Streetwise Professor

In 1823, France and Spain, supported by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, threatened to reverse the independence of the revolutionary states in South America that had broken away from Spain. The British prime minister, George Canning, proposed that Britain and the United States send a joint warning to the continental powers. US Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, rejected the idea:  “It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war.”

How things have changed, in nearly 200 years. Talk about reversal of fortune. The UK now is the cockboat–if that–to the US man-of-war. It now faces humiliation in the Persian Gulf, having to admit after the seizure of a British-flag tanker by Iranian Revolutionary Guards that it hasn’t the means to escort other British ships, or to deter Iran from taking yet more.

A little short of 40 years ago, the British barely had the naval wherewithal to to overcome a third-rate power, Argentina, in the Falklands. Now it cannot even stand up to a fourth-rate (if that) naval power far closer to home, and in a region that had been at the center of British interest since before Adams opined that the US must assert its own interests in the Western Hemisphere. Such are the wages of decades of indifference to one of the primary duties of government: national defense. (Britain has proved increasingly deficient in performing the other as well: maintaining the public safety.)

As a result of its lack of capability, Britain is furiously signaling its desire to tamp down tensions with Iran. Which will only spur the Iranians on.

The United States has been trying to herd its alleged allies into an effort to convoy shipping in the Gulf. But despite all their imprecations against American unilateralism, and their fine words about the transcendent importance of alliances and the vital necessity of maintaining a rules-based international order, they would rather not, thank you very much.

Hollow words. Hollow nations. They deserve only contempt, not deference.

File this under “We didn’t bomb them enough.” (Maybe I should create a new category for easy reference.)

Item One: Angela Merkel expressed “solidarity” with Ocasio-Cortez, Omar, Tlaiba, and Pressley. She then proceeded to pontificate on her views of what makes America strong.

Item Two: The CEO of Siemens called Trump “the face of racism and exclusion.“

To which I say: mind you own goddam business, Fritz.

Merkel has obviously let all the post-November 2016 bologna about her being the new leader of the free world go to her head. In fact, she is merely the de facto leader of the 4th Reich (who recently succeeded in installing her puppet as de jure leader), and one who has pigheadedly stuck to immigration policies that many Germans strenuously oppose: this no doubt explains her haste to chime in on an issue that is related to America’s immigration debate.

As for Siemens: where to begin? This company’s history is so sordid that its CEO (a successor to a long line of corruptocrats, and an accomplice to mass murder) should not dare to cast aspersions on anyone for anything.

Siemens was deeply enmeshed in the Nazi war economy. Its attempted justification for its conduct makes appalling reading. It attempts to distance itself from its role by claiming it didn’t make things that actually blew up, like bombs and such. It only made electronics. Which of course were vital to a technologically advanced war (e.g., vital components of V1 and V2 rockets, which did in fact blow up, causing thousands of civilian deaths).

It admits to using forced labor, but its description is extremely sanitized, and incomplete. This sentence is rich: “The fact that Siemens allowed people to work against their will during a time when the company was an integral part of the wartime economy of the national socialistic rogue regime is something that the company’s current top management and employees deeply regret.”

Allowed people to work against their will? That sentence is an oxymoron, and a disgusting one at that. And the description of the actual extent of forced labor, and the nature of the forced labor, does not do justice to the malignity of the company’s conduct, and its complicity in the Nazi regime’s atrocities. It talks benignly about moving production facilities due to Allied bombing, but manages to neglect mentioning that it operated these facilities at numerous death camps, including: Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Flossenberg, Gross Rosen, Mauthausen, Neuengamme, Ravensbruck, & Sachsenhausen.

The whole presentation is so dishonest as to make it utterly worthless as an apology, or even an acknowledgement.

That’s in the past, you might say. Well, post-WWII, the company hasn’t utilized forced labor, but has engaged in what is likely the most pervasive pattern of corruption of any large company anywhere in the world. Google “Siemens corruption” and the suggested search terms list a slew of countries: Argentina, Greece, Nigeria, Russia, China. It has paid billions in fines.

Like other German companies, it rushed to do business in Iran (the country that has pledged to finish the job German started), only to state regretfully that the Bad Orange Man made it impossible to continue to do so.

And, of course, Merkel holds Siemens in the highest standing.

Merkel’s and Siemens’ opinions about US politics and US society are gratuitously offered, and worth less. And considering the source, they have no business lecturing others. So zip it, Fritz.

Post-Charlottesville, I have often stated that the war on American history would not end with Confederate generals, or Confederate privates. Every American historical figure is at risk. Recent evidence of this was the city of Charlottesville’s decision to end its observance of Jefferson’s birthday. But almost every day some American figure or symbol is being targeted.

Around July 4th, it was the Betsy Ross flag. Now it is the iconic “Don’t Tread on Me” Gadsden Flag. Why? Because apparently some white supremacist somewhere has embraced it.

I guess that makes the United States Navy a white supremacist organization. From 1980 to 2002, the Navy used a variant of the rattlesnake/Don’t Tread on Me symbol on the Navy Jack flown by the oldest commissioned ship in the fleet. Since 11 September, 2002, all ships in the Navy have used this jack. I guess that also makes the United States Naval Academy (one of my alma maters) a white supremacist organization: Navy sports teams have worn rattlesnake/Don’t Tread on Me-emblazoned uniforms since 2014.

