Streetwise Professor

My main beef with Tesla Motors is that it is a major beneficiary of government largesse masquerading as a free market success story.  The company received a $450 million loan from the Federal government to set up operations.  It has just paid back that loan, but does not justify granting the loan in the first place: indeed, it illustrates the heads-Musk-makes-a-lot-of-money-tails-the-taxpayers-eat-it aspect of the loan.  It socialized the risk of loss, and privatized the gains.  That’s bad, on principle.  (Things might have been ameliorated had the warrant the government received allowed it to participate in the upside, but the exact opposite happened: the warrant went away precisely when the stock price went parabolic.)

But the loan isn’t the biggest source of government support. The $7500/vehicle federal subsidy to purchasers and California’s Zero Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) credit program are.  When you look at the value of these subsidies, they dwarf the much ballyhooed profit Tesla reported for the first quarter (and those profits were driven by the write-down of the warrant and non-repeatable gains on yen exposure).

I’ve done some back of the envelope calculations to estimate just how much these subsidies benefited Tesla’s shareholders.  The basic idea is to calculate profits with and without the subsidies based two assumptions about the demand for Teslas: a constant elasticity demand curve and a linear demand curve.

The linear case is easiest to explain.  The equation is P=A-bQ, where P is price and Q is quantity sold.  A and b are constants that need to be solved for.  P and Q are known for the first quarter: I’ll use $75K for P (the average price of a Model S) and Q is 4750.  If Tesla was maximizing profits, it would set its marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, where the marginal cost nets out the subsidies.  The relevant equation is C-S=A-2bQ.  I derive C from the cost of generating revenue reported in the 10Q.  I divide this sum by Q, and then multiply by .6 because the cost number includes some fixed costs (e.g., tooling) and I want marginal cost: it turns out that the results I derive aren’t that sensitive to the multiple.  For S I add $7500 and Tesla’s ZEV credit revenues (reported in the 10Q) divided by the number of vehicles sold.  I now have 2 equations, and can solve for the unknown constants A and b.

I now have all I need to know to figure out revenues (including subsidy payments) net of variable costs.  This totals $206 million.  I can also figure out the price and quantity of Teslas sold without the subsidy.  Absent subsidy, Tesla would choose Q to satisfy: C=A-2bQ, which gives Q=(A-C)/2.  This can be plugged back into the price equation.

Doing this gives a no-subsidy quantity of 3558 (about 70 percent of the with-subsidy sales) and a price of $91K.  Using these numbers, and the assumed unit cost gives a no-subsidy profit (before fixed costs, etc.) of $116 million.

In other words, in this specification, Tesla pocketed about $90 million due to subsidies in one quarter alone.  That represents about 18 percent of its auto sales revenues, and dwarfs its profit even including the one-time boosters.

In the constant elasticity specification, I need to solve for the demand elasticity and the constant multiplying the Q raised to the elasticity.  Given the price, quantity, cost, and subsidy numbers, I can solve for these two constants using the demand equation and the marginal revenue equals marginal cost equation.  Given these constants, I can figure out profits with and without subsidies.

In the constant elasticity case, profit with subsidies (before fixed charges) is again $206 million, and profit without the subsidies is estimated to be $139 million.  So in the constant elasticity specification, subsidies pad Tesla’s profits by $67 million.

These are numbers for one quarter, folks.  This is money out of your pockets, or the pockets of shareholders of Ford, Toyota, etc., who have to buy ZEV credits.  Tesla would still be drowning in red ink absent the fat subsidies.

I sure hope you are enjoying Mr. Musk’s Wild Ride at your expense.  Your enjoyment being completely vicarious, of course, expect for the paying for it part.  That’s something you experience personally.

I would hope that these figures put the hype in perspective.  Tesla cars are fueled by electricity.  Telsa Motors is fueled by government money.  Your money.

One more thing.  Tesla and Musk are neck deep in a relationship with Goldman-Sachs, aka Government Sachs.  Think that it’s just maybe possible that Goldman will deploy its notorious political heft to keep the rain of government manna going?  If you doubt that, can I interest you in a bridge connecting two boroughs in NYC?  Which makes it doubly ironic-and nauseating-that many of the Tesla Kool Aid Gang also declaim against crony capitalism.  Well, so do I, except I at least do so with a modicum of consistency.

