Streetwise Professor

December 31, 2013

Let’s Play Connect the Dots! What Did the NYT Conveniently Leave Out of Its Hit Piece?

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Energy,Exchanges,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 9:26 pm

It’s New Years Eve, and perhaps a little game is in order to get ready for the turn of the calendar in about 3 hours.  Let’s play connect the dots.

  • In July, David Kocieniewski writes a big-totally incoherent, but big-article in the New York Times on the aluminum warehouse controversy involving Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and others. The article focuses on Goldman’s Metro Warehouse in Detroit.
  • On 1 August, 2013, the law firm Lovell, Stewart, Halebian and Jacobson LLC files suit against Goldman Sachs for violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in its operation of the Metro Warehouse in Detroit.
  • The Lovell, Stewart complaint cites the Kocieniewski article.  Numerous news articles state that Lovell, Stewart is the firm that filed the complaint.
  • Lovell, Stewart is one of the leading plaintiffs’ law firms in the country.  It is indisputably the leader in manipulation class action lawsuits filed under the Commodity Exchange Act.  LSHJLLP has been the lead counsel or co-lead counsel in virtually every major manipulation lawsuit in the US, and has won hundreds of millions of dollars in settlements in such cases.  Its web page lists numerous past and current commodity manipulation cases, as well as other cases filed against financial institutions.
  • I have worked as an expert in numerous cases for Lovell, Stewart (and its predecessor law firms) going back to 1994.  Many of these are manipulation cases.
  • David Kocieniewski knew, before writing his hatchet job, that I had worked for Lovell, Stewart.
  • Kocieniewski did not ask me about my work for Lovell, Stewart.  He did ask me about my work for trading firms and banks.  I did mention, on my own initiative, that I had been adverse to such firms in some of my work.
  • Kocieniewski mentioned my work for trading firms and banks, but did not mention my work for Lovell, Stewart.

So there are the dots.  Help me connect them.

Seriously.  I would like you to tell me in the comments what you see when you connect those 8 dots: what inferences do you draw?  I know what I see, but I’d like to crowd-source this.  Maybe you all see something different.  Thanks in advance for your help, and have fun playing!

And to all my readers: have a Happy and Healthy New Year.  Your interest and continued support is what makes this a rewarding endeavor.  Cheers!

Thank You, Dr. Sowell

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Energy,Exchanges,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 1:06 pm

I have always admired Thomas Sowell greatly.  I read his Knowledge and Decisions during my first year of graduate school, and it had a profound effect on my thinking and way of looking at the world.  I also read most of his work on discrimination, and found his book on Marxism to be a classic in intellectual history: a truly fair and penetrating appraisal of Marx, and Marxists (the two things aren’t the same, which is one of the points of the book).  Conflict of Visions is a classic: there is no better book for understanding the intellectual roots behind the political divisions in the West.  Yes, Sowell has strong views, but he is like John Stuart Mill in his ability to characterize his opponent’s views fairly and objectively.

Sowell has also been the subject of some the the ugliest personal attacks directed against any scholar over the last 40 years.  For the progressive left, to be black and on the right is to be an anathema who must be destroyed.  Yet he has handled the vicious attacks on him with equanimity and humor, and has never been cowed.

It is therefore beyond humbling to have Dr. Sowell come to my defense, and take on the New York Times “hit piece.”

All I can say is that I am honored beyond words.  Thank you, Dr. Sowell.

December 30, 2013

Here Comes the Cavalry

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Energy,Exchanges,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 9:39 pm

The NYT hatchet job has elicited quite a bit of discussion on the web, and on Twitter.  Several major bloggers have saddled up and ridden to the defense of Scott Irwin and I.  Pride of place goes to Felix Salmon, who wrote a long and thoughtful post at Reuters. This is particularly gratifying, because Felix and I have had our differences in the past (e.g., over the empty creditor problem) but I have always found him to be extraordinarily fair and open minded.  Felix wrote his piece before I posted mine, meaning that his was based on publicly available information (including his past interactions with me) which confers a considerable degree of objectivity: most importantly, it shows that information that the NYT ignored or distorted was there in plain sight.  Felix is like a judge entering a summary judgment motion against the NYT, with prejudice, making it unnecessary for the defense even to present its case.  I think it’s correct to say Felix’s verdict is pretty brutal, but eminently fair.

Other members of the cavalry include Jeff Carter’s Points and Figures blog (who was the first to arrive on the scene), Peter Klein at Organizations and Markets, Sonic Charm (or is it Crimsonic?) at Rhymes With Cars and Girls (who always cracks me up, whatever he’s calling himself these days), and John Hinderaker at Powerline. Peter and John point out the double standard under which academics who work with private business are often accused of being corrupt, whereas the motives of those who accept money from the government are almost never questioned.   Peter focuses on the Fed, John on climate research.  The common conclusion of all is that the NYT piece was a deeply biased smear written in bad faith with ulterior motives.  Crimsonic calls for a retraction.  Interesting idea.

Felix’s post and mine also unleashed a torrent of tweets.

Thanks to all.  I’m sure this isn’t over yet.  So keep your horses watered and your powder dry.

I Have Not Yet Begun to Write: Responding to the New York Times’ Farrago of Dishonesty, Insinuations, and Ad Hominem

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Energy,Exchanges,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 12:49 pm

The New York Times, in an article written by David Kocieniewski, has singled out me and the University of Illinois’ Scott Irwin for an extended ad hominem treatment alleging that our statements and research on commodity speculation are tainted due to financial connections with “Wall Street.”  As one individual put it to me, the article is “nasty, biased and thinly researched.”   All true (if incomplete-the list of sins is even longer).  But at the risk of providing credence to the incredible, I believe some sort of response is warranted.  So here it goes.

Let me start by saying I have been very fortunate. I have been able to pursue my academic passions, publish papers and books on them, and consult and testify as an expert witness on many matters related to these passions. Through each and all parts of this, I have been true to my Chicago School roots and to what I thought the data and good economics showed.  My opinions on speculation are the product of my training and my research, period.

Moreover, completely contrary to the impression in the NYT piece, the vast bulk of my consulting and testifying work has been adverse to Wall Street and commodity trading firms.  Virtually none of this work relates to the alleged subject of the NYT story: the impact of speculation on commodity prices.  In fact, much of this work relates to market manipulation (which is distinct from speculation) by commodity traders.  I have been, and continue to be, on the side of plaintiffs in attempting to hold traders who abuse markets accountable for their conduct.