The rattlesnake symbolism was widely employed in the years before the American Revolution. The rattlesnake does not strike unless threatened: the patriots/revolutionaries who used the rattlesnake iconography were telling the British that they would not threaten them if left alone, but they would defend themselves if Britain used force against them.

The Navy connection dates back to the Revolution as well. The first contingent of Marines marched under the Gadsden Flag–a yellow banner with a coiled rattlesnake and the legend “Don’t Tread on Me”–in 1775, and the flag was adopted by the first commander-in-chief of the Navy as his pennant in that same year.*

Indeed, the Gadsden Flag is arguably more representative of the Revolutionary spirit and ethos than the Betsy Ross flag. Which is why Americans who revere the ideals of the Revolution fly it and wear its emblem on their clothing. Or display it on their refrigerators: I have a Don’t Tread on Me Navy Jack magnet on mine.

But despite its deep connection with American independence, and the ideals of liberty, it’s now beyond the pale. Because white supremacy.

But here’s the thing: the progressive left defines white supremacy, and who is a white supremacist. And they define it to include anyone who honors the ideals of the Founding, the history of the Founding, and the Founders themselves.

Beto O’Rourke gave away the game: “The country was founded on white supremacy.” The obvious implication is that anything associated with the Founding is stained by the original sin of white supremacism. Therefore, anyone associated with the Founding is a white supremacist, as is anyone who believes that the Founding was on the whole a great boon not just for the American people, but for the world. And anyone who wears symbols associated with the Founding must be a white supremacist too.

So here is my response.

You have “issues” with the Gadsden Flag? Go fuck yourself.

You have “issues” with the Betsy Ross flag? Go fuck yourself.

You have “issues” with my “Come and Take It” shirt? Go fuck yourself.

I could go on. But you get the idea.

Perhaps you consider this intemperate and confrontational. I agree! It is intemperate and confrontational by intent. Just like the Gadsden Flag.

David French and his ilk argue that we must engage in civil discussion with the progressive left. This is a delusional attempt at appeasement: the Woken SS will never be appeased. They will pocket any concession you make today (well, Thomas Jefferson did own slaves, after all, so I guess we should consign him to the Memory Hole) and then proceed without even a thank you to their next target. And they will do so until every last vestige of the American past is similarly damned to oblivion and extirpated from our collective memory.

As O’Rourke’s remark reveals (and he has company, believe me), these people fundamentally hate and despise the Founding principles–and principals–of this country. There is no room for compromise here. There is no common ground. This is a fundamental conflict of visions.

This is about power and control. This is about them trying to shut people like me down and to shut people like me up–and if you read this blog, probably people like you too. And when somebody tries to shut me down or shut me up, I tell them to go fuck themselves.

If they’re lucky.

*The Navy Jack is probably a misrepresentation of the actual flag flown over the first ships of the Continental Navy. There is no doubt that Commodore Hopkins’ fleet flew a flag with the rattlesnake/Don’t Tread on Me symbols, but it was the Gadsden Flag, given to Hopkins by Gadsden himself. The uncoiled rattlesnake on a banner with 13 alternating red and white stripes was depicted in a 1776 British print of Hopkins, engraved by someone who had never seen either Hopkins or his ships. This print was used as the basis for a modern representation in the 1880s. John Adams and Benjamin referred to a South Carolina ships with a rattlesnake over 13 stripes.

Back in March, I opined that the Green New Deal was a Trojan Horse for a grandiose plan to remake the economy on socialist/communist lines:

But whenever Bordoff asked a question about energy, or climate policy, Gunn-Wright couldn’t even feign interest. Her responses were in the vein of “whatever”, and then she launched into impassioned monologues about what really interested her–a laundry list of progressive dreams from health care to child care to labor policy.

What’s clear from Gunn-Wright’s performance is that “climate change” is merely a Trojan Horse for a hard-core leftist agenda. The plan is to use climate alarmism to stampede voters into electing hard-left politicians who, once ensconced in power, will implement what good (I use that term ironically) socialists have been drooling to implement for decades–since before the original New Deal.

But don’t take my word for it! Heed the hand up the AOC sockpuppet, Saikat Chakrabarti:

“The interesting thing about the Green New Deal is it wasn’t originally a climate thing at all,” Chakrabarti said, according to the Post. “Do you guys think of it as a climate thing? Because we really think of it as a how-do-you-change-the-entire-economy thing.”

Pretty much what I said.

Chakrabarti, by the way, is known for wearing t-shirts bearing the image of one Subhas Chandra Bose. A charmer, he was. Escaping from India, he traveled to Germany, where he raised a force of Indian POWs to fight for the Nazis, only to be disappointed when his new buddy Hitler invaded his old buddy Stalin’s USSR.

He then took a U-boat (U-180) (you can’t make up this stuff!) to Japan, and then spearheaded the recruiting of the Indian National Army that fought alongside the Japanese in Burma.