Harry D’Angelo and Rene Stulz have an interesting paper about bank leverage.  It makes a simple point.  Banks’ liabilities-notably, deposits-are someone else’s asset. That asset provides a benefit, namely liquidity, that depositors can’t realize by trading in capital markets, due to some friction.  This intermediation is what makes banks special.  As a result, depositors are willing to hold bank liabilities in exchange for a lower return than bank assets. Banks therefore have an incentive to create these liabilities-that is, to leverage up-to the maximum extent possible, in order to capture as much of this liquidity premium as possible.  This leveraging is a good thing, because it supplies an asset that is highly valued by those who incur high costs to access capital markets directly.

In the D’Angelo-Stulz model, bank equity is the capitalized value of this below market borrowing rate/liquidity premium.  If the liquidity premium is modest, the  supply of liquid claims results in a high debt to assets ratio.  Again, this high leverage is a good thing, because it is the consequence of the efficient supply of intermediation.  Banks access the capital market effectively engage in a form of asset transformation that generates value: those who cannot access the capital markets, or at least not as efficiently, cannot engage in this asset transformation, and they are willing to pay banks who can.  Through diversification and risk management, banks can engage in asset transformation that is valued by depositors.

This paper is most useful as a corrective to the rather annoying Admati et al “Bankers’ New Clothes” arguments that banks are excessively leveraged and should therefore be subjected to far more rigorous capital requirements, e.g., 25 percent equity.   Admati et al rely heavily on Modigliani-Miller type arguments, and D’Angelo-Stulz show that high leverage can be efficient when there is a single deviation from MM assumptions.  Bank debt (at least some forms of it-more on this below) provides a valuable device in the presence of a friction, and therefore issuance of this debt (in lieu of equity) is socially beneficial.

That said, there are some issues with the paper.

First, the formal model is very rudimentary.  It posits that those without access to the capital market are willing to pay an exogenously specified premium for bank liabilities that offer liquidity, i.e., guaranteed purchasing power.  But willingness to pay does not determine the equilibrium price of liquidity.  In a competitive banking market, the equilibrium price of liquidity is determined by the cost of producing it as well.  This is not modeled in the paper.  The marginal cost of engaging in intermediation/asset transformation must be upward sloping in order for banks to earn producer surplus (which, when capitalized, would be the value of bank equity).

Presumably, equity is one of the means by which banks are able to engage in asset transformation that provides reliable liquidity to those holding bank liabilities.  In essence, equity is a means of bonding contractual performance (a point I learned from reading Yoram Barzel years ago).  In the banking context, equity provides a cushion that ensures that depositors will be able to realize the face value of their claims at will-which is the essence of liquidity.  Thus, the reliability of the liquidity banks supply, and hence the premium that depositors are willing to pay, depends on the amount of equity (as well as on the asset side of bank balance sheets).  The paper does not address this interaction, taking equity value as a pure residual value driven by an exogenous liquidity premium that does not depend on bank equity.

Second, although deposits that provide liquidity to investors without ready access to the capital market are one part of bank leverage, banks, and especially systemically important ones, borrow in other ways, and the resulting liabilities do not have the same money-like characteristics as deposits.   The paper does not explain the entire capital structure of banks.  Indeed, it predicts that banks should be financed almost exclusively by the issuance of money-like liabilities.  They aren’t, so the paper doesn’t explain why banks issue debt that does not provide liquidity benefits instead of equity.  (Perhaps it could be argued that banks provide liquidity indirectly, e.g., by issuing corporate paper that is purchased by money market funds which provide money-like claims to investors.  But this still doesn’t explain the issuance of longer term debt.)

Third, this analysis relates primarily to commercial banks that issue deposits.  What about investment banks?  They are highly leveraged, and it’s not so clear that their liabilities offer the kinds of liquidity benefits that drive the results in the paper.  (Theories that argue that banks are too highly leveraged because of deposit insurance subsidies or access to central bank liquidity (at subsidized rates) don’t apply to investment banks either, because those didn’t have access to deposit insurance of central bank liquidity support.)

Fourth, the paper discusses systemic risk, but this discussion is a little glib.  Debt that provides valuable liquidity services under normal circumstances is fragile, and susceptible to runs.  When runs occur, money-like bank liabilities do not provide liquidity.  Presumably, this affects the liquidity premium, which means that it is unclear that banks issue too much debt.  But the paper can’t really address this question because the value of liquidity is specified exogenously.

