Streetwise Professor

One of the few compensations of COVID was that the World Economic Federation meeting in Davos was canceled for two years. But all good things come to an end, and Davos is back, more malign than ever.

Of course the opening address was given by Klaus Schwab. (Aside: how come poor Appalachian whites are blamed for the evils of slavery, and the son of a for real hardcore Nazi gets a pass?)

He was touting “trust-based and action-oriented cooperation.” Orwellian doesn’t even come close to doing that justice. And nota bene: “cooperation” can be a synonym for conspiracy.

This is also Orwellian:

And finally. When it comes to business and economic activities, Davos is not a place for narrow self-interest. It is instead a place for the implementation of the notion of stakeholder capitalism, a concept I’m fighting for since 50 years. (Emphasis in original.)

A Forum partner is asked to value the contributions not just of shareholders, but of all those other stakeholders who are essential for business to succeed. As I wrote in my book Stakeholder Capitalism, Davos stands for a global economy that works for prosperity, people, and the planet.

“Stakeholder capitalism” is an oxymoron, and it is a synonym for fascism.

It is an oxymoron, because capitalism means that the owners of capital make the decisions on how it is used. Marxists have never liked the way that capitalists used it, which is why they wanted to expropriate it. At least they were honest, and didn’t say they were advocating “socialized capitalism.” “Stakeholder capitalism” means that those who don’t own something can nonetheless dictate how to use it, because they have some self-asserted “stake” in it. Using the word “capitalism” is a clever trick to seduce non-Marxists into believing that what Schwab et al are advocating is just a kinder, gentler version of a free market economy, when in fact their agenda is profoundly anti-capitalism and anti-freedom.

“Stakeholder capitalism” has no limiting principle. It can be used to claim control over anything anywhere anytime based on some Six Degrees From Kevin Bacon theory of somebody having a “stake” in it.

Though I would not recommend claiming that you have a stake in a fancy dinner at Davos. The WEF police (yes, they exist) will arrest you for sure.

It is a synonym for fascism because it is a variant on corporatism, which is the essence of the fascist economic model (as I’ve written before). Note the “cooperation” in the title of Herr Schwab’s speech: cooperation among stakeholders (namely, the state, corporations, and labor unions) was touted as the main virtue of fascist economics and governance. The stakeholders may be a little different (labor, for example, is barely even an afterthought at Davos), but the idea is functionally identical.

Now, Fascism 2.0 does have some differences with Fascism 1.0. The latter was avowedly nationalist, something which the former detests: it is avowedly anti-nationalist, and indeed globalist. “WEF” is more accurately an acronym for “World-Extensive Fascism.” It is the bastard child of world government types and economic fascists.

The WEF is also fascist in its utter antipathy for individual liberty and freedom. The most anti-freedom threat on the horizon–central bank digital currencies–was praised to the skies. And free speech? Well, you know, that needs to be “recalibrated.” (Inman is basically a less crazy-eyed version of Nina Jankowicz.) And you all just need to change the way you eat, got it?

I could go on.

The main moving force behind the WEF agenda is “climate change.” It is the existential threat that “stakeholders” need to “cooperate” on to fight. It is the primary reason why “stakeholder capitalism” has no limiting principle, because everything–I mean everything–supposedly affects climate, so everybody has a stake in it, so our enlightened WEF leaders acting benevolently on our behalf can reorder everything because climate change.

All of the nostrums that are being pushed will make energy and food more expensive. A lot more expensive.

Not that this lot cares. After all, energy and food expenditures represent a trivial fraction of their incomes. So they won’t feel a thing!

You, not so much. And the poorer you are, the more you will feel it.

Of course, these . . . people . . . claim to be acting on behalf of the poor. Because, of course, climate change hurts the poor most we’re told. Except that all of these assertions are highly speculative (at best), and the purported evidence supporting them is based on junk science.

Just like WEF-endorsed COVID policies (e.g., lockdowns), the cost of WEF-endorsed climate change policies will exceed the cost of climate change itself. And the cost difference will be greater, the poorer you are.

These people are your enemies. And the less well off you are, the bigger enemy they are.

You might think that the title of this post is hyperbole. You might want to think again.

This C-SPAN video of Kent Masterson Brown talking about his Meade at Gettysburg was sufficiently intriguing that I bought the book, and I’m glad I did. it is a thorough analysis of Meade’s generalship. I am in agreement with most of Brown’s full-throated defense of “that damned old goggle eyed snapping turtle” and his actions at Gettysburg. Laboring under tremendous disadvantages, having been thrown into command unexpectedly, operating with little information about his enemy, and knowing that a baying mob in Washington would crucify him if he failed, Meade responded smartly and professionally, and came away with a great victory.