The failure of David Kocieniewski to point out this salient fact alone betrays his utter unprofessionalism and bias, and is particularly emblematic of the shockingly shoddy excuse for journalism that his piece represents.

Moreover, none of the research or writing I have done on the speculation issue received financial support from any firm or entity with even a remote stake in this issue.  I started writing about this on my blog in 2006, and have been arguing this issue on my own time with no financial support from anyone.  Unlike, say, Ken Singleton (whom I admire immensely and am not accusing of anything remiss) I have not written any commissioned research on the subject of commodity speculation.  My work that has been done with firms that are connected, in some way, to commodities trading has been on subjects unrelated to financial speculation, and/or with firms that are not financial speculators, and/or took place well after my opinions on the subject were a matter of public record, including in national publications like the Wall Street Journal.  Therefore, to suggest some connection between my paid outside work and my opinions on speculation is misleading, deceptive, and plainly libelous.

True to my Chicago School roots, I believe this is a data issue informed by a strong understanding of the theory and empirics of commodity pricing-a literature to which I have  made many peer reviewed contributions.  And I have been open and remain open to reviewing any data on any market.  I further note that the vast bulk of other research on this subject, undertaken by world-class scholars including James Hamilton and Lutz Killian supports  my conclusions (and those of Scott Irwin).  Ironically, considering the where this piece appears, even Paul Krugman is in agreement.

The simple explanation for my views is that I am avowedly a “super-freshwater economist” by training and conviction.  Because I know that drinking saltwater makes you go crazy. Kidding aside, my work on speculation is a piece with all of my academic work, my background, and my training.  Randall Kroszner, former Fed governor, told me once that I was one of the last true Chicago School economists. That’s a compliment, that’s pretty accurate, and that’s aspirational.  That is a much better predictor of where I come down on any issue than anything else: including money.

What’s more, I do not solicit, have never solicited and would not solicit money for any institution or purpose based upon my views of speculation or the policy issues relating to speculation. Or any other issue.

A couple of other points before getting into specifics.

First, there are no coincidences, comrades. The NY Times has been Tiger Beat effusive in its praise for Gary Gensler of the CFTC.  This piece attacking two of the most prominent academic critics of Gensler’s efforts to impose a speculative position limits rule comes out days after the Commission approved a new version of the rule, and is in the midst of the comment period leading up to the formulation of a final rule.  Gensler fought for this rule for 5 years, and he views it as an important part of his legacy.  That is, there is a clear political agenda at work here: to kneecap those who have the audacity to oppose the regulatory agenda of Gensler and his media acolytes.

Second, this kind of ad hominem attack will have the effect (which is likely intended) of serving as a warning to other academics who cross powerful political interests with their academic research, and who have the temerity to speak out on controversial matters.  How can this be seen as anything other than having a chilling effect on other academic researchers in the the financial and commodity markets?  But maybe that’s exactly the point.

Now some specifics.

  1. There are many egregious distortions in the article, but the most egregious is Kocieniewski’s lying by omission.  Lying. By. Omission. Specifically, he omits the salient fact that the bulk of my consulting engagements (in the form of expert testimony) have been adverse to commodity traders and banks.  I have testified numerous times about manipulations by these types of firms, and have testified against them on other matters unrelated to manipulation.
  2. Let’s examine some of the firms I have been adverse to in my work over the past 20 years, shall we?  Off the top of my head: BP (twice); AEP; Ferruzzi (a commodity trading firm); Duke Energy; Nasdaq market makers; JP Morgan; MetLife; Morgan Stanley; Goldman Sachs; Cargill; Amaranth (a hedge fund that was one of the largest speculative-industry players in the country); Moore Capital (one of the world’s largest hedge funds, and another huge speculative industry player); Optiver (a major trading firm); Pimco (the world’s largest fixed income fund); Merrill Lynch (twice); Sumitomo (major copper trader); Microsoft; Cantor Fitzgerald (twice); and on and on.  A veritable murderers’ row of banksters and traders and energy firms.
  3. I say again: by omitting any mention of this work the Times is lying by omission, and presenting a biased and extremely distorted picture of me and my work.  This biased selectivity makes a joke of the Times’ motto “all the news that is fit to print”.   Leaving out this salient fact makes it plain that Kocieniewski and the Times have an agenda, and no interest in presenting a complete picture of me and my work.  The Times article (inaccurately-see below) lists some of my work on the side of commodity traders and exchanges to create the impression that I am their creature, but leaves out the work in which I have been their fierce antagonist-and in the performance of which I have contributed to their payment of damages running into the many hundreds of millions of dollars.  This failure to mention evidence that contradicts his pre-conceived conclusion is shoddy, dishonest journalism.
  4. Nowhere in the article does the article point out any mistakes or inaccuracies in my research or Scott’s, only making it plain that the problem is that our research does not fit his and the NYT’s preconceived notions about speculators.  I spoke to the reporter for quite a while.  Mostly about the substance of my arguments.  None of that made it into the article, and the reporter wasn’t even able to find another academic to criticize my arguments (or Scott’s): there’s no evidence he even tried, suggesting that the substance was irrelevant to him.  The failure to address the substance of my arguments is very telling.  If I am merely advancing some illegitimate commercial interest, my arguments would be easy to refute, no?  Moreover, Kocieniewski fails to mention my numerous peer-reviewed publications on commodities.  This provides independent validation (though imperfect, because I have serious criticisms of peer review) of my work on the behavior of commodity prices.
  5. There are several factual errors.  Most notably, Kocieniewski claims I wrote a “flurry” of comment letters on speculation/position limits.  I guess in the NYT Thesaurus, “flurry” is a synonym for “one.”   For I wrote a single comment on the issue: as I noted in an earlier post, the comment must have had something of an effect because the CFTC’s new speculative limit proposal eliminates language I had criticized in my letter.  (I also wrote a comment on the CFTC rule proposal relating to clearinghouse governance.  Thus my “flurry” of comments to the CFTC on Frankendodd totals two snowflakes.)  Also, the article ominously suggests that I simultaneously had undisclosed “financial ties” to banks and trading firms when I wrote the study on the systemic risk of commodity trading firms for the Global Financial Markets Association (GFMA).  This is not correct.  I agreed to write a white paper on commodity trading firms for Trafigura more than a year after writing the GFMA report.  Indeed, the GFMA report led to the Trafigura engagement.  Which again indicates that public revelations of my views typically precede any paid retention.
  6. Obviously, the story of the GFMA study, which I have discussed earlier on the blog, demonstrates clearly that my opinions are not for sale, and that I have stood up to and do stand up to “Wall Street.”  I would specifically note that one thing that I adamantly refused to remove from that study, despite the insistence of the attorney for JP Morgan’s commodity trading division, was my statements that commodity trading firms have been known to manipulate markets.
  7. Kocieniewski’s’ claim that I somehow conceal my consulting work by referring to myself “solely as an academic” is refuted by the biography linked to in his story.  That bio includes the following language, which I include in the bio for every speaking engagement I undertake: “Professor Pirrong has consulted widely. His clients have included electric utilities, major commodity processors and consumers, and commodity exchanges around the world.”  Therefore, Kocieniewski’s characterization of how I represent myself is deceptive and fundamentally dishonest.  I gladly reveal that I consult because it suggests I might actually know something about the real world that real people might learn from.
  8. Kocieniewski’s representations about disclosures are invalidated by his dishonest handling of chronology.  He insinuates that I did not disclose my work for the CME or commodity trading firms when I testified before Congress in 2008. But the work for CME Group, GFMA, Trafigura, etc., that Kocieniewski mentions occurred in 2011 and later.  My disclosures in my testimony were accurate at the time I made them.   But I guess I should have invented a time machine, or become Karnac the Magnificent and disclosed things that I would do in the future.
  9. The Times insinuates that my work for CME, Trafigura, TruMarx and others is related to the speculation issue, and hence taints my opinions about this matter.  My work for CME has consisted of evaluating the performance of the WTI contract as a hedging mechanism and an expert witness engagement regarding a patent on electronic trading systems: neither has anything to do with commodity speculation.  Trafigura is a physical commodity trader that uses derivatives almost exclusively to hedge, not speculate.  TruMarx launched a platform to trade physical energy, primarily between end users: again, nothing to do with financial speculation.  These matters and these companies are not related to the financial speculation issue, and Trafigura and TruMarx in particular have no real stake in the speculation debate.  Moreover, my work for them has nothing to do with the speculation issue.  Either Kocieniewski is ignorant of the fact that many commodity traders are not speculators, in which case he is not competent to be writing this story, or he is counting on the inability of his readers to understand the great diversity of firms involved in commodity markets, most notably the fact that many (most?) are not speculators, in which case he is attempting to mislead.  I know where I am laying my bets.
  10. The Times also mis-states facts about Scott Irwin, but that is mainly for Scott to correct.  One particularly egregious thing stands out which I cannot let pass though.  Kocieniewski talks about the $1.5 million that CME Group donated to the University of Illinois.  But not one cent-one cent-of that went to Irwin’s Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, let alone to Irwin personally.   To say that Kocieniewski’s connection of the CME’s financial support for the University of Illinois (a $4.4 billion dollar operation) and Scott Irwin is scurrilous is an extreme understatement.

