The William Clayton Memorial Manipulation Rule
Testifying before the Senate in 1928, Texas cotton broker William Clayton responded to an accusation that he had manipulated the market with this drily arch remark: “The word ‘manipulation’ . . . in its use is so broad as to include any operation of the cotton market that does not suit the gentleman who is speaking at the moment.”
I’m sure Mr. Clayton is long dead, but his spirit lives on in the CFTC’s just proposed manipulation rule. It is broad, sweeping–and maddeningly vague. It basically promulgates a we’ll-know-it-when-we-see-it-and-tell-you-when-we-do-(with-a-subpoena) “standard.”
The rule itself just regurgitates the language of Frank-n-Dodd. The explanation of the rule contained in the Federal Register provides ample evidence that the Commission views the rule as a fishing license to catch pretty much anything that damn well strikes its fancy. Some key quotes:
Likewise, the Commission proposes to interpret CEA section 6(c)(1) as a broad, catch-all provision reaching fraud in all its forms–that is, intentional or reckless conduct that deceives or defrauds market participants. [Emphasis added.]
. . . .
The Commission proposes to continue interpreting the prohibition on price manipulation and attempted price manipulation to encompass every effort to improperly [sic] influence the price of a swap, commodity, or commodity futures contract. [Emphasis added.]
. . . .
Consistent with judicial interpretations of the scope of SEC Rule 10b-5, the Commission proposes that subsection (c)(1) be given a broad, remedial reading, embracing the use or employment, or attempted use or employment, of any manipulative or deceptive contrivance for the purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating the integrity of the markets subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. [Emphasis added.]
. . . .
The Commission proposes to continue interpreting the prohibition on price manipulation and attempted price manipulation to encompass every effort to influence the price of a swap, commodity, or commodity futures contract that is intended to interfere with the legitimate forces of supply and demand in the marketplace. The Commission reaffirms this broad reading of the term “manipulation” with respect to new CEA section 6(c)(3), while also recognizing that manipulation cases are fact-intensive and that the law in this area will continue to evolve largely on a case-by-case basis.
It is quite clear from all this that the Commission wants broad authority, and the maximum discretion and flexibility, to reach any operation of the market that does not suit it at the moment. Willie Clayton lives.
I’ve written before that by attempting to craft anti-manipulation rules that are so broad to catch everything, Congress and the Commission in fact make it very difficult to catch anything, including the most egregious manipulative conduct. That is a real risk under the new rule, which just compounds the vagaries and definitional imprecision of the existing laws, regulations, and precedents by adding new ones. What is a manipulative contrivance or device? I have no clue–and the proposed rule provides none.
The Commission gives itself an out by saying that manipulation cases are fact intensive, and that “the law in this area will continue to evolve largely on a case-by-case basis.”
Well, that’s the problem, isn’t it? Anti-manipulation laws have been on the books since 1922, and there have been quite a few cases brought under the laws. But to characterize the result of this process as “evolution” would be far too charitable. “Chaos,” “confusion,” “muddle,” and/or “devolution” would be far more apposite. And it got that way precisely, exactly, because Congress and the various regulators charged with enforcing the law did not provide any real structure or guidance, again acting under the misguided notion that a broader, less precise law would be a more effective one. The problem is not that the CFTC has not possessed the powers to reach truly damaging manipulative conduct; it’s that it has employed these powers in a scatterbrained way. And that has happened, in large part, because the relevant statutes are vague and provide no structure or guidance.
I’ve written ad nauseum for almost two decades on the problems in the law relating to market power manipulation. Despite the fact that economics provides the logical and empirical basis to permit determination with considerable precision whether a market power manipulation has occurred; who committed it; and whether he intended to do so, the Commission has never succeeded in bringing a successful market power manipulation case. (As the discussion in the Federal Register notice makes clear, the CFTC’s much ballyhooed victorious DiPlacido case was not a market power manipulation case.) That is particularly disturbing because market power manipulation is likely to be the most damaging and socially costly type of manipulation that can occur in derivatives markets.
I’ve advanced recommendations as to how it would be possible to craft fairly specific rules that would make it easier to prosecute market power manipulations. More specificity would make it more likely that the CFTC could actually crack down on truly damaging conduct. Laying new broad, vague terms on top of old broad, vague terms won’t do that.
Just how, exactly, will the new rule address the problems that have stymied the Commission in cases like in re Indiana Farm Bureau? How does it correct the problems (most notably vagueness) that Judge Miller tellingly identified in Radley? (It does address some of the issues relating to jurisdiction.) Answer: not at all. Meet the new rule, same as the old rule–at least in its defects.
Moreover, the vagaries of the new rule will inevitably create uncertainty in the minds of market participants about what conduct is and what conduct is not a “manipulative contrivance or device.” More legal risk is not exactly what the markets need right now.
In other words, the new rule will raise the frequency of both Type I and Type II errors. Truly manipulative conduct will continue to go unpunished, and perhaps aggressive but legitimate conduct will not suit some enforcement guy at some moment. The new rule threatens to make all too real the old lawyer’s joke: “I won half the cases I should have lost, and lost half the cases I should have won, so justice was done.” Not really.
In brief, the new rule doesn’t fix the well-known problems with the existing regulations, statutes, and decisions: it just repeats them, and arguably adds some more. Since the reach of the new rule will be far greater than the old one–extending to every swap, for instance–the potential for damage is commensurately greater as well.
I found one part of the FR notice particularly amusing. Specifically, there’s this “we don’t need no steekin’ economists” language:
The conclusion that prices were affected by a factor not consistent with normal forces of supply and demand will often follow inescapably from proof of the actions of the alleged manipulator.
. . . .
Cases of this nature, where distorted prices foreseeably follow from the device employed by the manipulator, do not require detailed economic analysis of the effect on prices.
Yeah. And then there are all those other cases where conduct is not sufficient to infer price distortion. Which happen to be the far most important ones.
I understand that a lot of lawyers don’t like to have to rely on economists. I will pass over in silence why that’s true. Suffice it to say that the lawyers would be more successful if the laws and regulations reaching economic conduct were based on coherent, precise economics, rather than gassy generalities about “devices” and “contrivances.”