Hell of a lot of good that did him, though. His post-battle actions were the subject of brutal criticism, by Lincoln no less. As Brown explains in detail, this criticism was incredibly unjust. His battle actions were also second guessed, most notably by the notorious Daniel Sickles and his coterie of political, military, and journalistic backstabbers. Those criticisms were also unfair, as Brown shows. Meade’s shade must be smiling to know he finally has an able defender.

What convinced me to buy the book was the video’s retelling and interpretation of Meade’s actions leading up to the battle, and in particular the “Pipe Creek Circular” (which was also the subject of much post-battle and indeed post-war discussion). In Brown’s telling, thrust into command, Meade was going by the book. The books, actually, namely those of Jomini, Clauswitz, and his old West Point instructor Dennis Hart Mahan.

The textbook approach was (a) to establish a strong position, (b) send out a force (a reconnaissance in force) to cause the enemy to concentrate, (c) have that force withdraw, fighting, drawing the now concentrated enemy back onto the prepared position. According to Brown, this is what Meade intended left wing commander John Reynolds to do with the I and XI corp when he dispatched Reynolds north. Knowing Lee was generally oriented along the Chambersburg Pike that ran through Gettysburg, and receiving word from John Buford that many Confederates were near the town, Meade dispatched Reynolds as his reconnaissance force with the intent of using it to lure Lee onto Meade’s extremely strong Pipe Creek Line some miles to the south.

But Reynolds lost his head, and instead of fencing with Lee and drawing him back onto Pipe Creek, the Pennsylvanian advanced to support Buford, even leading the brigade in the van–the storied Iron Brigade–personally into the fight. For his troubles, Reynolds got a bullet in the back of the head. His successor, Abner Doubleday (whom, ironically, far more people have heard of for exactly the wrong reasons than have ever heard of Reynolds or Meade for that matter), did not know what Reynolds’ or Meade’s intentions were. He concluded that Reynolds must have wanted to fight west and north of Gettysburg, and therefore he would too.

Although the I Corps and some elements of the XI Corps fought valiantly, they were eventually overwhelmed. And here Reynolds’ precipitate decision to fight with the town on his line of retreat turned defeat into disaster. Retreating through the town led to a breakdown in units and mass confusion, and the loss of thousands of prisoners. The panting, panicking remnants, much thinned, rallied–just–on Cemetery Hill to the east of town.

So far, Brown’s story hangs together. Meade sent out a reconnaissance in force, but its commander either misunderstood its purpose or forgot it in the excitement, and brought on a battle in the wrong place at the wrong time.

It’s the next act in the drama that raises questions about Brown’s interpretation. Hearing of the situation in Gettysburg, Meade sent his trusted chief engineer, Gouverneur K. Warren to reconnoiter and report back. But crucially, he also sent his junior corps commander, Winfield S. Hancock to Gettysburg with the following instruction: “If you think the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under the existing circumstances, so advise [me] and [I] will order all the troops up.”

This is not the action of a man with a plan, particularly a plan to draw Lee onto a strong, prepared position. Meade delegated a crucial decision to a man, capable though he was, who had no full understanding of the current disposition of the Army of Potomac or its lines at Pipe Creek or its logistical situation–all relevant considerations for determining the best course of action. Further, if Meade had been so set on his plan (a) he would have explained that to Hancock, so the II Corps commander could have used that information to determine whether it was “better” to fight at Gettysburg or follow Meade’s original plan to fall back to Pipe Creek drawing Lee along with him, and (b) asked Hancock whether a fighting withdrawal from Gettysburg was possible.

Punting such a major decision to an uninformed subordinate does not bespeak commitment to a plan. But Brown is silent on this, which is the weakest point of the book, and something that undercuts his up-until-then plausible argument.

In the event, Hancock concluded that Gettysburg was “the strongest position by nature on which to fight a battle I ever saw,” and recommended to Meade to bring up the army.

Except it wasn’t–as Brown discusses in detail. Hancock only saw a part of what became the battlefield, which happened to be the strongest position. The rest of it, as Meade found out when he arrived and performed a detailed reconnaissance, had severe disadvantages. These almost cost the Army of the Potomac the battle on 2 July.

Moreover, by moving forward to Gettysburg instead of withdrawing the battered survivors of the 1 July battle back to Pipe Creek, Meade greatly exacerbated the already serious logistical handicaps under which he was operating. One of the best parts of Brown’s book is his detailing of these handicaps–including his extended description about how the march away from established supply lines to Gettysburg stretched the Army’s logistics to the breaking point.

