Streetwise Professor

June 30, 2016

Financial Network Topology and Women of System: A Dangerous Combination

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Economics,Financial crisis,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 7:43 pm

Here’s a nice article by Robert Henderson in the science magazine Nautilus which poses the question: “Can topology prevent the next financial crisis?” My short answer: No.  A longer answer–which I sketch out below–is that a belief that it can is positively dangerous.

The idea behind applying topology to the financial system is that financial firms are interconnected in a network, and these connections can be represented in a network graph that can be studied. At least theoretically, if you model the network formally, you can learn its properties–e.g., how stable is it? will it survive certain shocks?–and perhaps figure out how to make the network better.

Practically, however, this is an illustration of the maxim that a little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing.

Most network modeling has focused on counterparty credit connections between financial market participants. This research has attempted to quantify these connections and graph the network, and ascertain how the network responds to certain shocks (e.g., the bankruptcy of a particular node), and how a reconfigured network would respond to these shocks.

There are many problems with this. One major problem–which I’ve been on about for years, and which I am quoted about in the Nautilus piece–is that counterparty credit exposure is only one type of many connections in the financial network: liquidity is another source of interconnection. Furthermore, these network models typically ignore the nature of the connections between nodes. In the real world, nodes can be tightly coupled or loosely coupled. The stability features of tightly and loosely connected networks can be very different even if their topologies are identical.

As a practical example, not only does mandatory clearing change the topology of a network, it also changes the tightness of the coupling through the imposition of rigid variation margining. Tighter coupling can change the probability of the failure of connections, and the circumstances under which these failures occur.

Another problem is that models frequently leave out some participants. As another practical example, network models of derivatives markets include the major derivatives counterparties, and find that netting reduces the likelihood of a cascade of defaults within that network. But netting achieves this by redistributing the losses to other parties who are not explicitly modeled. As a result, the model is incomplete, and gives an incomplete understanding of the full effects of netting.

Thus, any network model is inherently a very partial one, and is therefore likely to be a very poor guide to understanding the network in all its complexity.

The limitations of network models of financial markets remind me of the satirical novel Flatland, where the inhabitants of Pointland, Lineland, and Flatland are flummoxed by higher-dimensional objects. A square finds it impossible to conceptualize a sphere, because he only observes the circular section as it passes through his plane. But in financial markets the problem is much greater because the dimensionality is immense, the objects are not regular and unchanging (like spheres) but irregular and constantly changing on many dimensions and time scales (e.g., nodes enter and exit or combine, nodes can expand or contract, and the connections between them change minute to minute).

This means that although network graphs may help us better understand certain aspects of financial markets, they are laughably limited as a guide to policy aimed at reengineering the network.

But frighteningly, the Nautilus article starts out with a story of Janet Yellen comparing a network graph of the uncleared CDS market (analogized to a tangle of yarn) with a much simpler graph of a hypothetical cleared market. Yellen thought it was self-evident that the simple cleared market was superior:

Yellen took issue with her ball of yarn’s tangles. If the CDS network were reconfigured to a hub-and-spoke shape, Yellen said, it would be safer—and this has been, in fact, one thrust of post-crisis financial regulation. The efficiency and simplicity of Kevin Bacon and Lowe’s Hardware is being imposed on global derivative trading.

 

God help us.

Rather than rushing to judgment, a la Janet, I would ask: “why did the network form in this way?” I understand perfectly that there is unlikely to be an invisible hand theorem for networks, whereby the independent and self-interested actions of actors results in a Pareto optimal configuration. There are feedbacks and spillovers and non-linearities. As a result, the concavity that drives the welfare theorems is notably absent. An Olympian economist is sure to identify “market failure,” and be mightily displeased.

But still, there is optimizing behavior going on, and connections are formed and nodes enter and exit and grow and shrink in response to profit signals that are likely to reflect costs and benefits, albeit imperfectly. Before rushing in to change the network, I’d like to understand much better why it came to be the way it is.

We have only rudimentary understanding of how network configurations develop. Yes, models that specify simple rules of interaction between nodes can be simulated to produce networks that differ substantially from random networks. These models can generate features like the small world property. But it is a giant leap to go from that, to understanding something as huge, complex, and dynamic as a financial system. This is especially true given that there are adjustment costs that give rise to hysteresis and path-dependence, as well as shocks that give rise to changes.

Further, let’s say that the Olympian economist Yanet Jellen establishes that the existing network is inefficient according to some criterion (not that I would even be able to specify that criterion, but work with me here). What policy could she adopt that would improve the performance of the network, let alone make it optimal?

The very features–feedbacks, spillovers, non-linearities–that can create suboptimality  also make it virtually impossible to know how any intervention will affect that network, for better or worse, under the myriad possible states in which that network must operate.  Networks are complex and emergent and non-linear. Changes to one part of the network (or changes to the the way that agents who interact to create the network must behave and interact) can have impossible to predict effects throughout the entire network. Small interventions can lead to big changes, but which ones? Who knows? No one can say “if I change X, the network configuration will change to Y.” I would submit that it is impossible even to determine the probability distribution of configurations that arise in response to policy X.

In the language of the Nautilus article, it is delusional to think that simplicity can be “imposed on” a complex system like the financial market. The network has its own emergent logic, which passeth all understanding. The network will respond in a complex way to the command to simplify, and the outcome is unlikely to be the simple one desired by the policymaker.

In natural systems, there are examples where eliminating or adding a single species may have little effect on the network of interactions in the food web. Eliminating one species may just open a niche that is quickly filled by another species that does pretty much the same thing as the species that has disappeared. But eliminating a single species can also lead to a radical change in the food web, and perhaps its complete collapse, due to the very complex interactions between species.

There are similar effects in a financial system. Let’s say that Yanet decides that in the existing network there is too much credit extended between nodes by uncollateralized derivatives contracts: the credit connections could result in cascading failures if one big node goes bankrupt. So she bans such credit. But the credit was performing some function that was individually beneficial for the nodes in the network. Eliminating this one kind of credit creates a niche that other kinds of credit could fill, and profit-motivated agents have the incentive to try to create it, so a substitute fills the vacated niche. The end result: the network doesn’t change much, the amount of credit and its basic features don’t change much, and the performance of the network doesn’t change much.

But it could be that the substitute forms of credit, or the means used to eliminate the disfavored form of credit (e.g., requiring clearing of derivatives), fundamentally change the network in ways that affect its performance, or at least can do so in some states of the world. For example, it make the network more tightly coupled, and therefore more vulnerable to precipitous failure.

The simple fact is that anybody who thinks they know what is going to happen is dangerous, because they are messing with something that is very powerful that they don’t even remotely understand, or understand how it will change in response to meddling.

Hayek famously said “the curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.” Tragically, too many (and arguably a large majority of) economists are the very antithesis of what Hayek says that they should be. They imagine themselves to be designers, and believe they know much more than they really do.

Janet Yellen is just one example, a particularly frightening one given that she has considerable power to implement the designs she imagines. Rather than being the Hayekian economist putting the brake on ham-fisted interventions into poorly understood symptoms, she is far closer to Adam Smith’s “Man of System”:

The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder.

