendance to his family members, and deployed considerable police and military resources to prevent anyone from going to the cemetery. They also attempted to undermine the development of a shrine by requiring the burial of the three main Wagner figures who went down in flames–Prigozhin, Valery Chekalov, and Dmitry Utkin–in separate locations (although that risks the creation of three sites of veneration, no?)

Perhaps the families should be grateful that funerals were even permitted. In Soviet times, the NKVD and KGB would send the families of those they shot a bill for the bullets used to kill them.* Did the FSB send the families of the Wagner casualties a bill for the S-300 missiles used to shoot them down? Or for the bomb, if that’s what did it?

Indeed, the Wagner leadership may be considered lucky as compared to their employees. There are reports that at least one cemetery of Wagner soldiers KIA in Ukraine is being obliterated.

There are also reports of the Kremlin and the MoD moving rapidly to seize control of Wagner assets and operations in Africa. This would represent a reprise of the early Putin policy of eliminating the Russian mafias by incorporating them into the state structures: it was a takeover, not an elimination.

*Someone on X pointed out to me that Indonesia still does this.

Last week Russian warlord/PMC impresario Yevgeny Prizoghin met his demise, as his plane plummeted from the skies near Tver, killing him and several other high ranking Wagner personnel.

Two theories of the cause of the takedown of his aircraft (it is not a crash, per se) are in play: (1) his Embraer corporate jet was taken down by SAMs, or (2) a bomb was planted on the plane and detonated in flight.

The second theory has been pushed by Russian sources, which is reason enough to discard it. When the theory was first advanced, skeptics pointed out that the plane fell with the fuselage intact but minus a wing, whereas a bomb in the passenger or cargo compartments would have seriously damaged the fuselage. The Russian sources then pivoted to say the bomb had been planted in the wheel well, located in the wing, which would explain its loss. Subsequent photos of the detached wing show it to be intact, however,and crucially, the landing gear and tire are pristine and bear no signs of fire or explosion.

Support for the first theory comes from (1) the observation of smoke or vapor trails pointing skyward in videos of the plane’s descent, and (2) photographs of plane pieces with many small holes, characteristic of the shrapnel jettisoned with the explosion of a SAM warhead. (FWIW, there are rumors that the corpses of the victims also contained shrapnel wounds.). It should also be noted that the takedown occurred close to a military base at Tver where SAMs are stationed.

So I’m strongly leaning towards the shoot down theory.

So whodunit, and why? Well, of course the near lock primary suspect is Putin. Prigozhin’s/Wagner’s Kornilov moment exactly two months before Yevgeny et al bit the dust was a threat to Putin, and worse, an insult (despite Progozhin’s protests he wasn’t targeting Putin) led virtually everyone to believe he was a dead man walking. The only question was how? Tea that would break a Geiger Counter? A window? “Suicide”?

Indeed, the most confusing thing about the entire episode is that not only did Prigozhin live so long, he was apparently traveling to, from, and within Russia with impunity. This led some to hypothesize that the entire June “coup” was some sort of scheme drawn up by Putin and Prigozhin, others to conjecture that Putin was too intimidated to move against him.

Or more likely, Putin figured revenge is a dish best served cold. And further, he needed to destroy not one man, but to decapitate Wagner altogether–and Prigozhin and his confederates did not provide the opportunity to do so until they boarded the plane this week.

One can only consider Prigozhin as a fool. He fucked up–he trusted Putin.

He was also a fool because he forgot the old adage–if you strike at the king, you must kill him. By recoiling at the last minute, he sealed his fate.

Now of course we’ll never know if Putin gave an explicit order. Perhaps it was a hint, hint, nudge, nudge will no one rid me of this turbulent boyar kind of thing. But it’s extremely unlikely that this happened without Putin’s approval.

Of course, like Murder on the Orient Express, many had a motive to kill Prigozhin. Most notably the Defense Minister Shoigu and the Armed Forces Commander Gerasimov, both of whom Prigozhin had attacked furiously and whose removal he demanded. But I seriously doubt they have the stones to do something like this on their own hook. Indeed, their sad-sackiness is exactly what drove Prigozhin nuts and which endears them to Putin.

What now? The hardcore nationalist factions in Russia are furious, and Wagner rank-and-file could pose a threat. But they are leaderless, and no doubt the FSB and GRU are sweeping up and eliminating the most dangerous of them. No doubt some hardcore elements will survive, perhaps fleeing to Africa, and attempt to move against Putin a la how French paratrooper veterans of Algeria tried to snuff De Gaulle. But the very public De Gaulle represented a much easier target than the reclusive Putin, and even then the disgruntled French soldiers failed in their attempts.

Presumably the event has also scared straight anybody else thinking of mounting a challenge against Putin. Indeed, the very extravagance of the killing–much more lurid than a mere fall from a high place–puts an exclamation point on the assassination, and sends a very strong message.