All this said, the paper is still valuable because it makes an important point.  Existing theories of banks posit that banks are leveraged because debt addresses some sort of agency or information problem.  These are essentially supply-side factors. The D’Angelo-Stulz theory identifies a demand-side driver of bank leverage.

Bank leverage is a big issue now, with Basel III and Brown-Vitter.  Good policy regarding leverage (and hence, capital requirements) requires an understanding of its costs and benefits. Calling attention to the demand for bank liabilities, and the benefits they provide, is an important contribution to such an understanding.

The fecklessness of the Obama administration’s approach to Russia beggars description.  Suffice it to say that the more earnestly Kerry implores the Russians to facilitate some less messy (not neat, just less messy) transition in Syria, the more abusively Putin and Lavrov behave.  The Moscow “spy” fiasco is part of that.  So are many other things-which I’ll discuss in a bit.

Kerry and Obama should wear “kick [or something more vulgar] me, Vlad” pinned to their backsides.  Hell, maybe they already do.  That would be consistent with the evidence, because Putin and Lavrov are kicking hard, kicking fast, and kicking often.

Look.  The Russians are doubling down on supporting Assad.  They are deploying large pieces of their ramshackle navy to the eastern Med.  (Including tugboats!  There must be tugboats! And I mean plural!) There is one reason and one reason only to do this: to make it virtually impossible for the US to use naval assets to do anything in Syria, including enforcement of a no-fly zone, or more drastic measures.  It is a tripwire.  The extensiveness of the deployment, given Russian naval capabilities, is such that even the blind should see that the Russians are making a major commitment to Assad.

What’s worse, in addition to sending Syria advanced S-300 and Pantir AA missiles, the Russians are supplying Syria with advanced Yakhot supersonic anti-ship missiles.  The Yakhot is a capable system.  The US has been aware of it for some time and presumably has many countermeasures in place, but they do represent a substantial increase in Syria’s capability and will dramatically increase the difficulties of any carrier operations in the eastern Med.

The Pentagon went ballistic at the news. Even Hagel bestirred himself to criticize the move.

But that’s what gets us to what’s worst: the State Department response.  According to Foggy Bottom, there’s no problem because these are not “new sales”:

Jennifer Psaki, a State Department spokeswoman, said Russia had disclosed the sale of the Yakhont missiles in 2011, and she added that U.S. and Russian diplomats were still planning the Geneva conference next month.

FFS.  That’s exactly the Russian line.  Exactly.  Gee, Jennifer, great job you got there, being Sergei Lavrov’s parrot.

I am sure the Navy (and the Israeli Navy) is so pleased that they will only be targeted by previously contracted for weapons, not new sales.  And John “Reporting for Duty” Kerry isn’t the one who will be painted by the Yakhot’s terminal guidance system.  Maybe he should think about those who could be, rather than sucking up to Sergei.

And all this BS about “defensive weapons” is just that.  They provide Assad a shield behind which he can slaughter the opposition with substantially less fear of any intervention.

And insofar as the sanctity of contracts is concerned.  First, since when have contracts ever meant jack to the Russians?  Second, to give an example of how this can be done, just look at how the US stiffed Pakistan for years over F-16 sales.  Where there’s a will, there’s a way.  Russia isn’t delivering weapons because their compelled to: they’re delivering weapons because they want to.  (Uhm, and how would the Syrians enforce a breach, anyways?)

Meanwhile, Kerry and the Brits and the UN are nattering on about some meeting in Geneva between the contending forces in Syria.  Yeah, like meetings in Geneva ever accomplish squat where existential and brutal civil wars are involved.

The Russians are making it very clear they are doubling down on Assad, and will defend his regime to the last.  Their deeds speak volumes.

I’m not advocating or even supporting US action in Syria.  Obama frittered away that opportunity a long time ago.  When wars get to the eating the eating your enemy’s hearts stage (and this by the “moderates” no less), the situation is pretty much beyond salvage, even by Russian tugs.

But it’s best to recognize what Russia is up to here, and state that forthrightly.  Make it plain who is ultimately responsible for the horror that is occurring in Syria.  Chasing after Putin and Lavrov like some pitiful suitor, and regurgitating the Russian party line in a way that undercuts our own military’s serious concerns, is just nauseating.  It’s worse than that.  It’s craven.  Cosmically craven.  And Putin will note that, and act accordingly in other things that matter.