When there are Men (or Women!) of System about, and the political system gives them free rein, analytical tools like topology can be positively dangerous. They make some (unjustifiably) wise in their own conceit, and give rise to dreams of Systems that they attempt to implement, when in fact their knowledge is shockingly superficial, and implementing their Systems is likely to create the highest degree of disorder.

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June 29, 2016

Will the EU Cut Off Its Nose to Spite Its Face on Clearing, Banking & Finance?

Filed under: Clearing,Commodities,Derivatives,Economics,Exchanges,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 7:45 pm

French President Francois Hollande is demanding that clearing of Euro derivatives take place in the Eurozone. Last year the European Central Bank had attempted to require this, claiming that it could not be expected to provide liquidity to a non-Eurozone CCP like London-based LCH.

The ECB lost that case in a European court, but now sees an opportunity to prevail post-Brexit, when London will be not just non-Eurozone, but non-EU. Hollande is cheerleading that effort.

It is rather remarkable to see the ECB, which was only able to rescue European banks desperate for dollar funding during the crisis because of the provision of $300 billion in swap lines from the Fed, claiming that it can’t supply € liquidity to a non-Eurozone entity. How about swap lines with the BoE, which could then provide support to LCH if necessary. Or is the ECB all take, and no give?

Hollande (and other Europeans) are likely acting partly out of protectionist motives, to steal business for continental entities from London (and perhaps the US). But Hollande was also quite upfront about the punitive, retaliatory, and exemplary nature of this move:

“The City, which thanks to the EU, was able to handle clearing operations for the eurozone, will not be able to do them,” he said. “It can serve as an example for those who seek the end of Europe . . . It can serve as a lesson.” [Emphasis added.]

That will teach perfidious Albion for daring to leave the EU! Anyone else harboring such thoughts, take note!

The FT article does not indicate the location of M. Hollande’s nose, for he obviously just cut it off to spite his face.

In a more serious vein, this is no doubt part of the posturing that we will see ad nauseum in the next two plus years while the terms of the UK’s departure are negotiated. Stock up with supplies, because this is going to take a while, since (1) everything is negotiable, (2) almost all negotiations go to the brink of the deadline, or beyond, and (3) these negotiations will be particularly complicated because the Eurogarchs will be conducting them with an eye on how the outcome affects the calculations of other EU members contemplating following Britain out the door–and because immigration issues will loom over the negotiations.

When evaluating a negotiation, it’s best to start with the optimal, surplus maximizing “Coasean bargain” (a term which Coase actually didn’t like, but it is widely used). This, as Elon Musk would say, is a no brainer: allow € clearing in London, through LCH. That is, a maintenance of the status quo.

What are the alternatives? One would be that € clearing for those subject to EU regulation and some non-EU firms would take place in the Eurozone (say Paris or Frankfurt), some € clearing might take place in London or the US, and most dollar and other non-€ clearing would take place in London and the US.  This would require the EU to permit its banks to clear economically in the UK or US, by granting equivalence to non-EU CCPs for non-€ trades, or something similar.

There are several inefficiencies here. First, it would fragment netting sets and increase the probability that one CCP goes bust. For instance, if a bank that is a member of an EU and a non-EU CCP (as would almost certainly be the case of the large European banks that do business in all major currencies) defaulted, it is possible that it could have a loss on its € deals and a gain on its non-€ deals (or vice versa). If those were cleared in a single CCP, the gain and loss could be offset, thereby reducing the CCP’s loss, and perhaps resulting in no loss to the CCP at all: this is what happened with Lehman at the CME, where losses on some of its positions were greater than collateral, but losses on others were smaller, and the total loss was less than total collateral. However, if the business was split, one of the CCPs could suffer a loss that could potentially put it in jeopardy, or force members to stump up additional contributions to the default fund during a time when they are financially stressed.

Second, default management would be more difficult, risky and costly if split across two or more CCPs. It would be easier to put in place dirty hedges for a broader portfolio than two narrower ones, and to allocate or auction off a combined portfolio than fragmented ones. Moreover, it would be necessary to coordinate default management across CCPs in a situation where their interests are not completely aligned, and indeed, where interests may be strongly in conflict. Furthermore, there would be duplication of personnel, as CCP members would be required to dispatch people to two different CCPs to manage the default.

Third, even during “peacetime,” fragmented clearing would sacrifice collateral and capital efficiencies and increase operational costs and complexity.

But it could be worse! Maybe the Europeans will cut off their noses and ears (and maybe some other parts lower down), and deny a UK CCP equivalence for any transaction undertaken by an EU bank. The outcome would be EU banks clearing in Europe, and most everybody else clearing outside of Europe. This would result in multiple inefficiently small CCPs clearing in all currencies that would exacerbate all of the negative consequences just outlined: netting set inefficiencies would be even worse, default risk management even more difficult, and peacetime collateral, capital, and operational efficiencies would be even worse.

Oh, and this alternative would require the ECB to obtain dollar and sterling (and other currency) liquidity lines to allow it to provide non-€ liquidity to its precious little CCP. How hypocritical is that? (Not that hypocrisy would cost Hollande et al any sleep. It hasn’t yet.)

The fact is that CCPs exhibit strong economies of scale and scope, and although mega-CCPs concentrate risk, fragmentation creates its own special problems.

So the wealth-maximizing outcome would be for the EU to come to an accommodation on central clearing that would effectively perpetuate the pre-Brexit status quo. Wealth maximization exercises a strong pull, meaning that this is the most likely outcome, although there will likely be a lot of posturing, bluffing, threatening, etc., before this outcome is achieved (and at the last minute).

I would expect that EU banks would support the Coasean bargain, further increasing its political viability. Yes, Deutsche Borse would be pushing for a EU-centric outcome, and some Europols would take pride at having their own (sub-scale and/or sub-scope) CCP, but the greater cost and risk imposed on banks would almost certainly induce them to put heavy pressure behind a status quo-preserving deal.

This raises the issue of negotiation of banking and capital market issues more generally. There has been a lot of attention paid to the fact that British banks would probably lose passporting rights into the EU post-exit, and this would be costly for them. But European banks actually rely even more on passporting to get access to London. Since London is still almost certain to remain the dominant financial center (especially since the UK government will have a tremendous incentive to facilitate that), European banks would suffer as much or more than UK ones if the passporting system was eliminated (and a close substitute was not created).

Thus, if the negotiations were only about clearing, banking, and capital markets, mutual self-interest (and political economy, given the huge influence of the finance sector on policymakers) would strongly favor a deal that would largely maintain the status quo. But of course the negotiations are not about these issues alone. As I’ve already noted, the EU may try to punish the British even if it also takes a hit because of the effect this might have on the calculations of others who might bolt from the Union.

Furthermore, the most contentious issue–immigration–is very much in play. Merkel, Hollande, and others have said that to obtain a Norway-style relationship with the EU, the UK would have to agree to unlimited movement of people. But that issue is the one that drove the Leave vote, and agreeing to this would be viewed as a gutting of the referendum, and a betrayal. It will be hard for the UK to agree to that.

