As the Iran War rolls into its sixth week, the media (especially the virulently anti-American UK rags FT and The Economist), the Democrats, and the Europeans have declared that the US is losing. Which means things must be going pretty well!
The US and Israel are allegedly losing because the regime has not toppled, and the Straits of Hormuz are largely (though not completely) closed. The first principle of war is “the objective,” and the losing narrative implicitly assumes that regime change is the objective.
But as the US made at the outset, and as Trump reiterated in his speech earlier this week, although that regime collapse would be a great outcome, that is not the objective. Instead, the objective is to destroy the ability of whatever regime controls Iran to use ballistic missiles and especially nuclear weapons to attack neighboring and non-so-neighboring states–including those in Europe, and perhaps eventually, the US proper.
It is difficult to get a definitive assessment on the campaign’s progress in achieving this objective. The administration claims it has made substantial progress, and a few more weeks of bombing will suffice. Given the intensity of the campaign, with now approximately 20,000 precision weapon strikes on strategic targets, that is very plausible. But bomb damage assessment is an uncertain exercise, so definitive judgment is difficult, especially for those (which consists of just about everyone outside select precincts of the Pentagon and the CiA) who don’t have access to all the intelligence in the first place.
A “war of choice” narrative is wrapped up with the “losing” narrative. Many on the left and the fringe right claim that the threat from Iran was not “imminent,” so the attack is premature and reckless.
The idea that a threat must be imminent to justify preemptive action is idiotic. Hell, what does “imminent” even mean? Those blathering about imminent never say.A day before Iran decides to launch a nuke? The day before it develops the capacity to launch a nuke?
By then it would be too late. And even if Iran’s nuclear development were to behind its ballistic missile development, one of the factors that features in the losing narrative–Iran’s continued ability to launch ballistic missiles and the imperfect ability and high cost to intercept them–makes it plain that if anything the US and Israel waited too long. Every month that would have passed would have seen a large increase in Iran’s missile stockpile, and an increase in their range and payload. In not too many months this would have made any attempt to attack Iran vastly more difficult and costly, and likely impossible. And the end result would be that Iran had North Korea-like immunity from attack, and could therefore act with impunity.
Imminent, in other words, was months ago. At best, February 28 was just in time.
Insofar as Hormuz is concerned, for the US it is an economic inconvenience, with mainly distributive effects. Yes, Americans pay higher prices at the pump (but not for natural gas and hence power, because the maxxing out of US LNG export capacity means that the demand shock from the loss of Qatari supply can’t hit the US), but American producers profit accordingly. And ~$100 oil is not an economic catastrophe–been there, done that (e.g., after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and other times before, especially if you look in real terms).
The often expressed idea (especially in the media) that the US did not anticipate Iran’s action, or that it had no plan to deal with it, is absurd. I think that the plan was exactly what the US is doing. That is, Trump and the Pentagon realized that a closing of the Straits would be a cost of taking action, but the cost of opening it by force is greater, as is the cost of not taking on Iran at all. If anything, the US approach to the Straits demonstrates what the US perceived to be the cost of not acting.
There are no free lunches, and no cost free wars. The enemy always gets a vote.
And with respect to Trump personally, he had to be cognizant of the potentially steep political costs he might pay–including another impeachment ordeal. You might disagree with Trump’s decision, but that is different from saying that he made his decision without due consideration of the costs (military, economic, political, personal). Revealed preference logic implies that he perceived these costs to be less than the cost of inaction. Saying “he didn’t consider the costs” really means you disagree about what the costs are.
Hormuz is also a military challenge, no doubt. The threat can be (and has been) reduced by attacks on Iranian anti-ship missile batteries, attack speedboats, minelayers, and conventional navy, but even residual capability would pose a substantial threat.
Europe and Asia also feel the impact of the blocking of the Straits, and more so than the US given that they are net energy importers. Europe huffily refuses to do anything about the closure (well worse than that actually–see below), saying it is not their war.
Well, to use a phrase attributed to Trotsky, “You may not be interested in war [Europe], but war is interested in you.” And the refusals betray sunk cost fallacy thinking. The war happened and you have to optimize subject to that fact: saying that you didn’t choose to be there is irrelevant. I know where you want to go, but you can’t get there from here.
It is likely that Europe’s indignant refusal to do anything reflects not so much moral superiority, as utter incapacity. Just what could they do, given their shriveled military–and especially naval–capabilities? Moral indignation is therefore most likely a way to avoid confessing powerlessness.
Furthermore, Europe is doing things that are distinctly contrary to its interests. Most notably, several European nations (Spain, France, and perhaps Italy) are restricting US use of bases in their countries, and limiting overflights. Which will not stop the US and Israel from continuing the campaign, but which might prolong it, thereby prolonging Europe’s economic misery. This is masochistic posing.
Europe actually could do something that would not require it to employ (non-existent) military force. It could contribute the the US marine insurance reinsurance backstop. That would facilitate the reopening of the Straits. I have not heard this idea mooted, weirdly not even by the US, but definitely not by Europe.
