Buying an Espionage Option
The debate over the Russian spy scandal is still rolling along at my first post on the subject. I don’t have a lot more to say, because there hasn’t been a great deal of new information. In the absence of new facts, this story has followed the trajectory of many spy stories. It has largely degenerated into a babble of Holmes-and-Moriarty-on-the-train-style arguments, most flogging a particular pet cause, i.e., to exculpate Russia or to damn it. My favorite of these is that the Russians deliberately set up a ring of bumblers to distract the FBI from its real, and capable, deep cover illegals. Not disprovable, so not worth any time arguing about.
I just want to draw attention to one article written by America’s premier scholars on Soviet espionage during the Cold War, Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes. They make the good point that one should not read to much into the fact that this ring had yet to make any serious attempts at espionage, if public reports are to be believed. But as Klehr and Haynes argue, operations of this sort are not intended to generate intelligence immediately. Instead, they are long term investments intended to create the capability–the option–to secure intelligence in the future when its value is particularly high:
There has already been speculation that despite years of residence in the United States, none of the accused had been able to gather and transmit any classified information. Since none has been charged with espionage, it is plausible that their actual value to Russia until their arrests had been minimal. The charges they do face, money laundering and failure to register as foreign agents, carry substantial penalties, but apart from a message from Moscow suggesting that their major task was to get close to policy makers, there is little indication of what their masters wanted them to do. That has led a number of commentators to dismiss this gaggle of agents as a bad example of a bureaucracy so addled that it spent large amounts of money to construct a spy ring whose tasks could have been met by anyone with access to the Internet.
This dismissive response misses the point. Russian intelligence, the SVR, made a very expensive, long-term investment by inserting these “illegals,” as agents without diplomatic cover are known, into the United States with instructions to spend several years constructing new identities and burrowing deeply into American society. The pay back in terms of espionage tasks performed (either procurement of information or, more likely, recruitment of sources with access to sensitive information and servicing those sources) would come only after five, ten, or more years of slow development.
If one takes this seriously, the most surprising thing is the fact that there seems to have been extensive contact between the plants and their Russian contacts prior to the time that they were activated for serious spying. (The contacts are still here, by the way: at least they have not been publicly kicked out of the country, as is pro forma in such episodes. Why?) Often, illegals are left with only infrequent contact for extended periods until they are activated. Perhaps this reflects a deep-seated fear in the SVR that the good life in America would be too attractive, and that these individuals would be very reluctant to perform on call at some distant date. Hence, keeping them busy and engaged on seemingly menial tasks was deemed essential to ensure that they stayed in the SVR’s orbit and control.
Like everything else, just a guess. But I think the question is an interesting one.