Perhaps even this could be finessed if the EU secured its borders, but Merkel’s insanity on this issue (and the insanity of other Eurogarchs) makes this unlikely, short of a populist political explosion within the EU. But if that happens, negotiations between the EU and the UK will likely be moot, because there won’t be much of the EU left to negotiate with, or worth negotiating with.

In sum, if it were only about banking and clearing, economic self-interest would lead all parties to avoid mutually destructive protectionism in these areas. But highly emotional issues, political power, and personal pride are also present, and in spades. Thus, I am reluctant to bet much on the consummation of the economically efficient deal on financial issues. The financial sector is just one bargaining chip in a very big game.

 

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April 22, 2016

Schrödinger’s Clearinghouse?

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Exchanges,Regulation — The Professor @ 6:31 pm

Three weeks ago I wrote about, and criticized, LSE CEO Xavier Rolet’s statement that “We can cross margin our over-the-counter clearing with their listed derivatives without merging the clearinghouses, and without comingling the risk-management framework. [Emphasis added.]”  Then three days ago I read Philip Stafford’s article in the FT stating “Deutsche Börse and LSE plan to link clearing houses“:

The two sides are working on common risk management and default frameworks for their market utilities, which risk manage billions of dollars of derivatives trades on the market every day. [Emphasis added.]

The exchanges’ long-term aim is for each customer to become a member of both the LSE-controlled LCH and Deutsche Börse’s Eurex clearing houses. The customers, which are typically banks, would agree to hand over their trading data in return for better risk management of their derivatives, according to two people familiar with the talks.

The planned London-based holding company would instruct the two clearing houses on how to proceed with a default after consultations with central banks, one of the people said. The two sides are discussing their plans with their regulators and customers, one person said.

So how do you have a “common risk management framework” without “commingling the risk-management framework”? Is there some fine verbal distinction I am missing? Or perhaps this is like Schrödinger’s CCP, in a state of quantum superposition, both commingled and uncommingled until someone opens the box.

In my post, I mentioned default management as one reason to integrate the CCPs:

Another part of the “risk management framework” is the management of defaulted positions. Separate management of the risk of components of a defaulted portfolio is highly inefficient. Indeed, part of the justification of portfolio margining is that the combined position is less risky, and that some components effectively hedge other components. Managing the risks of the components separately in the event of a default sacrifices these self-hedging features, and increases the amount of trading necessary to manage the risk of the defaulted position. Since this trading may be necessary during periods of low liquidity, economizing on the amount of trading is very beneficial.

Apparently the recent experience with the default of Maple Bank brought home the benefits of such integration:

One person familiar with the talks highlighted problems created by February’s default of Frankfurt-based bank Maple, which was a member of both exchanges’ clearing houses.

“Right now what you have is a blind process — the liquidation of positions is conducted without co-ordination,” the person said. “Therefore it has a negative price impact in the market as you have two guys running out liquidating positions in the name.”

Huh. Go figure.

“Commingling” makes sense. Coordination is vital, both in daily operations (e.g., setting margins and monitoring to reduce the risk of default) and in extremis (during a default).

Perhaps Rolet was trying to deceive regulators who are so obsessed with too big to fail (sorry, both Eurex and LCH are TBTF already!) and who are blind to the benefits of coordination. If the regulators need to be deceived thus, we are doomed, because then it would be clear they have no clue about the real issues.

One wonders if they will recognize coordination and commingling even after they look in the box. Apparently Rolet thinks not. If they do, Xavier will have a lot of ‘splainin’ to do.

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April 2, 2016

The Rube Goldberg Approach to Integrating CCPs: A Recipe for Disaster

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Economics,Exchanges,Financial crisis,Regulation — The Professor @ 12:38 pm

As noted in earlier posts (and by others commenting on the proposed Eurex-LSE merger) the main potential benefit to exchange customers* is the capital and margin savings from netting efficiencies between Eurex futures and LCH swaps. However, regulators and others have expressed concerns that the downside is the creation of an bigger too big to fail clearing entity. A couple of weeks back Silla Brush and John Detrixhe reported that the merger partners are trying to square that circle by cross-margining, but not merging the CCPs:

LCH.Clearnet and Eurex held 150 billion euros ($169.5 billion) of collateral on behalf of their members as of Dec. 31, according to the merger statement. The London-based clearer is developing a system that allows traders to offset their swap positions at LCH.Clearnet with their futures holdings at Eurex. The project, which works even though the two clearinghouses are separate, should enable customers to reduce the total amount of collateral they must set aside.

“We can cross margin our over-the-counter clearing with their listed derivatives without merging the clearinghouses, and without comingling the risk-management framework,” LSE Group CEO Xavier Rolet said in a Bloomberg Television interview on Wednesday. Rolet will step aside if the companies complete their merger.

The devil will clearly be in the details, and I am skeptical, not to say suspicious. In order for the separate but comingled system to work, Eurex’s CCP must have a claim on collateral held by LCH (and vice versa) so that deficiencies in a defaulter’s margin account on Eurex can be covered by excess at LCH (and vice versa). (As an illustration of the basic concept, Lehman had five different collateral pools at CME Clearing–interest rate, equity, FX, commodities, energy. There were deficiencies in two of these, but CME used collateral from the other three to cover them. As a result there was no hit to the default fund.)

How this will work legally is by no means evident, especially inasmuch as this will be a deal across jurisdictions (which could become even more fraught if Brexit occurs). Further, what happens in the event that one of the separate CCPs itself becomes insolvent? I can imagine a situation (unlikely, but possible)  in which CCP A is insolvent due to multiple defaults, but the margin account at A for one of the defaulters has excess funds while its margin account at CCP is deficient. Would it really be possible for B to access the defaulter’s collateral at bankrupt CCP A? Maybe, but I am certain that this question would be answered only after a nasty, and likely protracted, legal battle.

The fact that the CCPs are going to be legally separate entities suggests their default funds will be as well, and that they will be separately capitalized, meaning that the equity of one CCP will not be part of the default waterfall of the other. This increases the odds that one of the CCPs will exhaust its resources and become insolvent. That is, the probability that one of the separate CCPs will become insolvent exceeds the probability that a truly merged one would become so. Since even the separate CCPs would be huge and systemically important, it is not obvious that this is a superior outcome.

I am also mystified by what Rolet meant by “without comingling the risk management framework.” “Risk management framework” involves several pieces. One is the evaluation of market and credit risk, and the determination of the margin on the portfolio. Does Rolet mean that each CCP will make an independent determination of the margin it will charge for the positions held on it, but do so in a way that takes into account the offsetting risks at the position held at the other CCP? Wouldn’t that at least require sharing position information across CCPs? And couldn’t it result in arbitrary and perhaps incoherent determinations of margins if the CCPs use different models? (As a simple example, will the CCPs use different correlation assumptions?) Wouldn’t this have an effect on where firms place their trades? Couldn’t that lead to a perverse competition between the two CCPs?+ It seems much more sensible to have a unified risk model across the CCPs since they are assigning a single margin to a portfolio that includes positions on both CCPs.

