Streetwise Professor

The prospect that the war in Ukraine will drag on for some time has rendered urgent the question of how the west can support the country militarily. Specifically, what weapons can and should the west supply?

Retired General Barry McCaffery recommends supplying the full panoply of an American force–armor, air defense, aircraft. This is unnecessary, and unrealistic.

The immediate answer to the question hinges on the nature of the battle, the time frame, and the ability of the Ukrainian military to absorb and use equipment.

The nature of the battle is now clear: Ukraine is fighting a defensive battle, and will almost certainly do so on a relatively restricted front in the eastern part of the country.

The time frame is compressed. Although it will take some time for the Russians to generate sufficient combat power in Donbas given the necessity of reconstituting units devastated by the last six weeks of combat, Putin is clearly impatient and needs to demonstrate progress soon.

Military hardware can be complex and require considerable training to use effectively. Ukraine doesn’t have the time to train on unfamiliar equipment.

Given these realities, what are the priorities?

Number one, clearly: artillery. Artillery. More artillery. And lots of ammunition. Given that Ukraine is defending, towed tube artillery would do just fine, although self-propelled guns would have some benefits. Also, rocket artillery (MLRS) would be extremely useful.

Ukrainian troops could readily employ conventional artillery and it could play a decisive role in smashing any Russian advance. The stocks of European countries and the US should be adequate to provide a healthy upgunning of Ukrainian forces in relatively short order.

Relatedly: equipment to leverage the effectiveness of artillery. Specifically, counter battery radars (of which the US has already supplied some) and drones (for reconnaissance and battle damage assessment as well as for carrying out precision strikes).

Number two: air defense weapons, especially longer range SAMs. This could be something of an issue. The Ukrainians are trained up on Soviet/Russian weapons (e.g., S-300). It would take time to get them up to speed on western equipment (e.g., Patriots). Further, the US has legitimate security concerns about supplying these weapons, due to the risk of capture and reverse engineering.

A stopgap would be more MANPADs. The Ukrainians have made good use of those, and to the surprise of virtually all, have prevented the Russians from achieving air superiority, or even executing an effective air campaign.

Number three: more artillery.

Armor would be nice, but not necessary. The Ukrainians have already demonstrated a remarkable ability to defend against armor using ATGMs. So more of those, please. A Ukrainian armored assault is not in the offing, which reduces the need for more tanks beyond the T-62s, T-64s, T-72s already in its arsenal. (Not to mention captured Russian armor.). They likely have enough for the local counterattacks that they will need to execute as part of an active defense.

Aircraft would assist Ukraine in denying Russia air superiority, but it is uncertain how many decent pilots Ukraine has, and they would be limited to ex-Soviet aircraft types. Further, the bases would be vulnerable to Russian missile strikes. I doubt they would be decisive.

Get them the big guns, and the shells to feed them. That’s the priority. They would prove essential in a defensive battle.

Although Russia already has its hands full in Ukraine, and has proved to be a military paper tiger, amazingly it is looking to pick other fights. Latvia (the least anti-Russian of the Baltic countries) had the temerity to announce a commemoration of Ukrainians killed by Russians during May, the holy Victory Month. Which caused the Russians to lose their shit (I know, it’s a day that ends in “Y”, but still), and call the Latvians Nazis (of course!) and make threatening noises.

On cue, Russia state television trotted out a mouth breathing ex-military type to lay out how Russia would (and by implication, should) invade not just the Baltics, but Poland and Sweden (specifically Gotland):

Pointing a the map, Colonel Igor Korotchenko [Ukrainian name, interestingly], formerly of the Russian General Staff and air force and currently a reserve officer, said at the start of the invasion ‘a massive Russian radio-electronic strike is inflicted’ as ‘all Nato radars go blind and see nothing’, according to the Sun.

This was how the scenario for capturing the countries might look, he added.

Sweden has been politically neutral throughout its recent history, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought the prospect of the Nordic country joining NATO to the fore of political discussion.  

Russia has threatened Sweden and Finland over NATO membership repeatedly since the invasion began.

‘At this time, on the Swedish island Gotland, Russian military planes land, delivering S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, and Bastion coastal anti-ship systems,’ said Colonel Korotchenko. 

In the video, a border area labelled the ‘Suwalki gap’ is shown – the gap between Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, a leftover territory annexed from Germany after the Second World War.

Colonel Korotchenko explained how Russia would push up from Kaliningrad towards the Suwalki corridor separating Poland and Lithuania, blocking NATO reinforcements from the West.

Is this guy Ripski Van Winkle? Has he been asleep the last 6 weeks? Russia has not been able to blind Ukrainian radars, FFS. It’s vaunted electronic (and cyber) warfare capabilities have proved to be as Potemkinesque as its armored and air forces. And as if Russian transport planes would get anywhere near Gotland: they would all go down in flames due to Nato (and Swedish) SAMs and AAMs. And has Col. Korotchenko noticed that the airborne units that would necessarily spearhead such a mission (a) failed to achieve a similar mission outside Kiev on the opening day of the invasion, and (b) have been torn to shreds in the subsequent combat.

Gotland is an island, you know. Amphibious assault? The Russians haven’t had the stones to do that against Odesa or elsewhere, and the odds of pulling it off in the Baltic are far longer. Ain’t happening.

As for tearing through the Suwalki gap, the Russians haven’t torn through anything in Ukraine. And they could pull this off logistically how, Colonel? Your army has no clothes. Literally, in some cases.

This is the best part:

‘The astonished West and NATO will know that Russia declares a no-fly zone of 400km,’ added the enthused Colonel.

The only thing that is astonishing is that Russia has not been able to create a no-fly zone in Ukraine.

One would have to think this has to be for domestic consumption, to feed the image of a Russian juggernaut capable of taking on Nato to Russia’s northwest, thereby to distract the nation’s attention from the reality of its abject failure against Ukraine to Russia’s southeast. They really can’t be thinking of doing this, can they?

Six weeks ago I would have thought not. Now I am not so sure. The detachment from reality in Moscow is palpable. Ironically, the failure in Ukraine appears to have made the Russian leadership and the Russian people more delusional, not less. The shocking reality has led to denial, and a desperate need to fantasize about military glories to be won elsewhere to compensate for the fact of devastating losses in Ukraine.

Meaning Nato has to be ready for anything. They are just crazy enough to try it.

And in the meantime: send artillery to those who can use it.

Apologies for the hiatus. Was traveling in Europe for my annual teaching gig in Geneva. Other than the unseasonably cold weather in Geneva it was a great trip.