As the war ground down, 12 days after Hiroshima, Bose was tragically (well, not really) killed in the crash of a Japanese plane on Formosa.

Such is the role model of AOC’s ventriloquist. In his mind, British colonialism was so bad that it made acceptable and defensible canoodling with three of the four greatest mass murdering regimes of the 20th century (Bose died, alas, before he could have collected the set and conspired with Mao). Just think what he would be willing to do to rid the world of evil capitalist regimes, like the US.

As something of a coda to the previous post, it’s worth commenting on Sunday’s story that Russia dispatched 100 troops to Venezuela. Within hours of their arrival, the power went out, and the country was plunged into darkness yet again.

This is how deep Russia must dig to find allies, all in a pathetic effort to tweak its bête noire, the US. Yet this is the colossus that has preoccupied the fevered minds of the American governing class since 8 November, 2016.

It is also a rather scathing commentary on Putin’s alleged strategic genius. There’s an old adage: never reinforce failure. Venezuela is a failure–and a failed state–on a grand scale. Yet perhaps thinking of his previous “investments” in the country, Putin reinforces this failure.

Succumbing to the sunk cost fallacy is hardly a sign of strategic genius.

Further, if Trump is in Putin’s thrall, why has Trump ramped up the pressure on the Maduro regime? Maybe Max Boot or Bill Kristol can enlighten us.

The image of Vladimir Putin as an all-powerful mastermind was central to the Russia Collusion Hoax. In this telling, the omnipotent and omnipresent Vova, secure in his lair in Moscow, could manipulate at will the electoral process in the most powerful country in history. His power, devious intelligence, and malign purpose made it especially reprehensible and dangerous for Trump to collude with him, and the image of the Putin evil mastermind made collusion with him a grave threat to the republic, in a way totally different from, say, assorted Chinese boodlers boosting Bill Clinton.

The entire Russian Collusion Hoax was farcical to me from the beginning, and this grotesque exaggeration of Putin’s power and influence was the most farcical part of the charade. It was particularly annoying to hear about it from idiots who hadn’t paid the slightest bit of attention to Russia since, well, ever, and who when they did weigh in on Russia it was to slam Mitt Romney for calling it a threat, and to chortle at Obama’s snarky response to Romney’s alarums.

Put simply, most of these people who have been running around with their hair on fire about Russia since, come to think of it, the minute that Hillary conceded defeat and needed an excuse, couldn’t find the place on a map, despite the fact it is the biggest country on earth. But all of a sudden they were experts on all things Putin and all things Russia.

Perhaps in a signal to the hysterics that they should back off, the NYT ran an oped titled “How Powerful is Putin Really?” The answer: pretty much the same one I gave 12 plus years ago, and repeatedly–not very. Because Russia is not that powerful, and because Putin’s main role is to be an intermediary in wars between completing clans in the security forces and business, rather than to be a grandmaster moving inanimate chess pieces around the board.

This is comic gold:

The gulf between what Mr. Putin says and what happens in Russia raises a fundamental question about the nature of his rule after more than 18 years at the pinnacle of an authoritarian system: Is Mr. Putin really the omnipotent leader whom his critics attack and his own propagandists promote? Or does he sit atop a state that is, in fact, shockingly ramshackle, a system driven more by the capricious and often venal calculations of competing bureaucracies and interest groups than by Kremlin diktats?

I won’t keep you in suspense as to the answer. Hell, if you have been reading here anytime since around 2007, you know the answer. But then again, if you read me you probably haven’t been drinking the NYT Kool-aid, and won’t need them to tell you the answer 12 years too late.

If you read the rest of the article, you will see a description that echoes exactly the one I first applied to Russia in April, 2007: “a natural state.” As I quoted North, Weingast, and Wallis:

A natural state is a specific way of structuring political and economic systems so that the economic rents created by limited entry are available to secure credible commitments among politically powerful groups. Potential rivals in a natural state stop fighting (or fight less when the economic rents they enjoy depend on continued existence of the sate and of social order. Natural states limit economic entry to create rents and then use those rents to credibly commit powerful groups to support the state. In other words, natural states use the economic system as a tool to solidify the stability of the ruling coalition.

I also quoted Celeste Wallander:

Patrimonial authoritarianism is a political system based on holding power in order to create, access, and distribute rents. It is well known that Russia is deeply corrupt, but corruption in the Russian system of patrimonial authoritarianism is not merely a feature of the system; it is essential to the very functioning of political power. The political system is based on the political control of economic resources in order to enrich those within patron-client clans. The patron remains in power by rewarding clients, and the clients are rewarded by supporting their patron. The patron requires support from his clients, and he must access and distribute rents for that support. Without the creation and control of rents, political power disappears. At the top of the political system, Putin manages relations among competing patron-client clans headed by top government and business figures, such as Development and Trade Minister German Gref, Deputy Prime Minister and Gazprom chairman Dmitry Medvedev, Gazprom president Alexei Miller, and Igor Sechin, deputy head of the presidential administration and chairman of Rosneft. Each of these individuals in turn has his own set of clients, who are in turn patrons of their own clans, and so on, creating a complex web of relationships that sustain political power and distribute patronage rents.

