Streetwise Professor

August 26, 2015

Donald Trump Can Only Aspire to Match Obama’s Economic Ignorance

Filed under: Climate Change,Economics,Energy,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 8:00 pm

Yesterday I said Trump and O’Reilly were in a cage match to determine the world champion of economic ignorance. There is another contender of course, the current occupant of the office to which Trump aspires. Actually, I would say that Obama is the undefeated reigning world champ, and that the O’Reilly-Trump set-to was merely to see who might contend for the title in the future.

Obama’s gobsmacking ignorance-served up with a heaping side of superciliousness-was on full display at the “Clean Energy Summit” in Las Vegas on Monday. Time is finite, and my energy is only intermittently renewable, so I can’t possibly deconstruct these vaporings in detail. So I will limit myself to a few high-level comments:

  1. Obama’s claims that his policies on renewable energy and carbon will make a meaningful impact on climate is a massive fraud that would land you or me in jail. Obama’s own EPA acknowledges that the policy will reduce global mean temperatures by an imperceptible and irrelevant .02 degrees by 2100. Farenheit? Celsius? Who cares? It matters not. It is rounding error on any scale.
  2. Obama’s mantra is all about the jobs that his renewables policies are creating and will create. Jobs are costs, not benefits.
  3. Further, Obama is clueless about the seen vs. unseen. To the extent that these policies raise the cost of electricity, they will have adverse consequences on wealth and income in consuming sectors, and in sectors that could produce electricity more efficiently, but for the subsidized competition from renewables.
  4. And yes, these policies will increase costs. Renewables are intermittent and diffuse and therefore require backup resources to ensure reliability; there is often a long distance between renewable sources and demand, meaning that new investments in icky transmission are required; and there is often a negative correlation between renewable production and electricity demand (e.g., the wind usually stops blowing when it’s really hot). Just look to Germany, with its Energiewende fiasco if you have any doubts. There is a strong correlation between electricity costs and fraction of electricity from renewables, and although this could be due in part to an endogeneity issue (those with more costly electricity sources utilize more renewables), this does not explain the entire effect.
  5. Obama and other boosters of renewables boast about falling costs of solar. Wind is conspicuously absent from this discussion, even though it represents the bulk of renewables generation. Further. Fine! When these inexorable efficiency gains make solar economical as a large-scale source of electricity, it will be able to compete without subsidy. This is no reason to subsidize now. This technical progress in solar argument is a non sequitur of the first magnitude.
  6. Obama and other boosters rave about capacity additions attributable to renewables. Well, due to the intermittence issue, capacity utilization is very low. It takes a lot more than 1MW of renewable capacity to replace 1MW of thermal or nuclear capacity. Indeed, if the wind ain’t blowing, all the windmills in the world can’t replace one conventional plant.
  7. Obama’s ignorance is on full display when he claims that conventional electricity generation was not characterized by “a lot of innovation.” This is just a crock. Compare heat rates of plants 20 years ago to those of today: in California, for instance, thermal efficiency has improved by 17 percent over the last 13 years. Heard of combined cycle, Barry? There has been considerable innovation in electricity generation. Well, not at the light switch plate, which is probably the extent of Barry’s familiarity with the electricity value chain.
  8. Obama mistakes opposing subsidies with being anti-free market. Welcome to bizarro world. And, as is his wont, he did so in an Alinskyite fashion, demonizing his opponents (the always handy Koch Brothers) in a very personal way.

I could go on, but that would be an S&M exhibition, and this is (usually!) a SFW site.

Suffice it to say that in Las Vegas Obama gave a demonstration that proves that when it comes to economic illiteracy, Trump can only aspire to fill Obama’s shows.

And yeah. Take a moment to absorb just what that means.

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August 18, 2015

Vladimir Putin: At Sea in More Ways Than One

Filed under: Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 7:12 pm

Putin went for a dive in a submersible of the Crimean coast today. He was apparently in search of the Russian economy, and the ruble, but the sub couldn’t quite make it that far down.

As people get older, they tend to repeat the same behavior even after it has become self-parodying: they run out of new ideas and cling to old ones that used to work. This is especially true for people who are at a loss for what to do, because they are presented with insoluble problems.