And now that I am pretty much recovered from the travel, some new material:

Vladimir Putin no doubt imagines a sobriquet being attached to his name. You know, like “the Great,” as in Peter the Great or Catherine the Great, or Vladimir I the Great. He probably wouldn’t even mind “Grozny,” as in Ivan IV Grozny–under either of the offered translations of “Formidable” or “Terrible.”

What are some other possibilities that would appeal to his penchant for history?

Well, I think we can definitely rule out “the Humblest” (Alexei Mikhailovich). We can also clearly rule out “the Peacemaker” (Alexander III).

Putin no doubt views himself as “the Liberator” like Alexander II, who earned that nickname not for freeing the serfs, but for freeing the Balkans: Putin thinks he is liberating Russians in Ukraine and Georgia from a foreign yoke, and no doubt yearns to do the same in the Baltics. He also no doubt dreams of being known as “the Blessed” after Alexander I, who defeated the hated westerners (namely Napoleon), enforced autocratic rule in eastern Europe, and made Russia a world power.

But the trajectory of events suggests that other historical sobriquets are more likely to stick. “The Bloodstained” (Nicholas II) is certainly in the running. But I think that the best candidate is . . . “the Accursed” (after Sviatopolk, a Kievan prince, ironically).

Yes, Putin is riding a wave of popularity in Russia right now. But he is clearly cursed in Ukraine, the rest of eastern Europe, and much of the world. And I think that once the propaganda fueled euphoria fades, and reality intrudes, Putin will be known as The Accursed in Russia as well.

The invasion of Ukraine is a bloody fiasco. Stymied on the battlefield, Russia is resorting to indiscriminate bombardment. In the wake of its withdrawal from the Kievan front, evidence of atrocities is mounting. And just as the Soviets responded to German announcements of the discovery of mass graves at Katyn by claiming that the Germans were the actual murderers, the Russians claim that the mass graves and civilian corpses littering the streets of places like Bucha were not their doing, but the Ukrainians’, thereby proving Russia to be the true successor state to the USSR–and wrecking even further Russia’s already dismal credibility.

Russia had become a pariah state before these revelations. Russians going all Russian has made it even more of one, and it will always remain such as long as Putin is in power. This will relegate the country to persistent penury that propaganda will not be able to paper over for much longer. To maintain his stubby little fingers’ hold on power, Putin will resort to even more draconian measures and oppressions. Defeat (or even Pyrrhic victory), poverty, isolation, and oppression will, sooner or later, make Putin Vladimir the Accursed even in his own land.

As for the military situation, Russia has clearly experienced a major defeat in the north, to the west, north, and east of Kyiv/Kiev. It is withdrawing post haste from those areas, leaving the Ukrainians in control–and allowing them to uncover and broadcast the evidence of Russian atrocities.

One narrative is that the withdrawing units will be redeployed to the Donbas front, and bring a victory there by Victory Day (May 9). Quite frankly, this is delusional bullshit. Claims of redeployment are as convincing as Michael Palin’s insistence that the dead parrot is merely resting.

Units that have been as thoroughly thrashed as those around Kyiv/Kiev take weeks, if not months, to regenerate. And doing so requires a stream of men–which Russia does not have. (Note the extreme difficulty that the US had in keeping infantry units up to strength in the ETO during WWII.) No doubt Putin will find some way to circumvent the legal obstacle against deploying conscripts outside of Russia (e.g., by dragooning them into “volunteering” as kontraktniki, or claiming that Donbas is really Russia), but the new lot of conscripts are just being called up, and it will take them months just to figure out how to put on their gear and find the latrines. And once they are integrated into these units, why should it be expected that they will be any more militarily competent than their predecessors who died in droves while accomplishing nothing? Indeed, the experience of their predecessors means that they will no doubt start out with morale at rock bottom levels, even before they see any of their comrades incinerated by a Ukrainian ATGM. And their training will be, frankly, shit. They will be missile fodder, and nothing more.

Further, there are stories that replacement stocks of equipment are largely unusable. Not that that really matters, I guess, given how ineffective the front line equipment has proved to be. The best stuff blowed up real good. Just think what’s in store for the not so good stuff.

Moreover, if the Russians can redeploy, so can the Ukrainians now that the threat to the north has been reduced. And they can do so with less attrited units, and on interior lines. Adding more mass to the Donbas front–especially given the low quality of the mass to be added–will just add to the body count.

Putin’s alleged focus on 9 May/Victory Day is pathetic, and illustrates Marx’s maxim about history repeating, first as tragedy, then as farce. Even if by some miracle the Russians achieve some simulacrum of a tactical victory in Donbas . . . it is still Donbas, not Berlin–or even Kyiv/Kiev. A farcical achievement, at best.

So Putin is doomed to either a humiliating climb down (which I doubt he will choose, precisely because it would be humiliating), continuing a grinding, pointless battle that will kill thousands of Russians and Ukrainians (and bring more atrocities in its wake), or heaven forbid, escalating with nuclear or chemical weapons.

Whatever option he chooses, he will be cursed for it. By virtually the entire non-Russian world certainly, and eventually in the Russian world as well. He is deserving of the sobriquet The Accursed, but what death and destruction and poverty he will cause in order to well and truly earn it.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has ground to a shuddering halt. Not that it was ever that dynamic, but with the exception of meager gains achieved at great cost in Mariupol, the Russian army is not advancing. Indeed, in crucial sectors, including Kiev and Mykolaiv it is giving ground in the face of local Ukrainian counterattacks (not a counter offensive–that’s something different) and digging in. For now, at least, Russia has shot its bolt. And that bolt did not travel far.

Some of the stories that have been reported are rather remarkable. Most come from Ukrainian sources, so they must be taken with some skepticism, but given the situation on the ground, and a knowledge of the nature of the Russian military they are plausible. For example, desertions of large numbers of soldiers; orders to shoot deserters and malingerers (a tradition dating back to the Russian Civil War and World War II); large numbers of frostbite casualties; appalling medical care; failures to recover the dead; killing of officers (including one story of a tanker driving his vehicle over the legs of his commander in a unit that had suffered 50 percent casualties). Even discounting the most lurid of these stories, this is a picture of an army on the verge of collapse (if not past it). This would be consistent with the near cessation of offensive operations.

Perhaps the most remarkable data point is the largely confirmed (including by official Russian sources in some instances) spate of fatalities among generals and colonels. A handful of generals (including a lieutenant general) have been killed, and many handfuls of colonels are also apparently dead.

These are American Civil War rates of casualties among army, division, brigade, and regimental commanders–and those guys were on horses on the front lines under fire from massed musketry from a hundred or two yards away. Modern warfare has (until now) much safer for colonels and generals.