The basic point of the analysis was that of course someone like Putin is powerful within such a system, but he is not all powerful. Further, his power derives from his ability to intermediate between independent sources of power within Russia. The main purpose of the state in Russia is to organize theft, and divide the spoils. The main purpose of Putin is to keep that process from devolving into violent chaos.

Put differently, I’ve often emphasized the deinstitutionalized, highly personalized nature of the Russian state. The personalism is a bug, not a feature, and inherently limits the power of the person at the top. It is a great mistake to confuse the prominence of the public face of a shambolic state with actual power. Institutions are necessary to generate national power, either domestically or abroad. The power of deinstitutionalized state is inherently constrained.

But especially post-8 November, 2016, the left and the media and Hillary needed a figure to personify evil, and to tie him to Trump, so the reality of Russia and Putin and Putinism–which is pretty plain to see if you actually look–was deliberately ignored, and in its place our “elite” became fixated on a cartoonish Dr. Evil figure in a way that would make the most crazed 1950s Bircher blush.

These are people who fell for the scary wizard and his pyrotechnics, and paid no attention to the little man behind the curtain. Some because they were fools. Some–the worst of them, and the most powerful–because it advanced their political agenda.

So I say to the NYT: Bravo! Better 12 years late then never! But this should be a lesson: don’t pay the slightest bit of attention to those Bozos, because their news and editorial “judgments” are driven by a political and ideological bias that is impervious to readily observable realities.

Poor widdle Angela Merkel is apparently flustered that the Bad Orange Man is such a meanie to her. She’s “ruffled” by the prospect of more meanie-ness. And indeed, after meeting with Trump, Austrian president Sebastian Kurz said Trump “seems to have it in for German in particular.”

Well boo frickin’ hoo.

What? You have a problem with that? Not me! Merkel’s Germany is truly loathsome, and hardly an American ally. Furthermore, their hypocrisy–on issues like Nato, Russia, and Iran–is off the charts.

Who do you think is the bigger threat to Nato? Trump, who insists that Nato members make contributions commensurate with those of the US, and the sizes of their economies? Or Germany, whose pathetic military–to quote Patton–“couldn’t fight its way out of a piss-soaked paper bag“?

Germany military expenditure is about half of the minimal level of 2 pct of GDP it pledged to Nato, so spare me the lectures on how the US under Trump is undermining the alliance. And even that is exaggerated by including spending on the autobahn. And as the linked Politico article shows, what money they do spend is absolutely wasted because it provides precisely zero combat power.

Who is a bigger patsy for Russia? Trump, who has imposed sanctions, increased military spending, green-lighted military aid to Ukraine, repeatedly sent destroyers into the Black Sea, etc.? Or Germany, which has jammed NordStream II down the throats of the rest of Europe, thereby selling out not just the Ukranians, but the Poles and other eastern European members of the EU?

Who are the real antisemites? Trump, whose daughter converted to Judaism (hence making his grandchildren Jewish), and who has done more for Israel than any president in American history (perhaps only Truman excepted), including greatly ramping up pressure on Israel’s sworn enemy Iran? Or Germany, which cringingly sucks up to the Mullahs in Tehran?

Case in point. The execrable German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, slobbered all over Iran on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of its Islamic Revolution:

Germany’s largest paper Bild reported on Wednesday “On the 40th anniversary of that day, friendly greetings from Berlin arrived in Tehran by telegram: the President of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (63), sends ‘Congratulations’ on the occasion of the national holiday, ‘also in the name of my compatriots.”‘
 

“Friendly greetings” to a nation dedicated to completing what Germans started, but failed to finish: the annihilation of Jews.

How nice of him. And his “compatriots.” I think I understand the true roots of his friendliness.

Truth be told, German antisemitism has been sublimated, not eliminated. Opposition to Israel and support of Iran is objectively antisemitic, but can be portrayed as subjectively humanitarian (e.g., portrayed as supporting oppressed Palestinians).

So Trump is perfectly justified if he “has it in for Germany.” They’ve earned it. Maybe we just didn’t bomb them enough, so they need a supplemental dose of corrective measures.

There has been a steady chorus of wailing about how the US “retreat” from the Middle East (which is at present limited to an announced intention to draw down in Syria) is empowering Russia, and that Putin is exploiting the “vacuum” left by Trump.* This WSJ oped is representative of the genre. Which is to say it is incoherent to the point of idiocy.

For one thing, this piece, and the entire genre, mirrors one of Putin’s most glaring intellectual failings: zero sum thinking. If Russia gains, the US must lose, right?

Wrong. The US has global interests, and does not have unlimited means to pursue them. Strategic prioritization–most notably, focusing on China–and redeploying resources to focus on the new priorities is vital and beneficial and advances US interests. Perhaps Russia gains in some ways from this, but those gains do not come anywhere near erasing the benefits accruing to the US of downplaying peripheral theaters and focusing on more important ones. Further, any local gains Russia may achieve in, say, Syria are almost certainly to be more than offset by the disadvantages of competing with a United States that has its strategic priorities straight. Putin–and other American adversaries/enemies, notably Iran–have exploited US misadventures in the Middle East. Focusing efforts and husbanding resources makes the US stronger, not weaker, both absolutely and relative to would be competitors–including Russia.