Vladimir Putin is a perfect illustration of this. Even though his acts of derring do have become the target of world-wide satire, did the submarine thing again. (I thought he would actually go to Kherson, and claim to stumble a cross a relic of Vladimir the Great, but he went with the glass bottom boat again.) Perhaps smarting from previous criticism of his scuba dive in which he claimed to have found a (planted) amphora, today he asserted that the sea bottom was strewn with them.

Putin is at sea in more ways than one. He faces a dire economic situation. His old standby-various energy powerplays-has been undermined by declining demand growth and the development of new supplies. He is in a quagmire in Donbas. He has no idea how to address any of these problems, and indeed, everything he tries seems to turn out badly.

So he goes to the well one more time, and looks even more delusional than usual. It’s the kind of thing that people who are out of ideas do.

It’s also hilarious that the man who bans Dutch cheese and Dutch flowers*, and stymies the investigation of the shutdown of airliner with dozens of Dutch citizens aboard, went on his dive in a Dutch-built vessel.

I guess he didn’t trust a Russian one. Given that it’s August, that’s probably wise.

To round out the comedy, Putin communicated with Medvedev by radio. Poor Dmitry, always the sidekick who never gets to do the fun stuff.

* The Dutch flowers are allegedly infested with California thrips. Dutch flowers and American bugs! Obviously a Nato plot!

 

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August 15, 2015

Is Elon Musk’s Flim-Flam Beginning to Unravel?

Filed under: Climate Change,Economics,Energy,Politics — The Professor @ 7:03 pm

I’ve long been an Elon Musk skeptic.  He struck me as Harold Hill-esque con man, and an aspiring cult leader.

Izabella Kaminska at FT Alphaville has come to the same conclusion. (I appreciate her giving extended play to my posts on Musk, and for pointing out that I’ve “never bought the hype.”) Her last sentence says it all, in a rhetorically questioning kind of way: “Who was it again that said “the bigger the lie, the more it will be believed”?”

Exactly.

There are some major cracks beginning to show in the Musk facade. The most telling is the fact that one Musk entity-SolarCity-sold $165 million in bonds (that are backed by the cash flows from SCTY’s solar installations) to another Musk entity, SpaceX (which just experienced an embarrassing spacecraft malfunction.) When money is taken out of the left pocket to put into the right pocket, eyebrows should be raised. Especially when the explanation is this lame:

So why is SpaceX buying these up? According to SolarCity’s Vice President of Financial Products, Tim Newell, the answer is “very straight forward.” The bonds offered SpaceX an attractive rate of return for a one-year investment compared to other investment options out there. SpaceX carriers a fair amount of cash at times, noted Newell, and the company wanted to put that cash to work in the short term with a high degree of reliability

Sure. If it’s offering such a great rate of return, why isn’t anyone else buying it? And why does it have to offer a better rate than “other investment options out there”? A more plausible story is that the bonds weren’t selling, or that they would only sell at yields Musk didn’t want to pay, so  he had to use one of his companies to prop up another. Those kinds of shell games can only last so long.

Moreover, some executives have left, most recently the head of service, who is taking a leave of absence. This follows the departure of the CFO (announced in June).

Then there is the recent Tesla earnings report, which showed that despite the massive subsidies it has received, it still can’t earn a GAAP profit and, and is burning cash at a hellacious rate, $565 billion million* in the last quarter alone. Further the company revealed that it almost certainly will miss its sales target of 55,000, perhaps by as much as 10 percent. The introduction of the Model X is being pushed back yet again. The company had been counting on China for future growth. Performance there had been disappointing, and China’s current economic troubles (which include a huge automobile inventory overhang) make it an unlikely future savior.

But Musk responded in his typical supercilious fashion:

Rather sanctimoniously, the carmaker said that it would prioritise “a great product” over quarterly numbers. Investors have probably understood that by now. Just in case of doubt, Mr Musk followed up on the earnings call with: “We don’t want to set high expectations . . . Winning needs to feel like winning.”

Just a suggestion: channeling one’s inner Charlie Sheen is probably not a good idea.