Another part of the “risk management framework” is the management of defaulted positions. Separate management of the risk of components of a defaulted portfolio is highly inefficient. Indeed, part of the justification of portfolio margining is that the combined position is less risky, and that some components effectively hedge other components. Managing the risks of the components separately in the event of a default sacrifices these self-hedging features, and increases the amount of trading necessary to manage the risk of the defaulted position. Since this trading may be necessary during periods of low liquidity, economizing on the amount of trading is very beneficial.

In other words, co-mingling risk management is a very good idea if you are going to cross margin.

It seems that Eurex and LSE are attempting to come up with a clever way to work around regulators’ TBTF neuroses. But it is not clear how this workaround will perform in practice. Moreover, it seems to sacrifice many of the benefits of a merged CCP, while creating ambiguities and legal risks. It also will inevitably be more complex than simply merging the two CCPs. Such complexity creates systemic risks.

One way to put this is that if the two CCPs are legally separate entities, under separate managements, relations between them (including the arrangements necessary for cross margining and default management) will be governed by contract. Contracts are inevitably incomplete. There will be unanticipated contingencies, and/or contingencies that are anticipated but not addressed in the contract. When these contingencies occur in practice, there is a potential for conflict, disagreement, and rent seeking.

In the case of CCPs, the relevant contingencies not specified in the contract will most likely occur during a default, and likely during stressed market conditions. This is exactly the wrong time to have a dispute, and failure to come to a speedy resolution of how to deal with the contingency could be systemically catastrophic.

One advantage of ownership/integration is that it mitigates contractual incompleteness problems. Managers/owners have the authority to respond unilaterally to contingencies. As Williamson pointed out long ago, efficient “selective intervention” is problematic, but in the CCP context, the benefits of managerial fiat and selective intervention seem to far outweigh the costs.

I have argued that the need to coordinate during crises was one justification for the integration of trade execution and clearing. The argument applies with even greater force for the integration of CCPs that cooperate in some ways (e.g., through portfolio margining).

In sum, coordination of LCH and Eurex clearing through contract, rather than through merger into a single entity is a highly dubious way of addressing regulators’ concerns about CCPs being TBTF. The separate entities are already TBTF. The probability that one defaults if they are separate is bigger than the probability that the merged entity defaults, and the chaos conditional on default, or the measures necessary to prevent default, probably wouldn’t be that much greater for the merged entity: this means that reducing the probability of default is desirable, rather than reducing the size of the entity conditional on default. Furthermore, the contract between the two entities will inevitably be incomplete, and the gaps will be discovered, and extremely difficult to fill in-, during a crisis. This is exactly when a coordination failure would be most damaging, and when it would be most likely to occur.

Thus, in my view full integration dominates some Rube Goldberg-esque attempt to bolt LCH and Eurex clearing together by contract. The TBTF bridge was crossed long ago, for both CCPs. The complexity and potential for coordination failure between separate but not really organizations joined by contract would create more systemic risks than increasing size would. A coordination failure between two TBTF entities is not a happy thought.

Therefore, if regulators believe that the incremental systemic risk resulting from a full merger of LCH and Eurex clearing outweighs the benefits of the combination, they should torpedo the merger rather than allowing LSE and Eurex to construct some baroque contractual workaround.

*I say customers specifically, because it is not clear that the total benefits (including all affect parties) from cross margining, netting, etc., are positive. This is due to the distributive effects of these measures. They tend to ensure that derivatives counterparties get paid a higher fraction of their claims in the event of a default, but this is because they shift some of the losses to others with claims on the defaulter.

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March 9, 2016

Clearing Angst: Here Be Dragons Too

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Economics,Exchanges,Financial crisis,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 3:21 pm

We are now well into the Brave New World of clearing and collateral mandates. The US clearing mandate is in place, and the Europeans are on the verge of implementing it. We are also on the cusp of the mandate to collateralize non-cleared swaps.

After years of congratulating themselves on how the Brave New World was going to be so much better than the Bad Old World, the smart set is now coming to grips-grudgingly, slowly-with the dawning realization that not all the financial demons have been slain: here be dragons too. From time to time I’ve written about regulators recognizing this reality. There have been several more examples recently indicating that this has become the new conventional wisdom. For instance, Bloomberg recently editorialized on CCPs becoming the New Too Big to Fail: meet the new systemic risk, not that different from the old systemic risk. The BoE is commencing a review of CCPs, focusing not just on financial risks but operational ones as well. Researchers as Citi are warning that CCPs need more skin in the game. Regulators are warning that CCPs have become a single point of aim for hackers as they have become more central to the financial system. Researchers at three central banks go Down Under back into the not-too-distant past to show how CCPs can get into trouble–and how they can wreak havoc when they try to save themselves. An economist at the Chicago Fed warns that CCPs create new risks as they address old ones. Even the BIS (which had been an unabashed clearing cheerleader) sounds warnings.

I could go on. Suffice it to say that it is now becoming widely recognized that central clearing mandates (and the mandated collateralization of non-cleared derivatives) is not the silver bullet that will slay systemic risk, as someone pointed out more than seven years ago.

This is a good thing, on the whole, but there is a danger. This danger inheres in the framing of the issue as “CCPs are too big to fail, and therefore need to be made fail-safe.”  Yes, the failure of a major CCP is a frightening prospect: as the article linked above about the crisis at the New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange demonstrates, the collapse of even a non-major CCP is not a cheery prospect either.

But the measures employed to prevent failure pose their own dangers. The “loser pays” model is designed to reduce credit risk in derivatives transactions by requiring the posting of initial margins and the payment of variation margins, so that the CCP’s credit exposure is reduced. But balance sheets can be adjusted, and credit exposure through derivatives can be-and will be, to a large extent-replaced by credit exposure elsewhere, meaning that collateralization primarily redistributes credit risk, rather than reduces it.

Furthermore, the nature of the credit can change, and in bad ways. The need to meet large margin calls in the face of large price movements  causes spikes in the demand for credit that are correlated with market disruptions: this liquidity risk is a wrong way risk of the worst sort, because it tends to occur at times when the supply of liquidity is constrained, and it therefore can contribute to liquidity crises/liquidity hoarding and can cause a vicious spiral. In addition, as the article on the NZFOE demonstrates other measures that are intended to save the clearinghouse (partial tearups, in that instance) redistribute default losses in unpredictable ways, and it is by no means clear that those who bear these losses are less systemically important than, or more able to withstand them than, those who would bear them in an uncleared world.

The article on the NZFOE episode points out another salient fact: dealing with a CCP crisis has huge distributive effects. This makes any CCP action the subject of intense politicking and rent seeking by the affected parties, and this inevitably draws in the regulators and the central bankers. This, in turn, will inevitably draw in the politicians. Thus, political considerations, as much or more than economic ones, will drive the response. With supersized CCPs, the political fallout from any measures adopted to save CCPs (including extending credit to permit losers to make margin calls) will be acute and long lived.