I have yet to see anyone make a remotely plausible case of why an enduring US role in Syria makes any strategic sense. As I’ve said from the very day that Putin put troops there–if he wants the shithole, let him have it. It has no strategic importance to the US, especially in its utterly wrecked current condition. We have far more important issues to deal with, China foremost among them.

The WSJ piece also provides room for considerable doubt about Putin’s prospects. Specifically, it inadvertently demonstrates the inherent contradictions in Putin’s policy. The author, Angela Stent, spends much of the piece fretting about the warming relationship between Russia and Israel. She also frets about the cooperation between Iran and Russia. Well, those policies are utterly incompatible, given that Israel and Iran view each other as existential enemies. The rapprochement between Russia and Saudi Arabia is similarly incompatible with a strong cooperative relationship between Russia and Iran. Something has to give.

I also fail to see why having Russia and Israel on good terms is a bad thing, especially in light of the fact that the Soviet Union was Israel’s arch-enemy (except for a brief, historically miraculous moment in which Stalin thought supporting Israel–and arming it–advanced Soviet interests), and armed its enemies (including Syria) throughout the Cold War. This was a major reason why the US had to take substantial risks to defend Israel in the Cold War–and why some said this risk wasn’t worth it, and that the US should jettison its support for Israel. Indeed, Soviet support for Arab states waging war on Israel brought the USSR and the US to the nuclear brink in 1973. A Russia that values its relationship with Israel is more likely to put a brake on Israel’s enemies with whom it has influence (notably Iran and Syria). That reduces the likelihood of conflict in the Middle East, and reduces a source of friction between the US and Russia.

Tell me why this is a bad thing.

And don’t forget–it takes two to canoodle. Here Putin is canoodling with Benjamin Netanyahu, who is (a) extremely hawkish, and (b) recognizes that Israel’s security depends crucially on the US. If Netanyahu believes there are gains to trade to be realized from dealing with with Putin, it is likely that the US is a gainer too.

Having Russia on friendly terms with Israel enhances the Jewish state’s security, and thereby advances American interests. And if in the end Russia chooses Iran and Syria over Israel, the pearl clutching about a budding Russian friendship with Israel will look rather foolish, no?

The friendliness between Russia and KSA can be analyzed similarly. The contrast with the Cold War again deserves comment. The inflection point in US involvement in the Middle East generally, and KSA in particular–the Carter Doctrine–was a response to the perceived Soviet threat to seize the Arabian Peninsula. Although the military threat ebbed with the collapse of the USSR, a KSA with fewer enemies and threats requires less US protection.

Here it should be added that the main reason for KSA and Russia to cooperate now is oil. But this in many respects is a confession of weakness, not strength. The resurgence of US as a major oil producer has undercut the market power of the Saudis and Russia, and their cooperation is largely defensive, rather than offensive.

Those who are paying attention, moreover, realize that there is considerable disagreement within Russia about the desirability of cooperating with OPEC (which, in effect, means with KSA) on oil output. In particular, my old buddy Igor Sechin is lobbying hard against continued cooperation, claiming it is a strategic threat to Russia:

“The participants of the OPEC+ agreement have actually created a preferential advantage for the USA – that sees raising its own market share and the seizure of target markets as its primary task – which has become a strategic threat to Russia’s oil industry development,” the letter [from Sechin to Putin] seen by Reuters says.

“The key strategic challenge which the domestic oil industry is faced with today is the further decline in Russia’s market share, despite the availability of quality recoverable oil reserves, necessary infrastructure and personnel,” it said.

Here Sechin is actually expressing some economic reality. Given its market share, Russia’s–and Rosneft’s–demand elasticity is substantially greater than one, and restricting its output reduces its revenues/income. Russia/Rosneft would likely be better off with a lower price and higher output–which is precisely why for years it abstained from cooperating with OPEC.

This internal discontent among extremely powerful players–and Sechin is arguably the most powerful player in Russia after Putin–sharply limits the potential for enduring cooperation between Russia and the KSA. Again, the fears are vastly overblown.

In sum, freaking out over greater Russian diplomatic efforts in the Middle East is totally unjustified. Russia’s gains are not America’s losses–the world is not zero sum. There are inherent contradictions in Russian efforts that will inevitably force them to make choices that limit their influence. And some Russian initiatives could actually serve to reduce the likelihood of major conflicts that would harm US interests.

I can’t write about this subject without mentioning today’s remarks by the most annoying leader in the world today. And no, I don’t mean Putin–I mean Angela Merkel. At the annual security conference in Munich, Frau Merkel chastised the United States for its plans to draw down in Syria and Afghanistan:

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has warned that a hasty U.S. pullout from Syria runs the risk of strengthening the roles of Russia and Iran in the Middle East.
Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 16, Merkel questioned whether the planned U.S. withdrawal was “a good idea.”
“Will it once more strengthen the capacity of Iran and Russia to exert their influence?” she asked.
She also cautioned against a premature U.S. withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, saying that NATO’s Resolute Support mission in that country was dependent on the U.S. military’s commitment.