I could go on, and may expand on this in a subsequent post.  But this should suffice to show that the New York Times published a hit piece to achieve a political purpose.  That piece is is a farrago of dishonesty, insinuations, innuendo, and ad hominem.  It is dishonest to its very core because of its egregiously biased omission of some essential material facts and deceptive presentation of others.

And pace John Paul Jones,  I have not yet begun to write-and fight-on policy issues that matter to me.  I will continue to bring my style of economics, data, and facts to issues upon which I can make a constructive contribution. The fact that the New York Times feels compelled to answer with fundamentally dishonest ad hominem means that it knows it cannot win on the substance, and that it views me (and Scott) as a threat to its agenda.  That’s all the encouragement I need to keep it going.

December 24, 2013

Neanderthals Have Rights Too!

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Financial crisis,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 2:55 pm

Whenever I see a picture of Rusal CEO Oleg Deripaska, I know that Neanderthals still walk the earth.  This particular Neanderthal is in serious financial difficulties these days.  When Rusal IPOd about four years ago, it was priced at HK$10.20/share, and it’s been all downhill since.  The stock is now trading for about 75 percent less, at HK$2.32.  Rusal is levered up to the wazoo, and Deripaska has other pressing obligations, including construction projects at Sochi  made at Putin’s insistence which will almost certainly be huge white elephants.

The main reason for My Favorite Neanderthal’s financial distress is the depressed price of aluminum, which is down by about a third in the past three years.  For a smelter like Rusal, the only saving grace is the high premium of cash aluminum over the prices of metal in LME warehouses.  That premium is inflated by a bottleneck at LME warehouses like Goldman Sachs’s Metro in Detroit.  If that bottleneck is widened, the huge stocks accumulated during the financial crisis will make their way onto the market, crushing premiums and bringing down the price that Rusal (and Alcoa and Chinalco) get for their production.  This would probably be enough to put Rusal and Deripaska over the brink.

Stung by intense criticism, the LME has announced rule changes intended to loosen the bottleneck.  The mooted rule changes are a mortal threat to Deripaska, so he’s suing in London.  This is not surprising, because Deripaska has nothing to lose.

What is somewhat surprising is the specific claim that Rusal/Deripaska are making:

“Rusal has alleged that the consultation conducted by LME was unfair and procedurally flawed, that the LME’s changes to its warehousing policy are irrational and disproportionate, and that Rusal’s human rights have thereby been breached,” Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing, also known as HKEx, said in a news release. [Emphasis added.]

Human rights.  What a riot.  I know that many Russians have sued in European courts claiming that their human rights have been violated by the Russian government.  In 2012, there were over 22000(!) such claims filed in the European Court of Human Rights, which I believe is the largest total for any country.  The Court rejects virtually all these claims, but still enough proceed to make Russia consider invalidating the Court’s decisions.  (Ironically, this story appears today.  Merry Christmas!)

So I guess Rusal is playing turnabout is fair play.  Good luck with that, Oleg. Methinks the LME will prevail, cash aluminum premiums will fall $75/$80 per tonne or so, and Rusal will soon be staring bankruptcy in the face.  And maybe Neanderthals will become extinct after all.  Financially, anyways.

November 30, 2013

It’s Not Your Retro Brent-WTI Spread

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives — The Professor @ 5:47 pm

The Brent-WTI spread reached a record level last week, defying predictions that the gap would continue to close.  But this isn’t the retro spread of the last couple of years.