Thus, contrary to the way they were hawked in the aftermath of the crisis, CCPs and collateralization mandates are not fire-and-forget measures that reduce burdens on regulators generally, and central banks in particular. They create new burdens, as regulators and central banks will inevitably be forced to resort to extraordinary measures, and in particular extraordinary measures to supply liquidity, to respond to systemic stresses created by the clearing system.

In his academic post-mortem of the clearing during the 1987 Crash, Ben Bernanke forthrightly declared that it was appropriate for the Fed to socialize clearinghouse risks on Black Monday and the following Tuesday. In Bernanke’s view, socializing the risk prevented a more serious crisis.

When you compare the sizes of the CCPs at issue then (CME Clearing, BOTCC, and OCC) to the behemoths of a post-mandate world, you should be sobered. The amount of risk that must be socialized to protect the handful of huge CCPs that currently exist dwarfs the amount that Greenspan (implicitly) took onto the Fed balance sheet in October, 1987.

Put differently, CCPs have become single points of socialization. Anyone who thinks differently, is fooling themselves.

Addendum: The last sentence of the Bernanke article is rather remarkable: “Since it now appears that the Fed is firmly committed to respond when the financial system is threatened, it may be that changes in the clearing and settlement system can be safely restricted to improvements to the technology of clearing and settlement.” The argument in a nutshell is that the Fed’s performance of its role as “insurer of last resort” (Bernanke’s phrase to describe socializing CCP risk) during the Crash of 1987 showed that central banks could readily handle the systemic financial risks associated with clearing. Therefore, managing the financial risks of clearing can easily be delegated to central banks, and CCPs and market users should focus on addressing operational risks.

There is an Alfred E. Newman-esque feel to these remarks, and they betray remarkable hubris about the powers of central banks. I wonder if he thinks the same today. More importantly, I wonder if his successors at the Fed, and their peers around the world, share these views. Given the experience of the past decade, and the massive expansion of derivatives clearing world, I sure as hell hope not.

 

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March 7, 2016

Clear the Way: LSE (and LCH!) on the Block

The biggest news from the exchange world in a long time is the proposed merger between LSE and Eurex. Both entities operate stock exchanges, but that’s a commoditized business these days, and it’s not the real driver of the merger. Instead, LSE’s LCH.Clearnet, and in particular LCH’s SwapClear, are the prizes. LSE and Eurex also both have valuable index businesses, but its hard to see how their value is enhanced through a combination: synergies, if they exist, are modest.

There are potentially large synergies on the clearing side. In particular, the ability to portfolio margin across interest rate products (notably various German government securities futures traded and cleared on Eurex, and Euro-denominated swaps cleared through LCH) would provide cost savings for customers that the merged entities could capture through higher fees. (Which is one reason why some market users are less than thrilled at the merger.)

A potential competitor to buy LSE, ICE, could also exploit these synergies. Indeed, its Euro- and Sterling-denominated short term interest rate futures contracts are arguably a better offset against Euro- and Sterling-denominated swaps than are Bunds or BOBLs.

The CME’s experience suggests that these synergies are not necessarily decisive competitively. The CME clears USD government security and STIRs, as well as USD interest rate swaps, and therefore has the greatest clearing synergies in the largest segment of the world interest rate complex. But LCH has a substantial lead in USD swap clearing.

It is likely that ICE will make a bid for LSE. If it wins, it will have a very strong clearing offering spanning exchange traded contracts, CDS, and IRS. Even if it loses, it can make Eurex pay up, thereby hobbling it as a competitor going forward: even at the current price, the LSE acquisition will strain Eurex’s balance sheet.

CME might also make a bid. Success would give it a veritable monopoly in USD interest rate clearing.

And that’s CME’s biggest obstacle. I doubt European anti-trust authorities would accept the creation of a clearing monopoly, especially since the monopolist would be American. (Just ask Google, Microsoft, etc., about that.) US antitrust authorities are likely to raise objections as well.

From a traditional antitrust perspective, an ICE acquisition would not present many challenges. But don’t put it past the Europeans to engage in protectionism via antitrust, and gin up objections to an ICE purchase.

Interestingly, the prospect of the merger between two huge clearinghouses is making people nervous about the systemic risk implications. CCPs are the new Too Big to Fail, and all that.

Welcome to the party, people. But it’s a little late to start worrying. As I pointed out going back to the 1990s, there are strong economies of scale and scope in clearing, meaning that consolidation is nearly inevitable. With swaps clearing mandates, the scale of clearing has been increased so much, and new scope economies have been created, that the consolidated entities will inevitably be huge, and systemically important.

If I had to handicap, I would put decent odds on the eventual success of a Eurex-LSE combination, but I think ICE has a decent opportunity of prevailing as well.

The most interesting thing about this is what it says about the new dynamics of exchange combinations. In the 2000s, yes, clearing was part of the story, but synergies in execution were important too. Now it’s all about clearing, and OTC clearing in particular. Which means that systemic risk concerns, which were largely overlooked in the pre-crisis exchange mergers, will move front and center.

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January 31, 2016

CCPs & RTGS: Devil Take the Hindmost?

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Economics,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 6:37 pm

The frantic sewing of parachutes in a plane that is 30,000 feet in the air continues apace. Last week the Office of Financial Research (a Son of Frankendodd) released its 2015 Annual Report. This tome received attention mainly because it raised alarm about potential systemic risks arising from central clearing mandates. An improvement, I guess, but like most official evaluations of the systemic risks of CCPs, it misses the real problems.

It gets off on the wrong foot by misstating the real benefits of CCPs. According to OFR, the top two benefits of clearing are related to the ability of CCPs, and via them regulators, to get more complete, accurate, and timely information on derivatives positions and trading prices. But these can be achieved by transaction reporting alone, without going the full monty to clearing, which also entails collateralization (including both initial and variation margining) and mutualization of default risk. (Trade reporting has turned into a nightmare, which I will write about further soon. But the point is that you don’t need clearing to get the benefits OFR touts.)

But the main problem, yet again, is that OFR focuses on the “single point of failure”/interconnectedness/default loss contagion channel for CCP systemic risk. This is not immaterial, but it is not the main thing. The main thing is that CCPs create potentially massive contingent demands for liquidity, where the liquidity contingency is likely to occur precisely at the worst time–when the system is undergoing a financial crisis.

Further, OFR gets it wrong when it states that CCPs “reduce the risk of counterparty default.” CCPs redistribute the risk of the insolvency or illiquidity of a large financial institution away from its derivatives counterparties towards its other creditors. It protects one group of creditors at the expense of others.

It is very much open to question whether this reallocation is systemically stabilizing, or is instead a means whereby one relatively concentrated group of market participants can advantage themselves at the expense of others.

Reading Izabella Kaminska’s excellent FT Alphaville post on Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) mechanisms makes plain that this phenomenon of substituting liquidity risk for credit risk, and redistributing credit risk away from core banks, is not limited to derivatives clearing. RTGS replaced deferred net settlement (DNS) because of banks’ and central banks’ concern that in the latter, interbank credit balances could accumulate, resulting in a default loss to settlement banks in the event that an net payer bank failed before the next netting cycle. RTGS eliminates interbank credit exposure.