Well, for starters, lady, if you are so convinced of the need for military engagement in Syria and Afghanistan, why don’t you order your pathetic military to pick up its broomsticks and take the lead in the fights there? Oh. I forgot. You are the leader of the biggest free rider in Nato, who constantly lectures everybody else about global responsibilities, but who never puts her money–or the lives of German soldiers (assuming they still have any) where her fat mouth is. Until you do, you can kindly STFU.

The outrageousness of Merkel’s bloviation is even more remarkable given that in the very same speech called Russia a “partner” and “made a robust defense of Germany’s foreign trade relations and ties with Russia during her speech.”

Why, some might call that collusion!

So which is it? Russian influence is something to be contested, or embraced?

Merkel has also been a robust defender of the nuclear deal with Iran, and critical of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from it. German has led efforts to circumvent US sanctions on Iran–which are intended precisely to limit Iranian influence. But then she tells us we have to garrison Syria to fight Iranian influence.

Square that circle for me.

Angela cannot go away soon enough. But alas, no doubt she will be replaced by someone equally annoying. Germany is not America’s friend. But it is probably too much to expect that those who are demented by Trump hatred will understand that, just as it is too much to expect that said demented people will recognize that some modest Russian diplomatic achievements in the Middle East do little harm to the US, and indeed, may actually redound to our benefit.

*The whole idea of a US “retreat” in the Middle East is so completely unmoored from reality that anyone who uses this term, or similar expressions, should be ignored and mocked. The US is still in Iraq. It has actually increased its involvement in the Persian Gulf, most notably in its confrontation in Iran. It supports the Saudi’s fiasco in Yemen. It periodically bombs Libya. Support for Israel is at unprecedented levels. Egypt’s military government is getting military and political assistance from the US. If this is retreat, I’d hate to see an advance. Reducing involvement in what is arguably the least important country in the region–Syria–when its whole reason for being there (the presence of ISIS as a territorial entity) is strategic rationality, not a retreat.

US ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell recently tweeted that the Trump administration had been tougher on Russia than any of its predecessors. The reflexive anti-Trumpers wouldn’t stand for this. Not for a second.

NYT columnist Bret Stephens leaped into the lists to tilt at Ambassador Grenell:

And let’s play no word games about the difference between USSR and “Russia.” Putin’s Russia is the USSR reborn under the exact same management.

That’s what’s called “projection”, Bret, for you are playing word games by transmogrifying Putin’s Russia into the USSR.

Today’s Russia “is the USSR reborn” only in Putin’s wildest dreams. By any objective measure, Russia today pales in comparison to the USSR as a threat to the US (or the West generally). From 1945 through 1991, the Soviets had millions of men and thousands of tanks poised on the borders of western Europe. Today the men do not exist and the tanks are rusting away in storage–and all are hundreds of miles to the east of the Elbe. The Soviet Union had a very credible navy: Russia’s navy is back from the utter decrepitude of the 1990s and early 2000s, but is still a pale shadow of what it was under Admiral Gorshkov. Whereas the Soviet Union posed an extreme conventional threat to the US and the west, Russia poses no threat at all.

Oh, by the way Bret–where is Putin’s Warsaw Pact? Oh, that’s right–they are all Nato members.

The USSR was also a formidable ideological adversary, and its ideology was aggressive and expansionist. Especially prior to the 1980s, the Soviet ideology had substantial international appeal, especially in the Third World. The Cold War was as much intellectual and ideological, as it was military and economic.

Putin tries on new ideologies like a teenage girl tries on new clothes. But his ideological fashion choices are primarily for domestic political effect, and have no appeal outside Russia’s borders. Zero. Zip. This is in large part because most of Putin’s ideologies are nationalist and insular. His embrace of Russian Orthodoxy is a particularly telling in this regard. It only has very limited appeal even within Russia, and none whatsoever outside it.

Russia is not an ideological nation. It is a kleptocratic regime.

Yes, Putin laments the demise of the USSR. But his efforts to rebuild it are pathetic in the extreme. In his nearly 20 years in power, his efforts to reconstitute the USSR have succeeded in reclaiming–wait for it–Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and some rather decrepit bits of Ukraine. These are the offal of the USSR. He is now putting the squeeze on Belarus–but Lukashenko has no desire to go back to the Soviet Union.

And even these “accomplishments” have succeeded primarily in isolating Russia, with one of the consequences being economic stagnation that leaves Russia even further behind the US in the wellsprings of military power. After a brief splurge in defense spending, the realities of Russia’s parlous economic condition have forced Putin to cut back again, and announce new weapons with great fanfare–but not to produce them in meaningful numbers. Potemkin revisited.

In sum, Putin’s Russia is at best a pitiful simulacrum of the USSR. To equate the two, as Stephens does, is beyond farcical.

So after dispensing with Stephens’ sleight-of-hand turning 2019 Russia into 1979 USSR, let’s evaluate Ambassador Grenell’s statement on the merits, administration by administration post-USSR.