There is also a medium-to-long term risk for Tesla, and a deliciously ironic one (though it is somewhat hedged by SolarCity). Specifically, Musk is a anthropomorphic anthropogenic climate change true believer who touts electric automobiles as a way of combatting it. The EPA’s recent proposed regulation of CO2 is also targeted at climate change. Though by its own admission will do virtually nothing to ameliorate temperature increases, the regulation will make electricity much more expensive: that’s a certainty. Estimates are in the range of 10-20 percent. That makes electric cars that much less attractive. Higher energy costs will also reduce income, leading to lower demand for Tesla vehicles, but will also reduce the demand for petroleum, which will lead to lower gasoline prices which will also negatively impact demand for Teslas: the EPA regulation will therefore cause both income and substitution effects that are harmful to Tesla (though again SolarCity will benefit from the EPA plan). Meaning that one green dream will cannibalize another.

For those who see Tesla as more of a battery company than a car company, higher electricity prices hurt the storage battery business too.

But no doubt Elon will turn his attention to doing what he does best: importuning the government to subsidize him. I lay heavy odds that we will see an effort to increase or extend subsidies to electric vehicles with the specific purpose of offsetting the effect of EPA regulations on the sales of electric cars. Just watch. If the markets are becoming less enamored with Elon, there are still plenty of suckers for his shtick in government.

*Thanks to commenter Highgamma for catching this.

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August 12, 2015

Hey, It’s August: The Russian Economy Imitates the Kursk

Filed under: China,Economics,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 1:37 pm

Despite happy talk from the government in recent months, Russia continues its downward economic spiral. The economy contracted by 4.6 percent in the second quarter. This is pretty appalling, given that oil prices had rebounded some. The Economics Ministry says this is “the lowest point” for Russia, but given the recent rout in oil prices, and the troubling signs coming out of Russia, this seems unduly optimistic. If anything Q3 and Q4 are likely to be worse. These therefore seem to be more realistic predictions:

“While second-quarter growth surprised on the downside, perhaps far more importantly is the fact that the outlook for the Russian economy has deteriorated so far in the third quarter,” Piotr Matys, a London-based foreign-exchange strategist at Rabobank, said by e-mail.

. . . .

“The economic prospects for the coming quarters look pretty grim,” Liza Ermolenko, an analyst at London-based Capital Economics Ltd., said by e-mail. “Industry appears to have been a major cause behind the deterioration in the second quarter, having gone from being a relative bright spot in the first quarter.”

The consensus is now that the current economic situation is more dire than 2008-2009, and that it is likely to persist far longer.

On top of this, China’s sudden devaulation of the Yuan has caused a further decline in commodity prices, with Brent now below $50/bbl. This has contributed to a further decline in the Ruble, which fell about 2 percent in the aftermath of China’s move.  The Russian currency is now around 65 to the dollar.  Russia is particularly vulnerable to an extended Chinese malaise, not to mention a hard Chinese landing.

The Russian Central Bank now faces the same conundrum that it confronted last summer and fall. It can choose between loosening monetary policy to spur the economy but would thereby spur inflation (already running at over 15 percent) and pressure the ruble even further. Or it can choose to defend the Ruble, which would hamstring the real economy, and potentially spur capital flight if the credibility of the RCB’s action is doubted. Which leg does it chew off?

Wherever Putin and his economic advisers look, the scene is bleak indeed. The situation in China is particularly ominous, because Putin had grabbed onto China like a drowning man, hoping it would rescue him from the blows raining down from sanctions and the commodity price implosion. But the Chinese devaluation, combined with a litany of other grim statistics coming out of China, suggests that if China is not drowning itself, it is struggling mightily to keep its head above water.  Russia is particularly vulnerable to an extended Chinese malaise, not to mention a hard Chinese landing. Putin counted on China’s economic support to allow him to continue his Ukrainian adventure and weather the resulting sanctions.  It’s not happening (Chinese direct investment into Russia has fallen by 25 percent), and the prospects of it happening anytime soon are diminishing daily.

Nor are the long run prospects particularly encouraging, not with Bloomberg running articles titled “Russian Workers Vie With Greece in Race for Productivity Abyss,” the upshot of which is that Russia has the lowest productivity in Europe, running at 50 percent of the European average and 30 percent below Greece. (Which makes this boast by the Russian Minister of Industry and Trade that Russia has overtaken the US in labor productivity even more hilarious.)

