Streetwise Professor

The immigration issue is the subject of the most intense coverage right now, just as it was arguably the most important issue in the campaign. The issue has numerous facets. Here are a few observations on several of them.

Birthright citizenship. Trump eliminated it by Executive Order (“EO”). He did so on day one no doubt knowing that the issue will be litigated to the Supreme Court and he wants it decided ASAP.

This immediately elicited shrieks of “it’s unconsitutional!!!!!” Not so fast.

These statements are based on an 1898 Supreme Court decision, which established birthright citizenship on a given set of facts. Moreover, the decision was based on an application of common law, rather than the Constitution. The justices at the time basically used common law to fill a purported gap in the Constitution, specifically the 14th Amendment. This reliance on the common law was challenged (in a dissent) at the time, and the dispute over this continues.

The issue then, and the one on which any future decision will turn, is the language of the clause in the 14th Amendment italicized here: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” By ordinary principles of statutory and Constitutional interpretation, the clause must mean something. Moreover, it clearly qualifies the previous clause: if the amendment was intended to establish unqualified birthright citizenship, the clause would not be necessary, and indeed would be superfluous.

So what does it mean? It has to mean something more than “born in the US because the US has jurisdiction over the US,” which is what the ardent defenders of birthright citizenship claim.

An interpretation that squares with the debates over the Amendment, and the previous statute that it was intended to protect from challenge or repeal, is that it means “subject to the jurisdiction of no foreign power.” That is, subject to the sole jurisdiction of the US. An immigrant that comes here is potentially subject to the jurisdiction of his/her home country. By this reading, the children of parents subject to such jurisdiction would not automatically be citizens.

My GGGF’s citizenship paper says something like “I, Georg Pirrong, having foresworn my allegiance to the King of Germany” (quoting from memory). Which implies that previous to his naturalization he was presumed to have such an allegiance, and was therefore potentially subject to German jurisdiction.

It should also be noted that the Amendment was established when all immigration was legal, so the status of the children of illegal immigrants was not explicitly considered by Congress when the Amendment was enacted. Furthermore, this issue was clearly not what the 14th was about: it was obviously about putting the citizenship of black Americans on a firm Constitutional footing. The facts in the 1898 case also do not match up with the issue of birthright citizenship for the children of illegal aliens: the plaintiff in that case was born in the US prior to the restriction on Chinese immigration, and was denied admission to the US when returning from China after the anti-Chinese immigration law had been passed. So, he was not born to illegal immigrants.

The mismatch of facts between 1868 and 1898 and 2025 means this is not an open and shut issue. It will come down, of course, to squishes like Barrett and Roberts, and it is likely that they will go against the EO.

Who Will Pick Our Vegetables???? And build our houses? And buthcher our meat? This is a standard trope from the left and Democrats, wryly answered by the Babylon Bee:

Democrats Once Again Concerned About Who Will Pick Their Crops https://t.co/gkWTemIree pic.twitter.com/PbksCkaIUo

— The Babylon Bee (@TheBabylonBee) January 27, 2025

To which it must be added that it is an utterly ridiculous argument. There are (on the upside) 3 million farm workers in the US, half of whom are illegal. That figure comes from an advocacy organization. Government data is weirdly out of date: as of 2000 there were about 1.13 million hired farmworkers in the US. (That is from a 2025 USDA document–I haven’t found one with later data–please send if you can find it). Survey data published by the USDA suggest about only 500,000 are employed in crops. Interestingly, that data shows that the average age of hired farmworkers has risen steadily–meaning that recent immigrants (who tend to be very young) are not going into farm work.

There are about 6 million (non-supervisory) construction employees in the US: estimates are that 20-30 percent of these are illegal.

So we are talking at most 3 million illegals in these two sectors, many (if not most) of whom were here before 2021. (Employment in meat packing is less than 100K total, representing perhaps a mere 50K illegals). Yet approximately 10 million flooded in under Biden, not to mention the flow in earlier years, plus the offspring of those who came in during, say, the Obama years. So it’s obviously not the case that the new illegals are vital to sustaining the ag and construction sectors.

The whole issue is absurd on its face. Just what crops are the immigrants in the Roosevelt Hotel in NY picking? The residents of Little Village in Chicago? In any sanctuary city? I could go on.

Enforcing the border with the military. Another freakout is over Trump’s deployment of the military to the border, allegedly in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. There is a parallel freakout over declaring the cartels terrorist organizations. I don’t think the freakers out see the connection between these two issues.

The cartels are inextricably linked with human smuggling/trafficking. Waves of immigrants also contain numerous narcotics mules. If cartels are terrorists, using the military to combat their activities-including human and drug trafficking-is not purely a law enforcement activity, or even primarily a law enforcement activity. It is something clearly under the purview of the military.

But this country was built by immigrants!!!!! Over the weekend, media midwit Margaret Brennan challenged J.D. Vance on immigration. In her (limited) mind, her killer point was going to be: how can you oppose immigration, because this country was built by immigrants?!?!?

This is another idiotic trope that we hear over and over, along with its frequent fellow traveler, the Emma Lazarus poem about give us your poor yadda yadda. I find it particularly ironic that progressives trot out this line.

For one thing, those who solemnly declare native land acknowledgements think such “settler colonialism” is evil and a historical stain on America-so why do they want to elevate it to a principle that must never be challenged or changed? Aren’t immigrants invading tribal lands?

For another, why are they hardcore conservatives–in the strict sense of the word, meaning “devoted to conserving the past”-on this issue, and not on others? Relatedly, why are those who insist on a “living Constitution” that must change with the times because it was written at a time with markedly different circumstances arguing that immigration laws should not be “living” too? Why do they insist on having the dead hand of the past rule the living?

Because it’s a rhetorical trick that they think will appeal to ordinary Americans who descended from immigrants, that’s why. It’s an emotional ploy.

The circumstances of the United States in the mass immigration era were markedly different than is the case now. Moreover, the immigrants were very different than those coming here now, particularly in terms of cultural similarity to the native population. Crucially, the earlier immigrants arrived when assimilation was strongly encouraged–and often embraced–by the immigrants, whereas now that is considered a racist idea: the cultural differences also make assimilation far more difficult, and many of the new immigrants are militantly opposed to assimilation.