Furthermore, advancing to Gettysburg required his already fagged soldiers to undertake forced marches of dozens of miles in heat, humidity, and dust, with too little food and water. It put tremendous strain on horseflesh–another under-appreciated consideration that elsewhere Brown gives due weight. In essence, Meade gave Lee the gift that Meade was hoping to get from Lee: advancing and concentrating on an enemy already in position.

Perhaps there is an explanation for Meade’s actions. Maybe he, like Reynolds, got his blood up and this clouded his judgment. Perhaps he believed that a retreat would be considered treason by the febrile politicians in Washington. Perhaps something else.

But Meade’s decision and decision making (especially delegating such an epochal decision to a subordinate with an extremely narrow perspective) is problematic, at best. I think that it is worse than that, especially given that it cut against every consideration that Brown raises to explain Meade’s actions from the time he took command until news arrived of Reynolds’ death. So an explanation is required, but Brown does not give it. According to Brown, Meade was going by the book. Then he threw the book out the window. Why? We’re not told. There is a serious gap in Brown’s line.

Many mysteries and conundrums surround the battle of Gettysburg–which is why 159 years after the fact it is the subject of book after book, few as good as Brown’s. This is another mystery, and I wish Kent Masterson Brown had attempted to unravel it–not least because he poses it implicitly. Alas, he doesn’t even acknowledge it as a mystery. Which, I guess, creates an opportunity for yet another author to write another book about Gettysburg.

Ten days ago Vladimir Putin gave his much anticipated “Victory Day” speech, and said . . . well, not much at all.

There was much anticipation and speculation in advance. He would declare war and full mobilization. He would declare victory, or announce some criteria for victory that even his shambolic military could achieve.

Instead, he basically affirmed the status quo. Russia would keep grinding away. It would not escalate. Nor would it de-escalate.

In other words, Putin tacitly admitted what I had asserted weeks ago: Putin/Russia are in Zugzwang: any move makes things worse, so Putin has basically chosen to do nothing, or at least to change nothing.

There has been much conjecture what the Z on Russian equipment means. Now you know. It means “Zugzwang.”

Things have gotten even worse for Russia since 9 May. Ukraine has mounted a modest counteroffensive (a real counteroffensive, not a local counterattack) north of Kharkiv, and pushed the Russian army back across its border in places. The Russian offensive in Donetsk and Luhansk is essentially stalled. Indeed, the Russians suffered a humiliating reverse in an attempt to mount a river crossing: an entire battalion tactical group and its equipment were destroyed, as was the bridging equipment.

Overall, Russian losses continue to mount, with nothing to show for it. The only simulacrum of an achievement is the surrender of the besieged and battered defenders of the Azovstal plant after weeks of relentless Russian assault and bombardment. But on net Ukraine gained far more from that battle by delaying and attriting Russian forces than Russia has by its ultimate capture of the facility.

And now the Russians appear to view their “triumph” as an excuse to commit a massive war crime by trying the captives as war criminals and threatening to execute the surrendered Ukrainians.

But of course they have to do that to justify their war propaganda that they are fighting Nazis. You know, act like Nazis to pretend they are fighting Nazis. But the Russian military and state are already so far down the war crimes road they won’t stop now, especially if this one provides something that they can use to sell this fiasco to the Russian public.

Now the battle resembles World War I far more than World War II. It is an artillery war being fought on a relatively static front. Even if Russia gains some local objectives, “the big push” and “breakthrough” are clearly beyond their capabilities.

Ukraine is clearly encouraged that it can win, with victory defined as pushing out Russians from all of Ukrainian territory. I think this is too optimistic, and even if it is realistic, the cost to Ukraine, let alone the world, is not worth it.

I understand the risk of leaving Putin/Russia with a rump of Ukrainian territory from which they can spin up a future justification for resuming hostilities once they’ve licked their wounds and convinced themselves that they have really fixed their military this time. But the pretext will exist, and in fact be even stronger, if Ukraine retakes the Donbas. For no doubt the Russians will claim that Ukraine is Nazifiing the recaptured Donbas if it retakes control, and this will be a future casus belli. Retaking it would alter the tactical situation somewhat in Ukraine’s favor for the next time, but not enough to change materially the probability of another Russian attempt. The war exists because Ukraine exists. Redrawing the lines of effective control in Ukraine won’t remove the Russian rationale for war. It is not worth it.