But it’s not immaterial that Putin felt it necessary to engage in such extravagance and send such a message. A confident leader, like Caesar in many instances, can show mercy. A shaky or fearful one cannot. And perhaps it was the lesson of Caesar that convinced Putin that longtime colleagues can be extremely dangerous. “Et tu Yevgeny” were not words Putin was going to utter, if he could help it. And he could.

A current topic of debate by allegedly serious people in Germany is whether to ban Alternative for Germany (AfD), a nationalist political party which has been surging in opinion polls. Surging to such an extent that it currently out-polls the ruling Social Democrats and is in shouting range of the Christian Democrats. Those mooting the ban include Thomas Haldenwang, the head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier. These elite worthies label the AfD as extremist, enemies of the constitution, and threats to democracy.

The utter moral panic is palpable.

The irony of banning a political party in the name of “democracy” is beyond obvious.

Midwits defending a ban make arguments like, well, the Nazis came to power by democratic means, so it is necessary to protect democracy against the new Nazis–which they obviously believe the AfD to be.

This is historical idiocy. For one thing, the Nazis were declining in popularity when Hitler was invited by German President Paul von Hindenburg to become Chancellor, at the behest of Franz von Papen. Von Papen was a member of the conservative elite, which despaired of defeating the left without the Nazi base. He came up with the brilliant plan of bringing the Nazis into the government on the theory that the conservative elite would dominate Hitler and use him: “We’ve hired him” von Papen told Hindenberg.

Yeah, that worked out great!

Moreover, Hindenburg had to exercise his emergency powers under the Weimar Constitution to install Hitler as Chancellor since the Nazis did not have a majority or a majority coalition in the Reichstag. Again, he did so under the theory that by doing so he would prevent the left from obtaining power and install a puppet that his minority faction could control.

So no, the Nazis did not take power by democratic means. They had a considerable voting bloc, yes, but it was the arrogant and blundering machinations of a faction of the German elite that put them in power.

Soon thereafter, Hitler ran roughshod over those who thought he was their hireling. One of his first acts, in the aftermath of the Reichstag Fire, was to persuade Hindenburg to issue the Reichstag Fire Decree which suspended most civil liberties. This was followed by the passage of the Enabling Act that effectively allowed Hitler to rule by decree, and which ultimately resulted in . . . the effective banning of all political parties other than the Nazis.

More irony for you.

Other historical facts fundamentally differentiate the AfD from the Nazis. The Nazis had a vast paramilitary organization (the SA, and the SS, which was much smaller when Hitler took power) that could intimidate opponents and carry out violence against those that posed a political threat to the Party: the AfD does not. The Nazis obviously had a mesmerizing and messianic leader who attracted a mass personal following. The AfD does not.

The AfD are not my cup of tea, in large part because they are anti-American, although I can understand and sympathize with some of the positions that have made them a political force, namely their anti-EU stance, and their anger over the immigration policies that Merkel and the German political elite forced on the country.

But that’s neither here nor there. What’s particularly fascinating about this to me is how it validates something I pointed out before the 2016 election in the United States, namely, the utter inability of the western “elite” to comprehend–or even consider the possibility–that they created the thing that now terrifies them to the point of wanting to ban it.

AfD’s popularity is due completely to the failure of the German ruling class of all parties–SPD, CDU, Greens. Or maybe not its failure, but it’s Borat-like success of imposing its will despite popular opposition, and its demonization and cancelation of those who express their dissatisfaction.

In other words, the German establishment is reaping what it has sown, and doesn’t like it one bit. But instead of stepping back and asking why supposed Nazis have re-emerged in modern Germany, and considering whether maybe, just maybe, the enemy is them, and that they are primarily responsible for this malign development, they presume their righteousness and react by attempting to demonize and crush what they have created, Sorcerer’s Apprentice-like.

And again, this is not a phenomenon unique to Germany. It is ubiquitous in the west, where populist fires lit by the ruling classes are burning, and the ruling classes cannot even countenance the thought they they are the arsonists.

The Trump phenomenon in the US is one example. Brexit in the UK. (Both of these were prominent in my 2016 post.) But not just them. Look at France (Le Pen) or the Netherlands (Farmers’ Party) or Meloni in Italy.

Or Melei in Argentina. This clip is wildly entertaining, but not just for Melei’s volcanic rant or his Austin-Powers-Meets-the-Late Elvis hairdo: the look on the interviewer’s face is priceless:

“Argentinian Trump” Presidential candidate Javier Milei leaves reporter in STUNNED silence— WATCH

REPORTER: "Why do you call Leftists shit?"

MILEI: "BECAUSE THEY ARE SHIT!”

REPORTER: ?