And even more crucially, that immigration occurred in the pre-welfare era. The incompatibility of welfare and open immigration has long been emphasized by libertarians who are pre-disposed to favor immigration, such as Milton Friedman and Richard Epstein. An immigration system that works without welfare is a disaster with welfare. So choose, progressives: unbridled immigration, or welfare.

Along these lines, and related to the earlier discussion of immigrant labor. There are still acute labor shortages in, say, the Central Valley of California, despite large inflows of immigrants to that region (and California generally). Why?: because of the benefits showered on immigrants by the Federal government, and by the state of California. (The rising age over farm workers mentioned above is indirect evidence of this).

Margaret Brennan thought she had cornered Vance with this (tired) question. Vance was having none of it, and trenchantly answered that what we did 240 years ago is no reason to have the world’s dumbest immigration laws today. (If I would quibble with Vance, it is that various European countries, notably Germany, have pretty stupid laws too–it’s a close call as to which is dumber).

It never ceases to amaze that midwits like Brennan think they can play gotcha with Vance after he has run rings around them time and time and time again.

The immigration debate will continue to rage. But I predict the battle lines will not change, and that all of the above will be focus of contention for the next four years. At least.

Yesterday was Trump’s inauguration. It was also likely his apotheosis–the apex of Trumpness, the culmination of years of struggle. It’s hard to believe it could get any more glorious for him than this.

Watching him speak and then sign one executive order after another made me think “Prometheus unbound.” Trump was certainly a political Prometheus, defying the gods of the establishment, and condemned to years of torment for his impertinence and lese majeste (or lese deus). But through the exercise of will perhaps (but only perhaps) matched only by one man in American history (Andrew Jackson) he broke his shackles and triumphed, to relish a Conan-like best-of-life moment: “To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentations of their women.” (Yes, I’m looking at you, Liz Warren!)

The progressive left is staggering about (to quote Lincoln’s description of General William Rosecrans) “like a duck struck on the head,” not knowing quite what hit them. They have no one to blame but themselves. They failed to grasp that Trump is the living embodiment of Nietzsche’s aphorism: “What does not kill me makes me stronger.” If they had just let him alone four years and a day ago, he would have probably raged against the coming darkness, but soon faded from view. But they hated and feared him so much that they embarked on an all out campaign to destroy him personally and financially. But he fought back and they failed. All the while he absorbed all of their negative energy and turned it back upon them.

Further, whereas the Trump of 2017 was surprised, shocked, giddy, and naive, making him totally unprepared for the deep state’s and establishment’s unrelenting attacks, the Trump of 2021 is fully aware of what lurks in the recesses of DC and has launched a preemptive attack, the political equivalent of Operation Bagration, an all out attack on all fronts.

The opening barrage of executive orders hit every position the left has established in recent years. Immigration. Gender. Energy. “Climate change.” The public health apparatus (specifically by leaving WHO). Perhaps most provocatively, pardoning the J6 defendants en masse. His inauguration address hit all these positions and a few more to boot.

This broad front strategy is canny. By attacking everywhere at once Trump forces the left/Democrats either to dissipate their efforts by trying to defend everywhere at once, or to concentrate on a few sectors thereby leaving Trump to rampage through the undefended areas. And the stunned ducks haven’t been able to decide which. Army Group Left has been smashed.

The left will eventually gather itself, somewhat anyway. There will be legal counterattacks. Virtually the second Trump took the oath four lawsuits challenging DOGE were filed. His order to stop spending remaining moneys authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act [sic] will spur legal challenges over the constitutionality of impoundment. So there will not be surrender, let alone unconditional surrender, but the correlation of forces overwhelmingly favors Trump at this time.

Like Bagration, Operation Trump will eventually outrun its logistics and slow down, likely even bogging down for a time. But the momentum is his and the political battlefield favors his ultimate operational success.

Yesterday reminded me of a couple of previous political watersheds.

For one, this is Reagan’s “it’s morning again in America” on steroids. Trump is the embodiment of animal spirits, and MAGA is essentially a promise to free American animal spirits from the suffocating embrace of the nanny state–and the deep state. To harness a Jacksonian bumptiousness that has not been completely banished from the land, despite the establishment’s concerted effort.

The second harkens back to the early days of this blog, in which in what was one of my first political posts, I launched a rant (first of many!) against Obama’s election: it was apparently amusing enough to attract the attention of the WSJ’s John Fund Political Diary, which published an excerpt. Yesterday (and 11/5/24) represent the bell tolling for Obamaism. All political eras are eventually eclipsed. Obama’s just has been. Jackson’s was. Trump’s will be. But I sense that in the latter case, that eclipse will be some time in coming.

The euphoria over the collapse of the Assad regime lasted, oh, a good two weeks. Now the meet-the-new-boss-different-than-the-old-boss-but-still-really-bad reality is rearing its ugly head, and the war of all-against-all is returning with some combatants basically reversing roles.

Specifically, the old Ins–the Assadists/Syrian Arab Army–are the new Outs, and the old Outs–the jihadists including most notably the HTS–are the new Ins. The new Outs have fled to ethnic enclaves to resist the new Ins. The roles are reversed, and the locations changed, but the fundamental nature of the conflict is eerily similar.

?? Intense clashes rage into their second day in Tartus, Syria, between Syrian Arab Army resistance cells and forces loyal to the new government.

Footage captured by a local woman from her home offers a close-up view of the chaos, showing militants exchanging fire directly below… pic.twitter.com/jtsokMHdqO

— DD Geopolitics (@DD_Geopolitics) December 26, 2024

There’s plenty more like that. What happened in Iraq post-2003 is a good template for what will happen in Syria, namely, regime “dead enders” (in Donald Rumsfeld’s description) will burrow into ethnic enclaves (Alawites in the case of the SAA) and wage a brutal guerrilla/terror campaign against those who ousted them. And those who ousted them will not respond with the same scruples that the Americans did in Iraq.

The Alawites will see this as an existential conflict. It is likely that they will either hold on and wage a protracted war, or will be wiped out. Either way, the exit of Assad will not usher in a new Kumbaya era, but more war to the knife.

Meanwhile, the United States and other western powers are rushing to make nice with the leader of the new Ins, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Julani has a long al Qaeda pedigree, on the basis of which he achieved the great distinction of being named as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.” Not just a designated global terrorist mind you, a specially designated one, and one with a $10 million bounty on his head, no less. His parents must have been so proud.