In brief, the Russian economy is doing an imitation of the Kursk, 15 years ago. The only difference is that Putin has yet to admit the economy has sunk.

 

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August 10, 2015

Gazprom Has Unprotected Sales, And Pays the Price

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 5:40 pm

I have long mocked Gazprom’s obstreperous, and economically unhinged, defense of an oil price peg of its gas sales. So today is another schadenfreude day, as the FT reports that Gazprom’s vaunted gas deal with China is finding that The East is Red (as in ink) because the price was linked to oil and “offers no protection against low [oil] prices.” (And despite the evident risks of going without protection, Russia is contemplating a ban on foreign condoms! Maybe Gazprom needs to be more “strict and discriminating” in its contracting practices.)

Apparently the company took strategic advice from Obama, who when asked by Fareed Zakaria what would happen if the Iran deal failed, said that “I have a general policy in big issues like this not to anticipate failure“:

Asked whether the contract built in protections to ensure that Gazprom would not make a loss in the event of a prolonged period of low oil prices, Pavel Oderov, a director at the company, said: “We have registered high risk appetite for this contract and we do not envisage such an event.”

By “high risk appetite,” I think he meant: “we were freaking desperate and we put it all on black (as in oil) to gamble for resurrection.”

And of course, Putin can’t let Gazprom eat a loss:

Separately, the Russian government is preparing to support the flagship project. According to a document published by the Kremlin on Monday, president Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian government to draw up by the start of September a “comprehensive action plan to ensure government support for the construction of gas transport infrastructure, including the Power of Siberia pipeline”.

Like the Russian government has money to throw around, especially since Gazprom (and Rosneft) are supposed to be the cash cows that feed the rest of its corrupt cronies, and the budget.

Insisting on the oil peg was always nuts. Note that one reason why many buyers of LNG want to move away from the oil-link is to diversify their price risk: that’s exactly why Russia, already a huge oil long, should have jumped at the chance to move away from a 100 percent reliance on oil price linkages. Yes, oil and gas prices are correlated, but imperfectly so, and moving away from oil-based pricing for gas would have reduced the country’s exposure to oil prices. But apparently Gazprom management and Putin believed that oil would always outperform gas, and insisted on the link. Be careful what you ask for, Vlad!

This is just the latest in a litany of Gazprom failures. Along with today’s bad news about the China contract-the cornerstone of Putin’s vaunted pivot to Asia-the company disclosed that production was down and sales to Europe were down in the first quarter. The company’s ruble profits rose only because the ruble cratered: talk about the cloud engulfing the silver lining. Further, the Turkish Stream project appears dead in the water, foundering upon-you guessed it-the inability to negotiate a price. That, and the cracked economic rationale for the project.

The world is finally awakening to the fact that the alleged energy behemoth is in fact an economically incoherent mess. In the US, it would have been taken over, and ruthlessly rationalized. Or put into rehab. Or broken up. But Putin continues to let it blunder on, like a vodka-sotted giant.

Not so long ago, Putin was considered some sort of virtuoso. He apparently thought so too. But now everything that used to work for him is self-destructing. And he seems quite bewildered at his turn of fortune.

In truth, Putin was not a virtuoso: he confused luck–high oil prices–for some sort of strategic genius. He was a huge spec long on oil, and looked brilliant when the price was high. When it is low, not so much. And idiotically, one of his champions insisted on increasing that exposure instead of diversifying away from it.

Well played. Well played.

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August 3, 2015

Adding to Atlas’s Burden: The EPA’s CO2 Rule

Filed under: Climate Change,Commodities,Economics,Energy,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 6:41 pm

Acting under the aegis of its most malign agency, the EPA, in its unbending effort to hamstring the US economy, the Obama administration today released its long dreaded CO2 rule. The Rule mandates a 32 percent decrease in CO2 emissions by 2030. This outcome will be achieved by a dramatic reduction in the use of coal powered generation, and its replacement by renewables.

The administration touts its generosity by pointing out that compliance with the Rule has been extended by 2 years.

Great. We get screwed in 7 years, instead of just 5. Gee. Thanks. How thoughtful. You really shouldn’t have.