MILEI: “If you think differently they will kill you!”

pic.twitter.com/rybDuYtZN3

— Benny Johnson (@bennyjohnson) August 17, 2023

A smaller example is the freak out over “Oliver Anthony” (real name Christopher Anthony Lunsford), whose “Rich Men North of Richmond” dominates iTunes –along with several of his other songs. Anthony’s (who would be a spitting image of me at his age if he was about 15 lbs. lighter–I mean, a near doppelgänger) success has caused a moral meltdown among the establishment. Yes, the left in particular, but also the elitist right (e.g., National Review).

Again, the Other frightens these people no end, but they cannot come to grips with the fact that the Other is a reaction to them, 10000 percent.

In a typically supercilious and condescending way, New York Times columnist David Brooks (whom I have a vague recollection of encountering a few times during our shared time at the University of Chicago) tiptoed up to the precipice and looked over. But in the end he chooses to be a “card-carrying member of his class” (his words).

The populist forces shaking virtually the entire west will not abate until the ruling classes engage in self-reflection, self-criticism, and humility. But that is not in their nature. They KNOW they are better than you, and if you disagree with them that’s because you are the unwashed reprobate who doesn’t know his/her place. Which means that the populist backlash will not abate. Especially in Jacksonian America.

And when it does not abate, authoritarian responses are inevitable. Germany’s serious consideration of banning the AfD is just the harbinger of such responses. And that will look mild compared to what is brewing in the United States. The Sorcerer’s Apprentices of our ruling classes have unleashed forces that they cannot control, and are indeed redoubling their spells. Chaos is inevitable.

There is considerable angst over the glacial pace of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. This angst is a product of unrealistic hopes and expectations derived from totally different circumstances.

The unrealistic expectations derived from the stunning success of the Ukrainians last year, around Kharkiv/Kharkov and Kherson. These successes were rooted in Russian errors. The Russians overextended themselves in their initial offensive in 2022, leaving open flanks and exhausted forces that made them extremely vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks. The Russian situation last summer was in many respects comparable to the Ukrainian situation in 2014, when they overextended themselves in pushing at separatist forces, leaving them open to a devastating attack by Russian forces.

(Both episodes remind me of a maxim my mother uttered during one of our many tours of Civil War battlefields (she was a saint to take me on so many): “Nobody ever won a battle, but some people sure lost one.”)

Circumstances are totally different now. The Russians had ample time to dig in extensively, and in particular, sow extensive minefields. It’s a totally different proposition attacking deep, heavily mined defenses than pouncing on the flanks of demoralized, exhausted troops in the open.

The Ukrainians, Zelensky in particular, have been damning the West vitriolically for failure to provide enough of, well, everything. Sorry, but “enough of everything” would really mean deployment of several American heavy divisions, and most importantly, a good chunk of the USAF. American doctrine for attacking prepared defenses involves an extended period of intense air attack to degrade them, followed by assaults by heavy divisions (i.e., divisions other than the 82nd and 101st, and 10th Mountain), supported by continued air attacks and massive artillery.

Not happening in Ukraine. Never was going to happen. Never will happen.

I am a Patton fan, but this quote from the movie is wildly incorrect:

Fixed fortifications, huh? Monuments to the stupidity of man. When mountain ranges and oceans could be overcome anything built by man can be overcome.

As Patton surely knew, history is replete of examples of the power of fixed fortifications. Ironically this statement was made about the fortifications at Metz, which stymied Patton for months. (And it is amusing that in the same film Patton gives a tour of the fortifications of Malta, and describes how the Knights of Malta used them to stop the Turks.)

Given these realities, the Ukrainians have adapted. They are gnawing through some of the minefields (at non-trivial cost), but are also executing WWI-like trench raids to attrit front line units and deep strikes with drones and Western-supplied weapons (notably HIMARS and StormShadow) to undermine Russian logistics.

This has some chance of succeeding–eventually. Chewing a wide enough gap may permit a breakout, with someplace like Tokmak playing the part of St. Lo. Russian reserves and operational mobility are likely inadequate to contain such a breakout–if it can be engineered. With “engineering” being the operative word, because making the gap that could be exploited is first and foremost a combat engineering task.

But nothing will happen quickly, if it happens at all.

In the meantime, both sides are acting like exhausted fighters in a no-holds brawl, with attacks on civilian and infrastructure targets being the equivalent of eye-gouging and ear-biting. The Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain-exporting capacity are the most prominent example of this.

(NB, especially to people like supposed commodities expert Javier Blas. The first thing that pops into the minds of most when attacks on Ukrainian grain-handling infrastructure is wheat. But Ukraine is a much bigger player in corn than wheat.)

And these attacks carry the risk of dramatically escalating the conflict. Today Russia extended its missile attacks westward from Odesa/Odessa to the banks of the Danube, and executed a strike that landed ~100 meters from Romanian territory. That is, Nato territory.