But the US has indicated that he is someone they can work with, and has removed the bounty.

Apparently because he now wears western style suits and says anodyne things about his plans for Syria and because he’s not Assad.

NB: Assad wore really nice suits too.

I’m also reminded of when westerners cooed over Yuri Andropov because he drank scotch and liked jazz.

Suckers.

All of this is wishcasting. Leopards don’t change their spots, and snakes that shed their skins are still snakes.

And even in the unlikely event that the Face (Julani) has really had a road-to-Damascus conversion, what about all those heavily armed people under him? Will they get with the program, or view Julani as a sellout whom they will eliminate and replace with someone more congenial? Congenial to their jihadist agenda that is, not to humanity generally or the Syrian people specifically.

The Russians are still clinging to their bases on the coast. No doubt the bazaar is open and their are negotiations going on between them and the new Ins over the terms to keep them. It is no coincidence, however, that the aforementioned conflict between the SAA remnants and the HTS is taking place in Tartus–where the Russian naval base is.

Russia has every incentive to support these Alawite elements, meaning that the latter will have strong logistical support, possibly air and ground support, and a relatively secure enclave. Probably more secure than HTS’s was in Idlib. Iran also has an incentive to provide support though this will be somewhat more challenging given HTS’s control over Iran’s old overland supply routes. But overall, I seriously doubt the new Ins will be able to eliminate the new Outs, and the war will continue.

And don’t forget that the Assad collapse has helped ISIS, which has been an enemy of the new Ins when they were the Outs. In response, the US is bombing the shit out of ISIS, but that will not destroy them.

And Turkey is is continuing its onslaught against the Kurds in the northeast. Julani has said that an independent Kurdish enclave in Syria is unacceptable, thereby signaling collaboration with Turkey.

Which puts both on a collision course with the US, which has supported and protected the Kurds, primarily because the latter have been the main boots on the ground in the conflict against ISIS. Will that support continue under Mr. Unpredictable’s presidency? Despite his rhetoric, i’m betting it will, for several reasons. First, because of the aforementioned reactivation of ISIS, whom Trump fought viciously. Second, because that’s where the oil (such as it is) is, and who can forget Trump’s “we’re keeping the oil” statement (made to the accompaniment of much harrumphing around the world). Third, because I doubt Trump is will believe the new Ins have shed their terrorist spots. Fourth, because I doubt he wants to empower Erdogan–especially given the latter’s ambition to assume leadership of the anti-Israel movement.

And as for Israel, they are certainly not putting any faith in Julani and the gang, so they are merrily blowing up any and all weapons that the new Ins might think about using against them. Further, they are amassing a security perimeter on Syrian territory–which will inevitably lead to tension and conflict with the new Ins.

All this means that the situation today isn’t all that different than it was a month ago. Some of the players have switched places, but all the players are still playing. There was a sectarian and ethnic war in Syria for the last decade, and every indication is that there will be a sectarian and ethnic war there for the next decade. At least.

A federal court in Annapolis recently ruled against the plaintiffs in a suit challenging race-based admissions at the United States Naval Academy (of which I am an alum). Writing in Stars & Stripes Harvard Law professor Noah Feldman defends the decision. If his piece is representative of Harvard Law’s logical and legal rigor, then God save us.

Sayeth Feldman:

The court’s decision is legally defensible. The military needs a racially balanced officer corps, and the academies play a crucial role in training officers, especially those who make it to the highest ranks, and the academies play a crucial role in training officers, especially those who make it to the highest ranks.

Rather conclusory, wouldn’t you say? And the reasoning behind the conclusion is fundamentally flabby.

At most “the military needs a racially balanced officer corps” is a proposition. A hypothesis. And also an incomplete one.

Critically, this bald assertion ignores trade-offs. Using race as a criterion for admission to a service academy (or promotion) necessarily means that some individuals with superior qualifications that the military deems relevant for officers’ performance are denied admission to an academy. That is a cost. Is the cost worth the benefit? Feldman does not even raise the question, let alone answer it.

Saying “X is good, ceteris paribus” is a vacuous statement if ceteris ain’t paribus. And it ain’t here. And if it ain’t you have to compare the good of X with its costs.

And just what amount of “racial balance” is optimal? At what level of preference is the right trade-off between “racial balance” and performance-relevant qualifications (or signals of such qualifications) struck? Just saying “the military needs a racially balanced officer corps” does not even attempt to grapple with that question.

And there is another trade-off to be considered which Feldman ignores. Namely, such racial “balancing” undermines the no-discrimination principle which is and has been valued highly by many Americans. Martin Luther King, to name one.

Feldman (and apparently the judge) ignores whether the challenged means of achieving “racial balance”–racial preferences in admission to a service academy–is necessary, or even the best way, to achieve the stated goal of “racial balance.” There are other pathways into the US officer corps, notably ROTC and OCS. Those are likely less selective than the service academies but that is irrelevant if minorities who desire a career as a military officer can do so via these alternatives. This also has the benefit of avoiding the mismatch problem which is a baleful effect of racial preferences in higher education.

Along these lines, Feldman is factually incorrect when he insinuates that academy graduates are disproportionately represented “in the highest ranks.” True once upon a time, but today “ring knockers” no longer have a pronounced advantage over OCS or ROTC types.

In defending the lawsuit, the government argued the following, apparently to some effect:

Where things start to look very different is in the government’s explanation of why it needs a racially diverse officer corps. The government provided, and the federal court credited and cited, extensive evidence of racial violence in the military in the decades before and during the Vietnam era, including race riots aboard naval vessels. The court noted the history of racial discrimination in the armed services, especially in the Navy. Reviewing this context, the court accepted the government’s argument that a racially diverse officer corps is mission-critical.

Talk about a whopping non sequitur. Where to begin?

When reading that, I asked myself “What about the Trojan War?” because that war is about as relevant as the cited history, meaning that the sins of the past cannot justify the challenged policies of the present.

The racial strife in the military–and the Navy in particular–during the Vietnam era was not the product of too few minority officers. It was part and parcel of the racial strife that plagued the United States at that time. It was also a result of the problems within the military stemming from the Vietnam War, the draft, and the ending of the draft: as a result of these factors, if anything it was the result of too few minorities the the Navy’s enlisted ranks. That is, it was highly historically contingent, and those historical contingencies are absent today.

