After years of wending through to what is to an American an incomprehensible legislative process that involves a three body problem (the trialogue of the Commission, the EU Parliament, and member states), Europe has agreed on its version of the trade execution portion of Frankendodd: Mifid II. (The clearing and OTC collateralization equivalents are covered under a different law, EMIR.) A good summary is here.
It contains many of the objectionable features of Frankendodd, namely, a mandate that swaps be executed on SEF-like entities (Organized Trading Facilities, or OTFs, in Euro parlance), and commodity position limits. The former were pretty much a done deal after the Pittsburgh G20 meeting, the latter a reflection of the global suspicions of “speculation” in commodities, but intensified by European NGO convictions that speculation in food is evil. (The shade of Adam Smith is shaking his head, noting that his observation about the equivalence between the popular terrors and suspicions against speculation and the popular terrors and suspicions involving witchcraft is as apt today as it was in 1776. Except that witchcraft is probably much more socially acceptable these days.)
But the EU has added its own idiosyncratic idiocies to its law. Two things stand out.
First, the EU has mandated open access to derivatives exchange CCPs, in an attempt to demolish the vertical silo model. Yes, the mandate is delayed-by as much as 5 years-but “I will wait 5 years to be stupid” hardly seems to be much of a defense. As I’ve written for years-a year or two before SWP began, in point of fact-the vertical silo makes economic sense (from a transactions cost economics perspective), and the pro-competition justification for it (namely, to encourage competition in execution) is inconsistent with what economists have known since the 1960s (the “one monopoly rent” theorem).
Second, and even more inanely, Mifid II caps the dark pool share in the trading of any individual equity at 8 percent. Overlooking the operational difficulties of enforcing a collective constraint on volume across multiple venues, this reflects a suspicion of dark pools (a pejorative name in itself) that is again not grounded in good economics. In a second best world, where competition between exchanges is imperfect, off-exchange venues (block markets in the old days, internalization, dark pools) can be welfare enhancing. The fact that many market participants find them the lowest-cost venue to transact in should at least give pause to regulators, and ask them to inquire why this is true, and do the appropriate cost-benefit analysis of the trade-offs involved. But no, fools rush in.
It strikes me that the Euros have created a new Pixar character. Buzz Darkpool: “To stupidity and beyond!” Derivatives trading mandates and position limits are stupid, but they’ve decided to go beyond that.
Meaning that the US can perhaps adopt what I’ve often said is the Russophile motto: “Not the worst!”