So the war will grind on, because Zugzwang Putin can’t admit he’s lost, and Ukraine believes it can win. Nothing good will come of that.

Despite all the hype over DeFi, there is nothing really new under the financial sun. Yes, the platform or technologies may differ, but most (if not all) of what is being hyped as revolutionary today is closely analogous to something that has been around for a long time.

Case in point: stablecoins. As I pointed out in a post several years ago (and as many others have pointed out as well), they are functionally equivalent to notes issued by banks prior to the National Banking Act of 1863. And they have the same fundamental problem: they are liabilities backed by opaque balance sheets that make them subject to runs. Uncertainty about the value of assets backing the notes can induce a run.

How to address this? Well, an algo right? Because don’t algorithms fix everything?

That is the idea behind stablecoin TerraUSD and its companion cryptocurrency TerraLuna. The algo was that the holder of the TerraUSD has the right to exchange $1 of TerraUSD for $1 of TerraLuna. Since the value of TerraLuna fluctuates, the number of TerraLuna exchanged for $1 of TerraUSD must fluctuate as well to maintain the peg. So in essence, TerraUSD is backed by Terra Luna. And TerraLuna is backed by: GEE! LOOK AT THAT SQUIRREL!

But here’s the thing. Regardless of what it is backed by, or not, or what people think that it is backed by, it almost certainly has a downward sloping demand curve: More Luna, lower price. And that’s where the problem lies.

The Magic Algo broke down when many people tried to exchange TerraUSD for Luna, and the supply of Luna exploded . . . and hence the value of Luna crashed. (The story behind what caused the surge of redemptions is convoluted, and really is beside the point for explaining the flaw in the algo: spikes in demand to liquidate can occur for many reasons–sunspots, anyone?–and any one of them can cause the problem.)

The crashing Luna increased the incentive to liquidate TerraUSD which accelerated the downward spiral.

If this problem sounds familiar, it should, and is another illustration of nothing new under the financial sun. Anybody know what I’m thinking about?

That’s right. Enron. Enron set up various special purpose entities in which it placed dodgy assets. Enron protected investors in the SPEs by promising to sell Enron stock to cover losses. When the losses crystalized, Enron had to sell more and more stock, driving down its stock price, a process that eventually resulted in Enron’s messy demise.

The analogy isn’t exact, but it surely rhymes. A scheme intended to prop up the value of one thing by promising to sell more of another thing is inherently unstable because performing on the guarantee undermines the value of what you are guaranteeing it with (because you have to issue more of it), which makes the guarantee worth less, which creates incentives to run to cash in on the guarantee while you can, which triggers a lot of issuance of what you are guaranteeing it with, driving down its value.

It’s an inherently unstable structure. It’s arguably less stable than a traditional stablecoin aka digital bank note because it essentially mandates fire sales in increasing quantities in response to liquidation shocks. With a downward sloping demand curve (e.g., for Luna) the fire sales cause price declines that can–and in this case did–cause the entire structure to implode.

So why did anybody think algorithmizing a doom loop was a good idea? Lunatics, apparently. Quite literally.

I guess I understand the allure of algos, especially to the tech/computer savvy. They seem transparent. Superficially they take out guesswork and human error and human judgment and weird human behavior. But it is exactly their mechanical nature that some find appealing that can lead to disaster, because they often encode positive feedback loops that are triggered by humans behaving like humans when they interact with the algorithm. And in financial markets, positive feedback almost always has negative effects.

And that is what the TerraUSD-Terra Luna algo did.

Algos can be exactly like the broomsticks in the Sorcerer’s Apprentice. They do exactly what they are told. And as in the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, that can be a big problem.

Mark Twain never grows old:

“Reader, suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself.”

This came to mind when reading about the proposal of Rep. Katie Porter to impose some sort of price control on gasoline:

Oil giant @Shell reported a record $9 billion in quarterly profit—3x its earnings a year earlier. Like @exxonmobil and @Chevron, it plans to use windfall profits to enrich shareholders.

I just introduced a bill to crack down on Big Oil's price-gouging.https://t.co/qsF5wmLJ4Y

— Rep. Katie Porter (@RepKatiePorter) May 6, 2022

Since the beginning of recorded history–and that is not hyperbole–the stock government response to high prices is price controls. The Pharaohs. Hammurabi. Diocletian. And many other examples. And it continues through the ages to more recent history, e.g., rent control in NY starting in WWII, Nixon in 1973.

And the result is always the same: economic disaster. It is price controls result in real shortages: people standing in lines, empty shelves, etc.