Moreover, at least until the rise of wokeness (to which, ironically, the academies have succumbed, big time) those tensions had abated substantially. As for “the history of racial discrimination”, the official discrimination against blacks ceased long ago and cannot justify discriminating in their favor decades later.

Put differently, there is absolutely no reason to believe that striking down race-based admissions at the service academies in 2024 would throw us into the bad old days of October, 1972 or anything close.

(As an aside, when I was at Navy in 1977-8 Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s Memoir On Watch was assigned reading. Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations that had to deal with the wind down of Vietnam, and in particular with the racial turmoil that plagued the fleet. On Watch discussed that history in some detail).

It actually speaks volumes about the weakness of the government’s case (and the judge’s reasoning in accepting it) that it had to go into the wayback machine to justify policies that have been found unconstitutional for private universities. (It’s also worth noting that private universities were also hotbeds of racial strife during the late-60s and early-70s).

Perhaps a case can be made for racial preferences for service academy admissions. But Feldman and the government go nowhere even close to making it.

This is serious business. The better the officers, the fewer the number of people who get killed in wars. If academy admissions standards are not related to the quality of the officers they produce, then adjust those standards. If they are related to the quality of the officers they produce, then given the vital importance of good officers in matters of life and death (not to mention national survival) then there had better be very, very, very good reason for making exceptions. Just saying “diversity is mission critical” like a mantra and citing to ancient history to support it doesn’t cut it.

SecDef nominee Pete Hegseth (criticism of whom has quieted substantially of late) has made elimination of DEI a major priority precisely because he believes not only is it not mission critical, it is mission detrimental.* And if you read things like this you realize that his argument is much stronger and much more currently relevant than that made by the government in the Naval Academy case.

Diversity at the academies is just one element of the diversity culture that has poisoned the military. And ironically, that culture is more racially fraught than that of the 80s, 90s, and 00s. It is more likely to recreate strife like that that plagued the military in the early-70s than to prevent it. I therefore hope that Trump and Hegseth make the court’s decision in the Naval Academy case moot by eliminating the policies that it challenged.

*As an illustration of how woke culture has penetrated the service academies, West Point colluded with the leftist ProPublica in a hit piece on Hegseth. ProPublica was going to report that Hegseth lied about being admitted to the USMA, and West Point confirmed–twice–that he had not been admitted. Hegseth then produced a copy of his acceptance letter. If you think West Point made a mistake, I have a bridge to sell you.

The request line is open! Responding to Ex-Global Super-Regulator on Lunch Break, here are some thoughts on Syria.

The big picture: it was a shitshow, it is a shitshow, and it will continue to be a shitshow. Just under new management.

Reading the stories of the assault through Aleppo, then Hama, then Homs, and finally Damascus, I thought of the scenes in Lawrence of Arabia in which the Arab irregulars rampaged past a collapsing regular army and took Damascus on 1 October 1918, which soon plunged into tribal bickering and chaos under their rule.

If anything, the ethnic, sectarian, and ideological divisions of the 2024 conquerers are more extreme and latent with violence than the tribal divisions of 1918. Thus, the current euphoria over the fall of the truly odious Assad will prove as fleeting as the euphoria over the fall of the odious Khaddafy. Libya’s recent history is therefore a useful reference in evaluating Syria’s likely future. (The main difference is that Libya has relatively large amounts of oil to fight over).

There are numerous armed groups in Syria with wildly conflicting agendas. The group that has gotten the most attention, HTS, is widely portrayed as a Turkish proxy, but this is wrong. Turkey’s player in the game (a game with a very complex scorecard, even with which you might not be able to identify all the players) is the Syrian National Army, but it was not aimed primarily at the Assad regime. Instead, it (and hence Erdogan) has launched its main effort against the Kurdish (YPG) forces in northeastern Syria. The Kurds were instrumental in the defeat of ISIS–with a considerable assist from the US. Meaning that Turkey’s proxies are attacking US proxies.

Won’t that be fun. What the rump US administration will do is unknown, and that is presumably why Erdogan is in such a hurry, trying to change the facts on the ground before Trump takes office.

So post-Assad Syria is at least a 3-sided conflict, akin to the climatic scene of The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (minus any Good character a la Clint):

Probably more in fact because the Jihadi and Jihadi-adjacent HTS is itself a coalition of many Islamist groups who could well fall out. And because it would not be surprising if Assad regime elements go underground a la Saddamites post-2003 and wage a guerrilla/terror war. And because Iran will almost certainly attempt to employ Hezbollah elements to retain a shred of influence in the country.

A quick take on the losers and winners.

Losers:

• Iran. Clearly the biggest loser, and the worst in a string of defeats in the last year. Assad’s Syria was the essential logistical lynchpin and staging area for Iranian support to Hezbollah. That’s basically gone, leaving an already reeling Hezbollah to wither on the vine. Further, Israel has moved rapidly to destroy Syrian military infrastructure (which Iran used) and to seize “buffer zones” that will make it difficult for Iran to utilize even smuggling operations to sustain Hezbollah. In retrospect, October 7 may look like Pearl Harbor. A seeming smashing surprise attack that set off a chain of events that ended ultimately in defeat.
• Hezbollah. For the same reasons as Iran.
• Russia. His regime’s collapse makes Assad’s other major patron looks like a giant with clay feet. Russian troops in the interior are bugging out to the coast: the serpentine routes of some convoys looks like some mini-Xenophon Anabasis. As for the bases that these troops are fleeing to, they still remain in Russian hands although the anti-Assad forces have evidently surrounded them. These bases are so vital that I expect Russia will cut some deal with the victors to retain them. They are essential to supporting Russian operations in Africa. Moreover, without the naval base at Tartus Russia has no ability to support a presence in the Mediterranean, a prestige item for Russia. The Turkish Straits are closed to them so they can’t operate in the Med from Black Sea bases. Given that most of the Russian fleet now consists of short-legged frigates and the like, it’s not operationally feasible to show the flag in the Med from the Baltic or Arctic. (Not to mention if the Russians are forced out of Tartus, the frigates and patrol craft it has there now would have a hard time to get back to St. Petersburg. A winter voyage would be particularly fun!) So Russia will probably hang on with its fingernails, but its position will be tenuous and its reputation damaged further.
• Hamas. Another loser as a result of Iran’s emasculation.