I’m sure you’ve read all about the bizarre “spy” scandal in which a US State Department employee attached to the embassy in Moscow was arrested for espionage and thrown out of the country.

Everything about the story is risible.  The wigs. The map.  The Boy Scout compass (I had one like that decades ago.  Maybe we don’t trust Glonass!) The cash: umm, wouldn’t wire transfers to offshore bank accounts be more reliable and safer?  The location: why meet in Moscow, and not overseas?  Most notably letter detailing fiendish American plot to bribe Soviet . . . I mean Russian intelligence officer.  Yeah, you’re going to spell all that out in plain text?  Heck, the Hardy Boys would have known to use invisible ink.  And code.

No, this was theater.  My guess is that the FSB compromised Mr. Fogle, the alleged spy in some way.  My initial guess was a honey trap, but it may well be something seedier, like cruising.

Under either of those scenarios,  the FSB would have had considerable control over the timing of the big announcement.  No doubt Fogle was under surveillance, and if he was doing something compromise-able, the Russians had the ability to choose when to compromise him.  They also had the ability to do it quietly, or in the way they did it: an over the top spy spoof, that was deliberately absurd.

By choosing to compromise him now, and in such an outlandish way, the Russians were sending a message: indeed, the outlandishness was part of the message.  Pushback over our criticism of their handling of Tsarnaev?: they made a big deal that the FSB agent Fogle was allegedly recruiting was an anti-terrorism specialist from the North Caucasus.  Something related to Syria, Kerry’s visit, etc.?: Trying to embarrass the US during a period of time the US is trying to pressure and cajole Russia into dumping Assad?  Dunno.

Whatever it is, the real story is hiding behind a wig.  Almost quite literally.  But I’m pretty damn sure Fogle or the CIA weren’t the ones who bought it.

This story is very bizarre, and I can’t figure out what is going on, exactly.  Or put differently, what has put a bee in the CFTC’s bonnet about CME Clearport’s Exchange of Futures for Swaps (EFS) facility after all these years.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has issued a “special call” asking Wall Street banks and other traders to provide documents that would prove recent derivatives transactions known as “exchanges of futures for swaps” were legal. Lawyers at the CFTC enforcement division are also scrutinising the trades for possible violations.

. . . .

The new inquiry centres on whether large traders and market-makers used unregulated over-the-counter swaps markets to trade what were in fact futures, strictly regulated contracts that are economically identical to swaps.

Trading futures off an exchange is illegal, and regulators are concerned that traders may have used these deals, known as EFSs, to agree prices that did not reflect the market.

“They’ve made information requests to everybody that’s ever traded an EFS. They’re saying, ‘prove to us that the swap was legitimate’,” said a recipient of a CFTC document request

The only thing that makes sense is that the CFTC believes that market participants engaged in EFS transactions without having a legally binding swap agreement in place first, meaning that the parties would have engaged in futures trades off-exchange.  Or something.

Note that even if the parties had entered a swap, it may have been in effect a very short period of time-just as long as it took to execute the deal and submit it to Clearport for clearing.

I also find it curious that the article mentions that the CFTC is looking only at deals done post-Frankendodd, even though deals have been done this way since the 2002 time frame, if memory serves.  One explanation is that CFTC believes the alleged conduct was permissible under CFMA, but not under DFA.  Another guess on my part.

If there is a violation here, it seems to be a highly technical one.  The end result is pretty much the same if they did or they didn’t execute a binding swap first: each party has futures positions obtained at a privately negotiated price.

CFTC has a lot on its plate already: is this really a priority? Really?

Moreover, the party that usually screams the loudest about off-exchange trading of futures is the futures exchange.  But Clearport is a CME system, and EFS is a CME procedure, and it seems that CME is totally fine with this.  Actually, if the following quote relates to the EFS issue (and it’s not clear that that’s the case from the article), CME is actually hacked at this:

Terry Duffy, CME executive chairman, said in a letter to CFTC last week: “In our view, nothing is served by piling on duplicative reporting mandates.”

For certain, though, CME was perfectly satisfied with the way market participants were doing EFS deals.

So who is the victim here?