When Brent-WTI was at its earlier record wides, the spread between Brent and Gulf Coast crude prices (e.g., LLS) was not that anomalous.  Instead, WTI was at a huge discount to LLS. This reflected a bottleneck in getting crude from the Midcontinent to the Gulf.

Now that bottleneck is largely eliminated: LLS is only at a $4 premium to WTI, which is pretty close to marginal transportation costs.  The current price structure is that the LLS-WTI spread has normalized, but the LLS-Brent spread has cratered.

So where’s the bottleneck now?  Part of it is legal: it is impossible to export crude from the US, except in a limited way to Canada.  It is possible to export products, and US refined product exports are at all time highs, nearly 3 times larger than the level of only 8 years ago.  (Interestingly, US product exports started their upward trend in 2005, well before the splurge in US oil production.)  However, refinery capacity is insufficient to close the gap, and there are logistical constraints that limit the amount of products that can be shipped out.   Some simple distillation units are being built to refine crude into products (including fuel oil) that can be exported.

Meanwhile, production issues in Libya and Nigeria are supporting Brent prices.

If the differential persists, it will be interesting to see whether there is pressure to eliminate, or at least relax, the constraints on exports of US crude.  I would presume that even if pressure begins to build, there will be a political battle in the US that will likely long delay any such relaxation or elimination.  So in the meantime this will be a boon for domestic refiners, and a roller coaster ride for traders.  The political, infrastructure, and refining bottlenecks that separate Brent and WTI will not close anytime soon, and the supply shocks on either side of the divide will cause prices to move with considerable independence.  A continued spike in US production will weigh on US prices, but can’t be communicated efficiently to Brent prices because of the bottlenecks; similarly, another shock to Nigerian or Libyan production will primarily move Brent.

In some ways, the world oil market, which is conventionally considered a “world” market due to the relative ease of shipping the stuff around the world, is becoming more like the natural gas market, with regional markets separated due to various bottlenecks, and the prices in these markets driven by idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in those regional markets.  The adjustments necessary to ease the bottlenecks in crude are likely cheaper than those in gas, but they won’t take place overnight.  And until they do, Brent-WTI will remain a major speculative play.

November 12, 2013

OMG! NSA Spied on OPEC! GOOD! I Will Sleep Better Tonight.

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 8:33 pm

The latest earth-shattering Snowden revelation emanating from the Russian Front aka Der Spiegel is that NSA and GCHC have spied on OPEC.

A couple of responses.

1. Duh. Or in the words of a Navy chief who left an indelible impression on me during Youngster Cruise: “That’s a real no sh*tter, son.”

2. Good!

Please. OPEC is of major economic and geopolitical importance. Of course it is a prime target for intelligence collection-and a legitimate one.  It is also an organization representing governments, many of whom are hostile to the US (Venezuela, anyone? Iran?), or of quite doubtful friendliness.  Many of its members-and I could probably say, all of its members-are hopelessly corrupt, and/or connected with terrorist organizations.

What would be scandalous is not that we’re watching OPEC with every means at our disposal, but that we were turning a blind eye.  I will sleep better tonight knowing that the NSA has not been delinquent in its duty to collect information on an economically important cartel that is really a congeries of corrupt anti-American nations.

And to the Berlin gang, I ask: do you seriously think that German intelligence isn’t vacuuming up every piece of information about OPEC that it can? (That question was purely rhetorical: I still haven’t caught a ride on the cabbage truck, let alone fallen off head first.)

Here’s an even better question: don’t you think that the Russians are aggressively spying on OPEC?  Hell, they are directing a major effort at the Finns-the Finns-for crying out loud.  Don’t you think that Russia, which lives and dies by the price of oil, has a major economic and geopolitical interest in OPEC decisions, and hence is straining every nerve to collect every piece of information it can about it?  If you answer “no”, then either (a) you are a pathological liar, (b) you are a Russian tool, or (c) not only did you fall off the cabbage truck head first, it backed over your melon several times.  (I’m placing heavy money on “b”.)

One of the “revelations” in the Der Spiegel story is that the NSA had collected information that confirmed that OPEC and Saudi Arabia had released misleading estimates of oil production.  Can you imagine the wailing and rending of garments at Der Spiegel had it uncovered accounting fraud at Siemens, let alone Exxon?

OPEC is a malign organization, and many of its members would have to undergo thorough reforms to graduate to becoming merely malign.  Not only should we be collecting all the information on it we can, we should be using that information to undermine it at every turn.

No doubt the Berlin gang and its echo chamber around the world will use this story to claim that the NSA is engaged in “commercial espionage.”  Um, engaging in espionage on commercial enterprises is different than engaging in commercial espionage.

Commercial espionage, properly understood, is the covert collection of information from foreign firms that is then utilized to benefit commercial entities in the country engaged in the spying.  The Chinese, Russians, and yes, the French, are notorious for this.  Their intelligence agencies steal intellectual property, business plans, etc., and provide it to domestic firms who use it to improve their products, win contracts, etc.

Nothing in the stories that Der Spiegel or Greenwald have produced based on Snowden leaks demonstrate that information collected from commercial or quasi commercial organizations (OPEC, Petrobras) has been provided to American companies, to advance their commercial interests.  Indeed, the absence of specific disclosures of this nature is revealing in its own way: you know that if Snowden had evidence that this occurred, Greenwald and Der Spiegel would be shouting it from the rooftops.

The whole Snowden narrative has gone well beyond stale and tiresome. The only people who are outraged are those who want to be outraged.  Those who are looking for a reason to be outraged. Those willing to suspend disbelief in order to feed their desire to play the outraged victim. Serious people who know the way the world works react with disdain.  Sadly, such people seem to be in short supply, while there is a surfeit of wannabe victims, especially in Germany.

Update: I was especially amused at the “revelation” that OPEC tried to pin the rise of oil prices on “speculators”.  I made a presentation on the impact of speculation on energy prices at a conference at Champouloc in January, 2008 (before the big runup in prices in the spring and summer) at which I quoted several statements by OPEC officials blaming speculators for high oil prices.  As I recall, I sang a chorus of of Chuck Berry’s “It Wasn’t Me!” to make the point.  You didn’t need the NSA to uncover this great insight.  You just needed to read the energy press.

November 10, 2013

Assume the Position

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Energy,Exchanges,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 8:30 pm

The CFTC has released its new position limits proposed rule.  It is an improvement on the earlier version, but still lacks a serious logical and empirical basis, try as the agency might to muster up a justification.