Winners:

• Israel. The biggest winner by far. Iran’s and Hezbollah’s losses are its gain. It has moved with remarkable speed to exploit the opportunity by (a) obliterating virtually all Syrian military assets (aircraft, ships, depots, arms production facilities) thereby depriving any successor state/statelets of them, and (b) establishing the aforementioned buffer zone east of the Golan Heights. Israel’s security situation in the north is better now than probably ever.
• The US, though the picture is far more mixed than for Israel. Although the Biden-Obama administration is likely to differ, Iran’s strategic defeat is a gain for the US. (Biden-Obama’s approach to Iran is one of the most baffling and stupid foreign policies in American history). As noted above, a conflict with Turkey over the Kurds looms. A jihadi regime in Syria (or more realistically, parts of Syria) is not ideal, and may be worse from a realpolitik perspective than an Assad regime. The greatest benefit to the US would be a serious retrenchment by Iran, which would reduce the strategic risks for the US in the Middle East (given that Iran is the main source of those risks).
• Other Arab regimes, especially in the Gulf. Again due to the Iranian losses. Some are saying the Saudis and Qatar will be the big winner because Assad’s fall will permit the building of a gas pipeline through Syria (and Jordan) to Turkey and then Europe. This would exacerbate Russian losses and be a win for the Gulfies, but I think it is an unlikely outcome. The chaos that is likely to reign for years in Syria will make this pipeline as chimerical as the oft-vaunted claims about pipelines through Afghanistan.

TBD:

• Turkey. Again, it’s main interest is not in Syria per se, but in the Kurds. I expect the US will prevent Erdogan from achieving the destruction of the Kurds that he seeks, so it is likely that Turkey will not achieve the victory it seeks. Many in Turkey greeted the news of Assad’s fall by saying: “Great! Now all the Syrians can go home!” Unlikely, for reasons I discuss shortly.
• Lebanon. The weakening of Hezbollah should be a great boon to Lebanon. But it’s Lebanon.
• The Syrian people. Assad’s regime was monstrous. The country has been devastated. (I think GNP has fallen by something like 90 percent). But the likelihood of continued strife means that Syrians are unlikely to harvest the fruits of peace. And being ruled by Islamists will not be fun times–especially for minorities like Christians and Alawites. So contrary to the hopes of the Turks (and the Europeans who have also found Syrian immigrants to be pestilential) I doubt there will be a flood of people back to Syria, and indeed there might be another exodus.
• Ukraine. Ukrainians are crowing over Putin’s humiliation. But how Putin will react is unclear. Having lost and made to look ineffectual in Syria he may decide to amplify his efforts in Ukraine. And will logistic complications lead him to redeploy assets from Africa to Ukraine? Who knows?

So that’s my hot take on Syria. The basic takeaway is that it is the end of a regime but not the end of wars in Syria. And that from a geopolitical perspective it redounds to the benefit of all those at odds with Iran.

I don’t have a dog in this particular fight, but since (a) the UK often plays the Ghost of Christmas Future to the US, and (b) the UK ruling class-most notably the current PM, Keir Starmer-has felt free to pontificate on similar events in the US, it’s fair game for me to comment on the unrest (riots) that rocked the UK recently.

The proximate cause for the riots was the murder spree by the Welsh-born child of Rwandan immigrants, who knifed to death three young girls and badly wounded eight other individuals at a Taylor Swift-themed yoga party. In part due to the refusal of the UK police to identify the assailant, rumors soon spread (including on social media) that the murderer was a Muslim immigrant, leading in the first instance to violence against mosques, etc.

The ruling class immediately jumped on the mistaken beliefs about the perpetrator to condemn the rioters as ignorant racists, which in their minds fully justified a crushing response by the state.

This narrow interpretation of the cause of the riots that spread far beyond the site of the original crime (Sunderland) was unsurprisingly opportunistic and self-serving. It permitted the complete decontextualization of the riots in a way that denied a priori any legitimate justification and thereby rationalized the unleashing of a “standing army” (Starmer’s words) against these rioters–measures that were conspicuously absent in other violent civil disturbances–hence the bitter complaints about “two-tier policing.”

The brutal slayings in Sunderland were merely the last grain of sand dropped on a pile of grievances that has been accumulating for literally decades. The allegedly unreasoned and indiscriminate reaction to this single grain was just an example of the non-linearity inherent in such situations. In emergent orders–social orders particularly–a single event can set off a massive reaction that seems disproportionate and unrelated to it. This is often true in revolutions. A single event unleashes massive latent forces that have been building for extended periods. This is why authoritarian governments are so hell bent on suppressing any dissent no matter how seemingly minor. Small sparks can ignite social explosions.

The mountain of grievances clearly related to a single factor: mass immigration into the UK, and especially mass immigration from some of the most misgoverned and dysfunctional parts of the world with radically different cultures from the native inhabitants. In this environment, a mass murder by an individual only peripherally related to the underlying source of grievance could spark massive unrest. Further, given the recent history of the UK (consider, for example the bombing of the Ariane Grande concert in Manchester, or other mass stabbings that have occurred in the UK in recent years e.g., on a bridge in London in 2017) it is not at all surprising that many people would leap to the conclusion that a Muslim was the perpetrator in Sunderland.

The grievances have built inexorably precisely because any dissent from the ruling class view has been ruthlessly targeted and suppressed. When voice is denied, again and again, it will inevitably come to the point that the aggrieved will substitute violent deeds for words.

But it is exactly these things that the British ruling class cannot admit, and is in fact at great pains to deny precisely because of its direct culpability for mass immigration, its malign effects, and the identity of those who have borne the economic, cultural, and psychic damage. It therefore has to deny vehemently the underlying cause and place full blame on the evil of the rioters.

British classism is also on full, ugly display here. Indeed, it is worse than its historical antecedents (e.g., in the Victorian era) because there is not even the palliative of condescending paternalism: it is merely vicious hatred, disdain, and disgust.

The sick irony is that those who refuse to look honestly at “root causes” here (in no small part because they are the root cause) routinely invoke “root causes” to excuse, rationalize, and justify other social dysfunctions–including rioting far more destructive and violent than that that has occurred in the UK recently. Starmer represents a perfect example. He delivered sick-making remarks about the George Floyd rioting that explained them, and hence excused them, as the understandable consequence of systemic racism. The British ruling class has been similarly disposed to excuse and rationalize Muslim violence as the product of legitimate grievance.