The Rule is tarted up with a cost-benefit analysis which purports to show massive benefits and modest costs. The benefit is in the form of improved health, in particular through the reduction in respiratory ailments.

But every step of this analysis is literally incredible. Consider the steps. First is an estimate of how the regulation affects climate. The second is an estimate of how climate affects health. The third is an estimate of the value of these health benefits. None of these calculations is remotely plausible, or even is it plausible that they can be made realistically, given the incredible complexity of climate and health.

And note the bait and switch here. The Rule is touted as a solution to the Phenomenon Once Known As Global Warming. But the Rule itself admits that the effect on temperature will be point zero one eight degrees centigrade by 2100. This is effectively zero, meaning that the “Climate Change” benefit of the Rule is zero.

The health benefits come from reductions in particulates from coal generating plants. So why not regulate particulates specifically?

This all points out that cost benefit analysis for large federal rules is basically Kabuki theater. Some laws require this analysis, but since courts give so much deference (under Chevron) to agencies, that this analysis is not subject to any serious scrutiny. Consequently, the process is ritual, not a serious check on agency discretion.

The Rule is grotesquely inefficient even if you believe this Making Shit Up And Calling it Science!® “cost-benefit analysis.” An efficient rule would achieve its results at lowest cost. But the command-and-control EPA rule does not do this.

Originally, the Rule was expected to lead to a substitution of natural gas for coal. But we can’t have that, can we, given that natural gas is a fossil fuel (even if Nancy Pelosi doesn’t think so)? So the current rule encourages the use of renewables.

The economics of renewables (especially wind) are atrocious. They are intermittent and diffuse. Intermittency strains reliability, and requires maintaining backup generation. Germany (and other countries, including Spain) have gone all in on renewables, and it has been a disaster. Energiewende has saddled Germany with high costs and lower quality power that has imposed great costs on German manufacturing. (Fluctuations in wind and sunlight induce fluctuations in frequency that wreak havoc with precision manufacturing processes.) California is already on the verge of reliability problems when the sun sets during winter months due to a sudden drop in solar generation (aka the swan problem) that requires a sudden ramp up of conventional generation: but the supply of solar during daylight hours undermines the economics of conventional generation. Wind power in Texas is leading to frequent bouts of negative prices which reduce the profitability of conventional generation necessary to maintain reliability.

The Rule acknowledges reliability issues, but the response is totally inadequate:

[T]he rule requires states to address reliability in their state plans. The final rule also provides a “reliability safety valve” to address any reliability challenges that arise on a case-by-case basis.

That’s just great. EPA says: “Yeah, we know renewables create reliability issues. Not our problem! You figure it out, states.” Note that this is problematic because the electrical grid is interconnected, meaning that retiring a coal plant in one state can have serious effects on reliability in numerous other states. So how do individual state plans efficiently address these inherently interstate issues? And as for the “safety valve”, the case-by-case analysis is likely to be cumbersome and costly.

Let’s get down to cases. By its own calculations, the proposed Rule will have a risible effect on global temperature. Therefore, there is no cost benefit justification for the control of CO2 per se, the ostensible purpose of the rule. If there are substantial benefits from reducing particulate emissions, then tax these emissions at a rate commensurate with these costs and let utilities and others find the most economical way of complying.

But that’s not the point, is it? Obama and the EPA don’t want efficiency. They have an intense ideological animus against fossil fuels, and a romantic attachment to renewables: many of the Democrats’ largest donors are have a strong investment in renewables. Pigouvian approaches would likely result in the failure to litter the landscape with bird blending windmills and massive solar panels, so they prefer command and control approaches instead.

And did I mention that Obama insinuated that if you oppose the Rule you are racist?

This new Rule is a piece with the last 6 plus years of grotesquely inefficient legislation and regulations. Frankendodd. Obamacare. Net Neutrality. Each of these add huge amounts of new weight that the Atlas of the American economy must bear. An economy subjected to such burdens will survive, but it will not thrive. The EPA’s new Rule will provide no meaningful benefit, and any benefits that it does generate will be gained at excessive cost. But that is the Obama way. That is the leftist way.

