Give Trump a Chance? The Biden Administration Says No
Last week marked the 1000th dreary day of the Russo-Ukrainian War. It also saw a new, and disturbing, phase in the conflict.
Specifically, the Biden Administration (not the non compos mentis Biden, of course, but some shadowy cabal of aides) granted permission to Ukraine to utilize Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) to attack targets on some Russian territory, specifically Kursk oblast and environs. In response, the Russians launched a nuclear capable experimental intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) into Ukraine: the missile was topped with six non-nuclear (and in fact non-explosive) warheads.
In many respects the western response to Russia’s launch was overwrought. It was obviously a signal of escalation dominance that reminded me of Crocodile Dundee and the knife:
“That’s not a missile. That’s a missile.” I see your tactical missile and raise you a ballistic missile. I call.
Regardless of the merits of unleashing the ATACMs (which I will discuss below) it was utterly irresponsible for a lame duck administration to do so. It will not have to deal with the consequences. The incoming Trump administration will. And it can only complicate Trump’s already daunting task in Ukraine. Given how clearly disruptive this move was, it could only have been undertaken with malign intent. An “if we can’t rule, nobody will,” spiteful decision.
Regarding the merits. On the one hand ATACMs do not represent a substantial escalation: Ukraine has for months launched attacks on Russia using drones, and on soil Russia has claimed its own (notably Crimea) using various western-made cruise missiles. However, and ironically, by previously pointedly refusing to permit the use of ATACMs on targets in Russia the administration effectively deferred to Putin’s declaration that doing so would cross a red line. Thus, the volte face can only be interpreted as a deliberate flouting of said line, and therefore a deliberate escalation.
And for what? ATACMs, especially in the limited numbers that the US has supplied to Ukraine, cannot have a decisive effect on the war. (Nor can Storm Shadows, or SCALPs, or Taureses, or JASSMs). At most they can disrupt to some degree Russian logistics (e.g., by blowing up munitions depots) or command and control (by striking headquarters). (The fact that the administration made this argument to justify its previous denial of permission for using ATACMs in Russia demonstrates that it recent reversal was an act of spite rather than a reasoned military judgment).
But Ukraine’s military problems so fundamental that inconveniencing Russian operations in these ways will not be decisive.
Ukraine’s first fundamental problem is manpower. Yes, Russia is suffering far larger casualties, but the bloody minded Putin has shown his willingness to tolerate them, and Russia can absorb them far more readily than Ukraine.
Ukraine’s second fundamental problem is air defense, which has both a tactical and a strategic dimension. Tactically, after almost two years of complete ineffectualness, the Russian air forces finally found a way to influence the battle zone by dropping large numbers of FAB glide bombs (some weighing 3 metric tons) on Ukrainian positions from beyond the range of Ukrainian air defenses. Yes, ATACMs can be used to strike the airfields hosting the SU-34s that drop the bombs, thereby forcing the Russians to base them further away and reducing the number of sorties they can launch, but this effect is at the margins. Strategically, through drones and missiles (like iskander, which is more capable than ATACMs) Russia has devastated Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Whether Ukraine can survive another winter of concerted attacks on its power grid is debatable.
Zelensky has been screaming for more anti-aircraft missile systems (especially Patriots) and some have been forthcoming, especially from Europe. But the need far outstrips the capacity of the US to provide more.
Ukraine’s third fundamental problem is its military command, starting with Zelensky himself, his military chief Syrski, and his general staff (“GenStabU”). The excellent Sarcastosaurous substack is the go to source on this, but its critique is echoed by Ukrainian troops that bear the consequences of the command’s incompetence.
The problems are myriad. The underlying problem is that old Soviet habits die hard. Most notably, command is overly centralized, leading to slow responses to battlefield crises, and a shocking indifference to information coming from those on the front lines.
The centralization has also led to an extremely defective organizational structure. The Ukrainian army has brigades which control battalions, but it has no divisions that control brigades, or corps that control divisions.
Supposedly because divisions are too expensive. Getting brigades and battalions destroyed due to command and control problems isn’t?
The lack of divisions leads to poor coordination between adjacent brigades, and the Russians have learned to exploit these seams. (Seams between units are always a vulnerability. Multiplying the seams multiplies the vulnerabilities). Moreover, Syrski et al control the brigades and even battalions directly, and shuttle them around willy-nilly in response to the latest front line crisis. This has created numerous opportunities that the Russians have exploited, for example by attacking when a new unit is shuffled into line without adequate preparation, or by putting units with no communication channels next to one another, making coordinated response to Russian attacks almost impossible.
When you see reports of this brigade or that being in some place, it is often not an intact brigade, but just a few battalions (and sometimes only one) from that brigade. Meaning that Ukrainian lines are held by jumbles of units controlled (or pretended to be controlled) by generals in Kyiv with minimal operational awareness. It makes the (often exaggerated) Chateau Generalship of World War I look good by comparison.
The Ukrainian command has also exhibited at times a Hitleresque (or Stalinesque) tendency to demand that units fight to the last and not withdraw when caught in an untenable situation, leading to pointless casualties (including the loss of prisoners who are executed by the Russians). This is particularly disastrous when manpower is in precious short supply–as it is.