Root causes for me, but not for thee, you yobs. Your root causes are totally illegitimate.

Like J6 in the US, alas, the riots are worse than a crime–they are a blunder. They have given the increasingly authoritarian British state the justification to engage in mass jailing of its political dissidents. Further, given the inevitable role of social media in disseminating information and opinion about the riots and the causes, the riots have provided a justification for the state to increase its power to control and censor it. Indeed, the head of London Metropolitan Police has even threatened those expressing their wrongthink outside of the UK with arrest and extradition.

Wouldn’t that be fun.

Thus, this backlash against egregious mis-government has redounded to the benefit of that dysfunctional government and the class that rules it.

Which demonstrates the fundamental dilemma of the mis-governed. How can one resist malign authority without strengthening it, like sowing dragon’s teeth? I don’t have an answer, except to say that direct confrontation has exactly this effect.

The US faces very similar issues–hence the Ghost of Christmas Future metaphor. However, I doubt it will play out here similarly to the way it has in the UK. The reason is quite simple. The white working and under classes are still present in numbers in UK cities where they are tooth and jowl with the immigrants. That is not the case in the US: white flight occurred long ago. So a UK-style white riot is not in prospect here.

Urban white rioting is a staple of the Oi genre, which is uniquely British. There’s nothing like it in the US.

The underlying conditions that have sparked rioting in the UK are therefore not present in the US. But the severe discontent about mass immigration is, as is the ruling class’s determination to crush any opposition to it. So something will likely happen here, but it will be different. How exactly, I can’t say.

If Forbes’ David Axe is correct, Russia has finally given up on attempting to resurrect its lone aircraft carrier, the Kuznetsov. Too bad! It’s been a source of material for me for years. Indeed, I think it’s fair to say that I was a pioneer in mockery of the the ship, with posts going back almost 16 years. I was especially fond of pointing out that this naval colossus never left home–although it very seldom left home–without a salvage tug bobbing in its wake. (It only made seven–seven!-deployments in 33 years).

Old Smoky–or was it Old Brokey?–was hardly a big boy carrier even when it was brand spanking new. It used a jump ramp rather than catapults, which seriously limited the capability and carrying capacity of the aircraft it operated. And it operated relatively few aircraft–about 36, of which only 22 were attack/fighter types.

There has been no official announcement of Kuzentsov’s demise. Axe infers its fate from the fact that many of its special-built aircraft (MiG-22KRs) have been deployed to operate from land (including Crimea). But this could just be another manifestation of Russian materiel losses over Ukraine (and domestic accidents, such as yesterday’s crash of an Su-34) forcing it to resort to stopgap measures.

Although the ship is clearly useless, and a money pit, Russia has persisted in keeping it alive. All to give the impression that it is a serious naval power.

Just how pretentious this is is reflected in the current deployment of a Russian “flotilla” (in the words of the FT) to Havana. The “flotilla” consists of one nuke sub, one frigate (the Admiral Gorskov, displacement 5,400 tons), one oiler, and–wait for it!–one tugboat. I guess it could be worse: the FT could have called it an armada. (The media hyperventilating over this pipsqueak squadron has me rolling my eyes).

The Russian navy has been ravaged by a nation without a navy: the Black Sea Fleet has lost about one-third of its hulls, including several of its most capable, to Ukrainian drones (airborne and seaborne) and cruise missiles. It has all but abandoned its former home port of Sevastopol, and scampered to Novorossiysk, essentially abandoning the western Black Sea. And it is reported that yesterday one of its larger combatants suffered severe fire damage in the Barents Sea.

It is a simulacrum of a navy, perhaps intent on living up to the glory of Admiral Rozhestvensky’s Baltic Sea Fleet in 1905.

Not that Russian efforts on land are exemplary. Indeed, looking at the wreckage of the Russian campaign in Ukraine I am hard pressed to find in all of history a worse military performance on any level–tactical, operational, or strategic. Putin has achieved the triple crown of failure.

But he is apparently ebullient nonetheless. According to the Institute for the Study of War he “articulated a theory of victory” in which “Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.” Further:

Putin stated that Russian forces aim to “squeeze” Ukrainian forces out “of those territories that should be under Russian control” and therefore Russia does not need to conduct another mobilization wave. Putin asserted that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are sufficient for this approach and that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024 (a figure consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits between 20,000-30,000 recruits per month).

In other words, Putin thinks that suffering 30,000 casualties per month (most of which are KIA or too badly wounded to return to combat) to gain a few kilometers here and a few kilometers there is not just sustainable, it’s the path to victory! (It is highly likely that the “crypto-mobilization” has basically created a steady state where the influx of recruits just balances casualties).

These force generation efforts do not just sweep up unfortunate Russian citizens (disproportionately from non-Russian republics), but also shanghai African students attracted to Russia by promises of a free education. They also attract impoverished Nepalese, Chinese, Bangladeshi, Indian, etc., by dangling promises of lucrative pay–which if they live to collect (highly unlikely) may not receive it anyways. Russia also routinely reneges on promised payments to families of KIA–and even frequently fails to give the supposedly honored dead a decent grave.

And maybe saying “a few kilometers here and a few kilometers there” gives way too much credit. The vaunted Russian attack on Kharkiv initially gained a few kilometers in two mini-bulges, but was stopped after a few days, and in the past week Ukrainian counterattacks have ejected the Russians from most of those paltry gains achieved at disproportionate cost.

Falkenhayn and Pyrrhus stand aside before true greatness.

This is a truly twisted man, perfectly content to reinforce failure after failure, to sacrifice untold numbers, all to satisfy his grandiosity.

Meaning that Russia’s army is a simulacrum as well. There is much angst in Europe over the prospect of Putin launching an attack on some Nato countries, especially the Baltics or Poland. How? With what? To what end–other than an even more catastrophic defeat?

Yes, perhaps Putin is just delusional enough to do it. Or perhaps he will adopt Eisenhower’s advice: “If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it.” But if he does, it will not solve his problem, except in the way that death solves all problems.

For they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind: it hath no stalk: the bud shall yield no meal: if so be it yield, the strangers shall swallow it up.

