Streetwise Professor

November 23, 2017

Igor Is Not Available. Please Leave Your Name and Number, and He’ll Return Your Call as Soon as Possible.

Filed under: Economics,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 10:27 pm

Who knew that Igor Sechin was such a shy and retiring type? He has been summoned thrice to testify at the Ulyukaev bribery trial, and thrice he has failed to appear. One time he apparently dodged the summons by hiding in his office, and having his staff refuse to accept it. The other times he has said his busy travel schedule precludes him from attending. He has been summoned yet again to appear on 27 November, but the judge in the case said that Sechin indicates that his schedule wilt allow him to testify before the end of the year.

What will his next excuse be? “Sorry. I’m washing my hair that day”? Alas, “I’m scheduled to have my mullet trimmed” is no longer credible.

So why is Igor so reticent? After all, it is because of him, and a sting in which he participated, that Ulyukaev is in the dock. I discussed the issue with a Russian who follows the situation closely–perhaps too closely for comfort, in fact–and we pretty much agree on three possible explanations.

First, embarrassment. Transcripts, then audio, and now video of the sting have been released. Sechin does not come off well in these, and his offer of sausages in a hamper has become something of a running joke in Moscow. Relatedly, Sechin’s behavior violates the norms of inter-elite interaction (sort of like violating the mafia code), and this is there for all to see.

Second, there have been inconsistencies in the prosecution story. Sechin may dread cross-examination that will expose the episode as entrapment or fraud.

Third, Sechin may be testing the limits of his power and autonomy, or deliberately flouting the rules to show that he is an untouchable.

Will we ever learn the truth? This being Russia, there is considerable room for doubt. But one thing we can be sure is not the truth is that Sechin is a respectable figure. He is either an arrogant thug who operates outside the law–or wants to do so. Or he is a buffoon who played out a charade–badly–in order to punish someone who tried to thwart him.

Come to think of it, I’m going with “both”.

And it is not that Sechin’s performance as head of Rosneft compensates for his buffoonish thuggery (or is it thuggish buffoonery?). Indeed, the last earnings report was a disaster, and there are still many questions about the whole Rosneft-Glencore-QIA-Intesa-VTB-CEFC-Ivan Doesky* deal, and just how money from that deal made it (or didn’t) to the Russian budget to fulfill Putin’s privatization promise.

Rosneft’s stock price has been lackluster, at best. Yet the company has been on an acquisition binge overseas. (And how is that Venezueula thing working out? Pouring money down a corrupt rathole–sheer genius! What strategic vision!)

Things have gotten so bad–and so impossible to ignore–that even Sberbank released a scathing criticism of the company:

In the 64-page research report, dated October 2017, Sberbank’s division Sberbank CIB called on Rosneft to change its strategy “markedly” after the energy company incurred huge debts following an acquisition spree at home and abroad.

“Rosneft has been touting its top-down efficiency effort, complete with Stalinesque tales about employees being confronted with charges of malfeasance at management meetings and marched straight into police custody,” the initial report said.

. . . .

The report’s authors, in a section titled “Rosneft: We Need to Talk About Igor”, also said Rosneft’s powerful Chief Executive Igor Sechin “almost single-handedly sets the company’s strategy”.

They calculated that since purchasing oil and gas producer TNK-BP for around $55 billion in 2013, Rosneft had spent a net $22 billion on acquisitions, “with no clear focus”.

“Assuming he remains in charge, the company will continue to pursue volume growth. In doing so, its heft will push it further out of Russia and perhaps further out of oil. This will only disappoint its shareholders,” the report said.

LOL.

Actually, Sberbank wasn’t laughing, because Igor and Rosneft took extreme exception to the snarky criticism. Sberbank subsequently withdrew the report and reissued it, minus the offending language.

One can imagine what transpired in order to achieve that result.

Thus the management of the world’s largest publicly traded oil company (by volume, NOT by value, to be sure). Run by–indeed dominated by–a strategic imbecile who attempts to compensate for his managerial incompetence by strong-arming his domestic rivals into giving up their resources, and engaging in clownish masquerades to frame up those who have attempted to thwart him.

There are larger lessons here too. Keep Igor in mind whenever anyone shrieks about Putin’s fearsome juggernaut. If the management of a national champion in the largest and most important industry in Russia is any indication, the colossus has feet of clay–and a head of brick.

