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	<title>Comments on: Imperial Hangups</title>
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	<description>Research (on Financial Markets) Conducted by Other Means</description>
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		<title>By: Cutie Pie</title>
		<link>http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=1947&#038;cpage=1#comment-66021</link>
		<dc:creator>Cutie Pie</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2009 09:30:43 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>From the SWP:

&quot;It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the Georgia war last August, not a single Russian ally or integration partner followed Moscow in recognizing Abkhazia or South Ossetia. They all refused not out of any affection or sympathy for Georgia or President Mikheil Saakashvili. They were simply sending a Moscow a distinct message: We are independent states, not adjuncts of a former superpower.&quot;

----

For that matter, Georgia doesn&#039;t recognize Kosovo&#039;s independence, along some EU countries, that have rationally chosen to take a different position from the US, UK, Germany and France.  

The independence recognition given to Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia is problematical, as shown by the how majority of the global community remain opposed to such declarations.

Russia would&#039;ve been arguably better off not recognizing South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. This perspective is offered while differing with the Andrei Zolotov stated (on the PBS aired Foreign Exchange) view that such recognition encourages secession in Russia. (If anything, the British recognition of Kosovo&#039;s independence seems to stand a better chance of increasing secessionist desires in Scotland.) At present, some territories outside Russia show interest to become a part of it - whereas no republics in Russia are seeking independence.

Russia isn&#039;t as geopolitically strong as the combination of the US, UK, Germany and France. In comparison to the Kosovo independence drive, the Kremlin can&#039;t expect to have as great a clout in wanting greater international support for the independence recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

Diplomatically, a better Russian PR move would&#039;ve been to hold off on deciding whether to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It&#039;s not like these two lands have much of a choice in terms of moving away from Russia. Russia could&#039;ve chosen the consistency route on the disputed lands in question (Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Holding off on deciding whether to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence would&#039;ve probably made the Georgians less antagonistic towards Russia.

In the post-Soviet era, Russo-Georgian relations have taken a dramatic turn for the worse. (In addition to the Soviet period, Russo-Georgian relations weren&#039;t so bad in pre-Soviet times.) With the right policy in place, this situation can change. The Kremlin&#039;s decision to recognize South Ossetia&#039;s and Abkhazia&#039;s independence appears to run counter to this idea.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From the SWP:</p>
<p>&#8220;It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the Georgia war last August, not a single Russian ally or integration partner followed Moscow in recognizing Abkhazia or South Ossetia. They all refused not out of any affection or sympathy for Georgia or President Mikheil Saakashvili. They were simply sending a Moscow a distinct message: We are independent states, not adjuncts of a former superpower.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8212;-</p>
<p>For that matter, Georgia doesn&#8217;t recognize Kosovo&#8217;s independence, along some EU countries, that have rationally chosen to take a different position from the US, UK, Germany and France.  </p>
<p>The independence recognition given to Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia is problematical, as shown by the how majority of the global community remain opposed to such declarations.</p>
<p>Russia would&#8217;ve been arguably better off not recognizing South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. This perspective is offered while differing with the Andrei Zolotov stated (on the PBS aired Foreign Exchange) view that such recognition encourages secession in Russia. (If anything, the British recognition of Kosovo&#8217;s independence seems to stand a better chance of increasing secessionist desires in Scotland.) At present, some territories outside Russia show interest to become a part of it &#8211; whereas no republics in Russia are seeking independence.</p>
<p>Russia isn&#8217;t as geopolitically strong as the combination of the US, UK, Germany and France. In comparison to the Kosovo independence drive, the Kremlin can&#8217;t expect to have as great a clout in wanting greater international support for the independence recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. </p>
<p>Diplomatically, a better Russian PR move would&#8217;ve been to hold off on deciding whether to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It&#8217;s not like these two lands have much of a choice in terms of moving away from Russia. Russia could&#8217;ve chosen the consistency route on the disputed lands in question (Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Holding off on deciding whether to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence would&#8217;ve probably made the Georgians less antagonistic towards Russia.</p>
<p>In the post-Soviet era, Russo-Georgian relations have taken a dramatic turn for the worse. (In addition to the Soviet period, Russo-Georgian relations weren&#8217;t so bad in pre-Soviet times.) With the right policy in place, this situation can change. The Kremlin&#8217;s decision to recognize South Ossetia&#8217;s and Abkhazia&#8217;s independence appears to run counter to this idea.</p>
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		<title>By: Ray</title>
		<link>http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=1947&#038;cpage=1#comment-65844</link>
		<dc:creator>Ray</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2009 19:31:53 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>OK, I found the link for the Tuesday MT story on Putin&#039;s reaction to Medvedev&#039;s remarks to the ministers.

http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/600/42/377404.htm

Here&#039;s an exerpt from the article:  &quot;Putin, who preceded Medvedev as president, leaned back in his chair and looked down expressionlessly, as he often does during Medvedev&#039;s speeches. The other ministers sat stiffly in front of their notepads as they listened.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>OK, I found the link for the Tuesday MT story on Putin&#8217;s reaction to Medvedev&#8217;s remarks to the ministers.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/600/42/377404.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/600/42/377404.htm</a></p>
<p>Here&#8217;s an exerpt from the article:  &#8220;Putin, who preceded Medvedev as president, leaned back in his chair and looked down expressionlessly, as he often does during Medvedev&#8217;s speeches. The other ministers sat stiffly in front of their notepads as they listened.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: Ray</title>
		<link>http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=1947&#038;cpage=1#comment-65843</link>
		<dc:creator>Ray</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2009 19:06:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>SWP wrote: &quot;But the interesting thing here is the implicit swipe at Putin.  The premier has yet to acknowledge fully the depth of the crisis.  Note that he was in the audience, but his reaction to Medvedevâ€™s remarks is not recorded.  Very interesting.&quot;

Yes it was, as a matter of fact!  It was in Tuesdayâ€™s Moscow Times.  I can no longer access it there because Iâ€™m not a registered user.   But I remember what it said.  Medvedev was severely scolding the cabinetâ€¦..and while all the ministers were sitting up straight in their seats, with their eyes attentively on Medvedev as he lashed at them, the Prime Minister was instead sitting back in his chair..â€¦with his head downâ€¦..expressionless. (In my mind as if to say: &quot;I don&#039;t care what he says&quot;)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>SWP wrote: &#8220;But the interesting thing here is the implicit swipe at Putin.  The premier has yet to acknowledge fully the depth of the crisis.  Note that he was in the audience, but his reaction to Medvedevâ€™s remarks is not recorded.  Very interesting.&#8221;</p>
<p>Yes it was, as a matter of fact!  It was in Tuesdayâ€™s Moscow Times.  I can no longer access it there because Iâ€™m not a registered user.   But I remember what it said.  Medvedev was severely scolding the cabinetâ€¦..and while all the ministers were sitting up straight in their seats, with their eyes attentively on Medvedev as he lashed at them, the Prime Minister was instead sitting back in his chair..â€¦with his head downâ€¦..expressionless. (In my mind as if to say: &#8220;I don&#8217;t care what he says&#8221;)</p>
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