Always. If price doesn’t clear the market, waste (e.g., time spent standing in line) will.

But politicians never learn.

Nancy Pelosi (who is old enough to remember gas lines–hell, she’s probably old enough to remember the Code of Diocletian, if not that of Hammurabi) is of course fully on board. Which is an illustration that the adage “those who don’t remember the past are condemned to repeat it” is wrong: many who can remember the past repeat its errors nonetheless.

Elizabeth Warren hasn’t weighed in on this yet, but you know she will, because she’s the main spokes-shrieker for The Gouger Theory of Prices.

The Gouger Theory is stupid on its face. Did oil companies wake up one morning and realize: “Whoa! We coulda jacked up prices and gouged the suckers! What were we thinking?” Did they have some sort of epileptic fit in 2020, when prices crashed? What were they thinking?

No. This isn’t gouging. This is-as it almost always is-fundamentals.

Oil prices are high. But in this week’s edition of “Find the Bottleneck,” that’s only one of the drivers (no pun intended) behind high gasoline and diesel prices. The bottleneck is in refining.

How do we know? Let’s look at the diesel crack:

It’s gone from around $22/bbl to as high as $70/bbl. (And the $22 is high compared to what it was a year ago). (Gasoline crack somewhat similar though not as bad–though it is likely to get so when the peak demand season kicks in.)

A high refining margin means that refinery capacity is constrained. And yes, it is constrained: it’s not as if refiners are exercising market power (i.e., gouging) by withholding output. Here is the capacity utilization in the US over time:

It’s running at pre-Pandemic levels.

And here’s another thing: post-Pandemic capacity is well below pre-Pandemic capacity:

That drop from pre-Pandemic levels is around 5 percent. That’s a lot.

So refineries are running flat out, and refinery capacity is down. What do you get?: big refining margins and high prices at the pump. Yes, it’s good to be a refiner now (though not so much two years ago). But it’s not good because you get to exercise market power. It’s because even under competition it’s highly profitable because of supply-demand fundamentals.

A variety of factors have contributed to this. The loss of a good chunk of Russian oil output is keeping the price of oil up, but the loss of Russian diesel supplies to Europe is probably a bigger factor. The US is to a large extent filling the gap, to the extent it can, by exporting.

But no matter how you break it down, it is clear that this is fundamentals driven. It is not gouging. And capping prices on the delusional belief that it is gouging will wreak economic havoc.

Which has never stopped the Democrats before, I know. (And Republicans too, e.g., Nixon).

One thing here does deserve emphasis. The decline in capacity is directly attributable to the Pandemic. Correction: it is directly attributable to the horrible policy choices that politicians and bureaucrats forced on us in the name of the Pandemic. The lockdowns in particular.

Like many, many things going on in commodity world right now, the current spike in product prices overall, and relative to crude, is yet another baleful consequence of completely mental decisions to shut down economies and crater the economics of producing and processing commodities.

In other news of economic-related political hysteria, there is also a lot of finger pointing going on about baby formula. I don’t have the information at hand to analyze in the same way as I can refined petroleum prices, but I can say what it isn’t. It isn’t “oligopoly.”

But again, those educated in politics (did I really use “educated” and “politics” in the same sentence?) and not economics immediately seize on this as an explanation.

Er, the baby formula business was an oligopoly a year ago. And a year before that. And a year before that. So . . . why all of a sudden did they supposedly decide to create a shortage? And pray tell–how do you make money if you aren’t selling stuff?

So whenever Congresspeople, or people who buzz around them like insects (yeah, I’m looking at you, journalists) come up with some economic brainstorm, remember Twain. They’re idiots. Dangerous idiots.

In the latest episode of Condescending Lectures From Our Betters: Shut Up, Proles!, Samantha Power (the Lioness of Libya) recently “informed” us that the drastic decline in the supply of chemical fertilizers is actually a good thing, as it will wean farmers off these horrible concoctions, and induce them to use natural alternatives like manure and compost instead:

Biden official Samantha Power celebrates fertilizer shortages that will force farmers to “hasten transitions” to “natural solutions, like manure and compost.”

“Never let a crisis go to waste." pic.twitter.com/rZ5uMy0K5U

— RNC Research (@RNCResearch) May 1, 2022

This is so bat shit delusional I don’t even know where to begin. Following Power’s advice would ravage agricultural productivity and condemn literally billions to starvation. And as if there isn’t a real time, ripped from the headlines case study that proves the insanity–and evil–of her prescription.