It’s actually ironic that EFS was the CME’s way of implementing clearing for energy and metals.  And the CFTC is rah-rah about clearing.  But it is looking askance at the CME’s way of implementing clearing.  I guess it’s a case of that was then, this is now.

CFTC also effectively killed EFS as a mechanism for facilitating OTC clearing by determining that a swap, no longer how short its existence before conversion into futures, counted towards a firm’s annual $8 billion (to be reduced to $3 billion) de minimus swap volume for the purpose of determining whether it is a swap dealer.  As a result, market participants are moving to block futures trades rather than EFS to clear energy transactions: block futures trades that are negotiated away from the central market, just as the allegedly phantom swaps were. So this is last year’s war.  If traders weren’t doing papering officially a swap deal, they were effectively engaging in block futures trades, which is what they are doing now.  If it’s OK now, other than the technical violation, was it so horrible then that it requires a full blown investigation?

So what’s up?  A burdensome, intrusive “Special Call” to investigate a possible technical violation that the exchange that would be hurt by a violation doesn’t seem to care about, and which is of little relevance going forward.

Wow.  That seems like a totally reasonable use of scare resources-resources Gensler claims he doesn’t have nearly enough of.

Javier Blas of the FT just posted an article about a report “written by a leading academic on commodity markets” on whether commodity trading firms (like Cargill or Vitol) are sources of systemic risk.

What, haven’t heard about that report?  Well, that’s the main point of the story.  The report was spiked by the GFMA, a banking trade association, which commissioned it.  According to Javier:

However, the report was never completed and remained in a “draft” status, after its conclusions went against the interest of the lobby group, three people familiar with the matter said.

So yes, perhaps you’ve guessed by now that the academic in question is me (though you have to read 2/3s of the way through the story to get to my name).  And yes, that’s pretty much what I understood to have happened, though I was never told that in so many words.  It’s nice to have it confirmed by “three people familiar with the matter”, even though it was blindingly obvious to me at the time. *

I call them like I see them.  GFMA didn’t like that.  I wouldn’t change the call, so they sat on the report.  So it goes.

I think GFMA handled this badly even from the perspective of its own interests, though I guess I am not really surprised: this is the way organizations like this tend to behave.  I am sure this has given the report more visibility than it ever would have achieved otherwise, and makes GFMA look bad in the bargain, at least in my (probably biased) opinion.  The regulatory body they were trying to influence-the FSB-was briefed on the findings, and had a draft of the report, so deep-sixing the report only signaled to the FSB that GFMA didn’t like the results, which it probably knew anyways.  Spiking the report also serves to validate the independence of the findings-and of the finder of the findings.  That’s definitely an upside for me.

Working on the report helped me learn a good deal more about the global commodity trading firms, so that’s also a good thing.  I look forward to learning and writing more in the future.

*For the record, the copy of the report “seen by the Financial Times” didn’t come from me.

Electric vehicle manufacturer Tesla’s stock rocketed up last week after the company reported positive earnings and operating cash flow for the first quarter.  The stock had been heavily shorted, and short covering evidently fueled the stock’s take off.

Color me skeptical.  The company was heavily shorted for good reason, and is even more ripe for shorting after the run-up.  (Personal opinion.  Not investment advice.  You’re on your own about that.)

For one thing, although operating results did improve from the (really terrible 3/4Q12), the much hyped earnings number was put into positive territory by two items: a write down of a warrant that Tesla granted the Department of Energy as part of a $465 million DOE loan to the company, and FX gains (mainly on yen).  Not repeatable.  And the first seems highly dodgy to me-a squishy number based on an assumption that Tesla will be able to pay off the loan.

I’m also skeptical because of the near miraculous nature of the turnaround. Mere months ago, the company was in dire straits:

It’s a lucky thing for Tesla Motors shareholders that the U.S. Department of Energy loves the company’s loan applications.

Without the hundreds of millions of dollars Tesla (US:TSLA) has received from the federal government this year, the electric-car maker’s financials would be gasping for air as 2012 winds down.

Given the ugly state of Tesla’s finances — and the company’s sky-high valuation: almost $4 billion — it will rank among the top candidates in Silicon Valley for a 2013 stock collapse, unless it receives significantly more cash next year.