All this raises the question: what’s the point? And I don’t mean the point for Russia and Ukraine, or more particularly their governments. I mean for the interests of the United States.

A strong case can be made that the US has already achieved–courtesy of tens of thousands of Ukrainian lives and tens of billions of American dollars–about all of the conceivable strategic benefits of this war. Courtesy of Putin’s idiocy, Russian military capacity has been (a) dramatically reduced, and (b) shown to have been not that great in the first place. The threat to Europe posed by Russia (which (b) suggests was not that serious in the first place) has been neutered, at the cost of increasing the US’s vulnerability in a more vital theater–Asia. Good strategic thinking should not focus on making the rubble bounce, but should pocket gains in eastern Europe and focus on Asia.

So rather than acceding to Zelensky’s ever greater demands, the message to him should be: take half a loaf, and make a deal. For the sake of your people.

But that is not the attitude of America’s (and most of Europe’s) ruling class. They are monomaniacally focused not just on restoring pre-2014 borders, but crushing Putin and transforming the Russian state. As illustrated by this:

Vladimir Kara-Murza writes: There is only one outcome of this conflict that would be in the interests of the free world, of Ukraine and, ultimately, of the Russian people: resounding defeat for Putin, to be followed by political change in Russia and a Marshall Plan-type international assistance program both to rebuild Ukraine and to help post-Putin Russia build a functioning democracy so that it never again becomes a threat to its own people or its neighbors. That is the only way to make sure Europe can finally become whole, free and at peace — and stay that way.

Sounds great! How is that going to happen, exactly, Vlad baby? Especially the part about “build[ing] a functioning democracy so that it never again becomes a threat to its own people or its neighbors”?

This reminds me of a statement that I saw from China today, about how government policy makers promised to “optimize and adjust policies” in response to the real estate meltdown. Optimization is not a plan–it is an aspiration. Almost to a person the policy establishments in the US and Europe are hooked on a categorically, metaphysically unachievable aspiration and are willing to spend countless lives and dollars in the futile attempt to achieve it.

These people believe in fairy tales. Murderous fairy tales that cannot possibly come true.

In an ironic twist, a war in Europe (not Asia) is now “The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” (I’m not a big Omar Bradley fan, but he got that one right.) But our policy “elites”–of both parties–are hyper-focused on the wrong war. (Why that is is a story for another, and probably much longer post.)

War and geopolitics require cold-blooded calculations. The cold-blooded calculation for the United States is definitely not to dream of magically transforming a notoriously intractable and autocratic society into Switzerland with nukes. (The possession of nukes in itself making such a transformation wholly fantastical.) It is instead to push for an outcome that satisfies none of the combatants–and indeed infuriates them–and shift focus from eastward to westward. Don’t fight the last war. Prepare for the new one–in order to prevent it.

Today is Independence Day, but for me it is more an occasion of resignation (or melancholy even) than celebration, because the chasm separating the present America from that envisioned in the Declaration is vast, and growing by the day.

The bedrock ideals in the Declaration were individual liberty; emancipation from government tyranny; natural rights possessed by all individuals; and self-government. 247 years later, all of these ideals are widely scorned by the ruling classes, and are as a result are becoming progressively further from realization.

I use the word “progressively” deliberately: for progressivism–especially in its most current guise–is directly responsible for the assault on these ideals. 21st century progressives do not revere the ideals in the Declaration–they revile them. (And it has always been so for progressives–cf. Woodrow Wilson).

Individualism has been replaced by collectivism and identitarianism. Individualism is anathematized as white privilege, and the fact that those who met in Philadelphia in 1776 (and in 1787) were white, and in some cases held slaves, is considered proof of the illegitimacy–and indeed the evil–of the Founding.

The concept of natural rights possessed by all individuals equally is also an anathema to progressives, who elevate group and tribe over individuals, and who believe that members of some tribes are more equal than others, and have claims on others due to iniquities allegedly inflicted on the long dead members of one tribe by the long dead members of the other tribe. Guilt and punishment have become collectivized, and unmoored from individual conduct.

The 21st century state exercises vastly more tyrannical power over virtually every aspect of our lives than George III or Lord North could have even imagined in 1776. Relatedly, as for self-government, the colossus of the administrative state is almost totally unchecked by the branches of government that are supposed to be accountable to the people. Taxation without representation has been replaced by regulation (of the most minute details of our lives) without representation. Parliament on the Thames in the age of sail was never so remote to the average American as a regulatory agency on the Potomac in the days of the Internet.

The progressive march through the institutions, which began at the dawn of the 20th century, has accelerated greatly in the first quarter of the 21st. The institution with which I am most closely affiliated–academia–seems to me to be beyond saving. Tragically, an institution which has been of deep interest and importance to me–the US military–is on its way to joining academia as a lost cause.