 

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July 22, 2015

Vlad’s Pivot to Oblivion

Filed under: China,Commodities,Economics,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 7:09 pm

This story is a Sino-Russian twofer:

The contract between Russia and China for gas supplied via the western route known as Power of Siberia-2 is being delayed indefinitely, Vedomosti cited Russian officials. They say China is reviewing its energy needs due to the economic slowdown.

The demand growth for gas in China is slowing, at the same time access to liquefied natural gas (LNG) is becoming more available in the country, for example from Australia, due to the fall in oil prices, Sberbank CIB analyst Valery Nesterov told Vedomosti on Wednesday.

Repeat after me: Gazprom finalizes about one out of a hundred of the vapor deals it announces. This is especially true where China is involved.

There are three basic problems. First, the pipeline is expensive, primarily because the Russians insist on building it. After all, how else could they tunnel out money? And if they can’t tunnel out money, what the hell is Gazprom good for?

“Gazprom offers CNPC a high price, explaining this by the high cost of the Power of Siberia – 2 construction. China is ready to build the pipeline at a cheaper cost and at public tender, so its companies could participate and for the construction price to be transparent,” the president of the Russia-China analytical center Sergei Sanakoyev said.

Second, the pipeline would go to the western part of China, which is convenient for Gazprom, but it isn’t where China needs the gas.

Third, China doesn’t need as much gas period, because (a) new (LNG) supply is coming on line in Australia, and (b) despite the happy talk of official statistics, every indication is that the Chinese economy is slowing:

The demand growth for gas in China is slowing, at the same time access to liquefied natural gas (LNG) is becoming more available in the country, for example from Australia, due to the fall in oil prices, Sberbank CIB analyst Valery Nesterov told Vedomosti on Wednesday.

So how’s that pivot to Asia working out, Vladimir? Timing is everything in life, and Putin is counting on China precisely when China has its own issues to deal with. If China was continuing to power forward, Putin’s pivot would have turned him into China’s pilot fish. Now even being a pilot fish looks out of reach.

To all those who hyperventilated at the announcements of huge Sino-Russian gas deals: when will you people learn to discount virtually anything Gazprom says down to just above zero? That’s especially true when there was a huge political reason for Putin to hype such a deal. I guess suckers never learn.

The second part of the twofer here is the further evidence it provides of China’s economic troubles. Look at the commodity carnage going around: oil, copper, iron ore, gold, platinum, you name it are in the dumper. China put them there. This is just another pixel in the image.

 

 

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July 18, 2015

Nothing Says Panic Quite Like Three TARPs

Filed under: China,Economics,Energy,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 3:41 pm

The invaluable Christopher Balding has been tracking closely the massive financial support the Chinese government has been injecting into the banking system, the shadow banking system, local governments, and the stock market. In a blog post earlier this week, he estimated that this support totaled at least $692 billion, rising to $933 billion if the Reserve Ratio cut is counted as a subsidy to the banking system.

These funds went to the local government bond program I wrote about in June, an  investment in pension funds, PBOC 6 month loans to banks, and PBOC loans to the Chinese Securities Financing Corporation, which in turn will lend these funds to buy stock on margin.

But it’s hard to keep up! Christopher kindly shared with me his most recent calculation, which shows that the Chinese government keeps pumping in the money, most notably an additional $200 billion in loans to intermediaries who will use these funds for margin lending, and a rumored (but not yet confirmed) $160 billion in additional support for provincial municipal bonds. This brings the total to $1.3 trillion.

In RMB, that totals over 8 trillion (with a “t”, boys and girls). To Sinofy Evertt Dirksen: A trillion here and a trillion there, and pretty soon you are talking real money.

Another metric: $1.3 trillion is approximately three TARPs. Maybe we should start using that as a new unit of measurement, as in, “Chinese authorities intervened in the market and banking system today, providing an additional .5 TARPs in state funding.”

Yet another metric: $1.3 trillion is almost exactly $1000 per Chinese citizen. TARP was about $1500 per American. But China’s per capita GDP is (depending on whether you use exchange rates or PPP) about 1/5th or 1/7th of US GDP per capita. Thus, a low middle income country is spending roughly 3 to 5 times more per person as a percentage of per capita income than the high income US did. (Given that Chinese GDP is likely overstated-another issue that Christopher has analyzed in detail-the true multiples are even higher.)