I get a whiff of a company that needed a miracle to stave off disaster.  Maybe it got one, but I am always skeptical of miracles whenever accounting is involved.  And that’s certainly the case here.

The shorts have been bloodied, but they’ll be back.  Indeed, this seems like a typical battle in a war between a dodgy company and short sellers.

But I am most skeptical because of Tesla’s not-really-founder-but-biggest-investor, Elon Musk.

Mr. Musk is Occupy’s favorite crony capitalist.  And Occupy is one of Mr. Musk’s favorite movements.

Yes, once upon a time Musk started a real business, Paypal, that proved very successful without any government help.  That was then, this is now.

Musk has three ventures: Tesla, SpaceX, and SolarCity.  All are heavily dependent on government largesse.

Take Tesla for starters. It received the $465 mm loan from DOE, but it also benefits from a $7500/car federal subsidy for electric cars.  Moreover, it benefits from the State of California’s Zero Emissions Credit program.  In its infinite wisdom, CA mandated that all the major auto companies sell a certain number of zero emissions vehicles.  If they don’t they have to buy credits from companies that do make them-namely, Tesla.  This was also essential in putting the  company in the black in Q1, and the company is sitting on $250 mm worth of these credits.

IOW, Tesla’s profits are courtesy of you, the taxpayer-and also courtesy of the shareholders of Ford, GM, Toyota, Honda, etc.

Next consider SpaceX.  This venture provides evidence of Musk’s love for Occupy: he has promised that this private space venture will go to Mars, and wears an Occupy Mars shirt to make the point.

It is also touted as a privately capitalized space venture, which it is, I guess, but it is also almost completely dependent on government contracts.  The private money is attracted by the scent of public money.   Sorry, but a company that is dependent on NASA’s IV for support is not truly a private company: the company is basically a cutout between the investors and the taxpayers.

The company has not exactly covered itself in glory.  It had serious trouble with its initial launches, including an embarrassing episode in which the ashes of Star Trek’s Scotty, James Doohan, were on a SpaceX craft that didn’t make it into space: it crashed instead somewhere in the South Pacific.  Which I guess would have been great if James Doohan had starred in South Pacific.  Don’t worry, though.  As a precaution, some of Mr. Doohan’s ashes were retained, and that part of the beloved actor’s remains did make it into space as he desired.

And speaking of Broadway and movie classics, Musk is auditioning for a role in a summer stock Music Man with his boosterism of SpaceX:

You don’t have to be a believer in conspiracy theories to wonder why senior government officials are so committed to going the commercial route in space. Even a cursory review of SpaceX programs and plans reveals reasons for doubt. The questions begin with a business strategy that isn’t just disruptive, but downright incredible. Mr. Musk says that he can offer launch prices far below those quoted by any traditional provider — including the Chinese — by running a lean, vertically integrated enterprise with minimal government oversight that achieves sizable economies of scale. The economies of scale are possible, he contends, because there is huge pent-up demand for space travel in the marketplace that cannot be met within the prevailing pricing structure. By dropping prices substantially, this latent demand can then be unlocked, greatly increasing the rate of rocket production and launches. When combined with other features of the SpaceX business model, the increased pace of production and launches results in revolutionary price reductions.

There isn’t much serious research to demonstrate that the pent-up demand Musk postulates really exists, nor that the price reductions he foresees are feasible. He has suggested in some interviews that launch costs could decline to a small fraction of current levels if all the assumptions in his business plan come true, and he has posted a commentary on his web-site explaining how SpaceX is already able to offer the lowest prices in the business. It’s hard to look inside the operations of a private company, but SpaceX does seem to be doing all the things necessary to minimize costs such as using proven technology, building as many items as possible in-house, and hiring a young workforce willing to work long hours. And to his credit, Musk has committed over $100 million of his own money to the venture. However, his rockets have major performance limitations compared with other launch vehicles in the market, and they are not yet rated as safe for carrying people. Becoming “man-rated” will necessarily increase the role of federal officials in monitoring SpaceX operations, which is not good news for a business model grounded in minimal government oversight (traditional launch providers say government regulations and overhead charges are a key driver in their own pricing policies).

Downright incredible sounds about right.  It sounds like a con to me.  Especially the whole “economy of scale” thing.  That’s the kind of thing defense contractors say to get the government to buy more units of a plane or ship.  It’s not good economics.