Ukraine’s only saving grace is that Russian command is even more incompetent. The difference is that Russia has the material resources to compensate for this incompetence. Ukraine does not.
Ukraine has also made some incomprehensible decisions on how to allocate its scarce resource. Most notably, despite the demonstrated effectiveness of the Russian prepared defenses (and in particular the use of heavy minefields) in stopping the much vaunted but failed Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023 (the Surovkin Line), time and again Ukraine has failed to fortify obvious targets of Russian offensives.
So as it is, Ukraine is barely hanging on. It’s not losing yet, but it certainly is not winning. And definitely not by Zelensky’s definition of victory: regaining all occupied Ukrainian territory. That is the pipe dream to end all pipe dreams.
Yet he insists on it.
The situation now is that both sides need an end to the fighting, but neither is willing to acknowledge it. Ukraine’s dire circumstances are evident, and although Russia’s aren’t quite so dire, they are bad, and the cost Russia is incurring is certainly not worth the possible gain–adding another string of shitholes to Putin’s collection. Eastern Ukraine was a shithole before Russia invaded: now it is a depopulated shithole buried under rubble.
And the economic consequences for Russia have been baleful. Speaking of rubble, that describes the ruble now: it is now worth less than a penny. Official Russian statistics tout the strength of the Russian economy, but it is a war economy. Shoveling massive resources to the military, to be blown up in Ukraine, props up GDP, but people don’t consume aggregates. The economic circumstances of Russians have degraded substantially in the past 1000 days, and will only degrade more every additional day the war goes on. The Portuguese living standards that Putin once promised are a bad joke now.
Neither side can achieve victory as they have defined it. Heretofore neither side has been willing to acknowledge that.
Trump has boasted that he will end the war. Given the intransigence of the parties, this boast seems unrealistic. But perhaps he can exploit the fact that neither side gains from continuing the war to to cobble together something resembling peace.
The most likely path: another frozen conflict in which Putin will get de facto control of what he has grabbed in the past two plus years.
The biggest obstacle to this outcome is Zelensky. I think he is genuinely dead set (emphasis on the dead) on driving the Russians from Ukrainian territory. But that is a delusion.
Zelensky, apparently not realizing that he who pays the piper calls the tune, has demanded that the west supply the resources to achieve his objective. For one thing, such resources don’t exist, and meeting even a fraction of Zelensky’s demands would denude the US’s already scanty stocks of missiles and shells. The US has more pressing concerns than eastern Europe: eastern Asia in particular. Moreover, the real binding constraint on Zelensky’s ambitions is not hardware but meatware. Ukraine has too few soldiers, a large fraction of its military-age population is unwilling to serve, and it is even more of a demographic basket case than Russia.
In brief, Zelensky played a vital role at the outset of the war, and his conduct then was exemplary. But it has quite clearly gone to his head, and he is now a delusional autocrat who is an existential threat to the people he claims to represent. Not to mention a military incompetent (as discussed above).
The establishments in the United States and Europe inveigh against a settlement that leaves Putin in control of even a sliver of Ukraine. They invoke the ghost of Munich, and claim that Putin will use the respite to rearm and will then set his sights on Nato’s eastern flank.
As if. If this war has shown anything, it has shown that Russia’s ability to project conventional military power beyond its borders is virtually non-existent. Further, the army that went into Ukraine was supposedly the product of serious reforms that addressed the flaws exposed in Georgia in 2008. In the event, it wasn’t. Given the systemic defects of the Russian system (of which corruption in the military is just one symptom) any future “reforms” are almost certain to be as tragicomic as the previous ones.
And how long would they take? Years. The establishments obsess on Putin, who is already 72. He will be well past his sell by date (especially by Russian male standards) by the time his allegedly reformed military will be capable of doing anything. And that is time that the Europeans can use to put on their big boy lederhosen and pantalons and create something other than Potemkin militaries that Putin (or more likely his successor) would be unwilling to confront.
That is, deterrence of Russia is completely in European hands. And if they decide to forego it, that’s their choice and their problem.
So Trump has a chance to realize his boast by negotiating (a la Teddy Roosevelt perhaps) an outcome that satisfies no one. But war is politics by other means, and politics is the art of the possible. The dreams of Putin, Zelensky, and the establishment are impossible. If Trump can get them to accept that, an imperfect peace is possible. And an imperfect peace is far preferable to the current nightmare.
The biggest challenge to achieving this is making it clear to Putin that he cannot prevail. Abandoning Ukraine altogether now would undermine that. So, rhetoric and I think genuine belief notwithstanding, to get his peace Trump will have to hold his nose and continue to fund Ukraine to some extent. The delicate balance to be found is between providing enough support to persuade Putin that continuing the war is futile, but not so much as to refill Zelensky’s pipe of dreams.
The acts of the dying Biden administration are certainly no help. The road to a settlement is torturous enough as it is without its malign actions.
Give Trump a chance. The odds are against him, given the characters involved in the conflict. But the Biden administration seems hell bent on stacking the odds against him and denying him–and hence those dying in Ukraine–that chance.