It is an improvement primarily for two reasons.  First, it has more sensible aggregation standards.  Whereas in the 2011 proposed rule, an entity would have to aggregate positions in every entity of which it had a 10 percent or greater stake in order to determine its overall position for the purpose of determining compliance with the limit, now that threshold has been increased to a more reasonable 50 percent.

Second, the new proposal does not include “class limits”.  Under the 2011 rule, swaps and futures were treated as different classes, and long positions in one class were not offset against economically equivalent short positions in the other.  Thus, a firm could have a zero economic exposure because a swap position was offset by an equivalent futures position, but it could be in violation of the position limit.  This made no economic sense, and was likely a surreptitious way of hamstringing swap dealers’ ability to enter into transactions with the massive passives who bother Chilton (and Gensler) so much.  Along with many others, I submitted comments criticizing this approach, and lo and behold, it has disappeared.  Now position limits are based on net exposures, meaning that a swap dealer can hedge a swap entered into with a customer using futures, in any quantity, without falling afoul of the position limit rule.

Unfortunately, not all nonsensical features of the 2011 proposal have vanished along with the class limits.  Most notably, the 2013 proposal not only includes, but extends the scope of, the “conditional limit” on positions held during the last 5 days of the a contract month.  Under this provision, the limit on delivery-settled contracts during the last 5 days is 25 percent of the deliverable supply, but the limit on otherwise identical cash-settled contracts is 5 times larger (i.e., 125 percent of deliverable supply).

As I commented in 2011-based on a paper I published in the Journal of Business in 2000-this makes no economic sense.  A trader that is long a delivery settled contract can manipulate by standing on excessive deliveries, thereby effectively buying up too much of the deliverable supply.  But a trader that is long a cash-settled contract can have the same price impact by buying the same quantity in the cash market.  Under the conditional limit rule, the holder of the cash-settled contract can get 5 times the benefit from this price impact as the holder of a delivery-settled one. The logic of the 25 percent of deliverable supply limit implies that the CFTC believes that taking delivery of something less than 25 percent of deliverable supply permits the long with a futures position of 25 percent of deliverable supply to manipulate profitably.  This means that the holder of a cash-settled position equal to 125 percent of deliverable supply can manipulate far more profitably.

This rule is passing strange especially considering that the CFTC has filed a manipulation claim against a trading firm-Parnon-that allegedly used cash market purchases to distort futures prices.  The strategy that the CFTC finds illegal in Parnon would benefit both cash-settled or delivery-settled contracts.  Under the conditional limit rule, the agency provides an incentive for the holders of cash-settled contracts to engage in such strategies.

What’s more, whereas the 2011 rule would have potentially constrained such strategies by limiting ownership of physical supplies by the holder of a cash-settled derivatives position to 25 percent of deliverable stocks, the new rule imposes no such constraint.  Instead, it imposes a requirement to report cash market holdings, and hopes that market oversight officials at exchanges will intervene if it looks like a manipulation is in progress.

None of this makes economic sense, and is in fact logically contradictory.  What makes it worse is that whereas in the 2011 proposal the conditional limit applied only to natural gas futures, it now applies to all contracts subject to position limits.

A big chunk of the proposal is a long-winded justification of the rule, in an effort to overcome the legal challenges that saw a federal court reject the 2011 proposal.  It seems to me that the commission is merely restating the arguments that failed in court, so I don’t really see how this helps.

A couple of things struck me as quite interesting.  In both the 2011 and 2013 proposals, the CFTC utilized the Hunt silver case and the Amaranth case as examples of the kind of destabilizing conduct that the rule would prevent. But whereas the 2011 rule argued that large leveraged positions (like those held by the Hunts) posed a threat to market stability, the word “levered” does not appear in the 2013 proposal’s discussion of the kinds of positions that are particularly worrisome.

This is interesting to me, in part, because my criticism of the 2011 rule as over-inclusive focused on the leverage issue.  If leverage is the problem, I argued, why impose the rule on unlevered positions, like those held by ETFs (which are fully collateralized) or real money investors? If leveraged positions were the real problem, the rule was over inclusive because it would apply to unlevered positions too.  Arguably, this argument had some impact, as all reference to the unique dangers posed by leveraged positions disappeared between 2011 and 2013.

But dropping the argument doesn’t eliminate the problem.  The CFTC has not shown how large, unlevered positions with trading decisions made by many individuals (as is the case with ETFs like USO or USNG) pose a threat to market stability in the way the Hunts did, or can cause unwarranted fluctuations in commodity prices.

Relatedly, the 2011 rule argued that position limits would reduce systemic risk.  I commented that it is wildly implausible that even a disorderly liquidation of a large position in a small market could destabilize the financial system.  Would a disorderly liquidation in the milk futures market really pose a threat to world financial stability?  Seriously?

And wouldn’t you know, the 2013 justification does not mention systemic risk.

More generally, the two-two, mind you-cases that the CFTC puts forth to justify its imposition of limits is highly unpersuasive.  I regularly use the Hunt case as an example of how speculation can distort prices.  Or, should I say, the example.  It is pretty much the exception that proves the rule. It occurred over 33 years ago.

Talk about ancient history.  When do we get to the part about the Trojan War?

The commission’s analysis, such as it is, of the Amaranth episode relies heavily on a report from the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations.  This report in no way demonstrates that Amaranth distorted prices, or that the liquidation of its position when it ran into financial trouble caused unwarranted price fluctuations.

A more plausible story is that Amaranth took a huge bet on natural gas spreads based in large part on a view that 2006 would be another big hurricane season.  When September came with no hurricanes, and none in prospect, spreads collapsed and Amaranth lost a lot of money.  The loss does not demonstrate that Amaranth distorted spreads, just that it took a big bet on these spreads, and bet wrong.

It’s not the job of the regulators to prevent market participants from losing big, if those big bets do not distort prices, either when they are initiated, or when they are liquidated.  (In the event, Amaranth’s positions were assumed-quite profitably-by JP Morgan and Citadel, with no notable dislocation in market prices.)

Moreover, even taking the commission’s view, the two episodes do not support the level of limits it proposes to impose.  The 2013 limits (like those proposed in 2013) would limit an individual firm to between 2.5 percent and 10 percent of open interest: the bigger the contract, the smaller the limit as a fraction of open interest.

