Trump’s blunt statement that he was a nationalist has set off paroxysms of rage from the usual quarters. This culminated with French president Macron intoning (under a monument to French national pride and military conquest–but we’ll see that’s just a sliver of the hypocrisy) that “patriotism is the exact opposite of nationalism.”
Upon reading this, my initial reaction was: bugger off, froggie. Here’s my more considered reaction, though I have to confess it pretty much arrives at the same conclusion, only with bigger words 😉
Macron, and most of the other people European and American who have seized on Trump’s remark, are playing a slippery rhetorical sleight-of-hand. They are trying to equate Trump’s use of the word with European-style blood-and-soil nationalism, which in the 1930s fueled fascism, and contributed to conflict–but not to the degree that Macron and his ilk claim.
This is categorically false, and in fact a slander. It is clear that by “nationalism” Trump means putting American national interest first. Moreover, Trump’s assertion relates primarily to means, not goals. He views collective international organizations to be an impediment to, and at times inimical to, the advancement of American interests. He believes that a more transactional, bilateral approach better achieves American goals, and that collective organizations (even Nato, not to mention the WTO or UN or whatever) are beneficial only to the extent that they lower the transactions costs of the US making deals that benefits it.
That is, the antonym to Trump’s nationalism is globalism. It has little if anything to do with ethno-nationalism of the blood-and-soil variety, as Macron and others ceaselessly insinuate.
You can disagree with Trump’s belief that a more unilateral, transactional approach is more beneficial to US interest than alternatives, but at least it is bluntly honest, as opposed to the hypocrisy of the EUropeans, as epitomized by Macron. For they too want to advance national interests, but do not have the heft to do so as individual nations. So Germany and France in particular have found that the most effective way to leverage their national interest is through collective organizations, such as the EU, Nato, and the UN, which they then tart up as high-minded humanitarianism.
In other words, the US is Gulliver, and the European Lilliputians are incensed and frightened that under Trump Gulliver-America is no longer willing to remain tied down. So spare me the condescending lectures.
The Macron et al criticisms are false and slanderous as well because they grotesquely mischaracterize American nationalism–perhaps because the Europeans are projecting their own failures on us. As many have pointed out over the years, American nationalism derives from a creed and an ideology, rather than ethnicity. To confuse American nationalism with European nationalism is a category error.
American nationalism has assumed an ethnic or religious tinge primarily during times of large-scale immigration from countries and regions with cultures (political, social, religious) that were feared to be incompatible with American ideals of liberty and democracy. Those fears usually turned out to be overblown, precisely because the United States has proved uniquely able to assimilate people from about everywhere, many of whom rapidly and eagerly adopted American identity–something Europe has never done, and continues to fail to do. (Small illustration. As a kid I was in a Civil War reenacting unit. I was struck that most of the men in this group had eastern European names, and had no possible family connection to the Civil War, let alone the Revolution or the Mayflower. But they were enthusiastic about the Civil War and American history, and all were vocally patriotic.)
So the sneering criticisms of Trump’s avowed American nationalism emanating from Macron et al are a mixture of ignorance, slander, and advancement of national self-interest by multi-lateral means. Which is why he–and they–can bugger off.
Another point. Why should we trust the judgment of soi disant international(ist) elites? Especially when their prescriptions have varied wildly over time.
Note: national self-determination was a bedrock Liberal Internationalism 1.0. Look at Wilson’s 14 Points, one of the foundational documents of liberal internationalism: points VI through XIII–that is, more than half–were dedicated to nationality questions. Furthermore, the thrust of these points was that ethnic nations should have their own states, or at least a major voice in the states in which they perforce lived as minorities. Further, the post-WWI settlement created ethnicity-based nation states in Europe, and embodied the principle in colonial areas given mandate status.