* And no, Donald Trump is not one of the Ivan Doeskys, dossier notwithstanding. I am referring to the unknown party or parties who (a) chipped in the difference between what Glencore, QIA, and Intesa cop to have paid, and the amount that Rosneft claim to have received, and (b) indemnified Glencore against loss.

November 22, 2017

Obama Turned the Net Into a Neut: But It’s Getting Better!

Filed under: Economics,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 9:52 pm

Few subjects generate such intense reactions as net neutrality. It has become freighted with much emotional baggage, largely because it has been framed–artfully–as a matter of free choice and free speech vs. censorship and control of information by malign interests.

The Trump FCC’s announcement of its plans to reverse the Obama FFC’s 2015 net neutrality rule has led brought the issue–and the Manichean rhetoric–back to the fore.

One would hope that applying some basic economics might shed some light, and cool some of the rhetorical heat. I will give it a go.

The basic economic issue is straightforward. It is basically a matter of price discrimination, a subject that economists have analyzed and understood for years. The crucial feature of net neutrality is its ban on ISPs charging different prices for different types or categories of service. So for example, your Internet provider cannot charge higher prices for more intense consumers of bandwidth (e.g., streaming services).

Although the term “price discrimination” has bad connotations–which net neutrality supporters emphasize–it can be good, and it is difficult to identify conditions in which it is unambiguously bad compared to the real world alternative.

One reason that charging different prices for different types of customers can enhance efficiency–and why suppressing the ability to do so can be inefficient–is that the costs of providing a service can differ between customers. Some customers are more expensive to serve, or demand a differentiated service that is costlier to deliver. Providing the price signals that give the incentive to consume, produce, and invest in capacity efficiently requires price discrimination: higher cost customers should pay more than lower cost customers.

This is an issue in providing Internet services. Some services and users that consume more bandwidth, and impose greater risk of congestion on the system. A pricing structure that does not charge such users/services a higher price to reflect these higher costs induces overconsumption of these services, and imposes costs (e.g., poorer quality of service) on those who do not put such demands on the system. Furthermore, preventing ISPs from charging prices that reflect higher cost distorts their incentives to invest in more capacity, or in technologies and congestion management techniques that ease burdens on the system.

Prohibiting charging prices that vary by type of service or customer therefore results in cross-subsidization (low cost customers subsidize high cost ones), which both transfers wealth and undermines efficient allocation of resources.

Price discrimination can also occur as a result of market power. There are different “degrees” of price discrimination. To keep things simple, the most common kind is “third degree price discrimination”, in which a firm with market power who can segment customers based on their demand elasticities: less price sensitive customers pay higher prices than more elastic demanders.

It is plausible that demand elasticities for Internet services differ, and that elasticity may vary by the type of content, e.g., that the demand for streaming services is less price elastic than the demand for email or cat videos. In this case, charging a different price for streaming services vs. more mundane uses of the Internet could well be a form of 3d degree price discrimination.

It has long been known that the welfare effects of 3d degree discrimination are ambiguous: as compared to a single price for all services/customers charged by a firm facing a downward sloping demand curve, welfare (consumer plus producer surplus) or consumer surplus can be higher of lower with price discrimination. Furthermore, if a firm faces substantial economies of scale, the efficient way of covering fixed costs typically involves 3d degree price discrimination (“Ramsey Pricing”).

So one cannot say a priori that even if price discrimination by ISPs reflects market power, suppressing price discrimination improves welfare: the market power remains, and the ISP might exercise it in a way that causes welfare to be lower than if it exercises it by price discriminating.

Moreover, there is reason to doubt that a predicate for inefficient price discrimination–ISP market power–exists, or is more acute in this market than it is in many other markets where price discrimination is common (and believe me, that is pretty much every market). The days of the “last mile” monopoly are over. A very large fraction of Internet users in the US have access to multiple ISPs. Furthermore, wireless service (4G, and perhaps soon 5G services) competes with traditional cable and DSL service. Between wireless and cable, off the top of my head I can think of 8 providers that I can access. Yes, there is some overlap (e.g., ATT provides both types of service), but the number of choices most Americans have for Internet access is greater than they have for many other goods and services. Meaning that it is unlikely that market power problems are so acute in this market as to justify regulations unheard of in other markets where price discrimination is widely practiced.