And, where, pray tell, is the manure to come from, if we follow another ukase of the ruling class, namely the war on meat and livestock? After all, livestock belch and fart, producing methane–and we can’t have THAT, can we? For example, Ireland is supposed to cull 1.3 million animals, and Northern Ireland another 1 million, to meet GHG emission standards.

No animals, no shit. No shit!

So we are supposed to become vegans, eating gruel produced from plants fertilized by livestock that don’t exist–smart! What would we do without smart people telling us how to live?

And even if meat survives, if you haven’t noticed: (a) collecting the manure of pasturing animals would cost rather a lot, and (b) pastureland and small grains farmland tend to be located rather far apart (because the former is not suited to be the latter), transporting the manure of pasturing animals to the fields would cost rather a lot (not to mention involve the release of massive GHGs–or did I forget that it would be transported in electric vehicles powered from wind and solar generators?)

In other words, Samantha Power is completely full of shit. As if you should have needed me to tell you that.

This is just another example–an egregious one, admittedly–of the utter insanity of those who presume not just to tell us how to live–but who presume to force us to live according to their obsessions. The utter unreality of the “energy transition” is another example.

You could get the idea that these people want to kill us. And in fact, you may be right. Based on the evidence, you cannot reject the hypothesis.

Its unexpected success on the battlefield has convinced Ukraine that it can achieve victory. And by “victory,” I mean driving Russia out of Ukraine altogether, including Donetsk, Luhansk, and yes, Crimea.

This is very disturbing. Defending against a shambolic attacking army with horrible logistics and a pathetic operational plan is one thing. Attacking–even against a shambolic army–is another. This is particularly true given that the Russian army was designed and trained to stop a Nato offensive (as ludicrous as that idea is), and has massive amounts of artillery that would make any attack a nightmare: if it was doctrinally unsuited for offense, and adopted a terrible offensive plan, that does not imply that it cannot defend (and against an army that has itself taken serious casualties in personnel and materiel). And all of the tactics that allowed the Ukrainians to blunt the Russian attack, notably ATGM ambushes and attacks on lengthening supply lines, could be turned against them. Ukraine would be giving up all the factors that have worked to its advantage, and would be courting all of the factors that contributed to Russia’s disaster.

The last time the Ukrainian army got the bit between its teeth, in Debaltseve in 2014, it did not turn out well. Yes, the Ukrainian army is far better now, but fools rush in.

Worse, the US appears to be encouraging this. And in an unbelievable and inexcusable error, the administration–SecDef Austin in particular–have publicly announced that the US objective is to weaken Russia. Even if this is the objective, and that would be defensible, it is not defensible at all to make it public. It only validates the Russian narrative that it is at war with the West, thereby bolstering Russian popular support for the war, but it encourages Ukraine to run risks that it should not.

What is the alternative? Alternatives have to be evaluated in terms of the ugly facts.

The war is exacting a horrific toll on Ukraine. Its people, its infrastructure, and its economy. Tens of thousands dead. Millions of refugees. Devastated cities. A ruined countryside.

But more, it is exacting an awful toll on the world, through its extraordinary disruptions of agriculture and energy markets. All the more because Russia appears to be exacerbating deliberately these impacts. This is not merely a matter of comfort and ease. It is a matter of survival for the world’s poorest.

Given this reality, a less than ideal, and likely temporary, resolution is preferable. Something that gives Putin (or whoever is really in charge) a pretext to cease hostilities, and leaves Ukraine not in control of all the territory within its official boundaries. Edward Luttwak suggests legitimate (emphasis on legitimate) plebiscites in various Ukrainian regions.

The downsides are apparent. Putin/Russia could come back for more in time: maybe “will” is the better word, because no deal with Putin/Russia can be considered binding. Such a deal would represent major concessions on fundamental principles.

But it would stop the slaughter and mayhem for a time. It would allow time to build up Ukraine, and to permit a development of a longer term strategy to deal with the Russia Problem. And it is a big problem.

Remember. There are no ideal “solutions” in foreign policy. There are only shitty options. Statesmanship is the ability to choose the least shitty, and make it reality. Neither Ukraine nor the US (nor Russia) is demonstrating such statesmanship.

One can understand, on a human level, the Ukrainian reaction. The US does not have the same excuse. It is a time for realism, realistically pursued with cold eyes. It is not the time for Wilsonian impulsiveness. That has never turned out well.

MacArthur said “there is no substitute for victory.” This was an absolutist statement that violated fundamental principles of choice. Substitutibility depends on relative costs. Victory–e.g., expelling Russia from all of Ukraine–would be very costly, if is achievable at all. Given such cost, there are substitutes, MacArthur notwithstanding.

