Russian “Privatization”? Only If Putin Is Desperate Indeed
Putin held a meeting with the CEOs of seven state-owned enterprises to discuss the sale of minority stakes in their companies (a move sometimes mischaracterized as “privatization”). Putin frankly admitted that the impetus for this discussion is Russia’s dire budgetary situation. Putin caused some confusion by saying the “new owners of privatized assets must have Russian jurisdiction,” leading some to conclude that he was ruling out foreign investment. Peskov clarified the next day, saying that Russia welcomed foreign investors, but “If the question is about a foreign investor, that’s one thing. If it’s about a Russian investor, it must not be another offshore scheme.”
I consider it likely that this initiative will be stillborn, at least insofar as sales of stakes to foreigners are concerned. Putin said that the sales must not take place at “knockdown prices.” Well, in the current environment, the prices (especially for Rosneft and VTB) are likely to be very low indeed.
This is especially so since foreign investors will demand a substantial discount to compensate for expropriation risk. Savvy investors with long memories will recall that Putin justified expropriating Shell’s Sakhalin II project by saying that the terms of the Sakhalin PSA were unfair to Russia, and that Shell had exploited Russia’s economic desperation when it signed the deal at a previous time of low energy prices. Putin (or whoever succeeds him) could easily resurrect such rhetoric in the future when oil prices rebound. Further, minority shareholders in Russian enterprises–especially state enterprises–have few protections against schemes that divert assets, or which dilute their holdings.
Given that prices are likely to be very low, if there are sales to foreigners, it will indicate (1) that Russia is desperate indeed, and (2) Putin et al consider it unlikely that sanctions will be relaxed anytime soon.
If there are sales, it is likely to be to Russian oligarchs, and in particular those with extensive holdings outside Russia. Just as Putin dragooned them into paying for Sochi and other prestige projects, he could well pressure them into overpaying for stakes in the state enterprises. This would allow him to kill two birds with one stone. It would help stanch the budgetary bleeding. It would also advance Putin’s longstanding goal of onshoring Russian capital. That would fit with the “owners must have Russian jurisdiction” remark. And Putin has substantial leverage to get oligarchs to do his bidding–literally.
Even if partial sales take place, it will be merely a stopgap budgetary measure: it will not indicate a fundamental reconsideration of Russian economic policy. Putin is still obviously a firm believer in the state control/state champion model, despite its manifest inefficiency. Putin prefers the control over resources that state control provides to having an efficient economy. Which is why he finds himself in his current straits.