I should also note that some kinds of price discrimination can unambiguously improve welfare relative to simple monopoly pricing. First degree (rare in practice) or second degree (e.g., quantity discounts, two part pricing) is superior to simple monopoly pricing. I would wager that some ISPs will adopt such efficiency enhancing price policies if freed from net neutrality restrictions.

Thus, if your concern is that ISPs exercise market power by price discrimination, suppressing price discrimination is not the best way to tackle the problem: attack the market power directly by reducing entry barriers or antitrust actions against ISPs. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that price discrimination in this market is driven primarily by market power, given the competitive conditions in the market. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, attempting to squelch (at best ambiguously inefficient) market power driven price discrimination also precludes efficiency enhancing price discrimination based on differences in service/customer cost. Doing so imposes substantial costs.

For all these reasons, I conclude that net neutrality is (a) a solution to a non-existent problem, and (b) can do positive harm by preventing the development of efficient pricing systems that give appropriate incentives to consume and invest in system capacity, and to optimize its use.

Another aspect of the net neutrality rule is to prevent ISPs from favoring its content (which it either produces, or buys from others) over that supplied by independent parties.  Again, a necessary condition (but definitely not a sufficient one) for this to be a problem is ISP market power, which as noted above is unlikely to be a particularly serious issue. Furthermore, it is typically not in the interest of a downstream firm with market power to restrict its customers’ access to upstream product. Offering suboptimal product variety reduces the demand for the putative monopolist’s services, which reduces its profit. It is typically more profitable for the monopolist to offer the optimal product variety, and profit by charging a higher monopoly price.

There are some rather contrived models in which vertical restrictions (e.g., tying or exclusive dealing) can be used to lever market power from one good to another: the practical applicability of these models is dubious at best, as some of the modelers themselves acknowledge. But there is also an extensive literature (much of it originating in Chicago in the 1960s, including seminal contributions by my thesis advisor Lester Telser) showing that such vertical restrictions are usually efficiency-enhancing responses to some incompleteness in property rights or information problem. Indeed, in US antitrust law, horizontal restrictions (e.g., cartels) receive far more scrutiny that vertical ones, precisely because academic research on the potential efficiency enhancing effects of vertical restrictions, and the difficulty of using them to increase monopoly power, has informed antitrust policy–under administrations of both parties I might add. (As an aside, this makes the Trump DOJ challenge of the Time Warner-ATT deal somewhat strange, and intellectually at odds with the FCC’s move against net neutrality.)

In sum, I favor jettisoning net neutrality. No, I do not believe that the ISP market is perfectly competitive, but that is a red herring. Even acknowledging the possibility of imperfect competition in that market (although I do believe fear thereof is overblown), net neutrality is not the right way to address it, and indeed, might actually mean that market power is exercised in a way that reduces efficiency. In other words, the Obama FCC wanted to fight ISP market power in the worst way–and it did!

So if net neutrality is an inefficient policy, why did it prevail in the US, at least for a while? That is, what is the political economy of net neutrality?

Well, Chicago has a lot to say about this as well. Indeed, the work of another of my former advisors–Sam Peltzman–is directly on point. Sam’s amazing 1976 JLE article “Towards a More General Theory of Regulation” has an important, but widely overlooked prediction: regulation is likely to occur in industries where there are substantial differences in costs of serving different customers, and that regulated price structures suppress these cost differences. That is, regulated price structures cross-subsidize high cost customers. As Sam put it: “cross—subsidization follows a systematic pattern in which high cost customer groups are subsidized by low cost customers.” And: “The important contribution of politics is to suppress economically important distinctions and substitute for these a common element in all prices.”

That is net neutrality in a nutshell. Put simply, the Obama FCC bought political support Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Netflix, et al by implementing a policy that cross subsidized their services. They used the political system to push regulation that suppresses economically important distinctions.

This result is less surprising from a political economy/public choice perspective than the Trump administration’s reversal of net neutrality. My first stab at an explanation is that this reflects the fact that a Trump administration can never expect to obtain political support from these companies, and can doesn’t really have to fear additional opposition: they already hate him with the heat of 1000 suns. So why  not stiff them?

Karma is a bitch, eh?