But, of course, this doesn’t make credit exposure go away. It redistributes it to settlement banks’ other creditors. To a first approximation, the total losses from the inability of a bank to meet its obligations are the same under RTGS and DNS. The difference is who gets a chair when the music stops. Settlement banks–and crucially, the central banks–like RTGS because they almost always are going to get a chair.

Furthermore, as even its proponents acknowledge, RTGS is much more liquidity intensive. To be able to make every payment in real time, a settlement bank either has to have the cash on hand, or the ability to borrow it on demand intraday from the central bank. Liquidity needs scale with gross payments, which are substantially larger than net payments. Thus, like CCPs, RTGS substitutes liquidity risk for default risk.

This risk is exacerbated by the fact that a prisoner’s dilemma problem exists in RTGS. Participants concerned about the creditworthiness of other banks have an incentive to delay payments and hoard liquidity, since once a payment goes into the system, it is final and the payer is at risk to loss of the entire gross amount if a bank that owes it fails before it pays. This can lead to a seizing up of the liquidity supply mechanism, as the prisoner’s dilemma logic kicks in and everyone starts to hoard.

Since holding cash in sufficient amounts to meet all payment obligations is extremely expensive, RTGS has evolved to permit central banks to lend intraday on a collateralized basis. But as was seen in the 2008 crisis, collateralization poses its own risks, including ballooning haircuts that can set off price spirals due to collateral fire sales. Further, due to the potential for the breakdown of long and large collateral chains, this creates an interconnection risk, and represents a further coupling of the system. And it is coupling, remember, that is at the root of most catastrophic accidents. Secured lending can create a false sense of security.

Izabella’s post also points out another problem with RTGS, which is common to central clearing. It creates a much more tightly coupled system that is very vulnerable to operational risk. This risk crystalized in October, 2014, when a seemingly innocuous change to the system (deleting a member bank) caused the failure of the UK’s CHAPS  settlement system for a day. Ironically, this was the result of an interaction between one part of the system, and another part (the Liquidity Savings Mechanism) that was intended to economize on the liquidity demands of RTGS, and essentially created an RTGS-DNS hybrid. As in most “normal accidents”, unexpected interactions between seemingly unrelated parts of a complex system led to its failure.

There is another way to see all of this. Both central clearing and RTGS are intended to create “no credit” systems. That is true only in a very limited sense–a profoundly unsystemic sense. Yes, CCPs and RTGS are designed so that participants in those arrangements don’t have credit exposure to one another. But those participants aren’t the entire system, just a part of it: the exposure is pushed away from them to others. Further, the method for reducing credit exposure among the participants is to require extensive reliance on liquidity mechanisms that are prone to breakdown in stressed market conditions. Further, these liquidity mechanisms are based on credit: banks (or the CCP) borrow from other banks, or from central banks in order to obtain liquidity. Further, the credit moves into shadowier places.

Not to sound like a broken record, but things like CCPs and RTGS redistribute and transform risks, rather than eliminate them altogether. Unfortunately, these transformations do not necessarily reduce the risk of a systemic crisis, and arguably increase it in some cases. The failure of officialdom, and large swathes of the banking sector, to recognize or address this reflects in large part a failure to take a systemic perspective. Perhaps cynically, this can be explained by the fact that the central banks and banks that drive these reform efforts mistake their own interests for the interest of the system as a whole: le système, c’est nous. As a result, “Devil take the hindmost” could well be applied as the motto of RTGS and central clearing.

This illustrates a broader problem in public policy. Government is too often invoked as a deus ex machina that internalizes externalities. But the fact that most regulatory change efforts are driven by, or ultimately controlled by, a small subset of interested parties who have the most concentrated stake in an issue. Given the diffuseness of other impacted parties this is inevitable. But it means that in practical terms internalizing externalities via regulation of something as complex as the financial system is a chimerical goal. The externality hot potato gets tossed from one segment of the financial sector to another. Government regulation, as opposed to self-regulatory initiatives, mainly affect the makeup of the subset of participants who are involved in influencing the process, and the distribution of the bargaining power. This works through the entire process, from the crafting of legislation, to the writing of regulations, to their implementation. This is why we get things like RTGS or CCP mandates, which make a certain set of participants better off, but which it is heroic indeed to believe are truly welfare increasing.

 

 

 

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December 7, 2015

Clearing Mandates: Would That Regulators Had Remembered Takeoffs are Optional, But Landings Are Not

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Economics,Politics,Regulation — The Professor @ 9:41 pm

ln 2010 and 2011 I was a clearing Cassandra, sounding warnings about the potential systemic risks arising from clearing mandates. Prominent among those dismissing my criticisms were “macro prudential” regulators, notably the Federal Reserve and the Bank of International Settlements.

Things are rather different now. Regulators, including notably the Fed and the BIS, are now making the rounds expressing recognition, and arguably concerns, about systemic risks in clearing.

Case number one: Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo:

However, as has been frequently observed, if the financial system is to reap these benefits, the central counterparties to which transactions are moving must themselves be sound and stable. Extreme but plausible events, such as the failure of clearing members or a rapid change in the value of instruments traded by a CCP, could expose it to financial distress. If the CCP has insufficient resources to deal with such stress, it may look to its clearing members to provide support. But if the problems arise during a period of generalized financial stress, the clearing members may themselves already have been weakened or, even if they remain sound, the diversion of their available liquidity to the CCP may prevent customers of the clearing members from accessing needed funding. If the CCP fails, the adverse effects on the financial system could be significant, including the prospect that the CCP’s default on its obligations could amplify the stress on other important financial institutions.

. . . .

While the question of what constitutes the optimal default fund standard needs more analysis and debate, I think there is little question that more attention must be paid to strengthening stress testing, recovery strategies, and resolution plans for significant CCPs. The typical CCP recovery strategy does not take a system-wide perspective and is premised on imposing losses on, or drawing liquidity from, CCP members during what may be a period of systemic stress. Many of these members are themselves systemically important firms, which will likely be suffering losses and facing liquidity demands of their own in anything but an idiosyncratic stress scenario at a CCP. Moreover, in at least some cases, uncertainty is increased by the difficulty of estimating with any precision the extent of potential liability of members to the CCP, thereby complicating both their recovery planning and efforts by the official sector to assess system-wide capital and liquidity availability in adverse scenarios.

The failure of regulators to take a “system-wide perspective” in their analysis of systemic risk generally, and in the effect of clearing mandates on systemic risk in particular, was one of my oft-expressed criticisms.

Tarullo is an interesting case. When I made a presentation  expressing my warnings about the systemic risks of clearing before the Fed Board of Governors in October, 2011, Tarullo was sitting right next to me at the big table in the Fed Board Room. He was, to put it mildly, dismissive of what I had to say.

Glad to see he’s coming around.