Such massive spending-arguably the most gargantuan stimulus package ever-is not the sign of a confident leadership. It is a clear sign of panic.

Remember the extreme panic in DC and Wall Street in the post-Lehman period that culminated with TARP? Even in that hysterical environment, people questioned the need for and advisability of TARP. But in the end panic won out. That is the only reason TARP passed: people were scared stiff at what would happen if it didn’t.

Now think of how panicked the Chinese must be to implement measures that dwarf TARP. That’s what economists call revealed preference. Or, in this instance, revealed panic.

This gives the lie to official statistics, which showed a (patently unbelievable even absent this massive stimulus) .1 percentage point decline in the growth rate. Also giving the lie to the official statistics is the collapse in China-driven commodity prices, notably iron ore and coal, and oil as well. The slowdown in commodity economies further discredits the official Chinese data.

The Chinese stock market is getting most of the attention. This is the drunk-looking-under-the-streetlamp-for-his-keys phenomenon. The stock market is visible, and people can relate to it: this is why the government is using massive carrots (notably the support for margin lending) and even bigger sticks to try to arrest the decline. This would suppress the most visible manifestation of crisis. But the real dangers are lurking out of sight, in the leveraged sector (most notably the rats’ nest of non-bank lenders, but the banks are concealing a lot too), SOEs, and a real economy whose performance is masked by dodgy official statistics.

I’ve long referred to China as the Michael Jackson Economy, kept going by intense dosages of economic/financial drugs, cosmetic surgeries, and stimulants. The Chinese authorities are now administering the biggest dosages ever. This is an indication that the patient is doing quite badly. Further, although such actions may delay the inevitable, they make the end all the more horrific.

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July 12, 2015

Gazprom Struggles. And There Was Much Rejoicing.

Filed under: Commodities,Economics,Energy,Politics,Russia — The Professor @ 7:18 pm

Surprise, surprise, surprise. The vaunted Russia-Turkey gas pipeline deal is not really a deal. The reason-brace yourself against the shock-is that the two sides can’t come to an agreement over price:

Russia’s plan to build a new $15 billion pipeline to Turkey is at risk of delay because of a fight over gas prices, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

State-run OAO Gazprom and its Turkish counterpart Botas had a six-month period to agree on prices for gas supplies between the two countries, which expired on Monday. The Ankara-based company now has the right to take the matter to international arbitration, three of the people said, asking not to be named because the information is private.

The dispute over prices means there’s no immediate prospect of signing a binding pact for the new pipeline, the second between Russia and Turkey. An agreement could now be delayed until at least October, two more people said, also asking not to be identified.

I was about as surprised about this as I was to see the sun rising in the east this morning.

Remember: Gazprom consummates maybe one percent of the “deals” that it announces. And the deals founder on price. Almost every time.

By the way, this totally demolishes the alleged pipeline deal between Russia and Greece, because the Grecian pipeline was intended to carry gas that Russia had shipped to Turkey on to Europe.

Not that the $2-odd billion pipeline deal would have been more than spit in the ocean of Greece’s debt problem: the Greek government would only realize a fraction of the $2+ billion, many years from now. And as things look now, never.

In other Gazprom news, apparently the company is stiffing Turkmenistan:

Turkmenistan, irked by falling natural gas exports to Russia, hit out at Moscow’s gas export monopoly Gazprom on Wednesday, saying the energy giant had not paid for gas purchased from the Central Asian country so far this year.

“Since the beginning of 2015, OAO Gazprom has not paid for its debts to state concern Turkmengas for the shipped volumes of Turkmen natural gas,” Turkmenistan’s Oil and Gas Ministry said in a statement on its official website (www.oilgas.gov.tm).

Could be worse. Gazprom could have blown up the pipeline.

This suggests that Gazprom is having some major cash flow problems.

And who says there is no good news?

 

 

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June 15, 2015

Always Follow the Price Signals. I Did on Brent-WTI.