The awful head of the Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkos, set off a firestorm last week when he revealed that the DHS was setting up a “Disinformation Governance Board,” tasked with fighting disinformation. It has also been announced that a real head case, and a hyper-partisan one to boot, Nina Jankowicz will head the Board.

Left unanswered was how this new entity will combat disinformation. Here is my surmise. It will identify certain stories as disinformation, giving official imprimatur to this designation: it will not take any direct action against anyone disseminating this information. Instead, social media companies will then censor or suppress these stories, claiming that they have been identified as disinformation by the government–and who can argue with that, right? They always have our best interest at heart, right? Mommy is just protecting us from bad things!

This is the way that social media shut down COVID stories it didn’t like. If something contradicted CDC or WHO, Facebook and Twitter would label it disinformation and take efforts to suppress it.

In essence, with COVID, social media companies became the enforcers of bans on speech the government didn’t like. In an effort to circumvent First Amendment issues, the government essentially outsourced censorship to private entities. The private entities were happy to go along, because they were on board with the agenda.

The model worked so well that the government is now looking to expand this privatized censorship model to embrace all speech.

This transparent end run around the First Amendment cannot be allowed to stand. The first time Twitter or Facebook or anyone uses the Ministry of Truth’s guidance to remove or throttle or prevent the posting of content, there should be a 1A lawsuit.

Hell, there should have been such suits already over social media COVID censorship.

The real possibility that an Elon Musk-owned Twitter will not play this game is precisely why there has been such a hysterical reaction to his purchase.

This is the biggest threat to our 1A rights in our lifetime, and possibly ever. It cannot stand. It must be fought, and the battle must be won.

I have often written of my admiration for the United States Marine Corps–all the while acknowledging that I would not be good fit for the Marines 😛 In particular I admire its culture. It is a true warrior culture that often seems strange to outsiders, who often include even those in other branches of the military. This culture, forged in combat for almost two-and-a-half centuries has allowed the Marines to prevail in virtually every kind of battle (sniping from topmasts; counterinsurgency in Central America, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq; urban warfare; amphibious assault; and even armored drives in the desert) in virtually every possible climate (except Arctic, though the Marines train for that too). This flexibility and adaptability has distinguished the USMC, and perhaps reflects its often precarious status within the US military: it has had to adapt to survive, especially in the battle for defense dollars.

The organization and doctrine of the USMC is also very distinctive and worthy of admiration. The USMC has always been built round the rifleman: “every Marine a rifleman.” As such, its doctrine is based on fire and maneuver, with artillery, armor, and most crucially organic air power (fixed and rotary wing) having the mission of assisting the grunts at the pointy end take and hold ground. As a result, they have been amazingly successful in doing so.

The current Commandant of the USMC, David H. Berger, is pushing a major reorganization and reorientation of the Corps that would radically change it. The motivation for Berger’s revolution is that the US must reorient to confront China. Berger believes that the USMC can best advance that objective by operating in the littorals to direct fires at Chinese naval targets and to provide reconnaissance and screening for the USN and USAF.

To accomplish this mission, Berger believes that armor is irrelevant, and that conventional artillery will play a much diminished role in the Marine’s future. He also believes that the days of amphibious assault are over.

Based on these precepts, Berger would massively overhaul the force. All armor–all–would be eliminated, on the theory that if the Marines need it, they can call on the Army. (Hmmm.) The number of artillery battalions would be slashed. The number of infantry battalions would also be reduced, and the sizes of these battalions would be reduced as well. The Marines would operate many fewer aircraft.

What would be increased under Berger’s plan? Missiles capable of striking enemy ships and land targets from littorals, and anti-aircraft missiles.

Berger would also transform manpower policies, in particular by bringing in specialists in areas such as cyber and giving them rank and assignments based on civilian experience and expertise.

I must admit deep reservations about this vision. I do commend the refocus on fighting China, in the littorals in particular. I also understand that military conservatism can be extremely destructive. Living off past glories and perpetuating past practices risks becoming like the Prussian army that remained wedded to old ways, only to be crushed by Napoleon at Jena.

But I deem the proposal to be extremely risky, and likely ill-advised.

Most importantly, it is a reorganization built on a particular theory of what war will be fought in the future, and how it will be fought. Militaries have always been poor at forecasting the future. Moreover, creating a force that can do one thing gives an enemy the incentive to do something other than what the force is designed to do, which renders it all but ineffective. (Think of the Maginot Line. There are many other examples.)