The explanation being floated by Ukrainian and western sources is that a breakdown in communications has forced these officers to go right to the front to get things under control, where they get taken out by snipers. Well, I’m pretty sure that communications have something to do with it, but I doubt it’s that simple: if it were, casualties among the rank and file would be greater than the (already appalling) 20-25 percent that has been estimated by US and UK sources.

My conjecture is that the communications problems (which I alluded to in earlier posts) have allowed the Ukrainians (likely with US help) to hack and monitor Russian communications, allowing them to target the Russian commanders. In other words: hack them, track them, and whack them.

Regardless, this has to be very demoralizing to both officers and enlisted alike. Further, it exacerbates the command and control problems that the communications issues already created.

So what next? Most likely stalemate, and increased Russian reliance on indirect fire–including most horribly largely indiscriminate shelling and bombing of urban centers, notably Kiev, in an attempt to break the as of now unshaken will of the Ukrainian people and government. The Russians do not have the manpower to mount serious infantry and armor attacks into the cities. They have already taken appalling casualties (human and materiel), and urban combat is a notorious consumer of men and machines.

The biggest potential for a dramatic change in the battle is if the Russians are able to break through on one of the shoulders of the salient in eastern Ukraine, thus allowing them to trap large numbers of the Ukrainian army. This is something I’ve warned about in previous posts. Western military sources have expressed a similar concern lately.

UPDATE: Russian forces are attempting to envelop Ukrainian forces in the east of the country on advances toward cities of Kharkiv & Mariupol: British Defense Intel

A senior US defense official said ?? wants to pin ?? troops in the Donbas to prevent them from reinforcing cities.

— Jack Detsch (@JackDetsch) March 23, 2022

I suspect the Americans and Nato militaries have been telling the Ukrainians about this, but they are reluctant to leave. Hence, “defense officials” are making these concerns public in order to pressure the Ukrainians.

Giving up territory would be a bitter pill to swallow, especially given the success that Ukraine has had on the battlefield. But a flexible defense that trades space for time is advisable if the Russians threaten the bases of the salient. Withdrawal under pressure is difficult, and requires skill. But with well-timed counterattacks and indirect fire to interfere with Russian attempts to press the retreat, the demonstrated inability of the Russians to advance rapidly and to coordinate the movements of their various units, and the lengthening of Russian communications that the Ukrainians have already proven adept at attacking, a withdrawal that takes a far bigger toll on the attackers than the retreaters is very achievable.

So what next, if indeed a stalemate emerges? For better or worse, the initiative is in Putin’s hands. He can choose to accept defeat, fight it out by shelling Ukraine back into the stone age, or escalate in some way. Any escalation (e.g., use of a nuke, tactical or otherwise, attack on a Nato country–such as an attempt to build a corridor between Russia and Kaliningrad, or an attack on staging areas for supplies going to Ukraine) would be a horrible prospect, but cannot be ruled out.

The tone emanating from Russia is increasingly hysterical. Dmitry Medvedev’s recent diatribe on VKontakt is an example. Medvedev claims that the US wants to end “our Motherland,” and

“This means that Russia must be humiliated, limited, shaken, divided and destroyed,” Medvedev wrote, saying if Americans succeed in that objective, “here is the result: the largest nuclear power with an unstable political regime, weak leadership, a collapsed economy and the maximum number of nuclear warheads aimed at targets in the US and Europe.”

One interpretation of this is that Medvedev views the war in Ukraine as being an existential issue for Russia, and merely a battle in a Manichean struggle between the US and Russia, defeat in which would represent the end of the Russian state. Put this together with Kremlin spokesman Peskov’s statement that Russia would use nuclear weapons if the existence of the state is threatened, and the potential for nuclear escalation is very real.

Is this a bluff? Do we want to find out?

The US and Nato have to walk a fine line here, between concessions that could encourage Putin to pocket gains today and seek more tomorrow (and not just in Ukraine) on one hand, and an aggressive response that leads a paranoid, bitter, aggrieved Putin to play Sampson.

A chess player is said to be in zugzwang when he has to make a move, but any available move worsens his position. I think it is fair to say that Putin is currently in zugzwang in Ukraine due to the myriad operational, tactical, logistical, and intelligence failures of his invasion forces.

What are his available moves?

One would be just call the whole thing off, withdraw to Russia, and say “never mind.” That would represent an admission of humiliating failure, which would be not just completely out of character, but an act that usually seals the doom of autocrats. And it would probably not result in a return to the status quo ante: Russia would still be a pariah, and subject to myriad non-military punishments.

The other is to forge ahead. But that will almost certainly entail protracted battles on urban terrain, especially Kiev. (I seriously doubt Russia has the wherewithal to fight simultaneous city battles in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, etc.) Urban battles are notorious consumers of men and materiel. Given Russia’s manpower limitations, the most likely approach will be to utilize massive quantities of artillery, turning cities to rubble while killing countless civilians. To paraphrase French General Koechlin-Schwartz speaking to Patton about American infantry in WWI: “The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs; the [Russian] infantry needs all it can get.” Further, Putin evidently has no scruples about employing the firepower against civilians.

So which of these two bad options will Putin choose? From Putin’s perspective, the second is decidedly superior. He is willing to fight to the last Ukrainian, his paeans to the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people notwithstanding. Moreover, he can see some prospect of “victory” from this approach: if terror breaks the will of the Ukrainian government or the Ukrainian people, they will capitulate to his demands, and he will achieve his stated objective of subjugating Ukraine and removing it from the Western orbit.

This means that to Putin, the center of gravity of this conflict has now become the Ukrainian people and government. But history and operational realities are not on his side. Throughout the 20th century in particular, campaigns designed to win victory through terror (e.g., the London Blitz, the Allied bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan) have not broken the will of the enemy populace, and have often strengthened it. If Ukrainian will holds, Putin is unlikely to succeed. Given his limited numbers, their demonstrated tactical incapacity, and his army’s appalling logistics, the voracious maw of urban battle will consume the Russian army. All of his paper advantages–especially air power (not that he has utilized it effectively–are largely negated once the battle moves to the streets. Then it becomes war to the knife. Thus, Putin’s odds of taking control of Ukraine are low, but they are not zero. So it the best of his bad options.