The Clinton administration was all in propping up Yeltsin. When Yeltsin shelled the Duma in 1993, Clinton said: “I guess we’ve just got to pull up our socks and back Ol’ Boris again.” When Yeltsin was in grave peril of losing the 1996 election, Clinton said: “I know that means we’ve got to stop short of giving a nominating speech for the guy. But we’ve got to go all the way in helping in every other respect.” (Can anyone say “interfering in an election”? I knew you could.) The Clinton administration also supported Russian policy in Chechnya.

Bush II famously gazed into Putin’s eyes, and his administration got on rather well with Russia. Even the 2008 invasion of Georgia did not trigger a vigorous response.

And Obama. Where to begin? Of course there’s the Reset, complete with Hillary grinning like a buffoon standing next to Lavrov, holding an idiotic button (mislabeled in Russian, no less). Then there was Obama paling around with Medvedev–they were burger buddies, remember? Oh–can’t forget the hot mike statement that Medvedev should tell Vladimir to be patient, as Obama would have more flexibility after the 2012 election. In the 2012 campaign, Obama mocked Romney saying that Russia was a threat.

Given this, it’s not surprising that Putin smelled weakness, and that his peak aggressive phase occurred during the Obama administration.

Obama’s response was 90 percent petulance and condescension about Putin not following the arc of historical progress, and 10 percent rather ineffectual measures.

It is against this standard–not that of Cold Warriors facing an existential threat–that the Trump administration should be measured. And as Grenell said, by this standard Trump has indeed been far more robust. He has provided Ukraine with weapons (which Obama steadfastly refused to do). He has embarked on rebuilding the US military. He has implemented more vigorous sanctions than the Obama administration. And the US military smoked 200+ Russians who tried to throw their weight around against US forces in Syria.

Further, look at other news involving Grenell. The Germans are in apoplexy over Grenell’s threat to sanction any company that cooperated with the Nordstream II pipeline that will bring Russian gas to Europe. Merkel’s party spokeswoman huffed: “The American ambassador operates in a, shall I say, somewhat unusual diplomatic manner. He’s shown that not only through this letter [on Nord Stream 2 sanctions] but also from when he took office.”

And this is not a new thing. Trump has been bashing Nordstream since he took office–and the Germans have been reacting with outrage every time.

Trump’s notorious criticism of Nato is also hardly pro-Russian. His main criticism is that Nato countries–especially Germany–don’t do enough to counter Russia, but expect the US to do it for them.

This is not a hard call. The Trump administration has objectively been far harder on Russia than its predecessors–including most notably its immediate predecessor, whom people like Bret Stephens now lavish praise on. It isn’t even close. To claim that US policy towards the USSR is the appropriate yardstick by with to measure US policy towards the decrepit, dissolute successor state of Russia requires breathtaking intellectual dishonesty. But Bret Stephens is obviously up to the task

One of the Trump administration’s (and really, Trump is the one pushing it) more interesting ideas is the creation of an independent military “space force” as a separate service branch, co-equal with the Army, Air Force, Marines, and Navy. Given that this proposal gores many, many political oxen inside the military and without, it’s hard to get an objective viewpoint. Everyone’s opinion is colored by their vested interest.

I have no answer as to whether it’s a good idea or not. But I do have some thoughts on the appropriate framework that could contribute to a more objective evaluation. Specifically, transactions cost economics and property rights economics (and organizational economics, which has some overlap with these) address issues of how formal organizational structure, and the ownership and control of assets, can affect the allocation of resources, for better or worse. And that is the issue here: can a reorganization involving the creation of a new entity that has control rights over assets heretofore controlled by other entities improve the allocation of defense resources?

I mused on this topic long ago, but have never really pursued it in a serious way. But I’ll muse some more given the newfound topicality.

It’s useful to divide the analysis into two parts. First, how does organizational structure, and in particular the assignment of rights of control over existing assets (e.g., artillery pieces, aircraft), affect military effectiveness and combat power? Second, how does organizational structure affect the choices regarding which assets to invest in?

With respect to the first issue, over the centuries militaries have devoted considerable effort and thought to organizational charts, and the allocation of control rights over military hardware and military units. Some simple examples: should each division have its own artillery, with all guns being under division control, or should some guns be assigned to battalions subject to control at a higher level (e.g., corps, army)?; should all tanks be concentrated in armored divisions, or should infantry divisions also have organic tank units?; should submarines be employed in support of fleets, or operate independently?

As with all resource allocation decisions, there are trade-offs, and militaries have struggled with these. There has been experimentation. There has been success and failure. Changes in technology have necessitated changes in organization, because the nature of specific weapons systems may affect the trade-offs. These are arguments that never end, as the incessant reorganizations of militaries (e.g., the U.S. Army’s recent shift to a brigade-based structure) demonstrate.

A couple of transactions cost economics insights. First, most decisions regarding the use of military assets are made subject to severe temporal specificity. If I am under attack, I need fire support NOW. Moreover, it may be the case that even in a large military only a few resources are available to provide that support. Temporal specificity creates transactions costs that can impede the allocation of resources to their highest value use.