Case number two: Fed Governor Jerome Powell. I was particularly pleased to see that Powell recognizes that the picture that was repeatedly used to sell the benefits of clearing is highly misleading because it fails to take a system-wide approach: I criticized this picture in presentations as early as 2011, and also in some published work. Though I would say that Powell still omits many of the other connections between major financial institutions in a cleared world.

More from Powell:

I am a believer in the potential benefits of central clearing under the right circumstances. But central clearing is not a panacea. Charts similar to that in Figure 1 are often used to illustrate the netting of exposures and simplification that central clearing can bring to an OTC market. The tangled and highly opaque picture of a purely bilateral market is replaced by the neat hub-and-spoke network in which a CCP is buyer to every seller, and seller to every buyer, allowing netting and greater transparency for participants and regulators alike. Of course, reality is not so elegant, as Figure 2 illustrates. There are multiple CCPs, even within product classes, and major dealers act as clearing members across a broad network of CCPs. Clearing members also perform a range of services for CCPs, including custody, liquidity provision, and settlement. By design, increased central clearing will concentrate risks in CCPs; it is essential that, as these risks accumulate, the CCPs build up their ability to manage them. It is often noted that CCPs made it through the recent financial crisis without direct government assistance. But many of their major clearing members did receive such assistance. CCPs must now plan for a world in which these large firms will fail and be resolved without government support.

. . . .

All of these efforts are directly aimed at strengthening FMIs. But the strength and resilience of a CCP ultimately depends on the strength and resilience of its clearing members. I’d now like to shift focus to the relationship between these market utilities and the institutions that use them.

Barring an operational event, CCPs only face credit or liquidity risk when one of their members fails to make a payment when due. Thus, one effective way to make a CCP safer is to make its members safer. In that sense, the post-crisis reforms that have greatly strengthened our largest and most systemically important banking institutions have directly benefitted CCPs and other FMIs.

This last part, of course, raises the obvious question: would measures to “[strengthen] our largest and most systemically important banking institutions” been sufficient to address macro prudential concerns about OTC derivatives, making unnecessary clearing mandates?

But the biggest, and most surprising case is the BIS:

Clearing though a CCP creates a centralised network of trading exposures. Conceptually, this may influence systemic risk in two main ways. First, central clearing may affect the propagation of an (exogenous) shock through domino effects: the losses deriving from a counterparty default could trigger further defaults and spread the shock through the system. Second, central clearing, and the associated risk management practices, may affect the likelihood and impact of endogenous “run and deleveraging” mechanisms even in the absence of an initial default. While, in practice, both mechanisms may interact, considering them separately helps us to understand possible changes in the nature of systemic risk.

. . .

For example, the size of a shock would matter for systemic risk to the extent that defaults inflict a liquidity shortage on a CCP. If one or more clearing members fail to meet their clearing obligations, the CCP itself must provide liquidity in order to make timely payments to the original trading counterparties. The CCP’s own liquid assets and backup liquidity lines made available by banks may provide effective insurance against liquidity shocks resulting from the difficulties of one or a few clearing members. But they can hardly provide protection in the event of a systemic shock, when a large number of clearing participants – potentially including the providers of liquidity lines – become liquidity-constrained, thereby triggering domino effects.

. . . .

A centralised structure of trading exposures may also affect the likelihood and nature of endogenous shocks in the form of forced deleveraging, fire sales and runs. The critical issue in this regard is the interaction between CCPs’ risk management practices and those of clearing participants. On the one hand, if stringent risk management by a CCP replaces lax counterparty risk management in bilateral markets, central clearing would tend to reduce the risk of such procyclical behaviour. On the other hand, an unexpected tightening of CCP risk management could still lead to liquidity pressures on participants that could ultimately trigger fire sales and a self-reinforcing deleveraging (Morris and Shin (2008)).

. . . .

Turning to the risk of endogenous deleveraging, the assessment of the impact of post-crisis trends is similarly ambiguous. The fact that an increasing share of trading positions is subject to daily variation margin payments has arguably reduced the risk that counterparties are confronted with sudden big losses, as was for instance the case with AIG. However, the shift towards the centralised risk management of trading positions, including collateralisation and high-frequency margining, is also likely to affect market-wide liquidity dynamics. For example, extreme price movements in cleared financial instruments could result in large variations in the exposure of clearing members to the CCPs and therefore in the need for some of them to make correspondingly large variation margin payments. Such payments can be large, even if margin requirements remain unchanged. But they may be exacerbated if the CCP increases initial margins and/or tightens collateral standards in the face of unusually large price movements.

 

I made all of these points, or closely related ones, going back as far as 2008-2009, at times to the disdain of the BIS. One example occurred when made a presentation at the Notre Dame Financial Regulation Conference in May, 2011, where two BIS economists said I was being alarmist. Another was at a conference sponsored by the BofE, ECB, and Banque de France in September, 2013.

So it’s nice to see them come to their senses.

The last point in what I quoted is particularly amazing. One BIS position that I have ridiculed was that variation margin flows created no liquidity demands because they were zero sum: every dollar paid by the loser is received by the winner, allowing the collateral to be recycled. Presumably by having the winners lend to the losers. Even overlooking the operational impossibilities of this, what’s the point of variation margin (which reduces credit exposure in derivatives contracts) if variation margins are funded by credit? And there are operational issues. Liquidity is needed precisely because payments are not frictionlessly and instantaneously recycled. Timing mismatches create a need for liquidity and credit.

So it’s particularly nice to see the BIS get beyond its risible dismissal of the possibility that variation margins can create systemic risks via a liquidity channel, and recognize that this is a serious issue. Because it is. The most important risk in clearing, in my opinion, and one that becomes even more important when regulators take other measures to protect CCPs.

All in all, it’s good to see regulators starting to grapple with the potential systemic risks inherent in clearing. It is better than continued cheer-leading, as was the norm from 2009 until very recently.

But that said, the time to start worrying about potential major design flaws in an aircraft isn’t when it is just reaching cruising altitude. Takeoffs are optional, landings are not. It’s best to make sure that a safe landing, rather than a crash, is highly likely before taxiing down the runway. In their wisdom, legislators and regulators in a hurry didn’t do that. They rushed a new, complex, and untested design into the air. Let’s hope that the newfound awareness of the potential risks allows them to make in-flight repairs and adjustments that will make a crash unlikely.

 

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December 1, 2015

The Red Queen’s Race: Financial Regulation Edition

Filed under: Clearing,Derivatives,Economics,Financial crisis,Regulation — The Professor @ 8:44 pm

Well over four years ago, I raised concerns about clearing mandates leading to the rise of “collateral transformation” whereby those needing high-quality assets to pledge as collateral against derivatives trades would obtain them via repos collateralized by low-quality assets. I argued that these transactions were inherently fragile, and could go pear shaped during period of market stress.

If this were the only problem that post-crisis regulations created, how lucky we would be! Yesterday, the FT ran a nice (meaning scary) piece about other regulation-related driven spurts in securities lending that are collateral transformation on steroids.