War is uncertain, and the future of warfare is uncertain–and one’s enemies have incentives to attempt surprises that add to the uncertainty.

In the face of considerable uncertainty, optionality is extremely valuable. The ability to adapt is extremely valuable. A force designed to do one thing offers very little optionality, and is of little utility outside that one thing. Which gives an enemy a reason to do something else.

The Marines have demonstrated the benefits of that optionality for their entire history, and in particularly during the last 35 years. In that time, they have succeeded in armored warfare in the desert, urban warfare in extremely hostile environments, guerrilla warfare in jungles and the Hindu Kush. All because of the adaptability of fire and maneuver to different combat situations, the diverse organic weapons of the USMC, and the peerless training and esprit of Marines of all ranks.

Yes, fighting China in the littorals may be the most likely future conflict. But planning based on the most likely outcome is almost always faulty logic, especially considering that the enemy gets a vote and can avoid fighting the way you are oriented to fight.

Berger’s plans would largely eliminate that optionality. This would deprive the national command authority of the ability to respond flexibly to the predictably unpredictable types of conflicts that will occur in the future–or will not occur, because the US does not have the capability to fight them.

I am also deeply skeptical that modern weaponry has rendered fire and maneuver obsolete. If anything, the Russian experience in Ukraine demonstrates that the inability to execute fire and maneuver is a recipe for military disaster.

The re-engineering of Marine culture is particularly worrisome. It is really the USMC’s secret sauce. It is the product of centuries of evolution and experience. It is an intangible that has led to tangible results from the shores of Iwo Jima to the sands of Tripoli to the Halls of Montezuma and pretty much everywhere else that Marine boots have trod and Marines have bled.

All in all, Berger’s proposal has a very McNamara feel to it. McNamara had some insights and offered some constructive criticism and made some constructive changes, but for the most part his influence was baleful.

Ironically, Berger’s proposal has unleashed a barrage of fire and much maneuvering from myriad critics, including notably every living USMC commandant. The opposition position is well-summarized in a James Webb op-ed, Webb being a USNA grad, Vietnam combat Marine, and ex-SecDef and Senator. A series of essays in Task and Purpose also offers extremely trenchant criticism of Berger’s plan. I found General Van Riper’s essay particularly persuasive, as was the one on Berger’s “talent management” plan, which emphasizes the risk it poses to the Marines’ unique culture.

Of course, military forces have to adapt as technologies and threats change. Optimizing these adaptations is difficult because of the huge uncertainties involved. But it is precisely those uncertainties which make plans based on a narrow conception of future threats and technologies particularly ill-advised. The fire-and-maneuver-based USMC has demonstrated amazing flexibility and adaptability in his storied history. A prudent course would be to determine how to adapt such a force to incorporate a new mission without crippling its ability to execute old ones. Unfortunately, that is not the course that General Berger is setting, and that leaves me very uneasy indeed.

The early Russian story regarding the Moskva’s fate was that it sank in “stormy seas” or “heavy seas.” Well, pictures have emerged that show . . . now brace yourselves for this! . . . that the Russians are full of shit.

#Ukraine: The first image of the guided missile cruiser Moskva of the Russian Navy that sank a few days ago, via @Bormanike.

Depending on the side you choose to believe, the ship was either hit by 2x R-360 "Neptun" ASMs, or suffered a catastrophic ammunition fire. You decide. pic.twitter.com/CTRNAKT9ES

— ?? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) April 17, 2022

The sea is like glass. Other reports (including those from the US) said that bad weather obscured satellite and aerial imaging. Well, there is high overcast, but nothing that would prevent real time observation of the aftermath of the strike.

From the images, it does not appear that the P-1000 Vulkan ASM mounted so prominently on the deck were hit, or exploded. The hits appear to have occurred on the superstructure, although the list could have been due to a waterline hit. Alternatively, the list could have been due to the explosion of ammunition stowed in the magazines below deck.

The fire appears to have been very severe, and was obviously not extinguished before the ship was abandoned. The smoke appears even heavier in other images. (Helluva lot of good those two water cannon are doing there.)

Of course it is impossible to judge the condition of the inside of the ship from these photos in order to determine whether it should have been possible to save it. The external view shows less apparently less damage than on the USS Stark, which was also struck in the superstructure. (And to correct my earlier post, the Stark was hit by two Exocets, which BTW had warheads about 10 pct larger than the Ukrainian Neptunes.) So the inability to save the Moskva remains something of a puzzle.

Not that we will ever get the straight dope from the Russians on this.