I am tempted to say that these developments are un-American. But alas, although they are anti-American to the extent that “American” is identified with the ideals of the Founding, they are largely Made in the USA. A la Pogo, we have met the enemy, and he is us. Or at least, he is some of us, and that some hold the whip hand.

In many respects, as this article argues, progressivism–especially in its current Woke form–is just the current manifestation of the Puritanism which in many guises (including guises assumed by those who would consider themselves anything but puritanical) has been a catalyst for change and a source of social conflict in America for almost exactly 400 years. (I have made a similar point from time to time). And Puritanism is pretty damned American–or at least, has been a pretty damned important part of America from the first English colonization of the continent.

Like Puritanism, modern progressivism is extremely judgmental. It is Manichean. It is censorious. It divides people into the elect and the damned. It erects its own (now virtual) pillories. It ostracizes and banishes. It is uncompromising and unforgiving. It definitely does not believe in “live and let live.” It is prone to intense moral panics (cf. the Salem Witch Trials then, COVID or the Russians today). It is intensely self-righteous–and hence intensely hypocritical. Completely divorced from Calvinist religion, yes, but essentially Calvinist in spirit and mindset and conduct.

But it is worse than Calvinism qua Calvinism, because at least the original Calvinists had the fear of God in them, and thus from time to time had to question whether they really were doing God’s work. Modern progressives, secular to the core, have no God to fear and hence are immune from doubt. Meaning that they coerce without qualm. Indeed, they coerce with intense self-righteousness.

Mencken famously said that “Puritanism is the haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy.” I don’t think that’s quite right. Puritanism is the haunting fear that someone, somewhere, is doing something to make the Puritan unhappy–combined with the conviction that the Puritan has the absolute right to find, root out, and punish this transgression. But Mencken’s formulation and mine share one very important implication: the Puritan doesn’t want to leave anyone alone.

And what is “the pursuit of happiness” other than the desire to be left alone to behave by his or her lights? That is something that Puritans old and new just cannot abide.

In its original incarnation, Puritanism contributed to the social dynamic that ultimately led to the Declaration of Independence. The Puritans came to American shores, of course, to escape English royal and religious tyranny, and thus had a spirit of independence that intersected in some ways with the spirit of independence from English tyranny that gave birth to the Revolution. But that historically contingent confluence of interests belies a fundamentally different conception of the meaning and political implications of the word “independence.”

21st century America can be described as Salem and Gomorrah. Hardly a happy combination, and certainly not a combination that Thomas Jefferson et al strove to achieve when they pledged their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor 247 years ago today. Hence the mixed emotions which the Fourth of July evokes in this 21st century American. Reverence for what might have been, resignation at what has actually grown from the seed planted centuries ago.

The news of the day is that Yevgeny Prigozhin has reversed direction, and instead of attacking Ukraine has occupied Rostov-on-the-Don and Veronehz, and has advanced some distance into the Moscow Oblast in an attempted putsch. As in all things Russian, good information is hard to come by–and the Russian authorities are doing their best to shut down all non-official “information” sources.

Prigozhin launched a broadside against Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the military chief of staff Valery Gerasimov. In a version of the old “the tsar doesn’t know and is being misled by bad boyars” trope, Progozhin claims that this pair of mouth breathers deceived Putin about the need for an invasion of Ukraine and the ease of accomplishing it, and continue to deceive him by downplaying casualty figure. This is a transparent attempt to claim–incredibly–that this action is directed against Putin. Since Putin is the only man who matters, any challenge to the state is a challenge to Putin.

There are reports of combat between Prigozhin’s Wagner forces and the Russian military, with the former claiming to have shot down several military helicopters and at least one SU-34. There are also reports that some Russian military and national guard forces have thrown in with Wagner, or stood aside.

Some analysts claim that Wagner represents a real military threat to Putin. The conventional wisdom is that it does not: on the BBC Mark Galeotti claimed that Wagner has only 10,000 men at his disposal. But information is scarce, everything is in flux, and there is always the prospect that enough military and security force commanders are so disenchanted with the Ukraine fiasco that they will start supporting Wagner, or refuse orders to attack it, or block other units from doing so.

The most recent reports, from less than reliable sources (such as the Belarussian administration), are that Prigozhin has agreed to return to barracks. Which would be suicidal unless he has some sort of ironclad deal.

The fact is that the die is cast. Prigozhin made his choice and he must win or die. Any pause will be a tactical one.

My conjecture is that Prigozhin has known for some time that Shoigu and Gerasimov and the rest of the establishment intend to eliminate him and Wagner with extreme prejudice. The “sign a contract or else” ultimatum was just setting up the legal justifications for such an action.

Given that, Prigozhin was desperate, and had to throw the dice. He had nothing to lose.