It is important that the Ukrainians avoid a mistake that would help Putin redeem his currently grim prospects. In particular, their forces in the east are vulnerable to an attack breaking out of the Black Sea coast. They need to be willing to trade space for time and withdraw if that flank appears at any risk of cracking (assuming that they can manage the logistics of a withdrawal, and Russian air power does not exhibit a competence that has been lacking so far). Politically this is challenging because it sacrifices territory to a hated enemy: even an autocrat like Alexander I faced bitter criticism when employing it. But it has proved time and again the best way to prevail–eventually–against an invader on the steppes. As Russians have showed on multiple occasions. And I would argue that it is likely to be particularly effective given the Russians’ obvious logistical deficiencies: a withdrawal would extend their already groaning supply lines, and make them even more vulnerable to a variety of different kinds of attack (drones, guerrilla raids).

Ironically, Putin’s center of gravity is the same as his enemy’s: his population. Putin can continue a murderous campaign as long as the Russian people support it. At present, it appears that scattered protests aside, that flank is secure. Chauvinism combined with propaganda and a ruthless control of the information that Russians receive mean that at present there is either broad support for, or at least not broad opposition to, his invasion.

Severe economic distress resulting from sanctions is the most likely threat to this support. No doubt Putin’s regime will portray any such distress as evidence that Russia’s enemies truly intend to destroy it, and this will resonate with many Russians. But perhaps enough will realize that he is consigning them to misery for no prospect of real gain that Putin’s center of gravity will begin to crack.

Given all this, I estimate that the most likely outcome is a protracted, bloody stalemate lasting for months on the streets of Ukraine’s cities. If it could be guaranteed that the conflict would remain conventional, Nato intervention (through air power alone) could be decisive in days. But Russian doctrine has a low threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons, and that threat has to be taken very seriously. Thus, it is likely that Putin will grind on, under the cover of his nuclear shield.

Not a pretty prospect, but it’s hard to see Putin choosing differently.

Finally, a comment on some domestic US effects of this conflict. It is a depressing picture. Those on the Trump right detest Ukraine for its involvement with various efforts to undermine–and indeed, unseat–Trump. As a result, they are are clearly anti-Ukraine, and in many cases pro-Putin.

It must be said that Ukraine did make some horrible misjudgments. Thoroughly enmeshed in the US foreign policy establishment (Victoria Nuland, anyone?) and the Democratic Party (Hunter Biden, anyone?), and buying into the narrative that Trump was Putin’s puppet and therefore inimical to their interests, Ukraine played a part in the anti-Trump campaign that consumed his administration.

For that they are paying a price. Indeed, their fate would almost have certainly been better had Trump been reelected: it clearly could not have been worse. A Russian reporter friend asked me if this would be happening if Trump were still president. I cautioned against putting too much credence in alternative history, but made one observation. Putin’s ambitions haven’t changed, but his actions have.

Regardless of the folly of Ukrainian involvement in US politics, they do not deserve their current fate. They made a miscalculation about the best way to protect themselves against Putin, but it was clearly not wrong to seek desperately such protection–as current events bloodily demonstrate.

There is a single individual responsible for the current calamity: Vladimir Putin. Even if some Ukrainian actions enabled him, that does not mean that they deserve their current miseries. It is therefore beyond disgusting that a clique of Trump right chatterers cheer on Putin and fight against efforts to aid Ukraine.

And insofar as American interests are concerned, Putin’s public statements make it clear that subjugating Ukraine is not the limit of his ambitions. He has demanded the abandonment of everything east of the Elbe to Russian domination. Ukraine has laid bare his inability to achieve that using conventional military force, but that should hardly be consoling, given the only alternative available to him. He must be fought in Ukraine, and since direct US and Nato involvement is extremely risky due to the nuclear threat, that means finding all means to support a war of attrition in Ukraine. Ukraine has demonstrated its will to fight that grim war, and interest and compassion compel the US to support them.

It is important to avoid false choices. (I consider it ironic that the anti-Ukraine right in the US constantly offers false choices–e.g., “how can you defend the Ukrainian border when you don’t defend America’s?”–given that Obama was the master of the false choice. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.) It is possible to deal with those in the US whose misjudgments and manipulations greatly contributed to the current situation at the proper time while making the best choices on how to proceed from where we are–even if where we are is largely the product of those misjudgments and manipulations.

You have to play it as it lies. Sunk costs are sunk. The current lie is hardly ideal, the product of locust years, but the best play is not to abandon Ukraine and embolden Putin. The reverse is true.

ISW reports (based on US intelligence, allegedly) that the Russians are in an operational pause, waiting for logistic support and reinforcements. I have to say, an operational pause after 3 days of a planned operation launched from your own borders is pathetic.

Perhaps I should not have been surprised at the logistic difficulties. This article by a retired US Army LTC who now does simulations for Nato implies that Russian logistics are not configured for high tempo offensive operations away from railheads. If anything, it suggests an army configured to fall back on its communications.

Russian tactical proficiency also seems lacking.

Russian units are not fighting as BTGs. They’re not doing combined arms warfare. They’re driving down roads in small detachments, pushing recon and VDV units forward. Tanks without infantry. It’s not going well for them because this isn’t how they organize and fight (more later). https://t.co/5AibDoyUmL

— Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) February 27, 2022

Tanks operating without infantry is a recipe for disaster because they are extremely vulnerable to ambush by anti-tank missiles or attack by drones. This is particularly true if they are operating on roads, especially through built up areas: the ATM crews can pick off the lead and tail vehicles, stop the entire column, go to town on the immobilized vehicles, and then scoot for safety.

This is not news. It has been known since tanks were first deployed in WWI.

This is pretty shocking. The otherwise sensible Kofman cautions that the Russians aren’t fighting the Ukrainians the way they would fight Nato:

Folks are taking the right lessons about Ukraine’s military from this, but a number of the wrong ones about the Russian military. This operation looks terrible, and it should, because it’s assumptions were nuts, but this isn’t the Russian mil fighting as it would against NATO.

— Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) February 27, 2022

Why wouldn’t the Russians bring their A game here? This suggests that they don’t have an A game.

What is transpiring suggests that in addition to logistic and tactical failings, Russia suffered a major intelligence failure, especially with regards to evaluating the combat capability of the Ukrainians.

In sum, piss poor performance, despite alleged prior planning.

So who will take the fall for all this? There were rumors (since denied) that Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, had been fired. Maybe it’s not true now, but it could well be soon. Ditto with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

A deeply suspicious–and arguably clinically paranoid–man like Putin may suspect that he has been deliberately sabotaged by the military. If you are looking for a mental model of the man now, Stalin is probably the best bet.

This picture of Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov is unbelievable:

Again with the table! This suggests a man who is deeply scared about his immune system. (Look at his pictures. The puffy face is symptomatic of heavy steroid use.)