Second, trade is unlikely to be a viable option, especially given temporal specificity. “Hey. I need some artillery support on my position right now. Can you give me an offer on what that will cost me?” Yeah–that works. The prospects for spot exchange are almost non-existent, and intertemporal exchange is unlikely because (a) timelines are short (for a variety of reasons), making end game problems acute, and (b) potential parties to an exchange are unlikely to be interacting repeatedly over time with reciprocal needs.

Since voluntary exchange is out (except in very unusual circumstances) resources need to be allocated by authority. Which makes issues of organization and the allocation of authority (control rights) paramount.

With respect to space assets, the case for a space force relates to the fact that many space assets (a) offer value to air, naval, and ground forces, and (b) there are economies of scale and scope. Having each service invest in its own space assets likely sacrifices scale and scope economies, but eliminates the need for inter-service bargaining over access to these assets, and reallocation of these assets in response to shifting military needs.

Allocating space assets to one existing branch (e.g., the Air Force) would facilitate exploitation of scale and scope economies, but would require inter-service bargaining to permit the non-controlling service to get access. A specialized space force permits exploitation of scale and scope economies, but also necessitates inter-service bargaining. The key question here is whether a specialized force would have better incentives than an operational force. For example, the Air Force might favor itself over other services when deciding how to utilize space assets, whereas a separate space force would not be as parochial.

With respect to the second issue–which assets are procured–the impact of organization on the Congressional procurement process is paramount.

The services are highly politicized organizations, and certain specializations within a service may exercise disproportionate influence. For example, the “fighter mafia” in the Air Force is legendary. As another example, in the pre-WWII U.S. Navy, battleship admirals held sway. These factions within a service may warp and stifle the development of new technologies, new doctrines, or investment decisions: the stultifying effect of the dominant infantry branch within the pre-WWII U.S. Army on the development of armored forces (both hardware and doctrine) is an example.

Creation of a separate force that invests in assets provided by the other branches would tend to undermine the power that any faction in a particular branch could exercise. The branches would have to form coalitions to influence Congressional funding decisions. But the creation of a new entity with its own vested service interest and its own ability to influence Congress could prove problematic as well.

For example, in the immediate aftermath of the formation of the Air Force, beliefs that nuclear weapons made most conventional forces–including conventional air arms–obsolete, led the Air Force to try to persuade Congress to slash spending on conventional forces in order to focus on strategic forces, especially bombers. This led to the “Revolt of the Admirals.” It also led the Navy and even the Army to invest in nuclear capabilities in order to claim strategic relevance and maintain their share of the budget. These investments were almost certainly wasteful, and would not have been made but for the independent Air Force’s influence.

Perhaps the most important historical example that could shed some light on the desirability of an independent space force is the creation of a separate Air Force in 1947, and the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966, in which the Army ceded to the Air Force control over all fixed wing aircraft.

The effects of this reorganization were probably beneficial overall, but there certainly were problematic effects. In particular, it almost certainly attenuated the Air Force’s incentives to provide ground support, and resulted in the Army investing excessively in rotary wing aircraft (i.e., attack helicopters) to provide it.

Perhaps a better idea would have been to create a separate strategic air wing (first including strategic bombers, then strategic bombers and ICBMs, as well as air superiority fighters), and permit the Army to operate tactical aircraft for ground support. This was essentially what was done in in the immediate aftermath of WWII, with the creation within the Army Air Force of a Strategic Air Command, a Tactical Air Command, and an Air Defense Command.

The Marine Corps, and to some degree the Navy, provide a model. Each operate their own fixed wing air services, specialized to provide the kinds of air power each needs. Marine air is relentlessly focused on providing close air support. The Marine operational commander has control over these assets, and does not have to haggle with another service to get them. Moreover, the Marines’ acquisition decisions (notably the division between fixed and rotary wing aircraft) are oriented towards getting the optimal mix for the specific mission.

I have only touched upon some of the relevant considerations–there are no doubt others I have missed. Moreover, I have given only superficial attention even to the issues I raise. But this should be sufficient to show just how complicated this issue is. Organizational decisions, such as the creation of a separate space force, will have profound implications for how military resources are allocated, and what resources will be invested in in the first place. Crucially, the assets in question cannot be allocated by markets or the price system, so it is not a question of organization v. market, but the form of the organization(s). Further, military assets are complex, long-lived (and becoming more so–note that B-52s may be operational for more than a century), and can be extraordinarily specialized and hence specific (in the TCE meaning of that term). Technology is incredibly dynamic, and needs shift dramatically over time as new threats emerge. This all means that organization and the allocation of control rights matter. A lot.

And perhaps most importantly, organizational choices will be made in a politicized environment, and will affect political bargaining in the future. This will inevitably distort current choices (e.g., whether a space force will be created in the first place, what assets it will control) and future choices as well. It also makes it very difficult to sort through the debate on the topic, because everybody involved is a political player with its own political interests.

That makes it all the more important to establish a relatively objective and rigorous intellectual framework in which to analyze these questions. I think that transactions costs economics and property rights economics hold out great promise as the basis for such a framework.