One big driver is the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, which requires banks to hold one month’s stress period liquidity needs in liquid assets like government bonds. Rather than sell other less liquid assets to raise the cash to buy Treasuries, Gilts, Bunds, etc., banks are posting their less liquid assets (including equities) as collateral against borrowing of government securities.

Think of how this could work in a crisis. Yes, a bank can sell the borrowed guvvies to raise cash to meet deposit outflows or other cash needs in a crisis. But it borrowed these securities, so it has to buy them back, eventually. Perhaps its liquidity crisis will have passed before the loan matures, but perhaps not. What then, genius? Liquidity crisis deferred, not necessarily prevented.

There are other concerns. The lender of the government bond is likely to haircut the collateral more steeply during crisis periods, meaning that the stressed bank is going to have to come up with more collateral to support its loan precisely when it can least afford to do so. The cyclicality of the collateral mechanism is a concern, and it can create all sorts of vicious cycles that have spillovers throughout the financial system.

Furthermore, the article notes that asset managers like BlackRock are the major securities lenders. They lend out bonds purchased to back government bond ETFs, and take other securities as collateral. That is, the asset manager is engaged in a financial transformation in which there can be a mismatch between the assets underlying the ETF and its liabilities: swapping government bonds for equity (or other assets) creates such a mismatch. What happens if the ETF sponsor is it by a wave of redemptions–especially if the redemptions occur because investors become concerned because the value of the collateral the sponsor has collected has fallen, and may be substantially below the value of the assets lent out (which is what the fund is intended to track)? One possibility is fire sales of the collateral and “fire purchases” of the assets the fund has lent out. A more likely outcome is that this is the kind of event which will cause the fund to demand significantly more collateral from the security borrower, setting off the vicious cycles described above.

Oh joy.

The article states that another reason for the rise in securities lending is that banks get better capital treatment on the borrowed securities than the securities posted as collateral. If this is true, it is totally nuts. The borrowed security is not an asset to the bank: the assets posted as collateral for the loan are. The borrower has the asset in his hot little hands, but has an obligation to give it back: these things offset. At the end of the day, the bank still has the other assets posted as collateral. If capital regs treat the borrowed bond as an asset, and don’t treat the securities posted as collateral as an asset, and reduce risk weighted assets (and hence capital requirements) as a result, the regulations are even dumber than I had thought possible.

That is really saying something.

The third reason for the rise in securities lending is my old favorite, collateral transformation to obtain CCP-eligible collateral. This part of the article made me laugh:

There is a third plus, too, as another facet of post-crisis regulation gains momentum. With so much derivatives trading moving to central counterparty clearing, there is increasing demand for high quality assets to be used as collateral. And for that, government bonds — even borrowed ones — avoid punitive haircuts imposed on some equities.

I laugh because in a collateral transformation trade, there is a potentially punitive haircut on the equities (or whatever) posted in the collateral transformation trade.

Whenever I see things like this I keep coming back to the story about the Indian village that was infested by mice, so it brought in cats which then multiplied and became such pests that they brought in dogs to run off the cats, but then the dogs became such a problem that they brought in elephants to scare away the dogs, and when the elephants started wrecking the place they reintroduced the mice to scare away the elephants.

Things like the LCR and clearing mandates were introduced to solve one set of problems (or perceived problems) inherent in the financial transformations that banks provide. But these regulations have led to the proliferation of other kinds of transformations that are problematic in their own ways. These new transformations create new, potentially fragile, interconnections. They create new counterparty and liquidity risks even as they mitigate some old ones.

Or to invoke another metaphor, this is like the Red Queen, running at breakneck speed to stay in the same place:

“Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to somewhere else—if you run very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.”

“A slow sort of country!” said the Queen. “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”

Yes. Very much like that indeed. Perhaps we haven’t quite stayed in one place, but the running over the past 5 plus years has not moved us nearly as far as the Frankendodd and EMIR and MiFID II pom-pom squad claim.  Risks have been shifted and transformed, rather than eliminated. In the attempt to banish the devil we knew, we’ve teamed up with some lesser-known demons. Sadly, we are likely to become much better acquainted, sooner or later.

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October 24, 2015

Creeping Recognition that Regulation Has Created a Liquidity Death Star

Reason number one (by far) that I believe that clearing and collateral mandates increase systemic risk is that they transform credit risk into liquidity risk. Large price moves during stressed market situations require those with losing positions to make large variation margin payments in a very tight frame. These payments need to be funded, and funded immediately. Thus, variation margining causes spikes in the demand for liquidity. Furthermore, clearing in particular creates tight coupling because failures-or even delays-in making VM payments can put the clearinghouse into default, or force it to liquidate collateral in an illiquid market. The consequences of that, you should shudder to contemplate.

To be somewhat hyperbolic, clearing mandates create a sort of liquidity death star.

Recognition of how dangerous spikes in liquidity demand precisely when liquidity supply evaporates creates a major systemic risk is sadly insufficiently widespread, particularly among many regulators who still sing paeans to the glories of clearing. But perhaps awareness is spreading, albeit slowly. At least I hope that this Economist article indicates a greater appreciation of the collateral issue, although it fails to draw the connection to central clearing, and how clearing mandates can dramatically exacerbate collateral shortages:

WHEN the financial system teetered on the brink of collapse in 2008, the biggest problem was a lack of liquidity. Banks were unable to refinance themselves in the short-term debt markets. Central banks had to step in on a massive scale to offer support. Calm was eventually restored, but not without enormous economic damage.

But has the underlying problem of liquidity gone away? A research note from Michael Howell of Crossborder Capital argues that, in the modern financial system, central banks are no longer the only, or even the main, providers of liquidity. Instead, the system looks a lot like that of the Victorian era, with banks dependent on the wholesale markets for funding. Back then, the trade bill was the key asset for bank financing; now it is the mysteriously named “repo” market.

. . . .

Bigger haircuts mean that borrowers need more collateral than before in order to fund themselves. “When market volatility jumps, funding capacity drops in tandem and often substantially,” writes Mr Howell. The result, a liquidity squeeze at the worst possible moment, is a template of how the next crisis may occur (although regulators are trying to reduce banks’ reliance on short-term funding).

And again, it is at these times when the need to fund VM payments will kick in, exacerbating the liquidity squeeze. Moreover, clearing also ties up a lot of the assets (e.g., Treasuries, or cash) that firms could normally borrow against to raise cash. Perversely, that collateral can be accessed only if a clearing member defaults on a variation margin payment.

Just what the liquidity supply mechanism will be in the next crisis in the new cleared world is not quite, well, clear. As the Economist article (and the Crossborder Capital note upon which it is based) demonstrate, central banks lend against collateral, and the collateral constraint will already be binding in stress situation. Presumably central banks will have to be much more expansive in their definition of what constitutes “good” collateral (a la Bagehot).

It still astounds me that even though every major financial crisis in history has been at root a liquidity crisis, in their infinite wisdom the betters who presume to govern us thought they were solving systemic risk problems by imposing a mechanism that will sharply increase liquidity demand and restrict liquidity supply during periods of market stress. That should work out really, really swell.

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