And check out the happy couple who can barely be made out at the end of the table:

A ruble for your thoughts, gentlemen?

By the way, I’m being cheap there: as of now, a ruble is worth about .9 cents.

So Plan A–decapitation and blitzkrieg–didn’t work. What’s Plan B?

Alas, I fear it is a reversion to Russian form, by pulverizing Kiev and perhaps other cities.

There was a story circulating last night that Putin had ordered Kiev be taken by tomorrow.

Sorry, Vova. You don’t take a defended city in a day. Or a week. It usually takes months. Like the 2 months the Germans needed to take Warsaw in 1944 (and they obviously showed no scruple in their means). Or the 6 weeks it took in Grozny. Or the many weeks the US spent securing Mosul, or Fallujah, or Sadr City.

I could go on.

This is a terrible prospect.

Will Putin have the time to carry this out? To my amazement, the Europeans have shown some testicular fortitude and ramped up sanctions. The SWIFT restrictions on Russian banks, and most notably the restrictions on the Central Bank of Russia, threaten to demolish the Russian financial system, and like tomorrow: the sharp decline in the ruble is a harbinger of that. Moreover, this will hit ordinary Russians. There are already lines at ATMs, and bank runs are likely, as are runs on foodstuffs. This could–finally–galvanize widespread social unrest in Russia. With a fire in the rear and at the front, what will Putin do? How much time does he have?

Most concerning is the fact that Russia’s poor performance on the battlefield is a double edged sword. His conventional forces being revealed to be a paper tiger/Potemkin military, Putin has only a single card to play: nuclear weapons.

And he signaled his willingness to play that card today, by putting Russian nuclear forces on their highest level of readiness.

If Putin felt cornered before he launched this folly, how must he feel now?

Sobering as it is, the world’s fate may be in the hands of those unhappy men at Putin’s table, or their subordinates. Either through insubordination or coup, they can take the world’s fate out of the hands of someone who is either literally mad, or gives a damn good impression of it.

To the surprise of many, including to some extent me, the Russian assault on Ukraine has bogged down. But that’s probably not the right phrasing. It was never unbogged. It has made very little progress in the face of fierce Ukrainian resistance, and this was true from the opening moments of the assault.

The biggest surprise to me is that Russia has not been able to secure anything remotely approaching air superiority. On paper, they should dominate. But they have lost many aircraft, including not just ground attack SU-25s (which are pretty vulnerable) but also front line Sukhoi fighters and IL-76 transport aircraft (presumably loaded with airborne troopers, Russia’s best). Their main air attacks on Kiev have apparently used cruise missiles, which suggests concerns about the risks Ukrainian air defenses pose to Russian manned aircraft.

The first hours–days, actually–of a US assault would have been focused on dismantling the air defense system. (Remember the first 100 hours of Desert Storm.). Once that is achieved, the tanks roll. The Russians have done both simultaneously (perhaps for political reasons) and it is not working out for them.

On the ground, gains are apparently few, and achieved at high cost at places like Kharkiv/Kharkov. (Even though Ukraine probably has no von Mansteins in charge.) I thought Mariupol would fall pretty quickly, but the Russians appear to be more interested in moving east along the coast rather than securing the rest of Donetsk–which was ostensibly the pretext for this crime.

It seems that the Russian plan was to execute a coup de main to seize Kiev/Kyiv using airborne units and special forces (Alfa/Spetsnaz). They have not achieved that. They seized, then lost, then seized again an airport near Kiev that would have been the springboard for that. But damage to the runways and the losses of some planes that would ferry in the follow on forces have delayed that, and possibly scuppered it. Reports indicate that the VDV units are instead moving to Kiev/Kyiv overland from Belarus.

Some special forces units–in Ukrainian uniforms–have been killed and captured. (Here is an example from Nikopol.). Not a good look for the alleged elite. (Not a good look because of poor operational performance, and because of the violation of the rules of war: the Ukrainians had every right to shoot them on sight. But maybe they could serve as very effective weapons in the propaganda war.)

There are stories of some Russian penetrations into Kiev/Kyiv, but Zelensky is still there and the Ukrainians appear to be in control of the bulk of the capital.

Failure to execute a lightning strike that toppled the Ukrainian government now presents Putin with a grim choice. He obviously believes Kyiv/Kiev/the Ukrainian government is the center of gravity in this conflict. The failure of a decapitation strike against the Ukrainian government confronts Putin with the prospect of a protracted battle in the streets of the capital. Urban warfare is slow and bloody, a meat grinder par excellence.

The historical Russian approach to such battles is to use overwhelming firepower (cf. Berlin 1945, or more recently Grozny). But Putin supposedly venerates Kiev as the cradle of Russian civilization, and reveres St. Vladimir (a prince of Kiev) as “as the unifier and defender of Russian lands, as a visionary politician.” Will he subject this holy place to the Grozny treatment if Ukrainians (soldiers and civilians alike) fight his soldiers in the streets?

The cost in lives–including Russian lives–of such a choice would be immense. The financial burden on Russia of sustaining a high intensity conflict would also be acute. And making such a choice would almost certainly lead to the imposition of the most severe economic sanctions against Russia, namely its excision from the world financial system via expulsion from SWIFT and sanctioning of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. This would no doubt set off some intense political dynamics within Russia.

Putin was counting on a short, decisive, victorious war. With every passing minute, it becomes clearer that he won’t get it.

What then, Vova?

Given that he is quite likely mentally unbalanced–severely so–that question is as fraught for us as it is for him.

So why hasn’t the supposed juggernaut juggered?

Well, for one thing, the enemy gets a vote. (More on that in a bit.)

For another, Russia’s performance in Georgia in 2008 was something of an embarrassment to Putin and Russia. In its aftermath Russia embarked on a wholesale shakeup of the military, involving substantial investment in new equipment (not just tanks, planes, and the like, but things like radios) and an attempt to reform the manpower system.

From the outside–and here I and others likely fell for Russian information operations–the changes appeared to be working. The Russian army was not the shambolic wreck it had been. But it is clearly not the juggernaut it presented itself to be.

From the outset one question in my mind was not the hardware, but the meatware. I wrote a lot 10 years or so ago about the Russian military manpower problem. The military had become less reliant on conscripts, but the conscript cycle had become shortened to a single year, meaning that many of the soldiers currently violating Ukrainian soil have been in the army only a few months–hardly likely to be effective fighters. Just how this new mix would respond to contact with the enemy was much harder to evaluate than the change in Russian materiel. The initial results are not impressive.