But the Hunts and Amaranth had around 40-50 percent of the open interest in big contracts-at least 4 times, and arguably close to 20 times the limits the commission has proposed.  So even if you could argue that a 40 percent position could distort prices, or result in unwarranted price fluctuations when the position is liquidated, that doesn’t imply that a 10 percent or 5 percent or 2.5 percent of open interest position would.  There is thus a huge gap between the sizes of the positions that the CFTC claims, based on historical experience, distort markets, and the sizes of the limits it is proposing.

This is related, in a way, to cost-benefit analysis.  The agency is required to compare the costs and benefits of the regulation, but its analysis is perfunctory, at best. In particular, it does not provide a persuasive cost-benefit analysis of any major attribute of the rule, most notably of the size of the limits.  It basically adopts a precautionary principle approach: big positions could cause big problems, so they should be constrained as a precaution.  It asserts-but does not show-that liquidity will not be unduly restricted as a result.  This is insufficient.

Chilton-who has announced his departure-has claimed that the new proposal is immune to legal challenge.  I wouldn’t be so sure.  Even if the court accepts the verbose arguments relating to the commission’s obligation-or not-to make a finding that the limits are necessary, the agency is still vulnerable on the adequacy of its cost-benefit analysis.  Judge Wilkins never ruled on this issue in his 2012 decision, and in my opinion the CFTC is still vulnerable here.

It is not just the cost-benefit trade-off of the rule overall, but the specific choices made.  Most notably, the size of the limits needs to be justified better on a cost-benefit basis.  Similarly, the conditional limit needs to be so justified: and I’ll say that it is impossible-impossible-to do so, if one is constrained to using, you know, rigorous economics.

The rule is unbelievably long.  Five-hundred thirty three double spaced pages.  533.  (395 pages excluding appendices and attachments.) I have read most of it, but have to spend more time digesting the bona fide hedging portion of the rule.  More on that later.

Oh.  There are 846 footnotes: this is where the land mines lurk.  And there was much rejoicing.  By the lawyers, anyways.

November 7, 2013

The Russian Economic Ministry Channels SWP

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Energy,History,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 1:34 pm

For years-probably going on 7-I have argued that Russia was in for a long period of economic stagnation.  I referred to Putin’s Hamster Wheel From Hell, on which Russia would just continue spinning.

This prediction was based on my belief that Russia’s “natural state” politico-economic system was inimical to sustained growth.  Yes, the country could experience Cocaine Blues spurts of growth (“took another shot of cocaine and away I run”)-with the Russian economic cocaine being black and gooey instead of white and powdery-but the fundamental institutional deficits would continue to hold it back.  Indeed, the rent seeking and redistributionist policies that resource wealth sustain were-and are-a detriment to the country’s long term prospects.

I stopped writing about Russian stagnation so much, well, because I didn’t want the blog to stagnate along with them 😉  What new was there to say?

Today the Russian Economics Ministry released a forecast that echoes what I’ve been on about all these years:

Russia acknowledged for the first time on Thursday that its economy would lag global growth over the next two decades, setting the stage for an era of stagnation that could threaten President Vladimir Putin’s grip on power.

Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev forecast that Russia’s economy would grow at an average rate of 2.5 percent during that period – down from an earlier 4 percent and half the rate Putin targeted before his return to the Kremlin last year.

The downward revision casts Russia as the poor relation in the BRICS group of large emerging markets that includes Brazil, China, India and South Africa. The ministry expects the BRICS to grow at a 5.2 percent clip during that time.

With the ministry expecting global economic growth to average 3.4-3.5 percent, the outlook threatens to make a mockery of Putin’s oft-repeated pledge to lift Russia into the world’s top-five economies by the end of this decade.

And it is still based on an oil price forecast many analysts view as over-optimistic, showing just how much Putin’s Russia, the world’s largest oil producer, relies on not only high, but rising, oil prices to prosper.

Over-optimistic.  Too funny.

Note this isn’t a forecast about a year to two.  This is a forecast that extends to beyond Putin’s departure (likely, anyways, but not absolutely certain-which is symptomatic of the problems).  It is a damning verdict on Russia’s fundamental structural and institutional flaws.  From their own mouths.

One bank analyst sarcastically remarks: “Stagnation is starting to look like a policy goal in Russia.”  Actually, there is much truth in this remark, as I also noted in my writing on this subject going back to ’06-’07.  Autocratic systems like Russia’s that exist to redistribute rents in order to maintain political control and stability hate economic dynamism.  It creates new sources of wealth that can be used to challenge existing power structures.  It creates new groups of individuals, of middling means, who aspire for greater liberties and a political voice.

Meaning that given the choice between stagnation and control on the one hand, and dynamism and a lack of control on the other, Putin and the siloviki will choose stagnation in a heart beat.  Stagnation is a policy goal.  Stagnation means that those are on top stay on top, profiting wildly from their parasitism.  And that, ultimately, is the point.

Until it all falls apart.  Which it will.   The system is strong, in its way (note the utter demoralization of the opposition), but it is brittle.  Dynamic societies can adapt to big shocks.  Stagnant ones not so much.  They tend to shatter into little pieces instead of bending and adapting in response to big shocks.

I’ll sit here patiently waiting for all those soi-disant “Russophiles” who criticized, and at times ridiculed, my earlier prognostications as the product of a Russophobe mind to explain to me how the Economic Minister is similarly Russophobic.  Because he’s just saying what I’ve said for years. Some people are slow learners.  And some are no learners.  Which means I’ll probably be waiting a long time.

October 28, 2013

Moral Hazard, Defaulter Pays, and the Relative Costs of Cleared and Uncleared Derivatives Trades

I’ve been beavering away at the clearing section of my next book, which will be titled Market Macrostructure.  It’s been something of a struggle, because there are so many aspects to this issue that it is challenging to organize the material in a logical fashion.  I analogize it to trying to write a history of a complicated battle, where many things are happening simultaneously over space, and these things interact.  Inevitably, the narrative must jump around in either space or time or both, and the writer must summarize some material about one action at one time to relate it to the narrative of what is going on at another place at another time.

So it is with writing an analysis of clearing.  There are many moving parts that interrelate and interact, so there is always the challenge of relating detailed analyses of important pieces to one another, and to clearing as a whole, and to the trading process (execution and clearing) as a whole.

One virtue of this struggle, however, is that it can lead  the writer to new insights.  Conceptualization at a fairly highly level facilitates organization, and the process of conceptualization can lead to new ways of understanding.  So it is, I hope anyways, with the clearing analysis.