Now for some laughs!

November 7, 2017

If the Dems Keep This Up, Ima Gonna Run Outta Popcorn

Filed under: Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 9:59 pm

The Democratic establishment has gone to DefCon One over Donna Brazile’s (so far only excerpted) blasts directed at the Hillary campaign. The biggest return salvo was in the form of an open letter signed by dozens and dozens, including notables such as Huma Abedin (Hillary’s constant companion, who frequently wore an outfit to match Hillary’s–yeah, I don’t want to know either), Robby Mook (campaign director), and–wait for it–Marc Elias (the Perkins Coie lawyer who was the intermediary between the Clinton campaign and Fusion GPS, which in turn was the connection to Christopher Steele of dossier infamy). The whole thing is a hoot, but this part totally cracked me up: “It is particularly troubling and puzzling that she would seemingly buy into false Russian-fueled propaganda, spread by both the Russians and our opponent, about our candidate’s health.”

I mean it had to be the Russians, right? Had. To. Be.

First, this is now the Democrats’ Theory of Everything: THE RUSSIANS DONE IT. Second, who could possibly have had any doubts about Hillary’s health? That nagging cough? Nothing! The fainting spell (or freezing episode) or whatever it was on 9/11/16? Just “overheating.” Brazil also points out some odd Hillary public behavior, most notably her infamous “basket of deplorables” comment, which led Brazile to wonder whether Clinton was so mentally out of it that she wasn’t aware that she was speaking in public, rather than at a closed event.

In other words, far more than the rest of us, Donna Brazile had the ability to observe closely Hillary’s health, and it raised grave concerns in her mind. Yet Hillary’s phalanx of flunkies denies Brazile’s first hand knowledge, and instead blames her concerns on Russian propaganda.

Unbelievable. The only thing Russian about this entire episode is the Hillary cabal’s obfuscation of her health issues, which brings back memories of the last days of Chernenko or Brezhnev.

For her part, Brazile has been nothing if not entertaining. First, she denied that the word “rigged” is in her book. Well, it is definitely in the Politico piece which is allegedly an excerpt, and everyone who read that concluded that Brazile was accusing the DNC of rigging the process against Bernie: if not, why the candles and the music to put her at peace before the confessional phone call to Sanders? But maybe her book has undergone a quick rewrite (perhaps like James Comey’s letter regarding Hillary’s server, which included the legally damning phrase “grossly negligent” before it didn’t). Or something.

Second, Brazile accuses the campaign leadership of being sexist, and treating her like a slave. Randy Mook in particular comes in for damning criticism. I’m not a big Brazile fan, but Mook is a first class creep, so it’s an easy call regarding whom to pull for here.

Third, she makes some rather odd statements about murdered campaign Seth Rich. This has sent conspiratorial minds–of which there are far too many these days–into paroxysms of theorizing.

There are many conjectures about Brazile’s motives. Self-protection is a leading candidate in the comments section. Shifting blame and making money are others. Revenge is also in the running. Another theory making the rounds is that she is attempting (perhaps at the behest of the Bernie branch of the party) to torpedo a potential Hillary! 2020 repeat. Yes, some think that Hillary is in fact scheming to run again. I can understand many Democrats’ horror at the thought–she would be a very serious contender to tie William Jennings Bryan and Adlai Stevenson as three time losers (though Stevenson, of course, only was the party’s standard bearer twice, losing the party’s nomination to JFK in 1960, as Hillary did to Obama in 2008).

I’m going with “all of the above.” I think this is a seriously overdetermined mixture of the personal and the political. Whatever it is, I hope she keeps on it. Though if she does I’ll have to restock the popcorn because I’m going through it like crazy.

Circling back to the Russia obsession. Have you noticed that the Russians are inveterate liars spewing disinformation everywhere, except when a Russian is dishing dirt on Trump, in which case they are telling the gospel truth? The dossier is one example: to the Dems and Never Trump Republicans, it is Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John rolled up into one. Another example is the recent story that the lawyer who met with Donald Jr., one Natalia Veselnitskaya, claims that Junior “hinted at a review” of the Magnitsky Act if Veselnitskaya could provide evidence in writing of Clinton skullduggery.

Did he give an exaggerated knowing wink? Or maybe he did the whole “grin, grin, nudge, nudge, wink, wink, say no more!”thing. I mean, seriously.