And it must also be noted that Ukraine also engaged in a crash reform of its military post-2014. Its performance has been far more credible than most expected. Thus, if anything, it appears that the Ukrainian military reforms over the last 8 years have been more effective than Russia’s over the last 14. Indeed, the Ukrainians have demonstrated considerable pluck, with numerous incidents (telling a Russian ship to “go fuck yourself” when the ship demanded their surrender, a soldier sacrificing himself to blow up a bridge in the faces of advancing Russians) that will build a legend of national resistance. (This in turn would make any putative Russian occupation all the more difficult.)

Initial reports (which must always be treated with care) indicate the the Russians are already facing serious logistical difficulties. If true, this is gobsmacking. If you can’t support a campaign on your own doorstep, you may be a colossus, but you have logistical feet of clay. This is especially true since the Russians had considerable time to plan and prepare, lay in stocks, etc.

And their logistical difficulties will only get worse. It is axiomatic that the further the advance, the more logistical friction impairs operational effectiveness.

And supply lines present the Ukrainians with a perfect opportunity to turn the asymmetric warfare table on the Russians. Partisan warfare against invaders has long been a speciality of Ukrainians, whether it be against the Red Army in the Civil War, the Germans in WWII, or the Soviets in the aftermath of WWII. Tanks can’t move without gas. Soldiers can’t fight without food. Detaching units to hunt down guerrillas erodes combat power.

In sum, Putin wanted and expected–and in fact, absolutely needed–a quick victory. It is increasingly likely that he will not get it. Another example of “no plan survives contact with the enemy.”

On the one hand, that is encouraging–although Ukraine will pay a high price in a protracted conflict. But we have to ponder how Putin will respond to a stalemate, or a long slog towards victory.

Putin tells a story from his youth in which he cornered a rat–to his regret (Putin’s, not the rat’s). Maybe it happened. Maybe it didn’t. But he tells it to send a message: if you corner me I will try to rip off your face.

He justifies his invasion of Ukraine as a legitimate act of self-defense because the US and Nato had backed him into a corner. That was a grotesque exaggeration, but he may well find himself in a corner in Ukraine.

One response to stalemate is to escalate. As Eisenhower said, “If you can’t solve a problem, enlarge it.” But if Putin’s military proves itself to be a brittle sword, what other means does he have to escalate? The answer to that question is obvious–and ominous. Especially when one considers Russian nuclear doctrine.

So he’s done gone and done it. I can’t say that I believed this was the likely outcome, for reasons set out in previous posts. But there was enough uncertainty about Putin’s preferences and beliefs that it was always a possibility. And that possibility has become a reality.

Putin has appeared particular unhinged in his two most recent speeches. A combination of paranoia, grandiosity, and megalomania. The most bizarre aspect of his remarks is his portrayal of Ukraine as some existential threat, and in particular some existential military threat to Russia. It is hard to choose which would be worse: he believes it, or he doesn’t. The former would imply a paranoid man completely out of touch with reality, the latter a complete cynic willing to camouflage his covetous, irredentist, and history changing ambitions with transparently false justifications. (Similarly it is a no win situation in a choice between he is really unhinged or he is just playing it on TV.)

The recriminations in the West (and in the US in particular) are already underway. To be honest, Putin’s action suggests that there would have been little that anyone could have done to deter him. For reasons I’ve discussed, the action should have been self-deterring.

The only thing that could (not necessarily would) have made a difference would have been a concession by the US and Nato not to incorporate Ukraine now or in the future. It was stupid even to have contemplated Ukraine membership in Nato, so such a concession would have actually benefitted Nato and the US. Further, it would have deprived Putin of his pretext, and his reaction would have revealed more about his true agenda.

That said, such a concession was a necessary condition for avoiding the invasion, not a sufficient one: if Putin’s ambitions were truly larger, he would have proceeded regardless. But an invasion after a concession would have provided far more precise information about Putin’s goals than we have now. We are still in the dark as to whether seizing Ukraine will achieve Putin’s objectives, or whether those objectives are more expansive.

As my previous post indicated, Putin’s pre-invasion demands strongly suggest that his objectives are indeed more ambitious, and involve nothing short of rolling back Nato to its pre-1997 state. If that is indeed the case, the capitulation of Kiev would represent only a beginning and not an end. And that is a very disturbing prospect as it increases the odds of a Russia-Nato conflict in the near future.

Operationally, things are proceeding exactly as one would expect. The main outstanding question is how much opposition Ukraine’s armed forces will be able to mount.

I am also curious about what fraction of the invading forces are conscripts, and where they are in the conscription cycle. Those could influence how the campaign will proceed.

Back to Putin’s mental state. Recently he has been reprising what I referred to as “a man in a hurry” more than a decade ago. His haste seemed to have been in abeyance in recent years. So why has it returned?

A couple of possibilities come to mind. The first is that he just saw this as an opportunity. A weak and divided west, with a feckless and obviously mentally and physically limited American president. Germany compromised by its energy dependence on Russia, and its general Daimler über alles attitude. (BTW, Angela Merkel is probably grateful she left office–but she must called out on this mercilessly.)

A second possibility is that he is seriously ill. There have been rumors to this effect circulating recently–but there almost always are regarding strongmen. (There are rumors about Erdoğan’s health too.) But this precipitous, not to say maniacal, rush to war is something that a man on a mission would do if he believes the window to accomplish it is closing.

More later, as more information becomes available, and on what the options are available to the US and Europe, and what impediments may foreclose those options. (Re the latter, think of a country that begins with “G” and ends with “Y”.)

The most striking thing about the “Ukraine situation” (quote marks explained shortly) is its weirdness. All you hear about is Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine, but Putin’s recent demarche was not only about Ukraine, or even primarily about Ukraine (hence calling it the Ukrainian situation is highly misleading). Instead, Putin has demanded a restoration of pre-1997 eastern Europe, specifically the rollback of Nato and the elimination of Nato forces in inter alia Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltics. To Russia, Ukraine matters primarily to the extent that its inclusion in western security (and economic) structures would exacerbate an already unacceptable status quo.

I am reminded of this classic National Lampoon cover:

In my imagined reboot, Ukraine is the dog, Putin is holding the gun, and the caption is “If you don’t get Nato out of eastern Europe, we’ll kill Ukraine.”

In other words, and not for the first time, Ukraine is a pawn in a bigger game between great powers. Or to shift metaphors, Ukraine is a stage for an elaborate kabuki between Russia and the US (with western Europe playing its usual bit part).

