The WSJ reports that the CME Group’s new Euro-Denominated cocoa futures contract is floundering, due to a pronounced lack of liquidity. (h/t @libertylynx) The incumbent ICE Futures Europe Sterling-denominated and ICE Futures US USD-denominated contracts dwarf the CME contract’s volume, even though European hedgers face some currency risks in using these contracts.
This is not a surprise, not by a long shot. It is always very difficult for upstart contract to make inroads, let alone dominate, in competition with an established incumbent. Liquidity is king, and the established contracts have a liquidity advantage that new entrants almost never overcome, even if the new contract is superior on some dimensions.
The only real example of the displacement of an incumbent is Eurex’s wresting of the Bund contract from LIFFE in 1997-1998. That story, which I analyze in a forthcoming paper in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, is the exception that proves the rule.
First, because it was supported by German banks who direct a lot of order flow to it, Eurex (and its predecessor, Deutsche Terminborse) had a base of liquidity on which to build.
Second, because it was electronic, it was possible for Eurex to offer faster and easier access to US users once the CFTC approved Eurex’s application to install terminals in the US.
Third, and most important, Eurex exploited LIFFE’s smug complacency. Eurex aggressively cut fees, and LIFFE did not match: it was convinced that its superior liquidity, and the inherent superiority of floor trading, would prevent its customers from defecting to Eurex to save a few DM per contract in fees.
Wrong! As I document in the JACF paper, the liquidity cost difference between the markets wasn’t that great by 1997 (due to the German bank support and the influx of US customers), and taking into account the lower trading fees it was actually cheaper to trade on Eurex. Volume started to leak to Eurex, and the leak turned into a flood. LIFFE belatedly cut fees, but by then it was too late. The market had tipped completely to Eurex, and LIFFE had a near-death experience.
I can speak first hand of LIFFE’s overconfidence. In 1992, I produced a study for DTB that showed that its electronic market’s liquidity was comparable to that of the floor-based LIFFE. The study was not intended for release: it was commissioned to determine whether it was advisable for DTB to add a new membership type analogous to locals in order to improve liquidity. But the results were so surprisingly favorable for DTB that they released the study, much to the derision of LIFFE and the futures trading community generally, which was truly in the grip of the Cult of the Floor.
The CEO of LIFFE was quoted in the FT and Risk Magazine to the effect that I was an ivory tower academic who had no idea the way the real world works, because everybody knows the floor is more liquid and always will be. Real bulletin board material. Literally, in my case.
He who laughs last. When Eurex launched its assault on LIFFE in 1997, it distributed my 1992 study broadly. I doubt that had much of an impact on the final outcome, but it couldn’t have hurt.
The LIFFE CEO ended up resigning after LIFFE capitulated, and voted to close the floor and go electronic. I was a good boy. I resisted the very strong temptation to send him clippings of the FT and Risk articles.
Every other exchange learned a lesson at LIFFE’s expense, and responded to a fee cutting entrant by cutting fees immediately. For instance, the CBT saw off Eurex’s attempt to compete in the Treasury market in short order by cutting fees to zero, raising them after Eurex capitulated.
So CME shouldn’t feel bad. It has plenty of company in launching a contract that fails to make headway against an established incumbent. Indeed, the experience should be comforting, because it is the dominant incumbent in USD STIRs, govvies, equity indexes, FX, grain, precious metal, livestock, and energy futures. It benefits massively from the liquidity entry barrier. Compared to that, the failure to penetrate ICE’s cocoa monopoly doesn’t amount to a hill of beans.