This post is my first attempt to crystalize those thoughts; indeed, one of the original purposes of the the blog was to provide a place where I could think out loud and commit to pixels some early thoughts to be refined going forward in more formal writing.

The issue that I have been grappling with is why are some trades cleared, and others not?  Why do we see exchanges that trade cleared contracts operate side by side with bilateral markets trading similar contracts (and sometimes nearly identical ones) that aren’t cleared?  What determines the division of trade between these alternatives?

This is an issue that I’ve been looking at since the ’90s, and I identified some factors, but I was never completely satisfied.  But putting together some pieces that I have written about before, I think I’ve come up with a more complete explanation that captures some of the salient aspects of the economics of clearing and counterparty risk generally.

The first piece is that in theory-and indeed, in most theoretical treatments of clearing by academics (including yours truly)-clearing can operate as a classical risk pooling/insurance mechanism, in which market participants pool counterparty risk.  To the extent that this risk is idiosyncratic, such pooling allocates risk more efficiently and makes risk-averse participants better off.

But as I pointed out in my earliest work, and emphasized more in some later papers, like any risk sharing arrangement, mutualization of counterparty risk creates the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  Moral hazard problems are likely to be particularly acute.  Clearing participants can affect the distribution of the default losses they impose on the mutualization pool by adjusting the riskiness of their trading positions in the cleared derivatives.  They can also do so by adjusting the risks of their balance sheets, through, for instance, adjusting their trades in non-cleared derivatives (or in derivatives cleared at another CCP), changing their leverage, or adjusting the risk of other assets on their balance sheets

The prospect for moral hazard will inevitably lead to limits on the amount of insurance provided through the clearing mechanism.  That is, not all default risk will be mutualized.

Clearinghouses use margins to limit the amount of risk that is mutualized.  Only losses on defaulted positions in excess of margin posted by the defaulter are mutualized.  The higher the margin cover, the lower the level of risk sharing.

In practice, CCPs utilize a “defaulter pays” model in which margin covers losses on defaulted positions with extremely high probability, e.g., 99.7 percent of the time.  In a defaulter pays model, the amount of risk mutualization is very low.  CCPs are not, therefore, primarily an insurance mechanism.  They insure only tail risks (which has important implications for systemic risk and wrong way risk).

Note LCH.Clearnet’s boast that it had collected far more margin than necessary to cover the realized losses on the Lehman’s derivatives positions that it cleared.   The CME also had more than enough Lehman margin to cover losses on its positions (although there were shortfalls on some product segments that were covered by excessive margins on others).

At the Paris conference I attended in September, the head of Eurex Clearing, Thomas Book, was adamant that the goal of his CCP, and of CCPs generally, was to avoid mutualizing risk if at all possible.  His answer surprised Bruno Biais, whose model of clearing in the paper he presented focuses on the role of the CCP as a default risk insurer.

I confess that I have been inadequately appreciative of this point as well.  Understanding its implications has important consequences, as I hope to show in a bit.

To summarize.  CCPs generally operate on a defaulter pays basis: this is also sometimes referred to as a “no credit” system.  That term will help illuminate the differences between cleared and uncleared markets.  The defaulter pays system means that the amount of risk shared through a CCP is extremely limited.  This limitation on risk sharing is best explained as the consequence of moral hazard.

In contrast to a cleared market operating on the no credit model, dealers in bilateral OTC markets historically extended credit to derivatives counterparties.  Put differently, OTC deals often bundled a derivatives trade with credit provision.  That is, dealers often willingly took on exposure to a default loss when entering into a derivatives deal with a customer.  (This is not true for all types of customers.  For instance, hedge funds typically had to post margin.)  Taking credit exposure is equivalent to extending credit to the counterparty.

Now consider whether a firm will prefer to trade a cleared derivative, requiring the posting of a high margin and which thus embeds no credit, or prefers instead to trade an otherwise identical OTC product that does embed credit.  To fix ideas originally, let’s consider a firm that is cash constrained.  Therefore, if it wants to trade the cleared product, it must borrow to fund the initial margin.  The cleared derivative is a no credit transaction, but that doesn’t mean that moving to clearing necessarily reduces the amount of credit the firm obtains: it can borrow the money needed to post margin, and indeed, may have to borrow it.

One source of credit is dealer banks.  So the firm could either enter into an uncleared bilateral trade with a dealer, or borrow money from the dealer bank to fund the IM.  (The argument doesn’t really depend on dealing with the same bank on the derivatives deal and the borrowing: this just facilitates the exposition.)

Here’s were the loser pays aspect of margin comes in.  Let’s say that the firm is selling a derivatives contract with payoff P. If the firm defaults, the OTC counterparty’s exposure is max[P,0].  But in a loser pays model, the margin M is almost always greater than max[P,0].  Thus, the borrowing from bank to fund margin almost always exceeds the default loss that the bank would incur if it entered into a bilateral deal with the firm.

I can show formally that if the firm already has debt outstanding, under standard pro rata/pari passu default loss allocation mechanisms, holding everything equal,  the bank’s default losses if it extends credit to the firm to fund margin almost always exceed, and never are smaller than*, the default losses that it would incur if it had entered an uncleared bilateral trade with the firm.  This, in turn, will make the cleared transaction more expensive for the cash-constrained firm, and it will prefer to trade the OTC product.

There are at least a couple of reasons why the cleared transaction can be more expensive.  One is what is effectively a debt overhang problem.  In order to induce the bank to lend the margin for posting at the CCP, the firm must promise it higher payments in non-default states than it has to promise the bank in these states when it trades OTC instead.  Since the firm’s managers, acting in the interest of equity, only care about payoffs in non-default states, this means that returns to shareholders are lower when it borrows to fund margin than when it deals OTC.  This can be seen another way.  I can also show formally that the payoffs to the firm’s other creditors are almost always higher, and never lower, if it borrows to fund margin than if it trades OTC.  Thus, the value of the the firm’s non-margin-related debt is higher if it trades a cleared product and funds the margin by borrowing, than if the firm uses the OTC product.  Since the value of the firm’s assets doesn’t differ in the cleared vs. uncleared cases, and since value is conserved, this means that equity is less valuable when the firm trades cleared products than bilateral ones.   Some of the benefit of borrowing to fund margin flows to other creditors; this is where the analogy to debt overhang comes in.