The US character in this drama is particularly weird. The US was hysterically screaming that the invasion is “imminent.” It even named the date–16 February. Then it dropped the word “imminent” for a bit, before resurrecting it. Yesterday Biden said he was “convinced” that an invasion is forthcoming, and even claimed that he knew the ultimate objective–Kiev/Kyiv, i.e., a complete overthrow of the Ukrainian state. (Perhaps this was a veiled attempt to walk back his previous “limited incursion” gaffe.)

But . . . those supposedly in the cross hairs continue to downplay the threat. Ukrainian president Zelensky has told Biden (and the Defense Department, State Department, and various Deep State leakers) to chill. Yesterday the Ukrainian defense minister said that “we estimate the probability of a large scale escalation as low.”

Why is the US so alarmist, when those whom it is ostensibly alarmed about are not? Only weird explanations come to mind. One is that Biden (or more accurately, those really in control) actually want a conflict with Russia. Insane–but plausible, because other agendas are at work here. Another is that this is a cynical manipulation. The government knows Putin is highly unlikely to invade but is exaggerating the threat in order to take credit for his not doing so: “See! We stood up to Putin and he backed down!” (Kind of like my invisible tiger gun. What? You don’t think it works? Well, you don’t see any tigers around, do you?)

I seriously doubt that Putin will invade, on any scale. Or let’s put it this way, any invasion would likely turn out very badly, so a sane Putin would not do it. Yes, that leaves the possibility that Putin is not rational, but then, how could he be deterred?

A large scale invasion–i.e., Biden’s scenario of a drive on Kiev and the overthrow of the Ukrainian state–would saddle Russia with a costly, long occupation at best, and a perhaps an extended guerrilla war. (The nationalist militias that figure greatly in Russian and pro-Russian narratives on Ukraine present a credible threat of such an outcome.) A Ukrainian Ulcer, as it were.

And that is not to mention the consequences of any economic measures against Russia. And most importantly, it would certainly result in the exact opposite of what Putin currently demands: namely, greater militarization of eastern Europe and greater integration of that area into Nato force structures. (The just announced sale of M1 Abrams tanks to Poland is a harbinger of such an outcome.) It would also greatly increase the odds of Sweden and Finland joining Nato.

A more limited operation (e.g., movements focused on the Black Sea coast of Ukraine) would be less costly in terms of the operation itself and the occupation aftermath, but would mainly succeed in extending the front (currently limited to Donetsk and Luhansk) with the concomitant costs, thereby expanding an already draining frozen conflict, and adding another economic sinkhole to the great Russian empire. Moreover, it would almost certainly result in the same western and eastern European reaction in terms of sanctions and bolstering of Nato.

Perhaps Putin’s demands regarding a return to the pre-1997 status quo are a bargaining chip that he will sacrifice for some concessions on Ukraine. Recognition of Russian possession of Crimea and the Donbas, perhaps. And/or preclusion of Ukraine joining Nato and western economic and government structures. Installation of a compliant regime in Ukraine, and de facto Russian veto over the Ukrainian government.

In other words, his reservation price for not shooting the dog is lower than his current offer.

But even this negotiating strategy requires a credible threat to back it. The credibility of the threat to invade Ukraine is dubious, for the reasons outlined above.

Predicting the outcome of bargaining games under asymmetric information is always very difficult, and that’s what we have here. If I had to guess, I would say that the ultimate outcome will be something along the lines that Macron mooted when he met Putin: Finlandization of Ukraine. (Though it is uncertain whether Putin heard him across a 17′ table, which is yet another weird tableau in this already weird drama.)

To me, the most worrisome is not Putin’s mental state, but the mental state of Biden and the real decision makers (who can easily manipulate a weak and befuddled president). US propaganda games and hysteria do not inspire confidence. There are other agendas at work here, and those agendas are not likely to be compatible with a reasoned approach to Ukraine.

What’s a dog that hasn’t barked during the Ukraine situation? Think for a minute.

Answer: the UN.

Think back to Gulf Wars I and II. The UN was the cockpit of much diplomatic wrangling. The focal point of most negotiation. Further, the US, and other western countries in 1990/1991 and the UK in 2002/2003, went to considerable lengths to win UN approval. Remember the late Colin Powell’s infamous aluminum tubes presentation to the UN in 2003?

The refrain was that any action in Iraq would be illegitimate without UN approval. So the US repeatedly sought it.

Now, the UN is totally MIA with regards to Ukraine. Putin obviously feels no obligation to go to it, hat in hand as the US did. The US and others obviously believe that it is irrelevant, and any appeal to it futile, not least because Russia can veto any resolution. But most striking is the fact that those who preached about the vital importance of the UN as the determinant of the legitimacy of an international conflict are completely silent. Apparently they (and their intellectual successors) realize that it can only be manipulated against the West generally, and the US in particular. Or more pointedly, that they are only interested in manipulating it against the West generally, and the US in particular. For all their hosannas to the UN, they obviously only care about it when it can be enlisted against the US. Lilliputians to tie down Gulliver. Otherwise, it is an irrelevance.

Which is what conservatives have been saying forever.

Not a big deal, but worth noting.

Speaking of the Iraq wars, I wonder whether Putin is weighing their biggest lesson (especially the 2003 war). Overwhelming military advantage and a lightning conventional operational victory do not necessarily translate into strategic gain, and indeed, may create a strategic ulcer that ends in if not ultimate defeat, a hollow and costly triumph.

One of the contemporary criticisms of US strategy in Iraq was an alleged failure to commit enough troops to the occupation, which allowed anti-US elements (Islamists, former regime personnel, Shiite militias) to consolidate and gain control of parts of Iraq. That was at least a choice for the US. At the time it had the resources to do it, but deliberately chose otherwise.

Russia, in contrast, almost certainly lacks the manpower and fiscal wherewithal for an occupation of even a large portion of Ukraine, let alone all of it, especially if there is even a modicum of organized resistance. You don’t need an entire nation in arms, a la Spain v. Napoleonic France. Just enough of it.

Ukraine is not Iraq, and in particular it is unlikely that there are elements as numerous, vicious, and determined as those in Iraq (or in Spain circa 1812). But even if resistance does not reach that level, it is doubtful that Russia has the resources to crush it. This would leave it in a situation analogous to the US in Iraq. “Mission accomplished,” but actually not, and saddled with occupation of a corrupt and dysfunctional country. Look at Donetsk and Luhansk, and then extend that to any other portions of Ukraine that Putin might decide to absorb.

If Putin is a realist he will recognize this. But he may not be. He may believe that Russia can avoid the mistakes of the US in Iraq, or that Ukraine will be so inert that a long commitment will be unnecessary.