The uncertainties in a situation like this make prediction perilous. If I had to guess, I wold say that this will play out something like the pathetic Kornilov Affair in 1917, when the eponymous general marched on the capital (then St. Petersburg) in an attempted coup against the Kerensky government. (Though some claim that Kerensky was part of the plot–and not surprisingly I have seen some claim that Putin is actually in cahoots with Prigozhin.) The coup attempt collapsed within 3 days.

But you never know.

As for Putin, this morning he gave a fiery speech denouncing the putsch and promising that it would be crushed. In so doing, Vova treated us to some of his Fractured Fairy Tale history:

A blow like this was dealt to Russia in 1917, when the country was fighting in World War I. But the victory was stolen from it: intrigues, squabbles and politicking behind the backs of the army and the nation turned into the greatest turmoil, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, and the loss of vast territories, ultimately leading to the tragedy of the civil war.

For one thing, Russia was hardly on the verge of victory in 1917. In fact, its army was teetering on the edge of collapse–and at times did collapse. Widespread desertion and mutiny contributed to the crisis that culminated in the abdication of Nicholas II. After something of a recovery following the February Revolution, the collapse of the military resumed after the utter failure of the Kerensky Offensive. And vast territories had already been lost by 1917.

For another thing. Wait, whut? The Putin I know lamented the fall of the USSR as the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century. This Putin–is he an imposter?–is lamenting the revolution that resulted in the creation of the USSR. Just another illustration, I guess, that to Putin history is purely instrumental, meant to be distorted to meet the needs of the political moment.

Although who will win in Russia is in doubt, there is no doubt that the biggest winner here is Ukraine. Chaos at the top will distract the Russian military leadership from managing operations in Ukraine. If the Wagner threat persists Putin will have to divert units from fighting Ukrainians to fight Russians.

Regardless of how this plays out, it is a clear sign that all is not well in Putin’s Russia. In fact, things are quite bad. Some natives are restless–and with good cause. Meaning that Putin is confronted with a war on two fronts, precisely when experience has shown that he is incapable of handling just one.

So the long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun. How’s it going? Who knows?

Initial reports indicate that the Ukrainians have made advances measured in kilometers, but not tens of kilometers, in several areas along the long front. They have suffered losses in armor and of course personnel, but how much is hard to gauge. The Russians have crowed about inflicting large material losses, but showing the same damaged Leopard tank from several angles rather dilutes their boasts.

Regardless, this is hardly Guderian racing to the Channel coast, Patton rampaging from Normandy to Paris to Metz, or the USMC breaching Iraqi prepared defenses and reaching Kuwait City long ahead of schedule. But does that mean anything? Again, who knows?

For one thing, the above are exceptions rather than rules when it comes to offensives, so one should not benchmark Ukraine’s efforts against them. For another, it is still unknown whether this represents the main Ukrainian effort, or is instead probing attacks, or feints, or shaping operations, or initial grinding assaults intended to gnaw through prepared Russian defenses thereby opening gaps through which the main Ukrainian assault forces can pour into the Russian rear areas.

In preparation for the Ukrainian assault, the Russians have constructed multiple lines of defense, with the approaches heavily–and I mean heavily–mined. (Where’s Princess Diana???) Getting through the minefields is a major challenge, and the necessarily slow pace of doing so subjects the attacker to artillery bombardment and air strikes. So the going can expected to be tough, with high casualties.

One model that comes to mind is El Alamein. Rommel had entrenched along the Egyptian border, and sowed massive minefields. When Montgomery attacked, it was extremely slow going at first, with large casualties in personnel and armor. It took about 10 days for British (mainly ANZAC and South African, actually) infantry to clear pathways through the minefields through which British armor could eventually pass. During the 3 week battle, Montgomery shifted the weight of his advance from the right flank to the left and back again as one flank became bogged down. It was a long, slow process, but once the British had gnawed through the prepared defenses, at high cost, Rommel was forced to withdraw, thus beginning a race westwards through Libya and back to Tunisia.

The Normandy campaign is another. Weeks of bitter combat with Allied forces attempting to break through German lines, measuring progress in yards, if that, eventually resulting in breakout at St. Lo and a precipitous German withdrawal to the Seine and beyond.

Today, the Russians have some advantages the Germans lacked. In particular, they have an edge in the air, whereas the British did in 1942 and the Allies did in 1944: the breakout at St. Lo in Operation Cobra was made possible by a massive air bombardment that wrecked and stunned the already heavily attrited Panzer Lehr division–and also killed a lot of Americans hit by “shorts.” After being an non-factor during offensive operations, Russian attack helos have apparently been effective in the defense against the counter offensive. Russian fixed wing aviation has also made itself felt in contrast to its performance heretofore. Ukraine has no ability to execute the equivalent of a Cobra.

That said, German troops were far better than the Russians are–and maybe even the derided Italians in the desert were better than the mobiks currently absorbing blows.