This component of liberal internationalism was in part based on a view of right: the oppression of ethnic groups by multi-national empires (Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian in particular) was considered a grave injustice. It was in part based on pragmatic considerations. A major contributor to the outbreak of war in 1914 was the efforts of teetering multi-ethnic empires to maintain control over increasingly restive ethnic minorities. Hell, the reason that Austria-Hungary felt compelled to strike at Serbia was that if it didn’t, it would encourage the Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians, Ruthenians, Poles, and on and on to attempt to break away.
The belief that national self-determination would reduce the risk of world war was a very reasonable conclusion. Wars between empires are dangerous and bloody. Wars between empires are more likely when said empires are rent by ethnic turmoil–especially when Empire A deems itself the big brother and protector of an ethnic group in Empire B. Yes, little national states may be prone to conflict, but such conflicts are localized and unthreatening to continental or world peace.
It’s also interesting to note that the idealization of nationalism on the left has deep roots, notably the Romantics of the 19th century (who had influence on the early-20th century internationalists): think of Byron and the Greeks. The 1848 revolutions–often lionized by the left–had a decidedly nationalist thrust.
But what about the inter-war years, culminating in World War II? Didn’t ethnic nationalism set the stage for it?
Europe did not have a nationalism problem, generally speaking. It had a German problem, as it had had since 1870. To generalize about nationalism and national self-determination from Germany is another category error. Germany is its own category both intellectually/psychologically (Adenaur: “Germans are just Belgians with megalomania”), and due to its economic power. Fascist Romania–no big deal. Fascist Germany–very big deal. (Which is one of the reasons why today’s Germans want to condemn nationalism generally, in order to obscure their uniquely malign historical legacy. Another reason is that by keeping down the Poles, Hungarians, etc., Germany can achieve dominance by means other than panzers and the Shleiffen Plan.)
Liberal Internationalism 2.0 is the inversion of Version 1.0. It is predicated on the abnegation of national identity, based on the claim that pursuit of national identity and interest will cause the next general conflagration.
In brief:
Liberal Internationalism circa 1918: Poles, Hungarians, Slavs, etc. should have their own nation states in order to prevent war.
Liberal Internationalism circa 2018: Poles, Hungarians, Slavs, etc. should subordinate their nation states to the EU in order to prevent war.
So what is the claim to authority based on, given this 180 degree turn?
Let us also remark on the ahistorical cluelessness of Version 2.0. The reason that Macron and Merkel and all the other EUputians are particularly vexed by nationalism is that a majority of Poles, Hungarians, and English, and large and arguably growing minorities of Italians, Swedes, and yes, French, and yes!, even Germans, do not want to subordinate themselves to a supra-national, supra-ethnic government under primarily German domination. (Hey–sounds kind of like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, no?) Their response to this is not to attempt to accommodate the desire for some national autonomy, but to crush it. THAT is a subtext of Macron’s remarks.
But again redolent of Austro-Hungary (and the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman) these attempts to assert central (imperial) control over national groups only stoke more resistance. This could not be more obvious. Hell, even Merkel’s agonies are directly attributable to her mulish refusal to accommodate national sentiments within her own country, but she and her ilk insist on doubling down on Moar Europe, not realizing that the refusal to accommodate is a far greater threat to their dear project than Poles or Hungarians wanting to do things their way.
Merkel and Macron never tire of lecturing us about the Lessons of History, and in this just-past centennial of the end of WWI, about the Lessons of the Great War. Before lecturing us any further, they should have a séance with Franz Josef and see how the suppressing national sentiments thing works out. Sort of a Ghost of Christmas Past moment, if you will. Or they should contemplate more honestly the sources of their current problems–like the Ghost of Christmas Present. They really don’t want to see Ghost of Christmas Future.
In sum, the contretemps over Trump’s avowed American nationalism is just more bleating from a failed and failing elite who have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. What’s more, for those bleating the loudest–Marcon, Merkel, and their lot–entities like the EU are just a way of advancing national interest through other means. It is not an intelligent criticism. Anything but–it is deeply ignorant. Further, it is not a principled criticism. Anything but–it is hypocritical to the core.