Filed under: Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Energy,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 8:18 pm

As a blogger, I am long the option to point out when I call one right. Of course, I am short the option for you all to point out when I call one wrong, but I can’t help it if that option is usually so far out of the money (or if you don’t exercise it when it is in) 😉

I will exercise my option today, after reading this article by Greg Meyer in the FT:

West Texas Intermediate crude, once derided as a broken oil benchmark, is enjoying a comeback.

Volumes of futures tracking the yardstick have averaged 1m contracts a day this year through May, up more than 45 per cent from the same period of 2014, exchange data show. WTI has also sped ahead of volumes in rival Brent crude, less than two years after Brent unseated WTI as the most heavily traded oil futures market.

. . . .

WTI has also regained a more stable connection with global oil prices after suffering glaring discounts because of transport constraints at its delivery point of Cushing, Oklahoma. The gap led some to question WTI as a useful gauge of oil prices.

“I guess the death of the WTI contract was greatly exaggerated,” said Andy Lipow of consultancy Lipow Oil Associates.

But in the past two years, new pipeline capacity of more than 1m barrels a day has relinked Cushing to the US Gulf of Mexico coast, narrowing the discount between Brent and WTI to less than $4 a barrel.

Mark Vonderheide, managing partner of Geneva Energy Markets, a New York trading firm, said: “With WTI once again well connected to the global market, there is renewed interest from hedgers outside the US to trade it. When the spread between WTI and Brent was more than $20 and moving fast, WTI was much more difficult to trade.”

Things have played out exactly as I forecast in August, 2011:

One of the leading crude oil futures contracts–CME Group’s WTI–has been the subject of a drumbeat of criticism for months due to the divergence of WTI prices in Cushing from prices at the Gulf, and from the price of the other main oil benchmark–Brent.  But whereas WTI’s problem is one of logistics that is in the process of being addressed, Brent’s issues are more fundamental ones related to adequate supply, and less amenable to correction.

Indeed, WTI’s “problem” is actually the kind an exchange would like to have.  The divergence between WTI prices in the Midcontinent and waterborne crude prices reflects a surge of production in Canada and North Dakota.  Pipelines are currently lacking to ship this crude to the Gulf of Mexico, and Midcon refineries are running close to full capacity, meaning that the additional supply is backing up in Cushing and depressing prices.

But the yawning gap between the Cushing price at prices at the Gulf is sending a signal that more transportation capacity is needed, and the market is responding with alacrity.  If only the regulators were similarly speedy.

. . . .

Which means that those who are crowing about Brent today, and heaping scorn on WTI, will be begging for WTI’s problems in a few years.  For by then, WTI’s issues will be fixed, and it will be sitting astride a robust flow of oil tightly interconnected with the nexus of world oil trading.  But the Brent contract will be an inverted paper pyramid, resting on a thinner and thinner point of crude production.  There will be gains from trade–large ones–from redesigning the contract, but the difficulties of negotiating an agreement among numerous big players will prove nigh on to impossible to surmount.  Moreover, there will be no single regulator in a single jurisdiction that can bang heads together (for yes, that is needed sometimes) and cajole the parties toward agreement.

So Brent boosters, enjoy your laugh while it lasts.  It won’t last long, and remember, he who laughs last laughs best.

This really wasn’t that hard a call to make. The price signals were obvious, and its always safe to bet on market participants responding to price signals. That’s exactly what happened. The only surprising thing is that so few publicly employed this logic to predict that the disconnection between WTI and ocean borne crude prices would be self-correcting.

Speaking of not enjoying the laugh, the exchange where Brent is traded-ICE-issued a rather churlish statement:

Atlanta-based ICE blamed the shift on “increased volatility in WTI crude oil prices relative to Brent crude oil prices, which drove more trading by non-commercial firms in WTI, as well as increased financial incentive schemes offered by competitors”.

The first part of this statement is rather incomprehensible. Re-linking WTI improved the contract’s effectiveness as a hedge for crude outside the Mid-continent (PADD 2), which allowed hedgers to take advantage of the WTI liquidity pool, which in turn attracted more speculative interest.

Right now the only potential source of disconnect is the export ban. That is, markets corrected the infrastructure bottleneck, but politics has failed to correct the regulatory bottleneck. When that will happen, I am not so foolish to predict.

 

 

 

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