So since when did Veselntiskaya–a Russian!–become unimpeachably credible? Especially in light of numerous revelations suggesting that the Russians were (are?) not acting in a partisan way, but were (are?) merely intending to sow political chaos. In which case (a) they are succeeding beyond their wildest expectations, and (b) Huma and the Gang are accessories after the fact, and are compounding the chaos spawned by whatever Russian interference there was by overreacting to Russian interference.

Another revelation about Veselnitskaya came out today. In Congressional testimony in July, Bill Browder alleged that she hired Fusion GPS to conduct a smear campaign against Browder, a Russian bête noire.* Today it was reported that she met with Fusion GPS’s Glenn Simpson both immediately before and immediately after the Trump Tower meeting. You know, kinda like a briefing and debriefing. We also know that some time before this the Hillary campaign via Marc Elias had hired Fusion GPS to dig dirt on Trump (“opposition research” we’re told).

I don’t know about you, but to me that screams set-up. The Clinton-Fusion-Russia nexus is just too tight. (Note to the sickening hypocrisy. The outrage over the Trump Jr.-Veselnitskaya meeting is that he was looking for compromising material on Hillary. First, isn’t that just “opposition research”, per the Democrats’ defense of the Clinton hiring of Fusion? Second, for the people who hired dirt diggers par excellence-Fusion GPS–to get dirt on Trump from the Russians to wax indignant about Trump responding to offers of dirt on Hillary from Russians pegs the chutzpah meter–and mine goes to 11!)

So here’s where we are. Donna Brazile blasted Hillary and her campaign. Hillary’s henchpeople responded by saying that Brazile was a dupe for propaganda put out by those lyin’ no good Russkies. Meanwhile, the Hillary campaign hired a propaganda outfit with deep connections with the Russians, including Russians who just so happened to be in meetings that the Democrats and the media (but I repeat myself) claim compromised Trump. But to believe that, you have to believe that the lyin’ no good Russkies are telling the truth. Just this once!

Did I get that right? Pretty sure that I did. Truth is indeed stranger than fiction.

* Do not consider this an endorsement of Browder. In fact, I am not a Browder fan. I will detail the reasons for my distrust and dislike in an upcoming post.

November 3, 2017

Did Donna Brazile Find a Horse’s Head in Her Bed This Morning?

Filed under: Politics — The Professor @ 10:53 pm

Who you gonna believe, Donna Brazile or your lyin’ eyes? I read the Politico piece  carefully, and I damn sure reached the conclusion that Brazile had confessed to Bernie Sanders that the DNC had rigged the process. But Donna says No! I said nothing of the sort. Indeed, she has started a hash tag, #NeverSaidHillaryRiggedElection.

So I read the article again, and I still conclude that’s exactly what she said.

Several people commented last night that Brazile’s jeremiad had put her in mortal danger. Today’s furious attempt to deny what was clearly said the day before surely does suggest that Donna awoke this morning to find a horse’s head in her bed, and that got her mind right.

November 2, 2017

Donna Brazile Unloads on Hillary, and Gives SWP a Target Rich Environment!

Filed under: Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 7:16 pm

Donna Brazile–a long time Democratic operative and DNC official–has a book coming out. And the excerpt in Politico is damning of the erstwhile leaders of the Democratic Party.

To me the most interesting reveal is that the Lightworker left the Democratic Party’s finances is an utter, absolute shambles:

Obama left the party $24 million in debt—$15 million in bank debt and more than $8 million owed to vendors after the 2012 campaign—and had been paying that off very slowly. Obama’s campaign was not scheduled to pay it off until 2016. Hillary for America (the campaign) and the Hillary Victory Fund (its joint fundraising vehicle with the DNC) had taken care of 80 percent of the remaining debt in 2016, about $10 million, and had placed the party on an allowance.

This fits with my image of Obama as Mr. Magoo, who cheerily drove along, always coming out ahead, while leaving carnage in his wake. We already knew about how Democratic officeholders at the state, local, and Congressional levels were scourged during the Obama administration: now we know he did the same to the Democratic Party’s finances.