And Musk’s winning personality was on display when questioned about SpaceX’s launch failures:

Mr. Musk recently responded to a question from Space News reporter Amy Svitak about the two-year delay in accomplishing that second Falcon 9 launch by observing, “In the space business that’s on time.” Perhaps he was irritated by the reporter’s implied criticism, but it goes without saying that if astronauts on board the space station are awaiting supplies, a prolonged launch delay could spell big trouble.

What a guy.  Takes your money, and then gets peevish when you accuse him he’s blowing it.

Then there is SolarCity, an installer of solar panels.  The solar industry has raked in $4.1 billion of stimulus money, and the government thinks that SolarCity in particular has played fast and loose with the numbers to  get more than it should:

Last July, federal investigators subpoenaed SolarCity Corp., SCTY +9.10% the largest installer of residential solar panels, as part of a probe into whether solar-power companies received excessive government grants.

. . . .

Even before the Treasury Department’s inquiry into grant applications filed by SolarCity and other installers, House Republicans had questioned the program’s effectiveness in creating jobs. Congress declined to renew the grant program at the end of 2011, and only projects that were being planned by that date can receive grants today.

The government is looking into whether SolarCity and other firms misrepresented the fair-market value of solar systems in order to boost the value of the grants they received. In its suit, SolarCity says two of the company’s subsidiaries received smaller-than-expected grants. The company doesn’t say exactly how much funding it applied for originally, but it says the final grants issued by the Treasury Department were $8 million less than was proper under the law.

But SolarCity is doubling down on the chutzpah, and suing the government, claiming the government has paid it too little!:

Now, SolarCity is pushing back with a lawsuit that alleges the opposite: some of the taxpayer-funded grants it received weren’t as big as originally promised.

The suit, filed quietly in February in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, comes as SolarCity and other industry players are defending solar-friendly government policies, and it could undermine the industry’s message that solar power will soon be viable without government help.

Solar businesses have cratered around the world: China, Spain, Germany.  The industry is addicted to government support.

Elon Musk has a plan to get rich.  It involves you.  The taxpayer.  You pay taxes.  The government gives huge dollops of that money to Elon.  Elon gets rich.  Who could possibly object? Who could deny Elon’s genius?

He certainly thinks he’s a genius.  He has no hesitations in telling people so.

And there is a kind of perverse genius here.  In the Age of Obama he has found the key to riches.  Get in good with the government-by, you know, sponsoring an inaugural ball.  And then let the government give you the goodies.  Then sue the government if they don’t give you enough goodies.

And then preen before the world, touting your genius-and your environmental credentials. (Pay no attention to that private jet behind the curtain!) (Musk quit the Zuckerberg-created immigration lobbying effort FWD.us because it bought ads supporting politicians who support immigration changes but also had the temerity to support the Keystone pipeline.)

What a repulsive man.

Repulsive, yes, but sadly, Elon Musk is a Man For Our Age, in more ways than one.

I’m in Istanbul for a conference on CCPs.  I’ll post when I have time.  In the meantime, for your listening pleasure, They Might Be Giants:

There are reports that the CFTC will vote on the SEF rule next week.  The rule had been in limbo for months due to Gensler’s insistence that the rule require those requesting a quote solicit them from five potential counterparties.  Gensler has apparently relented because he could not get the new Democratic commissioner, Mark Wetjen, to join with Chilton and Gensler to vote out the 5 RFQ rule.

The compromise will require users to solicit two quotes for the next two years, and then three thereafter.

Whatever.

On the 1 year anniversary of the DFA, I named the SEF mandate as The Worst of Frankendodd. I haven’t changed my mind on that, though the competition is fierce.  And the RFQ requirement is the Worst of the Worst.  It is defended as a way of  improving competition.

This is at best paternalistic.  It presumes that those who want to enter into swaps don’t know their own interests.  Perhaps Gensler thinks that the buy side suffers from some sort of Stockholm Syndrome after years of captivity to the dealer banks.

In reality, buy side firms-most of whom are extremely experienced and sophisticated-are making trade-offs between competition and information leakage.  They are trying to minimize cost of execution, and have the information and incentive to do that.  Note too that they are required to do this for every trade, regardless of instrument, size, and other factors that may influence the trade-off.  But nope, one size fits all. They should be allowed to make that trade-off themselves, without any guidance from Gary.