Not knowing what he thinks about this is one reason we cannot know what he will do with any confidence.

A last note on Ukraine. Last week Biden spoke with Zelensky, and the Ukrainians said the call “did not go well.”

Color me shocked!

Not.

The post-call media coverage was bizarre. CNN reported that Biden had told Zelensky that invasion was imminent and Kiev would be “sacked.” (A la the Mongols in 1240?) Then that story was pulled and denied. Zelensky basically said “chill, bro. WTF are you talking about?” Then he made more pointed criticisms, saying that he was president of Ukraine so he kinda knows more of what is going on in Ukraine that anybody else (where the clear implication was that “anybody else” is commonly known as “Brandon”).

What a farce. The US (and to some degree) the UK is playing Chicken Little and those upon whom the sky is supposed to fall are not nearly so alarmed. If they are alarmed but playing it cool, well good for them. The US would do well to imitate.

Zelensky’s put down of Biden clearly got the White House’s panties in a wad. The pissy little bitches replied thus:

[ ?? RUSSIE | ?? UKRAINE ]

? «Nous comprenons la position difficile dans laquelle se trouve Zelensky. Mais en même temps il minimise le risque d'invasion de l'Ukraine et demande des centaines de millions de $ d'armes pour se défendre.» – Un responsable de la Maison Blanche. pic.twitter.com/g4Kr5cDxIn

— (Little) Think Tank (@L_ThinkTank) January 30, 2022

In other words: “Zelensky is a hypocrite for downplaying the threat and asking for weapons. How dare he break ranks with us and make us look bad in public, the ingrate.”

Perhaps somebody should get the National Security staff some Keep Calm and Carry On mugs. And some decaf to put in them.

Also, somebody should tell presidents not to have phone calls with Ukrainian presidents. They don’t end well.

The hysterical American rhetoric cannot be constructive. It is not unreasonable to conjecture that the administration wants the conflict to go hot. They are telling the Ukrainians: “Let’s you and him fight,” and are getting irritated that the Ukrainians are not obliging.

What could be the motive for such actions? There are many. One is evoked by a passage from Henry IV Part 2, in which Henry IV reconciles with Prince Hal and gives him advice:

My Harry

Be it thy course to busy giddy minds

With foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out,

May waste the memory of the former days.

The “former days” that Henry IV was referring to were the troubled times of his reign, which were beset by domestic struggles and division–due to his dubious legitimacy (wink wink, nudge nudge). Wag the Dog predates 1998, and Biden is beset by domestic struggles and division.

Although the idea may be tempting (not so much to Biden, in his current mental state, but to his minions), it would be an immense mistake that would inevitably multiply his troubles rather than calm them. So just as if Putin is thinking that an adventure in Ukraine would bolster his status at home but well could be disappointed, Biden (or his minions who actually make the decisions) would almost certainly face a similar fate.

Jordan Peterson has resigned his tenured position at the University of Toronto. Peterson provides an explanation of his decision in this long article in Canada’s National Post. I will not excerpt: I strongly recommend you read it in full.

I concur 100 percent with Peterson, especially in his dissection of modern academia in its current diseased–and probably fatally diseased–state. I often say that I am glad I am getting old, and on the downslope of a long academic career. I can’t imagine beginning an academic career today. Indeed, I can’t imagine that I would choose to embark on one–or that I would even be given the opportunity, given my various disqualifications (most of which are utterly out of my control). It’s been a great run, but the devil take the hindmost. (And he is doing so, as Peterson describes.)

Peterson’s diagnosis that the rot extends far beyond academia–and to the corporate world in particular–is also spot on.

It is indeed a dreary picture. What stands out most is the endemic dishonesty. Or more accurately, the assertive belief that honesty and truth are fictions, and the war on anyone who dissents from this smelly orthodoxy. We live in an Orwellian world, and academia and corporations are on the cutting edge of it.

The friend who alerted me to Peterson’s article asked me how will this all play out? How can we live in a world built on lies? How will we defeat it?

I responded that the best model (best in the sense of most accurate, not most desirable) is life in the USSR or the post-War Soviet Bloc. A life in which an official line is vigorously–indeed, viciously–enforced and that independent thought is relentlessly suppressed. A life in which many ordinary people cooperate with–often gleefully–with authorities to point out and punish wrongthink.

In such a world, people develop split personalities. Preference falsification is rampant. People realize they are being lied to incessantly in matters large and small. They also realize that pointing out the lies draws brutal retaliation. Loss of jobs. Loss of friends. Cancellation. Social death. Or worse. So they repeat the official mantras in public, or remain mulishly silent, and hate themselves in private for doing it. At most they communicate their recognition of the absurdity through indirect forms of humor. They limit honesty only to the most trusted.

And that is one of the most devastating effects. The need to be extremely guarded atomizes society: who can you trust, actually? Very few. And betrayal inevitably occurs, because the relentless pressure of the system incentivizes it.

Perhaps the best description of this dystopia is Vaclav Havel’s 1978 essay The Power of the Powerless. Havel described how oppressive systems are morally corrupting, and force those who dissent perforce construct inner personal spheres of honesty and truth and outer spheres of dissimulation. True believers and opportunistic lackeys enforce the party line: out of self-preservation the intellectually honest give superficial assent, but privately–usually very privately–dissent. Knowledge that the tall stalks fall to the scythe leads all but the bravest to lay low. And all the time the honest wonder how many others share their disgust. And they keep wondering because the entire system is optimized to make it impossible to know. Silence begets ignorance begets silence.

It is a grim world. A world antithetical to humanity and human development.

The only reason for optimism is that eventually the internal contradictions of a system built on lies become so obvious that everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows . . . that the system has failed. The mechanism of preference falsification breaks down, and mass dissidence spontaneously breaks out.

A system of lies cannot live forever.

Alas, as the experience of Russia especially, but much of the Soviet Block as well, demonstrates is that even after the House of Lies falls, much damage has already been done. Social trust destroyed is not easily restored. Longstanding habits of suspicion of institutions and other people are not readily transformed.

We are not in Havel’s Prague circa 1978. Yet. But we are on the road to it. Academia is furthest along that road, as Peterson describes in detail. But COVID–or more accurately, governments’ responses to the (to them) heaven-sent disease–has accelerated the pace of the journey for the populace at large. The poison of lies–official lies–has seeped into every cell of the body politic. The official enforcement of lies–with the eager cooperation of a disturbing number of our supposedly fellow citizens–becomes more intense as the falsity becomes more apparent. Continued compliance with the COVIDicracy will only cement our fate. Non-compliance and dissent now is our last, best hope.