Hosea, 8:7

Those words came to mind in the immediate aftermath of the Trump verdict in New York. For it is clear that baleful and long-lived consequences will flow from a trial and conviction that transgressed legal boundaries and common decency: while following it, I was wondering if Judge Merchan was striving to set the record for reversible errors and violations of a defendant’s rights.

Yes, an ill wind has been sown. Who shall reap the whirlwind?

The Biblical quotation suggests that the sowers are the reapers. It is indeed possible that the Democrats generally and the Biden administration specifically will reap in November what they sowed in May (and in fact for many, months before that, and it many places beyond New York): the decision has sparked outrage, and not just among Trump’s existing supporters, or Republicans. But it remains to be seen whether this outrage will outweigh the burden of running for president as a “convicted felon.”

Alas, I believe the entire country will reap what the regime and its apparatchiks have sown, and for many years to come. The by-any-means-necessary use of lawfare has violated all pre-existing norms, and has set a precedent that will cast a shadow over American politics forevermore. There is no going back.

America is now channeling Peruvian dictator R. Benavides: “For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law!” 

I was always astonished that during the Trump impeachment circuses that the Democrats smugly believed that this could not be used against them. They are similarly smug in their belief that they are immune from the type of lawfare they have waged since Trump left office.

Yes, their entrenchment in the deep, middle, and shallow states (to use the insightful desription of Jeffrey Tucker) does provide some immunity. But once a weapon has been unsheathed by one side, it is inevitable that the other will take it up as well.

2020s Lawfare will be to American politics what poison gas was to combat in WWI.

Lawfare–and especially the weaponization of criminal law–makes politics existential. All restraints are lifted in existential conflicts. We can only go downhill from here.

One of the things that really irked me about the Caesar bio show that I wrote about last week was the lionization of Cato. In fact, Cato was as responsible, and indeed arguably chiefly responsible, for the fall of the Republic which he claimed he was defending against tyranny precisely because he and his faction waged lawfare against their political enemy Caesar, and thereby made politics existential.

Caesar crossed the Rubicon with an army because Cato had ensured that his freedom and perhaps his life were in grave legal jeopardy if he crossed without one. Cato made politics existential for Caesar: Caesar understood that he could continue to exist only by waging civil war. Cato sowed the wind. He, but more importantly all of Rome, reaped the whirlwind.

And that’s where we are now.

The bitter irony is that a common criticism of Trump is that he transgresses American democratic norms. Most of this is in the fevered imagination of his enemies: most of his norm violations have come merely from running his big mouth. That pales in comparisons to the violations of political and legal norms that have become commonplace in the lawfare waged not just against him, but against many in his orbit, and many outside it who have had the temerity to challenge the regime.

Words can’t hurt you: legal sticks and stones certainly can. And if one side picks them up, the other side will inevitably do so.

It is also sickly ironic that a bogus charge of “election interference” (bogus because no actual legal violation of Federal election law was properly charged, and New York has no jurisdiction over this law regardless) is being used to engage in the most flagrant attempt in American history to manipulate a national election.

This betrays a deep insecurity among Biden and the Democrats. A confident president and party would not feel it necessary to stoop to such devices.

Exactly where we go from here is unknown. But it is clear that we are entering an era of existential politics. Such a politics inevitably descends into conflict, chaos, and violence. And frequently to civil war. And when future generations look back, they will know exactly who to blame, and to when the Time of Troubles began.

I watched a three part BBC show about Julius Caesar with low expectations. Give credit to the BBC–they not only met but exceeded them!

I figured that it would use Caesar’s story to give Big Lessons about the dangers of populism in the West, and in particular about the mortal threat to “democracy” posed by Trump. Call me Carnac the Magnificent.

Most of the talking heads (not all) repeatedly intoned that Caesar demonstrates the dangers populism poses to democracy. The irony about all this pontificating and chin pulling in the telling of a historical story was its utterly ahistorical content.

Yes, of course Caesar applied a death blow to the Roman Republic. But to take up the story in the 50s-40s BC and insinuate that Caesar was a sui generis destroyer is a complete distortion of history. Caesar just delivered the coup de grâce to a dying republic. He was far more of a symptom of its terminal decay than its cause.

The Republic had been disintegrating for at least 100 years. The Gracchi brothers–the proto-populists in Roman history–were completely unmentioned in the BBC program, as was their fate. The supposedly virtuous Senate was so threatened by Tiberius Grachhus’ attempts to empower the great unwashed populace that they beat him to death with chair legs and stones. His brother was also assassinated by the Senatorial elite some years later when he attempted the same.

And even if you say, well, Tiberius flouted Roman political norms (e.g., by attempting to stand for re-election as a Tribune in order to circumvent Senatorial attempts to stymie his legislation), that only shows that these norms were cracking long before Caesar arrived on the scene.

Also completely missing from the narrative was Sulla. Sulla who had become dictator decades before Caesar. Sulla who had marched on Rome, not just once, but twice. Sulla who had killed thousands of political enemies in his Proscriptions. (Caesar’s main criticism of Sulla is that he gave up the dictatorship. Notably Caesar did not engage in such bloodletting when he became dictator, though after his assassination Marc Antony and Octavian did).

Particularly ironic is that Sulla engaged in these autocratic acts to empower the Optimates faction that the BBC talking heads adore, and to crush the Populares that Caesar represented and the talking heads deplore. (Caesar had been on Sulla’s proscription list, but was spared after appeals by family and friends).

The omission of the Gracchi and Sulla is particularly stunning given the talking heads’ frequent paeans to “democracy.” Uhm, Republican Rome was hardly democratic. Indeed, the Senatorial elite was extremely hostile–literally murderously hostile, as the Gracchi would tell you–to democracy, and to giving greater political power to the non-elite. The whole idea of an Optimates party was that the better thans should rule (hence the name), and that the people were a mob who needed to shut up and be ruled by their betters. The Gracchi attempted to give more power to the people, and were killed. The whole thrust of Sulla’s “reforms” were to reduce the political influence of the people, e.g., by sharply reducing the power of the Tribunate (which was intended to be the representative of the people). Meaning that if you favor the Republic of the Optimates, you are necessarily anti-democratic.

This entire context that is vital to understanding Caesar, populism in Rome in the mid-first century BC, and the civil war in which Caesar eventually prevailed. Caesar was popular among the masses precisely because Rome was profoundly undemocratic, ruled by an oligarchic elite that was hell-bent on maintaining its power (in large part due to its belief in its own superior virtue and intellect) and depriving the people of power. And the people resented this.