RFQ5?  How about RFQ0?

Here’s an analogy.  How would you like it if the government told you how many stores you had to visit before making a purchase?  You know, to make sure that you get the best price.  Call it the CS5 rule.  You have to comparison shop at five stores before making a purchase.  On everything.   Of course, when deciding on whether to shop at one store or five, you trade-off the potential savings (which will depend on the value of the purchase, the good you are shopping for, and other factors) from shopping around more, against the cost (which will vary with the value of your time, how hurried you are, your income, the price of gas, where you live, etc.)  But none of that matters under the CS5 rule.  Want to buy a quart of milk?  Shop at five stores.  For your own good.

Yeah.  It’s that bad.  CS2 would be bad, but not that bad.

Once the SEF rule goes into effect it will be interesting to see how the structure of the industry involves.  There will be a land rush of new SEFs.  I predict there will be a shakeout, and there may well be only a single dominant SEF for each major instrument.  The SEF rule does not, as I understand it, require a SEF to send an order to another SEF offering a better quote.  Which means that the network effects of liquidity will tend to cause trading activity to “tip” to a single SEF for products big enough to support order book trading.

But the whole SEF landscape will also be shaped by the margin rules, the Bloomberg suit over those rules, block trading rules, and on and on.  The rule is not the beginning of the end, it is barely the end of the beginning.

The Obama administration is planning on easing repayment terms for student loans:

The White House proposes that the government forgive billions of dollars in student debt over the next decade, a plan that cheers student advocates, but critics say it would expand a program that already encourages students to borrow too much and stick taxpayers with the bill.

The proposal, included in President Barack Obama’s budget for next year, would increase the number of borrowers eligible for a program known casually as income-based repayment, which aims to help low-income workers stay current on federal student debt.

Borrowers in the program make monthly payments equivalent to 10% of their income after taxes and basic living expenses, regardless of how much they owe. After 20 years of on-time payments—10 years for those who work in public or nonprofit jobs—the balance is forgiven.

This is a statement against interest, and the proposal is hardly surprising, considering the source but I must say: This is a horrible idea.

We are constantly lectured how higher education is an “investment.”  Sometimes it is.  That investment has a rate of return.  What’s important that capital-financial, human, the opportunity cost of student time-earn a return that covers the opportunity cost of capital.  We want individuals whose ROR exceeds the relevant interest rate to make the investment, and those whose ROR doesn’t not to make it.  This isn’t rocket science.

Tying repayments to income totally undermines those incentives.  Hey, go get a low earning degree, one that has a poor rate of return-and likely, a negative rate of return-and you will make lower payments!  What could go wrong?

This reduces the cost of pursuing low-return majors, so we will have more graduates with psych or anthro degrees who will work in retail and fast food and other low-wage occupations.   That is horrible.  The exact opposite of what we want.

Try doing this at your local bank, by the way.  Not too many I know of advertise their wonderful Loser Loan Programs: “The worse your financial performance, the lower your payment!”

Yes, I know the idea is to provide insurance against income losses due to illness, or job loss, etc., but that insurance will be rife with moral hazard.

Another example of the problems when the government intervenes in the capital allocation process.  That worked out so well in the housing market, didn’t it?  This will work out no better.  It will raise expectations and saddle people with heavy burdens, thereby contributing to disillusionment and anger.

It is also highly cynical and manipulative.  Those most likely to get hurt are those who are least able to evaluate the costs and benefits of getting a college education.  Moreover, Obama administration policy is already screwing the young in ways that could teach the Kama Sutra some things, and this will add to that, all in the name of helping those who get screwed.

It is perhaps another example of what Raghuram Rajan identified as a feature of US polices ostensibly intended to reduce inequality.  He specifically focuses on subsidizing homeownership, but this is exactly the same thing that goes on with student loans.

Education can be a great thing, if you make wise choices.  One thing I’ve been on about for years is that learning programming is an important skill.  You don’t have to be a programmer, but you should know some programming.  It is a functional skill, and also helps you learn to think logically and precisely.  So I agree with this WSJ piece.

Unfortunately, easing student loan terms along the lines proposed by the administration will not provide incentives to do that.  It will provide incentives to do the opposite, and hurt most those it is intended to help.  Like the title says, run when the government-and especially this administration-says they’re doing something to help you.