This, in turn, left the DNC vulnerable to the Clinton mafia, who basically extended juice loans to the DNC. In return for financing the party to allow it to exist, Hillary’s campaign demanded, and received, control over its finances, and most of its key personnel choices. Hillary used this arrangement to launder campaign contributions in a way that clearly was intended to circumvent federal limits on donations to individual campaigns.

Oh, and “launder” isn’t my word choice: it’s Politico’s. Here’s how Brazile explains it:

“Gary, how did they do this without me knowing?” I asked. “I don’t know how Debbie relates to the officers,” Gary said. He described the party as fully under the control of Hillary’s campaign, which seemed to confirm the suspicions of the Bernie camp. The campaign had the DNC on life support, giving it money every month to meet its basic expenses, while the campaign was using the party as a fund-raising clearinghouse. Under FEC law, an individual can contribute a maximum of $2,700 directly to a presidential campaign. But the limits are much higher for contributions to state parties and a party’s national committee.

Individuals who had maxed out their $2,700 contribution limit to the campaign could write an additional check for $353,400 to the Hillary Victory Fund—that figure represented $10,000 to each of the 32 states’ parties who were part of the Victory Fund agreement—$320,000—and $33,400 to the DNC. The money would be deposited in the states first, and transferred to the DNC shortly after that. Money in the battleground states usually stayed in that state, but all the other states funneled that money directly to the DNC, which quickly transferred the money to Brooklyn [i.e., Clinton campaign headquarters].

“Wait,” I said. “That victory fund was supposed to be for whoever was the nominee, and the state party races. You’re telling me that Hillary has been controlling it since before she got the nomination?”

Gary said the campaign had to do it or the party would collapse.

“That was the deal that Robby struck with Debbie,” he explained, referring to campaign manager Robby Mook. “It was to sustain the DNC. We sent the party nearly $20 million from September until the convention, and more to prepare for the election.”

The states’ take for being the front for this fundraising scheme? “Yet the states kept less than half of 1 percent of the $82 million they had amassed from the extravagant fund-raisers Hillary’s campaign was holding, just as Gary had described to me when he and I talked in August.” One percent? Credit card companies collect more for processing payments.

Brazile claims that this was not illegal, merely unethical. I have no doubt that it was unethical. The legality is hardly obvious, given that it effectively allowed the Clinton campaign to blow through the $2,700 limit on individual contributions to campaigns. Blow through by a factor of 13. That’s all. No big deal, right?

Hillary, you might recall, claimed to be a stalwart supporter of campaign finance reform. But here she was playing a shell game that made a travesty of existing contribution limits.

And who is this “Gary”, you ask?

GiGi! That’s right. The Gary is none other than Gary Gensler. The Saint of the CFTC. Crusader for financial probity. Yet he was neck deep in a scheme that not only was a mockery of the campaign finance system, but which also effectively made the DNC the adjunct of the Clinton campaign during the primary season, when it was supposed to be non-partisan.

Ah, what ambition does to a man’s morals, eh there, Gar? Appalling. It profits a man nothing to give his soul for the whole world . . .  but for the Secretary of the Treasury?

Brazile seems to cut Gensler some slack. After all, he didn’t negotiate the deal. He just counted the beans.

Like Al Capone’s accountant.

There’s one other terribly revealing thing about all this. No, not that Hillary is a grotesquely unethical and manipulative woman: that’s hardly news. What’s eye opening is that she was so insecure that she felt that she had to rig the Democratic primaries by suborning the DNC, and making it her creature.

Yet the woman who was so nervous about winning her own party’s nomination wants us to believe that the only way she wasn’t anointed as president must have been the nefarious doings of the likes of the Russians and Jim Comey.

And now that I mention the Russians, consider this. An alternative explanation for the release of the DNC emails is that it was the work of a disenchanted Bernie Bro, not a Russian hacker. I always thought this was plausible, and none other than stalwart Democratic operative Donna Brazile makes it eminently clear that Bernie supporters working in the DNC would have had every reason to be outraged, because their guy was getting shafted the way only the Clintons can.

So by going after Hillary, Donna Brazile has created a target rich environment for the likes of me. Not just Hillary, but Obama, Gary Gensler, and the Russians hacked the DNC conventional wisdom. And that was just an excerpt. I can hardly imagine what the whole book will bring.

I never thought I’d say this, but here it goes: Thanks, Donna!

 

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