The Ukrainians have advantages in night fighting capability, and that can be decisive. But it’s hard enough to breach minefields in the day, let alone at night. So the night fighting advantage can’t be decisive until the minefields have been breached and the Ukrainians can close with the Russian defenders–assuming, of course, that the Russians stand if the Ukrainians do make a breach or breaches and start running amok in the Russian rear.

So as of now, uncertainty reigns. Uncertainty regarding the Ukrainian operational plan (e.g., is this their main effort, or a shaping operation?) Uncertainty regarding what is actually transpiring on the battlefield. Uncertainty regarding the combat power and endurance of the contending forces.

The advantage of the offense is that it is only necessary to break through in one place to achieve a decisive victory–provided the attacker has highly mobile reserves to exploit a breakthrough and the defender doesn’t have the mobile reserves (and especially mobile reserves led the by likes of a von Manstein or a Model) to seal the breach. It remains to be seen whether the Ukrainians have the ability to break through, and more importantly, the force to exploit a breach if they do. Several Russian counterattacks have apparently been repulsed quite bloodily (wrecking an entire division in one instance), and based on prior performance and the attrition of the past months I seriously doubt whether they can execute a mobile defense if their lines are breached anywhere–or even if Putin will let them. The necessity of deploying over a very long front extending hundreds of kilometers combined with the pronounced lack of skill at combined arms mobile warfare suggests that a Ukrainian breach anywhere would be devastating to the Russians. But whether Ukraine can achieve that breach before culmination is a very open question.

So I predict that the race between Ukrainian counteroffensive and the Russian defense will be like how Wellington described Waterloo: “the nearest run thing you ever saw.”

The big news in the Russo-Ukrainian war transpired not in Bakhmut or anywhere else on the battle lines, but in Moscow where a drone struck a flag flying over the dome of the Kremlin:

1000x more embarrassing as Matthias Rust landing a Cessna in Red Square. Moscow allegedly has the most formidable air defenses in the world. Apparently not. https://t.co/KTKFGQC9K6

— streetwiseprof (@streetwiseprof) May 3, 2023

Like all things Russia that have occurred over the last year plus (e.g., the Nordstream explosions, the Darya Dugin assassination) no one knows for sure who is responsible, or why. Hence, the theories and accusations fly fast and furious, but with no facts by which to evaluate, only competing theories of motive exist, and people make judgments based on their prejudices and their beliefs (largely shaped by their prejudices) of what motive sounds most plausible.

Yes, the Ukrainians have a motive. But they deny any involvement. You could also argue that realizing the possible reactions in Russia, they would not do this–or at least the government would not. (See below.). But there are hotheaded elements in Ukraine who would not be so restrained, and who might even want to provoke an escalation.

Putin might also have a motive–a false flag operation to blow up the flag on the Kremlin, as it were. In order to justify escalation, as wildly hypocritical as that would be: “We can invade you, bomb your capital (and many other cities), attempt to assassinate your president, but how dare you fling a few drones at us!”

Track record gives this theory credence–there is a reasonable likelihood that Putin orchestrated the apartment bombings in Ryazan in order to justify the Second Chechen War. Further, the catastrophic failures of the past 14 months mean that the regime needs to do something to distract from the disasters and the death, and to feed the narrative of Ukraine as an existential threat to Russia that must be vanquished regardless of the cost.

The hysterical Russian reaction gives further credence to this theory. A plot to assassinate Putin!!!!! FFS, to say that a couple of drones carrying the kind of explosives depicted in the video could pose a threat to Putin buried deep in the bowels of the Kremlin (even assuming that he’s there) is farcical: this was the Mouse of All Bombs, not the Mother thereof. (And he could hide under that huge table! A table saved Hitler, right?) But noted narcoleptic and boogie master Dimi Medvedev is saying that as a result of this assassination attempt Russia has now no choice but to “annihilate” Zelensky:

Oh the narcoleptic with the awesome dance moves is acting tough again. Maybe he should show Zelensky the video: he might die of laughter. https://t.co/jGylG4UaMb

Russia has no choice but to annihilate Zelensky—Medvedev https://t.co/TunFKBUGMx

— streetwiseprof (@streetwiseprof) May 4, 2023

But if so, this is a sign of true desperation. Admitting that Ukraine is able to penetrate what is supposedly the most formidable air defense of any city in the world with drones would be a confession of military ineptitude that makes the failure to prevent German teenager Matthias Rust from landing a Cessna in Red Square in 1987 look like a military triumph. (The Russian military claimed that the drones had been disabled by electronic measures–sure as hell doesn’t look like it in the video.). Would Putin/the Russians really be willing to look this weak to provide a justification for doing something extreme? Has he ever needed a justification before? FFS, he just made shit up (denazification!!!!) before he invaded last year. He could just make shit up again. And certainly will.

But . . . going further down the Russian rabbit hole, maybe someone in the siloviki did this precisely to discredit rival factions in the military in order to justify a purge.