This is most easily seen in the following scenario.  The firm can become insolvent when max[P,0]=0, i.e., the bilateral contract is out of the money to the bank, and the bank suffers no loss due to default, and all the losses of insolvency would fall on other creditors.  However, if the bank had lent the firm money to fund margin, it would suffer a loss on the margin loan in this circumstance.  This loss would reduce the loss suffered by the other creditors.

OTC is cheaper than cleared products in other models of capital structure.  For instance, moral hazard (or adverse selection) mean that the firm will be credit constrained: the amount it can borrow is limited by its collateral, and/or the amount of cash flows that it can credibly pledge to lenders.  The same formal analysis implies that more cash flows in non-default states must go to supporting a margin loan in a defaulter pays clearing model than in a bilateral transaction.  This leaves less cash flows to support other borrowing, so by borrowing to fund margin loans the firm must borrow less to support other investments (which, in this sort of model, it has insufficient equity to fund itself).  Thus, borrowing to fund margins on cleared transactions crowds out borrowing to fund positive NPV investments.

This analysis implies that this cash constrained firm will choose to trade OTC rather than cleared products with defaulter pays margins funded with loans.  The bank is indifferent, because it will price the product or the loan to cover its costs, but the firm is always better off  with the bilateral trade because it has to pay the bank less if it trades OTC than if it borrows to fund margin.

Moreover, the analysis implies that if the firm is forced to clear, it will either scale back its derivatives trading (because the cleared transaction is more expensive), and/or reduce its investments in positive NPV projects. Cutting back derivatives trading is costly if this trading reduces the deadweight costs of debt, for instance.  Indeed, I can show that the cost of margin is especially high when the derivatives trade is a “right way” risk, as would occur when the firm is hedging.

Clearing mandates are therefore expensive for such firms, and there is a legitimate reason to exempt such firms from clearing requirements.  (Note that even if these firms are exempted, other rules affecting dealer banks, e.g., punitive capital charges on OTC derivatives trades, can induce an inefficient use of cleared transactions.)

This analysis explains the preference of many firms, especially corporate end users, for uncleared OTC trades that embed credit, as opposed to cleared transactions that must be funded by increased borrowing.  This, in turn, can explain the growth of OTC markets relative to exchange traded markets from the 1980s onwards.

It is useful to step back a bit here, and understand what is really going on.  In essence, in this model clearing is expensive because it causes one agency problem to exacerbate another.  CCPs adopt defaulter pays because of an agency problem: the moral hazard associated with risk sharing.  Debt is expensive or constrained for firms because of agency problems (e.g., debt overhang problems, or constraints on borrowing due to moral hazard).  Effectively, the firm must obtain more credit to support a cleared position than an uncleared one, and  the cost of debt arising from agency problems makes this higher level of credit more expensive.

This analysis raises the question of why firms would ever choose to clear.  There are a couple of answers to that.

First, there may be other (private) benefits.  For instance, netting economies may be greater with clearing.  Of course, the efficiency effects of netting are equivocal (because netting primarily has the effect of redistributing losses among creditors), but as a positive matter is is pretty evident that netting offers private benefits, and thus the mulitilateral netting that can occur in clearing, but not to the same degree in bilateral trades, could induce some traders to prefer clearing.

Second, the analysis started from the assumption that the firm at issue is cash constrained and hence has to borrow to fund margin on the cleared trade.  Some firms are not.  One example would be an ETF like USO or USNG, which collect the entire notional value of derivatives in cash from their investors.  These firms do not require any credit to meet margins.  Large real money funds, like a Pimco, that collect cash from investors and use derivatives to gain exposure to price risks would be another.

Even many hedgers may not suffer from cash constraints that limit their ability to trade cleared contracts.  Consider commodity trading firms.  They typically use derivatives to hedge inventories of commodities.  Banks, in turn, are willing to lend against these inventories as collateral.  Thus, the commodity trader can fund margin using borrowings secured by commodity inventories, and the lender does not share in default losses pro rata with other creditors.  This type of borrowing is fundamentally different than the borrowing considered above, in which the firm borrows against its balance sheet and default losses are shared with other creditors.

Thus, the simple models would predict that whereas cleared derivatives used to hedge liquid inventories are as cheap or cheaper than uncleared derivatives, it is much more expensive to use cleared derivatives to hedge cash flows on illiquid assets, or to hedge broad balance sheet risks.  This is largely consistent with my understanding of the pattern of usage of cleared and uncleared derivatives.

This model, which combines a model of the cost of risk sharing at a CCP with a model of the capital structure of firms, has both positive and policy implications.  In particular, it can explain the adoption of defaulter pays by CCPs.  It can also explain the disparities between OTC and cleared markets when CCPs utilize defaulter pays.  Moreover, it demonstrates that clearing mandates can be inefficient if they are applied too broadly.  One source of this inefficiency is that the mandate leads to a perverse interaction between agency problems.

Of course, a rationale for clearing mandates is that clearing reduces systemic risk.  Anyone who has read my work will know that I am dubious of that rationale on many grounds, but it is worthwhile to consider the implications of the foregoing analysis for systemic risk.

The model is too sparse to make very strong conclusions, but one consideration does stand out.   If firms borrow from OTC dealer banks to fund margins, holding the rest of the firm’s liabilities and assets constant, these banks suffer larger losses when the firm goes bankrupt if they lend to them to fund margins on  derivatives trades than if they enter into identical uncleared OTC derivatives trades.  As noted before, there is a distributive effect: other creditors suffer smaller losses.  The systemic implications of this redistribution depend on the relative systemic importance of the banks and the other creditors.  Dealer banks are definitely systemically important, but other creditors may be too.  Therefore, it is not evident how this cuts, but if one believes that large financial institutions that serve as OTC dealers are especially crucial for systemic stability, moving to cleared trades would tend to increase systemic risk because clearing actually increases their credit exposures to customers.

But again, caution is warranted here.  The redistribution result holds capital structure and derivatives trades constant, but of course these will be different if firms have to clear than if they don’t.  These changes are difficult to predict, and the systemic riskiness of different configurations is even more difficult to compare given how little we really know about the sources of systemic risk.   But the fact that clearing can lead to adverse interactions between agency problems should raise concerns about the systemic implications of forcing clearing.

*To be more precise.  When P>M, the CCP and the lender suffer default losses, and the sum of these default losses is the same as the bilateral counterparty would incur on an uncleared trade.  Relatedly, other creditors of the bankrupt firm suffer the same default losses in the cleared and uncleared cases when this condition holds.  They suffer smaller losses whenever this condition does not hold and the firm goes bankrupt.

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