So you can make arguments for and against Caesar, but one thing one cannot do and retain a shred of intellectual credibility is to assert that Caesar’s enemies–Cato and the Optimates–were the defenders of democracy, and that Caesar was the enemy thereof. Caesar was a threat to a self-styled republic that limited power to a highly narrow oligarchic elite convinced of its own superiority, and which disdained the hoi polloi. Yes, Caesar was probably cynical in his appeal to the masses, but in doing so he was not destroying democracy. He was destroying an oligarchy.

And that’s no doubt why the talking heads and those who take them seriously are so threatened by Trump and other “populists.” For the talking heads and their confreres are part of an oligarchic elite convinced of its own superiority, and which disdains the hoi polloi. And which is tremendously insecure in the face of broad popular discontent–which is itself the product of the manifest failures of an “elite.”

Once one understands this, one can also understand the what has to be the deliberately de-contextualized, ahistorical telling of the Caesar story. Because a full and honest telling would hit far too close to home.

So what is instructive for modern politics in this program is not the lesson the talking heads attempt to impart; it is that they are so keen to try to impart it. The late Republic rhymes with current western politics (far more than the late Empire does), but not for the reason that the BBC et al express, namely that Caesar is an avatar for Trump, but because the first century BC Optimates are avatars for a failed and flailing 21st century elite.

It’s hard to say which of the talking heads is most annoying, but my choice would be British politician Rory Stewart. If he had a time machine, he’d use it to go back to 50 BC so he could get a room with Cato. (I made that as clean as I could!) But he is merely the most condescendingly clueless of a group so lacking in self-awareness that they don’t realize that a more accurate telling of the history that they presume to relate would condemn them as much or more than they condemn their bêtes noires Julius Caesar and Donald Trump.

Today is Memorial Day. It is also the 160th anniversary of the grievous wounding of my maternal great-grandmother’s uncle, Eli Hatfield. Hatfield’s 46th Ohio Veteran Volunteer Infantry was advancing as part of the 4th Division, XV Corps, Army of the Tennessee outside Dallas, Georgia when attacked by dismounted Confederate cavalry. (On this day the 46th was attached to the third brigade of that division, though it was part of the second brigade). Fighting without earthworks* the 46th suffered 1 killed and 10 wounded, including Eli.

The main Battle of Dallas occurred the next day. The 46th suffered heavier casualties repelling the assault of Bate’s division, including regimental commander Henry Giesy.

Eli’s wound was a bad one–a minie ball to the left arm just below the shoulder joint. Too close to the torso for amputation, the 46th’s surgeon resected the shattered bone, leaving Eli’s arm dangling at his side for the remainder of his life. (My great-grandmother said he was “Uncle Eli with the dead arm.”)

The survival rate from this surgery was very low, about 10 percent. In contrast, the survival rate from amputation was around 75 percent.

This wound was the culmination of a series of misfortunes. Eli did not have a good war. He was captured at Shiloh (where the 46th held the very right flank of the Federal army–not quite the 20th Maine at Gettysburg, but their stand was crucial). He spent several months in Cahaba (Alabama) Prison, which was not quite Andersonville but wasn’t Club Reb either. Paroled and exchanged, he returned home to Ohio but did not return to his unit, claiming that his imprisonment had rendered him unfit for service. Despite notes from his doctor (seriously–they are in his service file) the army disagreed, and Eli reported to the 46th in time to participate in the assault on Tunnel Hill at the Battle of Chattanooga. He survived the grueling (but unnecessary) march through appalling weather of the XV Corps to relieve Burnside at Knoxville, and a winter in camp at Chattanooga. He fought with the 46th at Resaca and during other skirmishes in the Atlanta Campaign, before his rendezvous with a bullet at Dallas 160 years ago today.

Eli returned to Ohio after a period of convalescence in Nashville. (Just imagine the agony of the jolting wagon or ambulance ride over rough Georgia roads to the Western and Atlantic Railway, and the subsequent train rides north over rickety rails to Nashville, and then home). He lived a long and productive life. He fathered four children (one born in November, 1865, a mere 18 months after his wounding), and died in 1899.

The 1880 Census lists his occupation as “engineer.” Of what I am trying to figure out. On a railroad? For a coal mine (one of his brothers and two of his nephews worked in the mines)? Given his rural upbringing, and the fact that virtually all his family were farmers or laborers, his profession is something of a surprise, and I am curious to learn how that came about.

He is buried in a small cemetery just east of Columbus:

Eli’s brother John also served in the 46th. John’s military records state that he was 18 when he enlisted. However, he was only 16. He enlisted a month after Eli, which combined with lying about his age suggests some parental resistance to his serving.

Unlike his brother John survived 4 years of war without a scratch, and apparently without serious illness: he is recorded as present every month for these four years–his service file is quite boring compared to Eli’s. Quite remarkable considering that his service included Shiloh, the Siege of Vicksburg (where disease was as deadly as bullets), the Second Battle of Jackson, Chattanooga, Resaca, Dallas, Noonday Creek, the assault on Kennesaw Mountain, the Battle of Atlanta (22 July), Ezra Church, Griswoldsville, the March to the Sea, the March Through the Carolinas, and Bentonville, as well as nearly continuous skirmishing during the Atlanta Campaign.

After muster out, life in Ohio was apparently unappealing to John, so he settled on a farm in Valley Falls, KS, where he died in 1915. He also fathered four children. His obituary in the Valley Falls New Era read:

Comrade Hatfield was well known in this community, took an active interest in church and G. A. R. Circles, liked to hear the bugle call and to the last enjoyed the camp fire stories, at all their gatherings and has a large circle of relatives and friends who will morn his departure. The G. A. R. Post took charge of the services at the grave.

Quoted in Find a Grave.

An old soldier who faded away, and who like many others considered his military service the high point of his life.** Eli’s feelings are unrecorded, or at least I have not found any record. Objectively it was the low point. But he survived and carried on with life.

Theirs are just two Civil War stories. I am glad to know them, and to be able to tell them.

*The report of the commander of the 46th records that the regiment dug shallow entrenchments after repelling this Confederate assault.

**A paternal ancestor corresponded nostalgically with comrades from the Bavarian Army (he was from the Palatinate, which was part of Bavaria at the time) long after he had emigrated to Chicago.