Really, whenever dealing with Russia I have to stop myself to prevent becoming like this:

Suffice it to say that under any theory one can think of, this does not bode well for Putin. Taken at face value, the event is further demonstration of Russian military incompetence. Switching to riddle-enigma-mystery-dogs-fighting-under-the-carpet mode, the event smacks of desperation and/or internal feuding and chaos. Regardless, it bodes a continuation of a futile, pointless war until Putin goes tits up, one way or another.

About six weeks ago, the NY Times ran a long story about election interference. From about the time of the Trojan War. Well, not quite that long ago–but a long time ago: the 1980 election. In its story, the NYT resurrected the “October Surprise” allegation that the Reagan campaign persuaded the Iranians not to release American hostages before the election, thereby torpedoing Jimmy Carter’s chances.

The sources? Well, the plural is not appropriate here: there is a single source, a certain Ben Barnes who allegedly accompanied John Connolly on a tour of Middle Eastern capitals “to deliver a blunt message to be passed to Iran: Don’t release the hostages before the election. Mr. Reagan will win and give you a better deal.”

Insofar as confirmation is concerned, the NYT talked to four people. All of whom said that Barnes told them the same story he told the Times.

What could be more solid than that, right? A single source plus an echo chamber. Journalism!

Let’s look at the last sentence of what I just quoted: “Mr. Reagan will win and give you a better deal.” So, just what was that better deal? What evidence is there of such a deal? In fact, there is no evidence of such a thing in 1981, 1982, etc. It wasn’t until Iran’s proxies kidnapped Americans while Reagan was in his second term that he made a deal with them.

The hostages were released right when Reagan was inaugurated: I remember vividly watching the split screen of the inauguration and the release of the hostages. This was plausibly more of an FU to Carter, whom the Iranians loathed and disdained, than it was some gift to Reagan–and again, there is no evidence of any reciprocal benefit redolent of a “deal.”

Barnes’ story would have been more credible had he said that the “blunt message” was: “If you don’t release the hostages when Reagan is president, we will bomb the living shit out of you.”

The NYT’s dedication of extensive ink and pixels to this story is particularly striking given its complete–and I mean complete–lack of ink and pixels to a story of far more relevance and news value, and which is much more firmly sourced than the recollections of the 85 year old Mr. Barnes: specifically, the revelation that ex-CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell said–under oath–that he had organized the creation of the letter signed by 51 ex-US intelligence officials suggesting that the Hunter Biden laptop was “Russian disinformation.” Moreover, that Mr. Morell testified–again, under oath–that had done so after being prompted by current Secretary of State, and then Biden campaign official, Anthony Blinken.

Pretty explosive stuff, especially given that according to polls a large majority of Americans say that the truth about the laptop–namely that it was 1000 percent real, and not the creation of the dreaded Russkies–would have impacted their vote. Given the closeness of the election, it is abundantly clear that absent the letter prompted by Blinken and organized by Morell, the outcome of that election would have been different. Talk about your election interference, and tampering with our “precious democracy [sic].”

But apparently this does not fall under the category of “all the news that is fit to print.” Instead, it falls under the category of “all the news that is fit to memory hole,” while items of merely antiquarian interest, such as the 1980 “October Surprise” emerge from the memory hole and wind up on the front page of the Times.

If you want evidence of the utter corruption and partisanship of the elite “news” media, you need look no further.

Those elite sources who have deigned even to mention the story attempt to downplay its significance by saying that Morell also testified that Blinken did not order or direct the letter.

Yeah, and Henry II did not order or direct his knights to murder Thomas á Becket: a mere “will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?” sufficed.

Blinken suggested, and Morell immediately organized an effort to bash the story on the skull and leave its brains on the floor, a la Beckett’s.

And the New York Times is perpetuating the lie–the disinformation, something it allegedly deplores repeatedly, accompanied by frenzied chin pulling–by failing to cover the story, not even running a column inch or two next to the obituaries.

And if Ben Barnes is telling the truth, I say thank God, if that spared us four more years of Jimmy Carter and brought us the most successful and beneficially impactful presidency since FDR’s. I am sure that Morell is telling the truth now–as rare an event as that is–and I say damn him and all of his co-conspirators (including the elite media, social media companies, etc.) to hell, because through their manipulations they have visited upon us the worst and most balefully impactful presidency on us since . . . James Buchanan’s? John Tyler’s? Or more likely–ever.

Further, unlike the Homeric retelling of long ago events, the laptop letter story is of great importance now, given that The Senescent One has announced his candidacy for 2024. Reagan ain’t running again. Biden is. The dishonest machinations of his 2020 campaign are obviously relevant in evaluating his 2024 effort.

Which is precisely why the NYT, and most of the rest of the elite media, is burying the Morell confession.

NYT delenda est. Hell, the entire elite media delenda est.