As for the nations that at least have pretensions of global military power, the UK and France: in perhaps a reversal of traditional stereotypes, Albion is feckless, and Gaul is perfidious. British fecklessness was demonstrated by its tragi-comic inability to deploy even a single warship to defend its base in Cyprus, and its passive-aggressive denial of bases in the UK and Diego Garcia, at least for a while.
France–and in particular Macron–is objectively an American enemy right now. As popular as tertiary syphilis at home, where he can accomplish nothing, the little popinjay (whose wife apparently periodically pops upside the head) struts around the world attacking the US. But worse than his words is his active opposition–in conjunction with Russia and China–to a UN resolution advanced by the Gulf Arab states to permit the use of force to open the Straits.
Macron says that this would be impossible. Well, nobody is asking you to do it boy. Among the options lead/follow/get the hell out of the way, all you need to do is choose #3. But no. You actively decide to get in the way.
This is incomprehensible for many reasons. First, it represents a complete rejection of Arabist French foreign policy extending back decades. The reversal of French support for Israel in 1967 is a good estimate of the starting point for this policy, but through the years it has seen, for example, strong French support for Saddam, e.g., building the Osirik reactor that Israel destroyed, and including being a major arms supplier to Iraq during its gruesome war with Iran.
One Arab state–the UAE–has already expressed its disgust with France’s action by withdrawing funding from a next generation Rafael fighter project. And France can be sure that the flow of Arab capital to the country generally will dry up. Which given France’s parlous fiscal and economic situation is quite harmful.
Second, anything that defers reopening of the Straits extends France’s economic pain.
Third, France, like the rest of Europe, has been in a panic about the US exiting Nato, or at least dramatically cutting its commitment to European defense. What better argument to make for the US to tell Europe, “lots of luck! You’re on your own! Practice your Russian!” than this active opposition to the US effort in Iran.
Macron’s remarks in South Korea–a country that exists by the grace of the US and 37,000 fatal American casualties–demonstrate his idiocy in this regard. He called for South Korea and other nations, including Japan which has also been the beneficiary of American military dominance, to form an alliance in opposition to the United States. Which would provide a perfect justification for the US to cut loose the members of this coalition of the weaklings. I’m sure that would work out great for all of them.
In World War I, Germany likened its alliance with Austria-Hungary as being “shackled to a corpse.” That’s what Nato has become to the US right now, and Macron is making the corpse’s stink all the worse. Unlike Wilhelmine Germany, the US can get out the bolt cutters.
Fourth, the Europeans–and France in particular–constantly bleat about international law. Well, Iranian interference with free navigation is a flagrant violation of one of the oldest and undisputed parts of international law. But rather than allow others to enforce this law, France actively opposes it.
This is pretty much spot on:
The absurdity of Macron’s position is manifest. The explanation is not. I am at a loss to understand what he is doing, or what he thinks he is doing, or what he thinks he will accomplish. The best explanation I have is a cut-off-your-nose-to-spite-your-face attempt to thwart the US. But this is absurdly futile. France’s actions are an inconvenience, and will not dissuade Trump or Israel. The second best explanation is blackmail. Other than that, I got nothin’.
So wither the war? I think the most likely outcome is a 2-3 week continuation of the bombing campaign. After which, the US let the chips fall where they may. Will Iran continue to close the Straits when there is no pretext for doing so? Fairly likely, which would amp up the pressure on those more dependent on the Straits to do something.
The dispatch of 2 Marine Expeditionary Units and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne division to the region has led to all sorts of speculation about ground action. One surmise is seizure of Kharg Island, Iran’s oil export hub.
I consider this extremely unlikely. First, the USN is not going to sail a couple of amphib flotillas up a shooting gallery. Second, the force sent to the region (roughly 10,000 combat personnel) is too small. Third, even if the island is seized, it is an . . . island–making the logistical support of US troops on it difficult and vulnerable. Fourth, it is not necessary to seize Kharg to deny Iran the ability to export oil. Just mine the approaches. Turnabout is fair play.
It is more likely that Marines will be employed to seize the islands (held by Iran, claimed by the UAE) in the Straits themselves. This would likely be necessary, but not sufficient, to reopen the Straits in the absence of Iranian capitulation.
Insofar as the bombing campaign is concerned, the US does have escalatory options–and Trump has threatened and continues to threaten to use them. These include destroying crucial parts of Iran’s economic infrastructure, notably power plants and perhaps desalination facilities. The latter option has been widely decried as a potential war crime, but Iran has attacked such facilities in Gulf states, so that genie is out of the bottle.
The main reason for such escalation is to secure if not regime change, a deal with the regime that cements the US objectives and opens the Straits. And here we get into a game theory dilemma. If the threat does not achieve this, acting on it will be unlikely to do so. And Iran can credibly play crazy and refuse to cave to the threat. So in some respects this is crazy vs. crazy, or at least two parties who can credibly play crazy.
And ironically, a regime that is willing to accept such severe punishment is the best argument for the war in the first place.
