Andy Home has an interesting piece in Reuters. He provides information that strongly suggests that the LME copper contract has been squeezed. All of the tell-tale signs are there:
What the exchange terms a dominant long position emerged on the copper market last week.
This player controlled 50-80 percent of all LME open stocks, excluding metal earmarked for physical load-out, and had bulked this up with cash positions to the point that its overall position represented in excess of 90 percent of all available stocks.
That position was being rolled forward daily, forcing shorts to pay the backwardation price as they too rolled their positions.
The cash premium over three-month metal, the backwardation, had flexed out as wide as $27.75 per ton the previous week as the long tightened its grip on the London market’s nearby date structure.
Someone, it seems, was not prepared to pay the roll price and decided to deliver physical metal against their position. [LME stocks rose almost 40 percent in a few days.]
And they did so in a way to generate the maximum bang for their buck.
It seems to have worked.
That cash premium has evaporated. As of Thursday’s close, the cash-to-three-months spread was valued at $15 per ton contango.
The ripple effects have spread down the curve, LME broker Marex Spectron noting that the July-December spread eased $10 to $35 per ton contango over the course of Thursday.
The latest positioning reports, denoting the state of play as of Wednesday’s close, show the dominant long still holding 50-80 percent of stocks <0#LME-WHL> but with no equivalent cash position <0#LME-WHC>.
All the signs are there: a large long position, here both in physical metal and prompt LME contracts; a spike in the backwardation; a movement of metal into deliverable position; followed by a collapse in the backwardation. Also, the large long apparently liquidated the bulk of his position in LME contracts, as is necessary to profit. Right out of the book.
These episodes are chronic in the commodity markets, and on the LME in particular. They impose real deadweight losses (the costly movement of copper into LME warehouses being an example), and undermine the effectiveness of derivatives contracts as a hedging mechanism. Would that regulators pursued this conduct more vigorously, rather than obsessing over spoofing games, or chasing the “excessive speculation” will-o-the-wisp.